TELOS

Number 45 Fall 1980

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Special Issue In Honor Of
LEO LOWENTHAL
On The Occasion Of His 80th Birthday

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a quarterly journal of radical thought

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A frequent contributor to *Telos*, *Ferenc Feher* teaches comparative literature at the Australian National University in Melbourne. His article on Eastern Europe is part of a larger work on the same subject due to appear sometime next year. A *Telos* editor, *Russell Jacoby* is now studying the works of Otto Fenichel in Los Angeles. This article is part of a major work on Western Marxism to be published next year. *Victor Zaslavsky*, on sabbatical in Rome, is a professor of sociology at Memorial University in Newfoundland. *Martin Jay* is a history professor at the University of California at Berkeley. *Helmut Dubiel* teaches sociology at the University of Munich, *Leo Lowenthal* is professor emeritus of socioloty at Berkeley, and *Jürgen Habermas* is the director of the Max-Planck Institut für Sozialwissenschaften in Starnberg, Germany. A *Telos* editor, *David Gross* teaches history at the University of Colorado in Boulder. *W. Martin Lüdke* teaches German at the University of Frankfurt in Germany. *Robert Sayre* is doing research in Paris. *Agnes Heller* is a professor of philosophy at La Trobe University in Melbourne, Australia. *Nicos Mouzelis* teaches sociology at the London School of Economics. *Lynne Layton* is an English instructor at Northeastern University in Boston. *Mary Papke* teaches English at Central Illinois University in Normal, Ill. *Ivan Szelenyi* will be a professor of sociology at the University of Wisconsin in Madison next year. *Russell Berman* teaches German at Stanford University in California. *Charles Levin* teaches English at McGill University in Montreal. *Carl Boggs* teaches sociology at the University of California at Los Angeles. *Larry Vaughan* studies in Berkeley. *Eileen Manion* does the same in Montreal. *Henry A. Giroux* teaches education at Boston University.

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INTRODUCTION

Dedicated to Leo Lowenthal on his 80th birthday, this issue pays tribute to a very influential, even if lesser known, member of the Frankfurt School's inner circle. The series of essays carefully assembled and edited by Martin Jay — with the help of Barton Byg, Susanne Hoppmann-Lowenthal, Catherine Gallagher, and David J. Parent — not only covers the trajectory of Lowenthal's intellectual career, but attempts to situate him within the context of contemporary sociology of literature by relating his work to that of Goldmann, Barthes, Adorno, etc. The geographical distribution of the various contributors, ranging from France and Germany all the way to Australia, attests to Lowenthal's lasting impact on a field still somewhat underdeveloped.

Recent developments in Poland have clearly shown that Eastern Europe is far from being a stable area and, very likely, will fill the front pages of newspapers in the coming years. Written well before the last wave of strikes, Feher's article prophetically outlines the general configuration of the confrontation, its limits and its possibilities. Although the author has allegedly written an epilogue to this piece to take into account the latest developments, it may presently be collecting dust somewhere between Melbourne, Australia and St. Louis, Missouri. If and when the U.S. or the Australian Postal System locates it, we will publish it as a separate note. Otherwise, the author will have to be talked into rewriting something along these lines.

If an apple a day keeps the doctor away, maybe a critique of conformist Marxism per issue will contribute to the retention of some minimal political sanity on the left. Thus Jacoby applies what could be appropriately called "conceptual janitorial practice" to the "scientific" ballast cranked out by French Marxists (and their pathetic English epigones) to expose the pedantry and irrelevance of much of their pompous "theoretical practice." Where Althusserians take Marxism to be a walnut, it has turned out to be more like an apple and, rather than keep chewing the rotten "scientific" kernel, it may be necessary to salvage the prematurely discarded Hegelian shell.

Most literature dealing with the USSR either depicts that country as a monolithic Leviathan flawlessly marching towards world domination, or as a conflict-ridden society on the verge of internal collapse. Both assessments have some elements of truth. In his carefully documented article on ethnic relations in the USSR, Zaslavsky points out both how ethnic conflicts have potentially explosive implications as well as how these conflicts are constantly integrated to legitimate the irrationality of the whole. While on the one hand ethnic issues are a constant source of trouble in the USSR, the regime's counter-measures may well contain and instrumentalize them in a context where stability must be constantly renegotiated.

In the notes section Mouzelis criticizes various reductionist tendencies within Marxism, and Layton and Papke discuss the possibilities for a non-sexist society in relation to a recent conference on the subject. Given both accounts, however, one wonders what is there left of Marxism after the reductionistic features are removed, or whether there are, indeed, any possibilities for a non-sexist society in light of the proceedings of the conference under discussion. Both accounts provide pessimistic evaluations.

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Consistent with our practice of running reviews dealing with books on everything under the sun, in this issue Szelenyi examines Gouldner's work on intellectuals and locates both stimulating as well as "flawed" features in it; Berman looks at Jameson's work on fascist literature in relation to recent debates; Levin discusses Baudrillard's book on seduction; Boggs writes about one of the two almost identical collections of Rosa Luxemburg's letters (as if even one was necessary); Vaughan shares his enthusiasm for Jaszi's philosophy which, like a good wine, gets better with age; Manion outlines some of the leading positions of French feminists — probably the world's most advanced ideas on the subject; and Giroux chastises Entwistle for not doing justice to Gramsci's views on education.

Paul Piccone

BOOKS FROM TELOS PRESS

ESSAYS ON METHOD IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF LITERATURE by Lucien Goldmann

Translated and Edited by William Q. Boelhower

A series of previously untranslated key essays by Goldmann dealing with methodology in the sociology of literature. Through the use of these essays, Boelhower provides an analysis of Goldmann's heuristic categories of the sociology of literature. Boelhower's lengthy introduction sets these categories against more recent work in the sociology of literature.

Cloth: $14.00. Paper: $4.50

FOR SOCIALISM *by Gustav Landauer*

INTRODUCTION by Tim Luke and Russell Berman

From his protest against Bebel's exclusion of the anarchists from the Second International in 1893 until his murder in 1919 by the reactionary troops' suppression of the Bavarian revolution, Landauer remained a tireless critic of all forms of bureaucratism and an advocate of a decentralized, libertarian socialism. A friend of Buber, Landauer had a great influence on the anarcho-socialist trends of the early Zionist movement and the development of the *Kibbutz*.

Translated by David J. Parent Cloth: $12.00. Paper: $3.00

Pannekoek and the Workers' Councils

Edited by Serge Bricianer

Introduction by John Gerber. This collection of writings by Pannekoek presents for the first time in English many of his works, which, with their libertarian vision of socialism, have been routinely ignored in the official histories of European social democracy. Widely regarded as one of the most important founders of council communism, Pannekoek's work has only recently begun to receive the attention it deserves.

Cloth: $14.50. Paper: $4.00

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EASTERN EUROPE IN THE EIGHTIES

by Ferenc Feher

In relevant, i.e., confidential and "un-self-censored" conversation between critical-minded and clear-sighted East Europeans, the crucial question that frequently arises is: "what will come 'afterwards'?" or, rather: "what *should* come 'afterwards'?" Interest in current political rumors ("Who said what on the last session of the Central Committee?") is, of course, still vivid but even moderate hopes for short-term and substantial changes are definitely waning. The new feature is *the regime's total loss of credit.* Obviously that does not refer to national oppression by overwhelming Soviet military might, nor to the "lack of freedom" in general terms, nor to the lower standards of living (even when compared to leading Western countries that have now been in crisis for a decade). These are all truisms for the "man in the street" in Eastern Europe. To understand what is really meant by "the total loss of credit," it is necessary to discuss changes in this region during the 1970s.

The first thing to mention is the nearly total disillusionment with "reforms from above." In 1953 Stalin died only physiologically. His political agony took place during the "secret session" of the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party and on the streets of Budapest in 1956. Similarly, Krushchevism, at least in the form of hopes of "reforms from above" and vague perspectives, did not disappear immediately after the coup against the first secretary in October 1964 but only in 1968, with the invasion of Khrushchevist Czechoslovakia. It is the dubious distinction of the present Leninist opposition (Bahro and Medvedev) that it courageously keeps "squaring the circle" by upholding Khrushchevism ideologically and with a wholly obsolete vocabulary. "Oppositional Leninists" are not only conservative but also superfluous: the much-quoted man in the street learned the lesson without their aid. Even when they were driven to despair by police salvos, in 1970 the Polish workers knew when to stop before the Soviet invasion came. Workers learned from the consequences of Czechoslovakia in 1968. They knew that they can strike back, but they cannot reform an inflexible and irreformable regime. I do not mean to advocate "social inertia": my whole argument aims at *pragmatic* and *limited*, but actual, changes. I only wish to speak against those high-soaring dialectical dreams (which I shared in the 60s) according to which one can change everything while everything remains, at least politically, unchanged.

Secondly, the 70s were the decade in which, strange as it may sound, the opposition became a structural feature of East European social life. Of course, its strength varied from country to country. It is oppressed everywhere

*Although this analysis has been proven prophetic by subsequent developments, the article was written well before the recent Polish events.

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and its *guiding* role in social conflicts is insignificant. But since such is the predicament of every opposition in every non-genocidal (non-Hitlerist, non-Stalinist) tyranny, this does not diminish its importance. For those acquainted with Leninism, there is no need to explicitly state how scandalous the very existence of any overt opposition is. Further, in moments of heavy social convulsions such as the Polish workers' riots in 1970 and 1975 this opposition sometimes extends beyond intellectual circles which are the hotbed of "free thinking," and thus gives added weight to its mere existence. Finally, with its sporadic and persecuted counter-press, the *samizdat*, always confiscated and destroyed but always resurrecting, it became the embryonic form of a *new public sphere*.

A third feature of the 70s was the final collapse of official ideology. Those who called Lukacs, Kolakowski during his Marxist period, Kosik, the *Praxis* group, "indirect apologists" for the regime, were correct at least to the extent that the type of Marxism which retained any cultural reputation existed only through them, in opposition to the long-since dead official version. The novelty of the 70s was the following: at the top, this atmosphere produced a new type of pragmatism, compared to which the much-reprimanded Khrushchev and his consumerist "goulash" communism were highly doctrinaire. Today, the first secretary's advisers are *technocrats* and *security experts* — electronic gadgeteers rather than Grand Inquisitors. *Professional ideologues,* especially if they take the pseudo-theoretical aspects of their duties seriously, are troublesome, if not altogether dangerous, types. The reason for this is clear. Maoism made the "ideological fanatic" suspect. Their passion can lead to "Chinese escapades," and can throw doctrinaire obstacles in the way of the unprincipled compromises by means of which all post-Stalinist governments operate. Djilas was right: East European leaders no longer give a damn for what they publicly call the "purity of our ideas." In the face of a sometimes overt opposition, the complicated rigmarole of disciplinary measures for deviations from the Holy Gospel has a blunted edge. If such measures are still used, they are only fronts for intricate political games under the surface, such as in the case of the Hungarian ideological purges in 1972-73. On the other hand, within the depth of social life, there is an increasing parricidal passion to "kill Marx" — the once religiously respected forebear whose original sin allegedly caused all the problems. This morbid passion turns into an often undisguised anti-Enlightenment vision and complements the local ruling strata's hostility to any genuine culture. Thus, it indefinitely buries Eastern Europe as an ideologically influential area.

The fourth feature is the emergence of a new phenomenon: a limited and Soviet-dependent state nationalism which, in some countries such as Rumania, already emerged in the late 1960s and whose social function is to replace earlier versions of "national communism." National communism looked up to Tito, and its objective was to regain genuine, even if "Finlandized," national sovereignty. Its last representative was Dubcek, whose political fate dissipated any lingering illusions concerning its possibilities. Limited and

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Soviet-dependent state nationalism ranges from a cynical and programmed pseudo-centrifugalism by satellite governments (e.g., in economic relations between East Germany and the Soviet Union) to a precarious balance between unfriendly and spectacularly disobedient gestures on the one hand and subsequent "remaining within limits" on the other (e.g., recent relations between Romania and the Soviet Union). Whatever its particular character, limited and Soviet-dependent state nationalism has no illusions regarding the possibilities of genuine sovereignty in an age of Soviet expansionism. Yet, it is an annoyance for the Soviet government, which, consequently, tries to nip such attempts in the bud (as it did with Moczarism in Poland in the late 1960s, which was too close to a Polish version of Ceasescu's regime).[1]

Various limited and Soviet-dependent state nationalisms also differ in their social functions. Some build nationalist images in order to continue semi-Stalinist practices in the post-20th Congress period (this was the starting point of Romanian separatism under Gheorghiu-Dej). Such intransigence, however, exposes them to dangers "from below": Stalinist or semi-Stalinist governments rarely like to be left alone with their own population. Therefore, an opening towards nationalist groups was and is aimed at widening the regime's power base.[2] Other similar tendencies, such as Moczarism, are narrower in scope. In the case of Moczarism, its social function was, through the mass rehabilitation of the *Armija Krajowa* (the non-communist insurgent army whose members were persecuted in the 50s and just tolerated afterwards) and other measures, to mobilize nationalist masses against rebellious intellectuals and university students with a basically chauvinistic and anti-semitic 'Black Hundred' ideology. Whatever their objectives, none of them seeks any longer to introduce political reforms in the way 'national communists' did. The hallmark of limited state nationalism is to build essentially phony national images such as that of a non-existent Great Romania based on Dacian cultural origins, or of an "East-German" nation and culture. Even Kadar, whose regime is the only conservative-*liberal* and not "state-nationalist," has lately introduced categories like "Hungariandom" whose bulk is 30 percent larger than the number of Hungarians living in the Hungarian People's Republic. The allusion was made mostly to Hungarians living in Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Russia as national minority groups who for consecutive Hungarian governments for 30 years have never been Hungarians, but citizens of the respective countries in which they resided. Partly, the message was broadcast to masses of emigrants who are still ready to maintain relations with the old country. This is, of course, considerably less than seeking national independence but more (and therefore more dangerous) than mere window-dressing. This "nation-building" which

1. General Moczar, a once famous underground fighter — a strange mixture of a nationalist and a hard-line pro-Soviet Stalinist — led an influential faction of the Polish Central Committe, which was politically annihilated by the Gierek leadership.

2. The most intransigent and brutal of these systems, Albania, went beyond the limits of Soviet dependent state nationalism, left the Warsaw Pact — which always constitutes the line of demarcation — and thus falls into a different category not to be analyzed here.

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includes, among other things, hysterical waves of sports chauvinism, is part and parcel of typical efforts of any ruling strata in permanent crisis frantically trying to channel social dissatisfaction into nationalist fervor.[3]

Another complementary feature of "limited state nationalism" is *permanent economic conflict* between individual countries and, occasionally, between all of them and the USSR. The main issues on this invariably stormy agenda are the usually unjust mutual clearing system within the Comecon (whose "rectification" is an unending problem), the tolerated extent of being partially integrated into the Western economic system which decides the industrial financing strategies of all East European countries, the prices of Soviet raw materials (the USSR being the major raw material exporter to practically all its satellites), the necessary contribution of each country to the Warsaw military budget (regarding which all presently display great and understandable reluctance), and the like. All this points towards a kind of conservative "imperial reconciliation" between the ruling strata of the Soviet Empire. This would not be altogether new in Eastern Europe. That, in fact, was the solution by which the Hapsburg monarchy postponed its collapse for half a century after its defeat by Prussia. But even if this is correct, this is the very first step of a development which will narrow operating room for small nations even more than did reconciliation in the Hapsburg monarchy. Unlike the Austrian Empire, the Soviet one has a very strong national center — historical Russia — with a population equivalent either to all East European countries or to that of other nations within Soviet borders. This makes it less vulnerable and more arrogant. Furthermore, it is not a traditionally conservative-autocratic system but rather a totalitarian one for which the prerogative over military, foreign and financial affairs, centralized in the imperial capital but to some extent shared with "partner nations" (as was arranged in the Hapsburg monarchy) will not suffice. Soviet leaders retain control over "international security" and the secret police.[4] Also, they will at least keep interfering with the planning of particular economic strategies — although here they are gradually losing ground.

These negative features clarify the nature of the single major (and novel) development of the 70s: the regime's total loss of credit (which is not to say it is close to collapsing). But there were also many positive features in the 70s that must be taken into account when evaluating Eastern Europe's predicament in the 80s. First of all, this was the decade of Soviet expansion beyond the Yalta-Potsdam line or beyond Stalin's conquests. The new conquests are not significant in terms of geographical dimensions, population or natural resources. They are mostly *African* satellites.[5] There are a few Arab satel-

3. In his autobiography, Ernst Fischer relates how German communists, led by Ulbricht, jubilantly cried in 1940, in the Hotel Lux (the Comintern hotel): "We have captured Paris!" Eastern Europe is not far from the time when such gestures will become officially accepted elements of "socialist patriotism."

4. No major appointments could be made in this field without Soviet blessings: KGB advisors directly control local activities.

5. They are mostly remnants of the collapsed Portugese colonial empire, plus Ethiopia and, until the conflict with Ethiopia in which the Soviets sided with the Menghistu-regime, Somalia. Independently of this development, Brazzaville Congo should be included in this region.

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lites (first of all South Yemen) which guarantee the easy access to this vital area for the growing Soviet fleet, and some highly unreliable close allies (such as Syria, Lybia and the Palestinian movement). There is growing Soviet influence in the vacuum created by the American defeat in Indo-China but, given the Vietnamese party apparatus' efforts to turn the whole area into *their own* satellite, this is rather a shaky and temporary influence: the Soviet presence is only one power factor among many.

On the whole, the following can be said: until the 70s, both East and West regarded the 1945-1947 situation as "ultimate and unchangeable" (in spite of attempts to expand on the part of the Eastern bloc, e.g., Korea, or NATO's "rollback" propaganda). Lately Soviet leaders seem to feel that they can get away with expansion, and this understandably whets their appetite. Whereas during the Suez crisis of 1956, they had the courage to send an ultimatum to France and Great Britain only when they realized that the United States would not support the latter, and they backed out quickly from the Cuban crisis, Admiral Zumwalt has testified that, in 1973, when Sadat was clearly losing and the Egyptian invasion army was on the brink of destruction, they sent an ultimatum to the United States and actually undermined an Israeli victory.

Secondly, the weakening of the West is equally beyond doubt. This started with Vietnam which, apart from the deep psychological defeatism it generated, became at least one crucial factor among many in the present crisis of capitalism. Through its enormous military expenditures, the Vietnam war upset the equilibrium of the American financial system on which the whole Western financial and credit system had rested since the political-economic settlement of WWII. As Kissinger has correctly pointed out, a second factor is the ongoing crisis of the executive arm of the American system: the presidency. Since 1960 no American president has fully served his elected time because of being murdered or driven out of office, or was an unelected bearer of this all-important post (as with Ford), or so clearly failed that he did not even run for a second time (Johnson) — a nearly obligatory policy, according to a very long tradition. Needless to say, this circumstance paralyzed Western decisions and was an important factor in the South Vietnamese collapse.

Thirdly, as a result of the above, as well as other reasons, NATO has undergone a growing crisis. Finally, Western capitalism has run into a new adversary in Moslem fundamentalism which, because of its natural resources, has a certain unprecedented hold over industrial countries. In terms of the problem under discussion, all of this means that *the West has no East European policy* — something the Hungarians have known at least since 1956.

The only time when this could have had any military meaning was when the West had a nuclear monopoly (up to 1949-1950). At that time, the only beneficiary was Yugoslavia which survived Stalin's official and public anathema partly because of Soviet fears of Western nuclear retaliation.

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Ironically, the "roll-back" policy was advertised at a time when the means necessary for it were already waning. This has been shown by the Korean "no-win-war." Hungary in 1956 is a classic case study. Radio Free Europe, sponsored by the American Congress and undoubtedly under CIA management — thus expressing an official or semi-official American position — pushed ever further the revolt's objectives to the point of driving Imre Nagy and all leftists out of office while promising, even if in vague terms, some Western aid. Everyone knows that this was just a cynical game and nothing happened. But the fate of the Helsinki agreement and the failed boycott of the Moscow Olympics clearly show how even that much concerted effort cannot be expected from Western governments concerned with avoiding a resuscitation of the Cold War. At any rate, this would not really help those who actually fight for freedom; it is instructive, at least, in the sense that freedom can only be regained by the fighters' own efforts.

Thirdly, the one competition the Soviet leadership feared in Eastern Europe, Eurocommunism, came to an abrupt halt due to the weakening of the Spanish, and the predictably perfidious behavior of the French communist parties. There is no need to exaggerate the Eurocommunist threat to Soviet interests in Eastern Europe. On the one hand, the relation between East European opposition and Eurocommunism has always been highly pragmatic, limited and insincere. They used each other for their own practical ends, without much reciprocal confidence. On the other hand, this is an ideological and political, rather than a power influence. The Eurocommunists provided at least a *language* for the public articulation of a certain type of East European opposition which could only be condemned with the final excommunication of the Eurocommunists, for which the Soviet leadership is not prepared. Should, however, the Eurocommunists speak the same language as Moscow does (as in the case of the deplorable demagogy of the French communist press in connection with Afghanistan), this relatively progressive role immediately disappears.

Given this state of affairs, one could outline what can be expected in Eastern Europe during the 1980s. First it is important to point out the limits beyond which political developments are very unlikely to go. The first is a *wholesale return to Stalinism.* The Soviet leadership closed the period of Stalinist "revolutions from above" with Krushchev and his successors. It feels much more secure without them, and the apparatus, the only possible "agency" of mass terror, lacks the determination to impose a semi-militarized life on the country and, mostly, on itself. The second improbability is the dropping of any country out of the Warsaw pact. Since the Prague Spring, watchful eyes follow the slightest suspect signs. Finally, the inner collapse of the Soviet system itself is highly unlikely. Within these limits, the following major conflicts will determine political developments in the region.

First there is the tension caused by the contradiction between Soviet global imperialism and its influence over East European economic and social life. It will suffice here to mention only one characteristic example. Ten to fifteen

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years ago, East European governments did not even suspect that there could be such a thing as a short supply of oil: Soviet resources seemed inexhaustible. Now, according to a well-known and independently corroborated CIA assessment, the USSR is likely to have an oil shortage in the mid-80s, partly also because of her hypertrophic military machinery. Quite naturally, the Soviet leadership tries to pass on at least part of its burdens to its satellites and, for the first time in the economic history of these states, the Soviet government now demands world-market rather than "political" prices for raw materials. Understandably, the East European leaders are outraged and, as cautiously as they should when dealing with their touchy master, yet firmly, they point out that mutual relations between "brother countries" are based on "fraternal principles," i.e., on politically created, not economically calculated, prices.

The second likely future conflict will take place between certain "limited state nationalisms" and Soviet military and diplomatic monopoly. There have been reports of growing jealousy and resentment against Soviet chauvinism, arrogance and unquestionable privileges. There is no doubt that the civilian and military East European apparatuses want their share of military command, political and diplomatic key positions, and they will tolerate less and less being informed about crucial events only *ex post facto* (as they most likely were in the case of Afghanistan). The role of a regional super power with nuclear weapons which imperial Iran briefly played within American strategy, is highly attractive to East German, Polish or Bulgarian military and political leaders. By the same token, it is seen as a serious danger by the Soviet leaders who do not regard their allies as reliable as themselves.

Thirdly, there is the problem of the coming changes in Soviet leadership. Not only will Brezhnev die, but also the majority of the Politburo and a huge part of the Central Committee will have to leave active politics during this decade. These are bodies that represent gerontocracies to the same extent as they are bureaucracies. Although it is a normal event without dramatic consequences in *every* country for leadership to rotate under the pressure of age, things are not quite that simple — even in Western liberal capitalism where the electorate's impersonal will rather than the politicians' personalities seem to dominate the political scene.[6] This is even more valid for the Soviet Union. First, this is because whoever wins the political competition is a total enigma, given the anonymous character of Soviet politics and its intolerance of policy differences — especially those attributable to distinct persons. The winner thus has to create his public image with unexpected gestures.

If a change of this type were to take place in the Soviet Union, everyone would be affected and the confusion would be general. Shrewd political hacks slip, lose their well-trained survival instincts, and sometimes make irreparable

6. If one considers that at least a considerable part of the pettiness typical of today's French public life can be accounted for by the fact that De Gaulle built a system of "presidential Bonapartism" with very mediocre candidates to the role, it is easy to see the overwhelming importance of changes of political personnel in *every* country.

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mistakes.[7] Secondly, and more importantly, the winner's position is initially very weak. He has no legitimation whatsoever. Thus, he desperately needs spectacular successes which are direct threats both to domestic tranquillity and the general equilibrium of world powers.

Thirdly, East European leaders are likely to take a bigger role in the appointment of the new Soviet leaders than has hitherto been the case. Or, more realistically: *some* of them are going to play *some* role in it.[8] Very likely, all potential successors to Brezhnev's position will involve Hungarian, East German, Bulgarian, and Polish lobbies[9] in the preliminary skirmishes since in the Soviet systems there are no legal processes of succession. Fourthly, and finally, the coming change of Soviet leadership is an event which does not necessarily imply only negative possibilities. The new leadership average age will not be below 60 (in this "revolutionary" society one has to be well up the rungs of the gerontocratic ladder to carry any political weight.) Even so, these new politicians will be part of a generation whose formative experience was the war and the immediate post-war hopes for a "milder" regime, rather than men of the "heroic" and ideologically committed 1920s and 30s. In Soviet politics and in Marxism-Leninism, the fewer the principles, the better. Thus, while the new generation of leaders will seek to keep together, or even expand, the Soviet Empire, they may also be receptive to various "openings."

A fourth type of conflict will in all probability develop between the increasingly nationalistic satellites themselves. One instance of this new conflict has already emerged in the 70s between Romania and Hungary. For a variety of reasons, the Hungarian government had been traditionally almost pathologically anti-nationalist, to the extent of being blind to the most understandable national aspirations of its population, such as the defense of the rights of national minorities living outside of Hungary. The Kadar government attacked the Romanian leadership only in order to toe the Soviet line. But internal pressure groups have gradually forced the Kadar leadership into a national strife which may slip out of Soviet control to the point of endangering one of the most sacrosanct elements in Soviet politics: postwar borders. This type of conflict is unprecedented in East-European history since the beginning of Soviet domination. Previously, some country was occasionally assigned the role of "loudspeaker" against certain others, or assumed the role voluntarily (such as Hungary against Tito in 1948-49, or East Germany against Dubcek in early 1968,) but the tone, duration, and vehemence, as well as the beginning and the end of the attacks were all dictated from Moscow. It is impossible to predict what configurations these

7. One of the most famous examples is Kàdàr's memorable speech highly apologetic of Krushchev after the coup, which was obviously made in a moral fit. Since Soviet memory is long, some eight years later this nearly cost him his post.

8. Gomulka was already used by Brezhnev and Kosygin as an *ex post facto* legitimizer of their newly established rule which was questionably legitimate even by Soviet standards. The Polish general secretary readily delivered the useful lie about Krushchev's "personal confession" to him of his intentions to retire.

9. Certainly not the Romanian and probably not the Czech, which even they consider a Quisling government.

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nationalist conflicts among satellites may take. Although painstakingly concealed, there are indications of a growing friction between Polish and Ukranian nationalism, a collective resentment by most other countries against increasing East German chauvinistic arrogance, a Polish-German conflict, and strained relations between Romania and Bulgaria over territorial questions. These conflicts are an inexhaustible source of nuisance to the Soviet leadership. They cannot favor any particular satellite without threatening their own interests in the other country, since they constantly have to supervise them — possibly without direct or even military interference. On the other hand, in the well-known spirit of "divide and rule", these conflicts are in the interests of the Soviet leaders who see imminent danger in the slightest tendencies towards confederation.

The next cluster of possible conflicts is generated by the gradual transition of the Soviet economy from an *extensive* to an *intensive* phase. In principle, such a development would result only in beneficial consequences. Given the fact that the Soviet Union is the largest economic unit of the area and *potentially* one of the world's greatest wheat producers, the introduction of intensive methods into Soviet economy promises blessings for the region. But, for reasons too long to even enumerate, the transition to the intensive phase is more of an exigency than a likelihood in Soviet economic life.[10] In addition, a considerable amount of these rationalizing efforts will be at the expense of East European countries. The conflict will result from an overall change of economic strategies and interrelations. The question concerning whether the Soviet Union exploits East European countries was already raised in 1956, in the wake of the Polish and Hungarian uprisings. The best answer has been provided by Sartre who pointed out that Eastern Europe displays a system of *mutually disadvantageous* economic relations dominated by force and the prevailing *political* interests of the stronger partner, the Soviet Union.[11] This situation is now slowly changing, but in a "Prussian," rather than in an "American" way. The Soviet leaders pursue the unattainable dream of rationalizing a society economically but not in terms of an overall social rationality. One could say that the Soviet leaders want American economic efficiency based on Russian bayonets and widespread KGB bugging technology.

Apart from the question of realizability, the policy objective is meant only for Russian purposes which hides a latent but inevitable conflict — not only with the "people" but also with Eastern European *communist governments*. These governments are themselves in the process of rationalizing. They are either in the process of moving beyond intensive development, or have been well past it, as in the case of Czechoslovakia or East Germany during the whole post-war period, when they were only forcibly slowed down by the Soviet presence. These ruling groups, and even more eagerly their national

10. For an excellent discussion of these problems, see Antonio Carlo, "The Crisis of Bureaucratic Collectivism," in *Telos*, n. 43 (Summer, 1980), pp. 3-32.

11. Cf. Jean-Paul Sartre, "Czechoslovakia: The Socialism That Came in from the Cold," in his *Between Existentialism and Marxism* (New York, 1974), pp. 84-117.

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technocracies, may rightly claim that the pattern of industrial development was literally forced upon them and that they had to renounce the most lucrative post-war opportunities of economic collaboration with the West because of Soviet demands.[12] In exchange, the Soviet Union offered them unlimited resources of raw materials at so-called "political prices." Should the Soviet leadership change this without taking into consideration its satellites' particular interests, the whole edifice threatens to collapse. East European governments are increasingly blackmailing Soviet leaders with the phantom of a coming "counterrevolution" in case of a constantly worsening economic situation resulting from one-sided Soviet economic rationalization. This internecine strife has actually begun between the Soviet Union and Romania. What lends support to the East European argument is that Russia can produce short-term economic "injections," can help sustain small entities such as Cuba on a subsistence level, but simply does not have the resources to rationalize at home *and* keep bigger East European countries on the near-West European level at which their population wishes to live, 35 years after the war. Finally it is unavoidable that during the 80s in certain countries open social conflict will break out in order to bring about a modicum of political pluralism. Whereas, especially since Tito's death, the explosion is generally expected from Yugoslavia,[13] there is little doubt in my mind that Poland is again likely to have the dubious distinction of becoming a world-historical nation: the center of the gathering storm.

None of the mentioned factors is news to the experts, or even to observant readers of periodicals. What is significant is their ensemble. First of all, Poland is a large European nation of 33,000,000 people with an army of more than 300,000 men. While the Soviet army has no equivalent in Europe, nevertheless in the case of a Polish army revolt a limited "police action" for the Soviets as in Hungary in 1965 or Czechoslovakia in 1968 would still be ruled out. Secondly, Poland is the country where social dissatisfaction not only became explicit, but extended far beyond the intelligentsia: here the working class is gathering an apparently unstoppable momentum. The scene is nightmarishly reminiscent of the late 19th-early 20th century socialist image of proletarian revolution — or, at least, its modest beginnings. At this stage, Polish workers are not fighting for direct democracy or political pluralism but for much more limited 19th century gains which they lost through "socialist emancipation": free trade unions. Thirdly, apart from the semi-legitimate organizations of the opposition, there is one visible national organization, the Catholic Church, which is wiser than to play an oppositional role prematurely, but which is more intransigent and influential than its other East European counterparts. As a result, it could not be assimilated into the regime, and it retained far-reaching spiritual and political powers.[14] Given

12. This is primarily true of Czechoslovakia, the only European country in 1945 with an intact and powerful heavy industry.

13. Cf. Sharon Zukin, "Beyond Titoism," in *Telos*, 44 (Summer 1980), pp. 5-24.

14. Once, in 1956, it more or less played the role of the arbiter, spelling out, through Cardinal Wyszynski, how far Gomulka's "reformist communism" should go to be acceptable for the nation, and how far the nation should not go in order to be still acceptable to the Soviets.

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that there is now a Polish Pope, and its immensely increased hold over social life gained during the complicated conflicts of the post-Gomulka decade, the Catholic Church is one of the most important power factors in the coming collision. Further, the oppositional intelligentsia very wisely avoided the "lobbying" policy of many of its East European colleagues and became the mouth-piece of universal national grievances, particularly those of the industrial working class — the spearhead of social rebellion in Poland.

Thus, for the first time in the history of East European dissent, the critical and even openly oppositional intelligentsia has roots and a protective "shield" in the industrial workers. Should the secret police go too far against them, there is at least the danger of a nationwide political strike. On the other hand, the workers have a multilingual and dedicated agency, with good connections in the foreign press to create instantaneous world publicity for all their demands. Finally, the Soviet leadership has hardly any other option but the military one to put down rebellious Poland. Traditionally, the nation is passionately and chauvinistically anti-Russian. The equally traditional myth of Polish irresistability is rapidly gaining ground. Economically, 33 million want affluence, or at least decent West European standards and, needless to say, the Russian option is ludicrous.

The above sketch may not be dramatic enough to emphasize the situation's seriousness. But it is on this battlefield that the coming fate of Eastern Europe for this century will be fought. All attentive observers of post-World War II history know that while many options were undecided in 1944-45 (Finland, perhaps even Hungary, Austria, and Czechoslovakia), and despite the fact that the Soviet army was exhausted, there was one objective for which Stalin was even prepared to start a new war: the domination of Poland. His unceremonious policy towards the Lublin Committee (the Moscow-appointed government of Poland which simply declared a minority communist group the "sole and legal representative of the Polish people" while the war against Germany was not yet over) leaves no doubt about the importance he ascribed to Poland. Nor is it reasonable to assume that this ever changed for any Soviet government, except in the sense that the Poles now could count on no Western allies. This leaves one logical conclusion: should a rebellious population endanger the Communist Party's ultimate rule or threaten Poland's defection from the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet government would go to *any* length to stem the tide. It could mean the destruction of major Polish cities, mass deportations and executions, a military and police rule and martial law. Similarly, no other parts of Eastern Europe would remain unaffected by these waves of neo-Stalinism.

A Polish civil war developing into a direct Polish-Soviet clash is the only thing that would resurrect the ghosts of Yeshov and Beria. On the other hand, the Soviet apparatus is just as hesitant to take the fatal steps or even precipitate them. The apparatus loathes the perspective of a recurrent Stalinism and its imminent dangers for *itself*. They are also aware of the unpredictable consequences of "Polish war" could trigger at home. Finally, they have no doubt that the "spirit of Munich" which is now so widespread in Western politics,

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would disappear in a moment should they do the irrevocable. While they are glad to toy verbally with the "danger of a new cold war," they would not welcome its actual recurrence. The only hope is that, while on the one hand both parties are adamant concerning at least a good portion of their demands, on the other, both are aware of serious, or even fatal, consequences of foolhardiness. This suggests a possible partial restoration of political pluralism, i.e., free trade unions, freedom of religion, a broader scope for limited private economic initiative, a relative separation of the judiciary from political authorities (at least in non-political matters), an increased and formalized legal tolerance towards the private person within the sphere of private law, a gradual emancipation of the workforce from the compulsion of labor, and the corollary restrictions afflicting private persons in their capacity as wage earners, guaranteed freedom of travelling. And such positive changes would not necessarily be limited within the Polish borders. Poland, her working class and dissident intelligentsia could become the first real liberator of Eastern Europe. They could also precipitate a collective catastrophe.

In conclusion, three dilemmas of East European history, all likely to intensify during the 80s, should be briefly discussed. The first can be summed up by this question: is the "Finlandization" of Eastern Europe possible? Whereas Western European nations regard "Finlandization" as a serious danger, Eastern European ones regard it as a considerable relief from their present situation. Characteristically, the most vehemently negative answer comes from Finnish observers. Since Finnish politicians occasionally take more than their share of humiliation from Soviet leaders, they tend to see their situation as the unlikely upshot of their unique and inimitably wise efforts. Yet, apart from seeking the domination of Poland, from extending his influence in the region as far as possible and from the general wish of grabbing as much spoil as he could, in 1945 Stalin had no definite strategic plan regarding Eastern Europe. Later, two disparate considerations combined to lead to his decision. The one was political: the belief that only a monolithic Communist Party rule imposed on East European nations could adequately serve Soviet interests. After 30 years of nearly uninterrupted uprisings, it is superfluous to comment on the practical value of this idea. In the ultimate analysis, to have or not to have an empire is reasonably decided by whether it brings more profit than it imposes burdens on the mother country.

The other consideration was military, shaped according to an "infantry strategy," which was already obsolete at the time of its conception. The Finnish example is again useful: Finland's borders were fixed so that no first waves of an infantry attack against Leningrad would succeed. No remarks are needed concerning how fruitful such a strategic vision is in the age of global missiles. Considering the obsolescence of the underlying military doctrine, and the enormous fiscal burdens of garrisoning huge occupying armies, it is not unrealistic to claim that *dependent but not simply occupied*, i.e., "Finlandized," buffer countries would better serve even the purposes of the Soviet military.[15]

15. It is frequently argued that all this amassing of conventional armies and armaments are

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The second dilemma is the following: should the restoration of Western-type liberal capitalism be the goal of oppositional movements? At first glance, this seems far-fetched and irrelevant for the 80s where even in terms of a not entirely pessimistic view, the most one can expect is some limited concessions on the part of Soviet and national ruling strata. Yet, social strategy is never irrelevant and has an impact on short-term behavior of political actors. And if one speaks of "Finlandization" it should be remembered that Finland is a liberal capitalist country.

As George Konrad argued in a recently published *samizdat*, capitalism cannot be restored *democratically* in these countries for two main reasons. One is Isaac Deutscher's argument that such a restoration is physically impossible since the development of a gigantic industry occurred in an area that had never been previously industrialized to such an extent. While this may apply to the Soviet Union, it does not necessarily extend to the smaller East European countries, which could easily be integrated into a system of multinational organizations. But there is another argument that has to do with the split consciousness of the state wage-workers in Eastern Europe. This social agent is vehemently anti-communist and anti-socialist as far as ideology is concerned. In Poland, it is also under the direct influence of the Church which advocates the most conservative social views. But when acting out its social impulses, the state wage-worker is anti-authoritarian and would hate to trade its impersonal master for a restored personal one. It was out of this "social impulse" that the Hungarian workers' councils were born in 1956.

There is no physical or social impossibility of a restoration, but this disobedient and rebellious subject has to be tamed first in order to be turned into a proper subject of a restored liberal capitalism. Of course, the social equivalent of "taming" is authoritarian conservatism, not democracy. Therefore, all those seeking democracy as a future for Eastern Europe have to consider socialism understood as a self-managed society. Unfortunately, an opposite tendency can be readily discerned among those who are politically active. The opposition already includes a new group of non-theocratic radical conservatives for whom democracy is a prime suspect. Since the so-called "subjective factor" and its preliminary political "schooling" are crucial to influence the convulsion to come — even if the convulsion is not likely to come in the 1980s — the clash within the opposition between conservative and democratic-socialist tendencies has a definite bearing on the future.

Finally, there is the third dilemma: can activities in different nations be synchronized? Is there such a thing as an international opposition? The importance of synchronized activities is paramount. Thus the spontaneously synchronic Polish and Hungarian 1956 revolts reciprocally affected each other. Similarly, the Soviet hesitation in October 1956 which provided a

meant for an eventual deployment in the West — or at least the "Finlandization" of Western Europe. Yet, it is hard to imagine a Soviet leader well aware of the fact that an open assault against Iran would be *casus belli* while a Soviet *marcia su Roma* would not. It is equally hard to believe that any military and political leaders on either side thinks that a nuclear war can be won — despite their frequently irresponsible statements.

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leeway for the Hungarian revolution and a chance for the Polish "flood" to break through peacefully was caused by the fact that the Soviet leaders had two problems on their hands, rather than just one.

On the other hand, in 1968 Dubcek could not have strayed much farther than the early Gomulka regime. He could never consolidate his system even on the most modest reformist basis, owing mainly to the "desynchronized" character of East European history, particularly evident in the fact that Gomulka's regime, the only possible obstacle in the way of Soviet and East German pressure hysterically gathering momentum, was on the decline. When Dubcek rose, Gomulka was about to leave the scene as a reformer. His regime had deteriorated for years and the reckonings came, in the form of the March 1968 Warsaw demonstration, precisely when Dubcekism was gaining ground. So, instead of looking for a reformist ally, Gomulka was haunted by the ghost of an "international counterrevolution" and thus joined the inquisitors. That was a signal for Dubcek's last and always overcautious protector, Kadar, who backed out. With this defection, Dubcek's fate was sealed.

But even if such a cooperation is necessary, it is unclear whether it is possible. At this point all ideas of a Central European confederation are futile and dangerous dreams. But even if it were possible, three major obstacles militate against it. The first is the nearly hysterical sensitivity Soviet leaders have always shown towards confederative ideas. An example of this is the then unprecedented open Soviet attack against Tito's and Dimitrov's joint statement about a possible Balkan confederation in 1947, at a time when Stalin was frantically attempting to keep up the appearances of a communist "phalanx without inner rift." Secondly, these nations have such diverse histories, sometimes even without ever having had independent states, that when "compressed" into one confederation, as with Yugoslavia, they present immense problems for their national leaders. Thirdly, any confederation, even under ideal conditions, would mean a duplication of bureaucracies, and there is nothing worse than a supra-national bureaucracy responsible to no one. But if the idea of confederation should be discarded, the intensification of separate national chauvinism should equally be rejected as even more dangerous. These nationalist ideologies simply serve Soviet aims to divide and rule, the classic example of this being the systematic anti-Ceasescu propaganda within Hungarian intellectual circles with tacit government consent: a political subculture in which it is increasingly argued that "even Soviet intervention would be better than Ceasescu's cultural genocide." There is no question about the Romanian government's crimes in culturally and politically oppressing the Hungarian minority. Since East European governments do not tolerate, and the Western media are not interested in unmasking these hard facts, it is a duty of the opposition to make them public. But to see this as the central Hungarian and Romanian social question is a fatal blind-alley and one day those who claim this could find themselves in the position of indirect agents of a Russian invasion in Romania. This type of intensification of nationalist ideologies is the shortest avenue to produce the new poison: a new conservative elite in the 90s.

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WHAT IS CONFORMIST MARXISM?*

by Russell Jacoby

I

"So much worse for the facts." With these words of Fichte, Lukacs closed the first draft of "What is Orthodox Marxism?" To the skeptical, and perhaps to the sympathetic, the words are outrageous. Marxism is not contradicted by the facts. The facts are duplicit or, at best, mute. To quantify, classify, categorize facts is to capitulate to them. "Truly orthodox dialectical Marxists paid little attention to the so-called facts."[1]

The obverse is plainer and more convincing: the facts confirm Marxism. The large events, as well as the small, prove the truth of the theory. The Russian and Chinese Revolutions, imperialism, the development of the working class, and so on, all demonstrate the continuous validity of Marxism. Marxism is compelling precisely because it is accurate, and finally, because it is successful: it works. The strength of the working class, as well as the victory of several revolutions, leave little doubt. Success is the proof.

Success: this is the rub. How does one evaluate success? The Seventeenth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party (1934) announced that the party has "triumphed" everywhere. Stalin declared that socialism was now "the sole commanding force." For this reason the official account dubbed this meeting "The Congress of Victors."[2] Several decades later, in 1956, Khruschev indicated how the victors fared: "Of the 139 members and candidates of the party's Central Committee who were elected at the Seventeenth Congress, 98 persons, i.e., 70 percent, were arrested and shot.... The same fate met...the majority of the delegates to the Seventeenth Party Congress. Of 1,966 delegates...1,108 were arrested on charges of revolutionary crimes, i.e., decidedly more than a majority...."[3]

The banal truth: today's success is tomorrow's failure. Everybody wants a winner. Nobody likes a loser. That nothing succeeds like success is true not only for bourgeois society, but its critique, Marxism. Marxists too want to win or, at least, side with the winners.

Orthodox Marxism has chased after success; and this hunt has paralyzed its critical nerve, past and present. Prior to World War I, the German Social Democrats exercised hegemony by virtue of their strength and electoral victories. After their moral and political collapse in World War I, the Russian Revolution and the Bolsheviks assumed this role. With the undoing of the Russian Revolution — dated anywhere from Kronstadt (1921) to the invasion of Czechoslovkia (1968) — the Chinese Revolution and Maoism step in. Since

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1. Georg Lukacs, "What is Orthodox Marxism?" and "Tactics and Ethics," in *Political Writings 1919-1929* (London, 1972), pp. 27, 26.

2. *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course*, ed. by the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) in 1938 (Calcutta, 1968), pp. 297-298.

3. "Khrushchev's Secret Report to the Twentieth Congress," in Bertram D. Wolfe, *Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost* (New York, 1957), p. 124.

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each worked, each promised to deliver the magic formula for success. The final argument flung by the Leninists at the non-Leninists is that Lenin succeeded. The non-Leninists were not only wrong, they failed.

The lure of success and the sweet smell of victory fuel orthodox Marxism. Marxism-Leninism or Marx-Lenin-Mao-Tsung-Thought exudes the no-nonsense of how to succeed. This is the source of their perpetual attraction as doctrines; unlike anarchism, syndicalism, council communism, or what not, they have proved themselves. They offer victorious revolutions to be emulated. Everything else pales before the fact of victory. The adherents of orthodox Marxism extol and promote the victorious revolutions and parties as the route to success — until their shortcomings or failure become too obvious; then another is adopted.

The ex post facto element damns this Marxism to apologetics. Marxism degenerates into public relations for revolutionary movements; it turns critical only at last resort. It may suffice for philosophy to attain wisdom at dusk, but Marxism must commence its flight earlier. To condemn the failures after the verdict is too late.

The issues are complex. The future events of history are beyond anyone's grasp. History provides no refunds, guarantees or insurance policies. The misappraisal of a successful revolution, or the revolution-in-the making, the premature celebration, the mistake, the retraction, and so on, form the very marrow of the human experience in history. For this reason the charge that a mistake has been made, or belatedly corrected, is itself compromised; it assumes a position outside of history, where there are no choices, failures, mistakes or successes. The charge implies that it is better not to chose, and it retreats to the tired wisdom that history is bunk and vanity; or it hides behind academic knowledge too cautious to think and judge.

If this is true, it is also insufficient. This rejoinder slips into the *c'est la vie* attitude that excuses indifferently all theories and commitments. It is no sin to be wrong, but it is no virtue to be consistently wrong; and this is the question which orthodox Marxism provokes.[4] History is assembled out of a series of discrete mechanisms; if one proves defective, another is always available. This approach is immunized against criticism by continually shifting its object: last year it was Maoism, this year the prison movement, next year the working class.

A minor example: Charles Bettelheim, a respected French Marxist, resigned from the Franco-China Friendship Association (May 1977), signifying his break with post-Maoist China.[5] For many years he enthusiastically praised the Cultural Revolution and Maoism. Now he believes that the campaign against the "Gang of Four" commenced a "great leap backward."

The ease and facility with which the advances of the Cultural Revolution and

4. See the "balance sheet" that Fernando Claudin draws of the record of the Comintern (pp. 36ff) as well as his important chapter, "The Crisis of Theory" (pp. 46ff) in *The Communist Movement from Comintern to Cominform* (Harmondsworth, England, 1975). See my review in *The Insurgent Sociologist*, VIII (Winter 1979), pp. 96ff.

5. Charles Bettelheim, "Letter of Resignation" and "The Great Leap Backward," *Monthly Review*, 30:1 (July-August 1978). Cf. the responses, especially by Arthur MacEwan, "Comments on *China Since Mao*," *Monthly Review*, 31:1 (May 1979), pp. 44-48.

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Maoism are being undone suggest to Bettelheim that the seeds for the reversal were planted earlier. Something must have been amiss with the Cultural Revolution itself which allowed it to be so rapidly set aside. And indeed Bettelheim tells us "when we look back and analyze what has happened since 1965-66, we can say that this change in the relation of forces was already apparent in the first months of 1967. . . ." He goes on to identify some features of this change: introduction of coercion, displacement of mass participation, rise of sectarianism, and so on.[6]

This may be fine and good, but why do we learn this only now? The answer is obvious; while Bettelheim states the changes were "already apparent" in 1967, they were not apparent to him (and many others) for another 10 years. The reasons that he now adduces for the 'great leap backward' were presented as successfully overcome in his 1973 book, *Cultural Revolution and Industrial Organization in China*. He wrote then that "through discussions and struggles involving millions of workers and vast sections of the population, a new road was opened up in the struggle for socialism. . . . It constitutes a decisive and permanent achievement, as decisive and permanent as any scientific or social experience which discovers new processes or new objective laws."

Nor was this the first time that Bettelheim identified permanent scientific advances that turned out to be neither permanent, scientific or advances. His analysis of the transition from capitalism to socialism, as well as the Russian Revolution, were both wanting. In the mid-1960s Bettelheim defended Stalin's ideas on the law of value in a socialist society against "Che" Guevara.[8] The rejoinder by "Che" decried Bettelheim's mechanical and undialectical approach.[9] Several years later (1969) Bettelheim debated the same issue with Paul Sweezy.[10]

In 1974 Bettelheim admitted that his writings in the period 1962-1967 on the transition from capitalism to socialism were "not satisfactory." The problem was that until 1956 he had taken the Soviet Union as a "model" for revolution. However the problem persisted for another ten years. Only the "lessons" of the Chinese Cultural Revolution "induced" him to "modify very seriously the terms of my analysis."[11] Hence Bettleheim began a major re-evaluation of the Russian Revolution, *Class Struggle in the USSR* (1974). Two additional problems emerge here. His serious modification of the evaluation of Russia is

6. C. Bettelheim, "The Great Leap Backward," pp. 38, 98.

7. C. Bettelheim, *Cultural Revolution and Industrial Organization in China* (New York, 1974), pp. 9-10. The book "relies heavily on material I gathered during my stay in China in August and September 1971" (p. 7).

8. "Formes et méthodes de la planification socialiste et niveau de développement des forces productives" (1964) in C. Bettelheim, *La transition vers l'économie socialiste* (Paris, 1968), pp. 129-152.

9. Ernesto "Che" Guevara, "La planificacion socialista, su significado" (1964), in *El socialismo y el hombre nuevo* (Mexico City, 1977), pp. 386-395. A brief summary of Che's criticism of Bettelheim can be found in Michael Lowy, *The Marxism of Che Guevara* (New York, 1973).

10. Charles Bettelheim, "On the Transition between Capitalism and Socialism" with a reply by Paul Sweezy, *Monthly Review*, 20:10 (March 1969), pp. 1-19. This text and others are in Bettelheim and Sweezy, *On the Transition to Socialism* (New York, 1971).

11. C. Bettelheim, *Class Struggles in the USSR. First Period: 1917-1923* (New York, 1976), p. 10.

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not very serious.[12] Bettelheim repeats the (past?) quaisi-official Chinese position on the Russian Revolution. And now that the Cultural Revolution has proved to be imperfect, he may have to re-evaluate it. Consequently his re-evaluation of the Russian Revolution may have to be re-evaluated, and so on.[13]

Is this gloating? To stand utterly outside the fray is hardly virtuous: it purchases purity by selling off critical intelligence and commitment. And to enter into the fray inevitably yields mistakes, including major ones. "There are no innocents in politics."[14] Yet neither is everyone equally guilty. Distinctions can be, and must be made. Political intellectuals who are perpetually on the hunt for successful revolutions, betray their ethos: success.

The issue is not the failings of an individual, but a style and procedure that eviscerates Marxism. Success is peddled, till it fails, and then is peddled again in a new form. At any single instant, the success appears more than convincing; the facts are on its side, while the critics command only theories and harping objections. The Russian, Chinese, and Cuban revolutions silence critics by their very existence and success. Debray's 1967 *Revolution in the Revolution* enthusiastically prescribed the Cuban model of revolution for all of South America. Ten years later the situation is sobering, the successes nonexistent. Gerard Chailland titles his recent analysis "Guerilla Inflation: The Foco Theory as a Theory for Failure."[15] Debray himself hardly disagrees; he calls his pamphlet "a book of the moment."[16]

Some of this can, and has been, characterized as "Third Worldism," the pursuit and promotion of Third World revolutions by intellectuals of North America and Western Europe. Yet the style has worked as effectively and perniciously within the industrial nations. The black movement, urban guerillas, prison movement, and the working class itself have all been the objects of instant mythologizing.

Not the least of the ills of orthodox Marxism is its wake of demoralization and cynicism. Hopes perpetually raised and dashed, take their toll. If its more public figures can switch objects without losing a beat, others have graver difficulties. Who can transfer their loyalties without doubt from the Soviet Union to China to North Korea to Albania? or from the student movement to the black movement to the third world to the working class? The committed leach away. The old anti-communist 'god that failed' becomes the weary 'gods that failed.'

For many Marxists an old routine has been refurbished to account for perpetual mistakes: self-criticism. Louis Althusser developed this into a fine art, and an effective marketing strategy. As an art it neatly absolves the past mistakes, makes way for new ones, and infers that the critics are spiteful and

12. For a fine analysis see Ralph Miliband, "Bettelheim and Soviet Experience," *New Left Review*, 91 (May-June, 1975), pp. 57-66. Cf. Carmen J. Sirianni's review in *Socialist Review*, 36 (November-December 1977), pp. 143-160.

13. For another Bettelheim debate, where he demonstrates his mastery of the Althusserian lingo, see "Preface to the French Edition by Charles Bettelheim" in Arghiri Emmanuel, *Unequal Exchange* (New York, 1972), pp. 343-356.

14. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Humanism and Terror* (Boston, 1969), p. xxiii.

15. Gérard Challiand, *Revolution in the Third World* (New York, 1978), pp. 39ff.

16. See his self-critical comments in *A Critique of Arms*, Vol. 1 (New York, 1977), p. 225.

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malicious for harping on the past. Who wants to criticize those who criticize themselves? As a commercial strategy it is marketed by the engineers of the planned obsolescence of thought; each theoretical innovation is fabricated out of defective parts, and is designed to break down or be recalled. The intellectual and book buyer turns into a perpetual customer insofar as he or she is compelled to buy the latest work which replaces the preceding one.

Althusser invented not only theoretical practice but pioneered in its malpractice. First he argued that Marx definitely broke with Hegel. Several years after this argument he confessed: "I must admit that I have given a much too abrupt idea of this thesis...."[17] It also turned out that in his notion of Marx's "epistemological break," "I...made *two* mistakes"; it was not epistemological nor a break. He also erred in *Reading Capital* calling philosophy "a theory of theoretical practice."[18] This mistake was not simply "terminological ambiguity but one of an error in the conception itself."[19] He also mistakenly concluded that "philosophy is a *science*." Later he discovered that "philosophy is not [a] science."[20] He also forgot about class struggle in *For Marx* and *Reading Capital*. "This is certainly the biggest mistake I made...."[21]

The list, if honest, is hardly enviable; nor is it exhaustive.[22] Moreover what Reich said of Freud — even where he was wrong, he was right — can be said, in the inverse of Althusser: even where he is right, he is wrong.

Althusser represents a Marxism that is forever wrong, or right too late. To explain his multiple miscalculations he reaches for an alibi beyond reproach: history. The irony is missed: Althusser and his followers have dedicated themselves to slaying the dangerous dragon of historicism. Historicism threatens the autonomy, rigor, objectivity, and finally the success of Marxism. For Althusser, historicism is a Hegelian corruption of the science of Marxism.[23]

Yet Althusser justifies all his mistakes by the fact that they were committed at a particular time and place, as if there could be some doubt about this. In Althusser's jargon the "conjuncture" ("the exact balance of forces...at any given moment"[24]) is the universal excuse for errors. The fetish of indicating the

17. Louis Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy* (New York, 1971), p. 93.
18. L. Althusser, *Essays in Self-Criticism* (London, 1976), p. 71.
19. L. Althusser and Etienne Balibar, *Reading Capital* (New York, 1970), p. 8.
20. L. Althusser, *Essays*, p. 68.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 146.
22. While defenders of the faith maintain that "North American resistance to the work of Althusser and his colleagues is ideological" (Terry Eagleton in *Clio*, VII [1978], p. 323), many cogent critiques of Althusser have appeared, including English ones. Top of the pile is E.P. Thompson's wild and extraordinary *The Poverty of Theory* (London, 1978); this reached me during the final stages of writing this manuscript, and consequently too late to be fully considered or utilized here. A fine discussion can be found in the review by Brian Singer of Rancière's *La Leçon d'Althusser*, *Telos*, 25 (Fall 1975), pp. 224ff. Other criticisms include: Raymond Aron, *D'une Sainte Famille à l'autre* (Paris, 1969); Pierre Vilar, "Marxist History, A History in the Making: Towards a Dialogue with Althusser," *New Left Review*, 80 (1973), pp. 65ff; Norman Geras, "Althusser's Marxism," *New Left Review*, 71 (1972), pp. 57ff; Alex Callinicos, *Althusser's Marxism* (London, 1976); and the review by Tom Good in *Telos*, 30 (Winter 1976), pp. 226ff; Miriam Glucksmann, *Structuralist Analysis in Contemporary Social Thought* (London, 1974).
23. See the chapter "Marxism is not a Historicism" in *Reading Capital*, pp. 119-144.
24. From the glossary of *For Marx*, with "corrections and interpolations" by Althusser, p. 250.

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exact time when they wrote, rewrote and corrected their manuscripts characterizes all the Althusserians. This furnishes the gloss of precision while anticipating a revision of the theory when the "conjuncture" changes. Nicos Poulantzas closes his *Fascism and Dictatorship* melodramatically: "Given the aim of this book, I prefer to give this conclusion a date (Paris, July, 1970)." [25]

"To understand these essays," Althusser tells us in the introduction to *For Marx*, "and to pass judgement on them, it is essential to realize that they were conceived, written and published . . . in a particular ideological and theoretical conjuncture. . . ." [26] Or he suggests that the "exceptional situation" in which his essay on Lacan was written explains why it has to "either be corrected, or expanded." [27] The evil is not in the appeal to history; rather history becomes the insurance policy for the perpetual theoretical malpractice suits. The theory or theorist is never wrong nor ever reconceived; the guilt resides in the historical process — the conjuncture. In this way orthodox Marxism immunizes itself; if it is always wrong or too late, the fault lies elsewhere.

Althusser's response to one of his critics, John Lewis, indicates his achievement. He chastizes Lewis for ignoring the historical situation in which *For Marx* was written, and then goes on to award himself a badge for courage and perspecuity. "Mr. Lewis never talks about this political history. . . . In *For Marx*, — that is, in 1965 — I was already writing about Stalin." [28] Some 30 years after the Moscow trials or 10 short years after Premier Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin shocked the world, Althusser was "already" criticizing Stalin. Althusser dreams he heads the theoretical parade, while tidying up years after the procession has passed him by.

If the category of success needs re-scrutiny, so must failure. Neither success nor failure can be accepted as a blank fact. Success or its absence is only one factor in the evaluation of a politics. We do not condemn the collaborators with Nazism because they picked the losing side; nor do we condemn the Spanish loyalists and republicans because they lost. The history of the opposition to orthodox Marxism — council communism, 'left' communism, dissident currents and so on — is a history of failure: let there be no doubt. Yet it is none the less valuable. Failure proves nothing, except who lost.

This is often forgotten. No one likes losers. The history of revolution is usually presented as a string of victories, blemished by some setbacks and defeats. Rarely does one find Marx's own honesty. He wrote following the revolutions of 1848: "With the exception of a few short chapters, every important part of the annals of the revolution from 1848 to 1849 carries the heading: Defeat of the revolution!" [29] Or he wrote some 15 years later,

25. Nicos Poulantzas, *Fascism and Dictatorship* (London, 1974), p. 359. For a good critical appraisal see Anson G. Rabinbach, "Poulantzas and the Problem of Fascism," *New German Critique*, 8 (1976), pp. 157-170. Cf. Martin Plaut, "The Problem of Positivism in the Work of Nicos Poulantzas," *Telos*, 36 (Summer 1978), pp. 159-167 and Salvador Giner, Juan Salcedo, "The Ideological Practice of Nicos Poulantzas," *Archives Européennes de Sociologie*, XVII (1976), pp. 344-365.

26. *For Marx*, p. 9. Cf. "Note to the English Edition," *Reading Capital*, p. 8.

27. L. Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy*, p. 189.

28. *Essays*, p. 36.

29. K. Marx, *Class Struggles in France 1848-1850* (New York, 1964), p. 33.

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summarizing the intervening period, "If, then, there had been no solidarity of action between the British and the continental working classes, there was, at all events, a solidarity of defeat."[30]

Outside Marxism the same issues have surfaced, although not in the same form. In historical and sociological studies, controversy has flourished for years about the autonomy and resistance of various social formations: American blacks, working class, Jews, and so on. Evaluations differ as to their degree of independence and resistance within the oppressive environments of slavery, concentration camps, and bourgeois society. Interpretations tend to fall into two types. One stresses autonomy and relative success at resistance; another stresses the converse, the power and ability of the establishment to repress or incorporate an opposition.

The issues are emotionally, and finally politically charged; and this is the point. A politics governs and fuels this debate; a left tends to elevate the advances and autonomy of the underlying class, or group, and the right extols the power (or genius) of the establishment. To be sure, the politics is often implicit, but for this reason it is so much the more potent; it is never questioned and congeals into a dogma: the left always and everywhere finds advances of the subaltern groups.

As a dogma it might be better than most; and it does seem to rest on a self-evident proposition: victims in history resist. They are also subjects of history. Yet it also draws upon the myth of success, an upbeat vision of past and future conflicts. An examination of the strength of the establishment is dismissed as reactionary. Analysis of social relations which induced identification and not independence and resistance is precluded. It is the task of a left to always find victories and successes of the oppressed? Not only does this tacit logic turn mythological but it ill serves its subject by minimizing the density and complexity of the oppressive social relations. That the oppressed were terrorized by terror conveys no insult; that they sold out so as to eat and live suggest no dishonor. The urge to people the desert of history is public relations for the moguls who have wasted it.

The configuration of these debates testifies to the same pressures at work inside Marxism: the inclination to present the struggle as upward and successful. This has been the tendency of Marxism in all its terrains. To be sure, for the recent historical and sociological studies, as well as for Marxism, the provocations have never been lacking. To argue that there was little resistance to slavery, as Stanley Elkins did,[31] or to Nazi extermination, as Bruno Bettelheim and Hannah Arendt did,[32] or to bourgeois power, as working class studies did,[33] was received as an insult; and the insult was doubled when it was

30. K. Marx, "Inaugural Address of the International Working Men's Association" (1864) in Marx, *First International and After* (New York, 1974), p. 78.

31. Stanley M. Elkins, *Slavery*, 3rd edition (Chicago, 1976). First edition: 1959.

32. Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem* (New York, 1965); Bruno Bettelheim, *The Informed Heart* (New York, 1971). First edition: 1960. It is hardly accidental that these books are themselves theoretically related. Elkins' book leans heavily on the essay that was later incorporated into *The Informed Heart*, Bettelheim's "Individualism and Mass Behavior in Extreme Situations" (1943).

33. See the survey of the literature on the "integration" of the working class in John H.

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further argued there was not only little resistance, but complicity and cooperation.

These works of Elkins, Bettelheim and Arendt, marked one swing of the pendulum. In the more recent years, historical studies have moved in the opposite direction, and stressed the forms of resistance by slaves,[34] Jews [35] and the working classes.[36] If more just, this perspective begins to shade into a mythic vision of resistance and progress. At this point it raises more question than it answers. The image of success and victories vies with the actual defeats and setbacks. If, for instance, the working classes were progressing in their culture, struggles and class consciousness, their defeat or relative passivity becomes not more but less understandable. If the structure and success of domination is omitted in the name of the dominated, the veil of history darkens. "A 'history from above' — of the machinery of class domination — is thus no less essential than a 'history from below,' indeed without it the latter in the end becomes one-sided (if the better side)."[37]

For those who imagine that dialectics requires matching mathematical opposites, no problem exists. On one hand there is domination, on the other resistance. Marcuse's *One Dimensional Man* was regularly derided as undialectical. Marcuse forgot that society was two dimensional; domination always incites resistance. This is the Official Marxist Interpretation of Everything or, the power of positive thinking for Marxists. Any suggestion of the victory of the state or bourgeois culture is countered by stressing the victory of the working classes and its culture. Each negative statement is answered by a positive. The total, however, is zero.

This mathematical interpretation of history issues into a picture of forces of liberation battling the forces of domination. If this is adequate for actual

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Goldthorpe, D. Lockwood, F. Bechhofer, J. Platt, *The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure* (Cambridge, 1969), pp. 1-29.

34. For an outsider, it is necessary to be intrepid to wade into the vast and passionate debate on slavery. Elkins (and Frank Tannenbaum) has been attacked for years; this is parly due to the utilization or misutilization of Elkins by the Moynihan Report; see Lee Rainwater, William L. Yancey, *The Moynihan Report and the Politics of Controversy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967). Inasmuch as blacks or the black family were seen as passive victims, the rejoinders emphasized the elements of resistance and autonomous culture. See *The Debate Over Slavery: Stanley Elkins and his Critics*, ed. Ann J. Lane (Urbana, Ill., 1971). Herbert G. Gutman's *Black Family in Slavery and Freedom 1750-1925* (New York, 1977) takes as its point of departure the Moynihan Report, and is an effective reply, arguing on behalf of a distinct black culture; on these grounds, Gutman criticizes Eugene D. Genovese's *Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made* (New York, 1975) for slighting a slave culture (pp. 303ff). Whether Genovese represents or is made to represent an opposite position remains a question. Two thoughtful and contrasting discussions of Gutman's book are by George Rawick and Evelyn Brooks Barnett in "A Symposium on Herbert Gutman's *The Black Family*" in *Radical History Review*, 4:2-3 (Spring-Summer 1977), pp. 76-101ff. See also George P. Rawick, *From Sundown to Sunup* (Westport, Conn., 1973) for an important discussion of the issues, esp. pp. 101ff. One final note here: Elkins is far from dead and finished; his "The Two Arguments on Slavery" (1975), included in the 3rd edition of *Slavery*, is to the point.

35. See Reuben Ainsztein, *Jewish Resistance in Nazi-Occupied Eastern Europe* (New York, 1974). Cf. Jacob Robinson, *And the Crooked Shall Be Made Straight: The Eichmann Trial, the Jewish Catastrophe and Hannah Arendt's Narrative* (New York, 1965) and Terrence des Preis, *The Survivor: An Anatomy of Life in the Death Camps* (New York, 1970).

36. The fundamental work, which has inspired many other and lesser ones, is E.P. Thompson's *The Making of the English Working Class*.

37. Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (London, 1974), p. 11.

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warfare, it fails as a model for the existence and persistence of capitalism. Capitalism does not simply rely on perpetual military subjugation. For this reason, too, any blank juxtaposition of 'history from above' and 'history from below' threatens to conclude in two volume works with few transitions. The crucial question is the relationship between these two histories.

The official proletarian culture of the Third International and, most recently, China, only portrayed smiling working and powerful peasants. Frowns, sickness, betrayals, defeats were eschewed. Andrei Zhadanov, proponent of Socialist Realism, explained why optimism and heroism were the guiding slogans. "Our [Soviet] literature is impregnated with enthusiasm and the spirit of heroic deeds. . . . It is optimistic because it is the literature of the rising class of the proletariat. . . ." [38] This is the logic of orthodox Marxism, and the hidden logic of much of the recent historical studies. The urge to stress the victories of the oppressed is deep seated and humanistic; it ill serves its subject when the objective defeats and surrenders — political and psychological — are whitewashed, and go unrecognized and uncomprehended.

Yet let there be no misunderstanding: the vision of unresisting victims by the social worker or the philanthropist is no better. This is a static view of history or the administrative dream of the world. Yet the application of the 'dialectical' scheme which decays into a behavioral psychology must also be avoided: stimulus provokes a response, or repression yields rebellion. Both visions corrode into myths.

II

By retreating from the political plane, the theoretical outline of orthodox Marxism is visible; a commitment to science pervades this outline. An esteem for science is hardly unique to Marxism; it infuses modern society. Science guarantees success. Marxism inherited this proposition from bourgeois society, and hammered it into a deadly weapon. For Marxists it became the revolver to shoot dissidents and opponents. The primal and final charge that orthodox Marxism invokes is that their opponents have violated the canons of science; they are pre-scientific, non-scientific, literary, romantic, utopian, historicist, humanist, aesthetic.

Marx also considered his work scientific, and contrasted it to utopian and other brands of socialism. "There is no royal road to science," Marx cautioned his French readers of *Capital*.[39] Yet Marx employed the term science sparingly, and criticized its excessive usage. More importantly, for Marx science meant "Wissenschaft," a term which resounds with Hegel. That the English and French "science" is more limited than the German "Wissenschaft"

38. Andrei Zhdanov, *Problems of Soviet Literature: Reports and Speeches at the First Soviet Writers' Congress*, 1934 (New York, n.d.), p. 20. Another proponent stated that socialist realism "not only criticizes, it affirms." Cited in and see Kenneth E. Harper, *Controversy in Soviet Literary Criticism on the Doctrine of Socialist Realism* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1950), p. 59. Cf. Eduard J. Brown, *The Proletarian Episode in Russian Literature 1928-1932* (New York, 1953) and Hermann Ermolaev, *Soviet Literary Theories 1917-1934: The Genesis of Socialist Realism* (Berkeley, 1963).

39. K. Marx, "Preface to the French Edition," *Capital*, p. 104.

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is a point regularly made in cultural and intellectual studies.[40] For the history of Marxism however it merits more attention than a footnote, since it involves the entire question of Hegel's impact on Marxism.

If Marx deemed his own work scientific, he distrusted a religion of science.[41] On more than one occasion he dissociated himself from the term scientific socialism. Marx charged Proudhon with fetishizing science. "No school of thought has thrown around the word 'science' more haphazardly than that of Proudhon. . . ."[42] For Proudhon science "reduces itself to a slender proportion of a scientific formula; he is the man in search of formulas."[43] Years later, responding to Bakunin's accusation that "scientific socialism" ("Wissenschaftlicher Sozialismus") was elitist, Marx clarified: "'Scientific socialism' was only used in opposition to utopian socialism, which wants to attach the people to new delusions, instead of limiting its science to the knowledge of the social movement made by the people itself."[44]

That science here meant knowledge of the "social movement made by the people itself" ("Erkenntnis der vom Volk selbst gemachten sozialen Bewegung")[45] suggests the divergence between the Hegelian "Wissenschaft" and the French and English "science." This can be overstated; but the terms illuminate, and ultimately sustain, two conflicting Marxist approaches to history and society. The distinction between "Wissenschaft" and science only gains currency outside the natural and exact sciences; this already structures the problem. For the issue was how to transfer the methods of the natural sciences to the social, political and philosophical terrain. By virtue of the palpable advances of the natural sciences, this was a compelling project. In duplicating the methods of the natural sciences the hope was to duplicate its achievements.

This project inspired a myriad of thinkers from Auguste Comte to Emile Durkheim, Karl Popper and contemporary sociologists, and forms the nub and hub of positivist (non-Hegelian) science. The history of these efforts is neither simple nor monotous; and it is cluttered with reservations and qualifications.[46] Each thinker has selected and prized only some of the features

40. One example: Walter Kaufmann, *Hegel: A Reinterpretation* (Garden City, N.Y., 1966), pp. 157-158. The transition from a Hegelian notion of science to a positivist one is developed in Herbert Schnädelbach, *Erfahrung, Begründung und Reflexion. Versuch fber Positivismus* (Frankfurt, 1971), pp. 185ff. See also the classic work of Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences* (Evanston, 1970).

41. See Paul Thomas, "Marx and Science," *Political Studies*, 24 (1976), pp. 1-23.

42. K. Marx, *Capital*, p. 161. Marx employs the term "science," not "Wissenschaft," here. K. Marx, *Kapital*, in Marx-Engels *Werke*, Vol. 23 (Berlin, 1963), p. 83.

43. K. Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy* (New York, 1963), p. 126. The term in the original French text is again science. K. Marx, *Misère de la philosophie* (Paris, 1964), p. 433.

44. K. Marx, "Conspectus of Bakunin's *Statism and Anarchy*," in *First International and After*, p. 337.

45. K. Marx, "Konspekt," Marx-Engels *Werke*, Vol. 18 (Berlin, 1969), pp. 635-636.

46. The term "positivism" poses many problems; there is little agreement on its definition. Some would restrict positivism to Comte and his direct followers. See W.M. Simon, *European Positivism in the Nineteenth Century* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1963), p. 3. Yet the Vienna Circle, with few or no links to Comte, adopted the term logical positivism. See A.J. Ayer, "Introduction" to *Logical Positivism* (New York, 1959), and, in the same volume, "Positivism and Realism" by Moritz

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of the natural sciences: quantification, natural laws, objectivity, clarity, and so on. Comte is illustrative; he originally considered sociology a "special kind of physics." By name and substance Comte patterned social physics on the natural sciences. He retarded "all phenomenon as subjected to invariable natural *laws*. Our business is . . . to pursue an accurate discovery of these laws with a view to reducing them to the smallest possible number. . . . The best illustration of this is in the case of the doctrine of gravitation."[47]

In one fashion or another positivist "science" imitated and adopted the procedures of the natural sciences. It rang through, for example, the program of the Vienna Circle; the "scientific world conception," the program stated, was "empiricist and positivist," and applied "logical analysis." These features called forth others; a scientific world conception necessitated the "search for a neutral system of formulae, for a symbolism freed from the slag of historical languages. . . . Neatness and clarity are striven for, and dark distances and unfathomable depths rejected."[48]

"The slag of historical languages" is the heap which separates the positivist science from the Hegelian "Wissenschaft." For a Hegelian tradition, the slag of history is as valuable as the nuggets. History is not footnoted or dumped, but infuses the theory. Here Hegelian and positivist science separate. The natural world, and its sciences, know history only externally; it does not determine its structure or method. The difference between the study of the moon and the French Revolution is history. Human sciences inspired by the study of the moon or the atom suppress or belittle the historical dimension.

Schlick. Cf. Gustav Bergmann, *The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism* (Madison, 1967), pp. 1-16. Others, such as Popper, who might be situated within the history of positivism, reject the term; see his "Reason or Revolution?" in T.W. Adorno, *et al., The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology* (London, 1976). Yet what Popper himself presents as the substance of his agreement with the Vienna Circle suffices to include him within the currents of positivism. "I still feel very much at one with the Vienna Circle;" and he mentions in particular the distinction Carnap drew between "the way mathematicians and scientists proceed" and the "depressing ways of the philosophers." K. Popper, *Unended Quest* (La Salle, Ill., 1976), p. 89. This seems to confirm Albrecht Wellmer: "Popper's criterion features the tendency proper to the positivist theory of science: that is, the intention to make scientific empiricism the unique, consciously applied law of scientific research." A. Wellmer, *Critical Theory of Society* (New York, 1971), p. 19. For a more sympathetic account of Popper, see Gerald Radnitzky, *Contemporary Schools of Metascience* (Chicago, 1973), esp. pp. 331ff. In general I will follow Leszek Kolakowski's definition: "Positivism is a collection of prohibitions concerning human knowledge, intended to confine the name of 'knowledge' (or 'science') to those operations that are observable in the evolution of the modern sciences of nature." *The Alienation of Reason: A History of Positivist Thought* (Garden City, 1969), p. 9. Compare this with: "One of the tenets of positivism is *methodological monism,* or the idea of the unity of scientific method. . . . A second tenet is the view that the exact natural sciences, in particular mathematical physics, set a methodological ideal or standard which measures the degree of development and perfection of all other sciences, including the humanities." Georg Henrik von Wright, *Explanations and Understanding* (Ithaca, 1971), p. 4. Cf. the definition and discussion in D.G. Charlton, *Positivist Thought in France during the Second Empire 1852-1870* (London, 1959), pp. 5ff.

47. *August Comte and Positivism,* ed. Gertrud Lenzer (New York, 1975), pp. 65, 75. On Comte see Otwin Massing, *Fortschritt und Gegenrevolution. Die Gesellschaftslehre Comtes in ihrer sozialen Funktion* (Stuttgart, 1966), and Oskar Negt, *Strukturbeziehungen zwischen den Gesellschaftslehren Comtes und Hegels* (Frankfurt, 1964).

48. "The Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle" (1929) in Otto Neurath, *Empiricism and Sociology* (Dordrecht, Holland, 1973), pp. 309, 306.

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History does not mean here a chronicle of events, but the story of humanity as actor and victim. As Hegel's greatest student wrote, "Men make their own history," and added the crucial qualification: "but they do not make it just as they please."[49] Positivist science tends to eliminate history as so much slag or intellectual baggage. To be sure, the natural world and the natural sciences are hardly impervious to history. The problems and approaches are themselves a product of history; but finally the structure of the moon or the atom is not historical. "Human history," wrote Marx citing Vico, "differs from natural history in that we have made the former, and not the latter."[50]

The Hegelian "Wissenschaft" is not wider or larger than the positivist science; rather it is impregnated with history. The natural reality and natural sciences do not know the fundamental historical categories: consciousness and self-consciousness, subjectivity and objectivity, appearance and essence. In direct opposition Neurath wrote for the Vienna Circle: "In science there are no 'depths,' there is surface everywhere." Or: "A scientific description can contain only the *structure*...of objects, not their 'essence'.... Subjectively experienced qualities — redness, pleasure — are as such only experiences, not knowledge."[51]

Yet Hegelian thought must not be confused with mysticism or irrationality; it does not promote the cult of depths and essences. Positive and empirical sciences are not false, but limited.[52] "To such questions as, when Caesar was born, or how many feet there were in a stadium, etc., a neat answer should be given, just as it is surely true that the square of the hypotenuse equals the squares of the other two sides of a right-angled triangle. But the nature of such so-called truths is different from the nature of philosophical truths."[53] The logic and approach of the empirical sciences and common sense is not so much true or untrue, but correct or incorrect; it does not attain truth. The judgement "the rose 'is red' or 'is not red'" can only be "correct" within the "limited circle of perception."[54]

For Hegel the ideal of the positive sciences — mathematics — is vulnerable to the same criticism: it is limited. As a single mode of cognition it is "external and indifferent." "Our knowledge would be a very awkward predicament if such objects as freedom, law, morality, or even God himself, because they cannot be measured and calculated, or expressed in a mathematical formula, were to be reckoned beyond the reach of exact knowledge...."[55]

49. K. Marx, *The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (New York, 1963), p. 15.
50. K. Marx, *Capital*, p. 493.
51. "The Scientific Conception...The Vienna Circle," pp. 306, 309-310.
52. The Hegel literature is out of hand. Some works I have found helpful are: Hans Radermacher, "Hegel und der Positivismus," in *Aktualität und Folgen der Philosophie Hegels*, ed. O. Negt (Frankfurt, 1970); Theodor Litt, *Hegel* (Heidelberg, 1953); José M. Ripaldo, *The Divided Nation: The Roots of a Bourgeois Thinker: G. W. Hegel* (Assen, The Netherlands, 1977); Otto Pöggler, *Hegels Idee einer Phänomenologie des Geist* (Freiburg, 1973); Andries Sarlemign, *Hegel's Dialectic* (Dordrecht, 1975); Wolfgang Bonsiepen, *Der Segriff der Negativität in dem Jenaer Schriften Hegels* (Bonn, 1977).
53. *Hegel: Texts and Commentary*, ed. W. Kaufmann (Garden City, 1966), p. 60.
54. *Logic of Hegel*, trans. W. Wallace (London, 1963), p. 304. This is the first part of the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline*.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 187.

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As object and method, Hegel's 'Wissenschaft' is saturated with history; this finally constitutes his protest against the positive and empirical sciences. They are historically blind, and treat truth as formal and static. "Truth is not a minted coin which can be given and pocketed ready-made."[56] History is a means and ends. "The harmoniousness of childhood is a gift from the hand of nature; the second harmony must spring from the labor and culture of the spirit"[57] — from the historical process.

These teachings of Hegel were neither well-received nor preserved. The story of the impact of Hegelian thought takes volumes. It is germane here in regard to a single issue: the critique of positivist science which does not collapse into irrationality or existentialism is unthinkable without Hegelian thought. For this reason the reception of Hegel by Marxists is fundamental. As the following chapter seeks to demonstrate, this reception preceded and defined the texture of the subsequent Marxism.

In the major philosophical traditions, Hegel remains an outsider. For instance, Anglo-American courses in the history of philosophy typically end with Kant, and recommence inthe 20th century with the troubling Hegel — as well as Marx, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer — is regularly omitted, or palmed off to the literature departments or to teachers not-yet-hired or about-to-be-fired. Karl Popper's evaluation, if not representative, at least suggests the deep and general mistrust. In *The Open Society*, a book, he tells us, grounded in a "rational attitude" of "openness of criticism,"[58] Popper credits the following judgement of Hegel as truthful and "excellent." "Hegel...was a flat-headed, insipid, nauseating, illiterate, charlatan, who readhed the pinnacle of audacity in scribbling together and dishing up the crassest mystifying nonsense. This nonsense has been noisily proclaimed as immortal wisdom by mercenary followers and readily accepted as such by all fools."[59]

If Hegel fared better in the Marxist traditions, generally he attracted little interest. He was easily situated, interpreted and forgotten with the aid of some phrases by Marx or especially some texts by Engels. Hegel was honored as the originator of idealistic dialectics, and with juggling these could be rendered materialistic and scientific. Ultimately they were codified by Stalin into a set of laws.[60] What Lenin scribbled down during the enforced leisure of World War I when he began to study Hegel remained a stray statement. "It is impossible to understand *Capital* without understanding the whole of Hegel's *Logic*. Consequently, no Marxists have understood Marx."[61]

Yet the role, or lack of a role, of Hegel should not be exaggerated for the fatïe of subsequent Marxism. Neither the presence or absence, accurate or

56. *Hegel: Texts and Commentary*, p. 58.
57. *Logic of Hegel*, p. 55.
58. K. Popper, *Unended Quest*, p. 91.
59. K. Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies*, Vol. 2 (New York, 1967), pp. 32-33. The quotation is from Schopenhauer.
60. Joseph Stalin, *Dialectical and Historical Materialism* (New York, 1940).
61. V.I. Lenin, "Conspectus of Hegel's Book *The Science of Logic*," in *Collected Works*, Vol. 38 (Moscow, 1963), p. 180.

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inaccurate interpretation of a single thinker can be held accountable for the vagaries of political and social movements. In this sense the relation of Hegel to subsequent Marxism (or Darwin to social Darwinism) is not cause and effect. The founders succumb to the imperatives of their followers. Yet that Hegel has been consistently misread or unread suggests something about the fabric of orthodox Marxism: Hegel proved a threat to the dominant idea of science. Consequently orthodox Marxism has sought either to reduce Hegel to a positivist notion of science or purge him from Marxism.

This has remained a current project of orhtodox Marxism. In recent years Althusser assumed this task; he is a short course on what is orthodox Marxism. His work has been marked by two closely related elements, a phobia of Hegel and a passion for science. "We have the right . . . and the duty, politically, to use and defend — by fighting for the *word* — the philosophical category of 'science' . . . . To use and defend the word 'science' . . . is a necessity, in order to resist the bourgeois subjective idealists and the petty bourgeois Marxists. . . ." [62] The main weapon of the petty bourgeois hoards is history, or historicism in Althusser's lexicon. History and historicism compromise the rigor of science. Marxism is no more historical than language," which as Stalin showed escaped [history]." [63]

Next to history, the main danger to science is Hegel; Althusser has met this danger through exorcism. He has argued that the "young Marx *was never strictly speaking a Hegelian*" except in 1844 when he broke with Hegel. [64] Althusser learned that this was not, strictly speaking, true, except in 1965 when he stated it. Later he discovered Hegel everywhere, and recast his thesis so as to save it: Marx was engaged in a life-long flight from Hegel, attaining safety only in death. With Althusser anything short of rigor mortis lacks rigor. The living Marx was tainted with Hegel. "The famous Preface of 1857 is still profoundly Hegelian evolutionist." [65] Althusser's geiger counter picks up Hegelian rays even in *Capital*; its one percent Hegel is still unhealty, as well as "flagrant and extremely harmful." [66] Only Marx's notes on Wagner, written the year his death, are "*totally and definitely exempt* from *any* trace of Hegelian influence." [67]

That generations of Marxists have been seduced by a popular idea of science cannot simply be traced to intellectual confusion; it is rooted, rather, in the ambivalent relationship of Marxism and bourgeois society. If Marx was capitalism's greatest critic, he was also its greatest admirer. Marx's own position can be presented theoretically with some precision; but more — or less — theoretically it has presented individual Marxists of specific societies with endless difficulties. Capitalism was denounced for its exploitation, its brutality,

62. L. Althusser, *Essays in Self-Criticism*, p. 116.
63. See generally "Marxism is not a Historicism" in Althusser and Balibar, *Reading Capital*, pp. 119-144.
64. L. Althusser, "Introduction" (1965) of *For Marx*, p. 35.
65. L. Althusser, "Preface to *Capital*" (1969) in *Lenin and Philosophy*, p. 93.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 103. "A Hegelian-evolutionist conception . . . disappears 99 percent in *Capital* and completely in Marx's later texts."
67. *Ibid.*, pp. 95, 94, Emphasis in original.

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pollution, hypocrisy — and the list goes on. Yet it was welcomed, even celebrated, insofar as it represented a giant step out of a pre-bourgeois order. Socialism could only be established on the foundation and wealth that capitalism produced. Capitalism was not only indispensable, it was desirable.

The message for individual Marxists was more complex, especially those located in societies where the work of capitalism was uncompleted; and this included all Marxists, with the possible exception of the English. In all other societies capitalism remained a progressive force; and the working class should abet capitalism until the material foundations for socialism had been created. The lesson was difficult and unpalatable. In January 1849 Marx advised the German democrats and workers. "We are certainly the last people to desire the rule of the bourgeoisie." Yet "it is better to suffer in modern bourgeois society, which by its industry creates the material means for the foundation of a new society that will liberate you all, than to revert to a bygone form of society which...thrusts the entire nation back into medieval barbarism." [68]

This says it exactly, and perhaps too exactly. For this provoked responses from an "ultra-left" impatient with its evolutionary logic. While these objections are generally ignored or slighted in the official histories,[69] they touch a raw nerve of Marxism. In the aftermath of the 1848, when these objections were raised, Marx advocated incremental social transformation. Protests emerged from various quarters, and finally split the Communist League, to which Marx and Engles belonged. [70] Andreas Gottschalk asked Marx sarcastically: "Why should we make a revolution? Why should we, men of the proletariat, spill our blood? Should we really escape the hell of the Middle Ages by precipitating ourselves into the purgatory of decrepit capitalist rule....? You are not serious about the liberation of the oppressed."[71]

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68. K. Marx, "Montesquieu LVI," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* (January 21, 1849) in Marx-Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 8 (New York, 1977), p. 266.

69. For a critique of Soviet accounts, see Boris Nicolaevsky, "Towards a History of the Communist League 1847-1852," *IRSH* 1 (1956), pp. 234-253).

70. Marx's actions and politics in regard to the Cologne working class movement and the Communist League have been subject to much controversy. Party of the dispute concerns the authenticity of a deposition made by Peter Röser, president of the Cologne Association of Workers. He reported, "Both Marx and Schapper want communism. This does not alter the fact that they are oppoentns or even enemies as soon asl it comes to the methods.... The supporters of Schapper and Willich want communism introduced at the present stage of development, if necessary by force of arms.... To Marx, communism is possible only as a result of an advance in education and general development; in one of his letters he addressed to us he distinguished four phases through which it will be necessary to pass before it is achieved." Cited in and see B. Nicolaievsky and Otto Maenchen-Helfen, *Karl Marx* (Middlesex, England, 1976), p. 416. The full text of Röser and a further discussion can be found in Werner Blumenberg, "Zur Geschichte des Bundes der Kommunisten. Die Aussagen des Peter Gerhardt Röser," *IRSH*, 9 (1964), pp. 81-122. Cf. Fritz Brügel, "Zur Geschichte des Kölner Arbeitervereins," *Die Gesellschaft*, 7 (1930), pp. 112-116. That this was Marx's position, if not his words, is confirmed by the minutes of the meeting of the League in 1850. In an oft-cited passage, Marx stated against Willich and Schapper: "While we say to the worker: you must pass through 15, 20, 50 years of civil war in order to change the relations, in order to make yourself capable of power, you say instead: We must *immediately* come to power or, we can stay asleep." "Sitzung der Zentralbehörde vom 15. September 1850," Marx-Engels *Werke*, Vol. 8, p. 598. Cf. Nicolaievsky and Maenchen-Helfen, *Karl Marx*, p. 231. On Willich, see Loyd D. Easton, *Hegel's First American Followers* (Athens, Ohio, 1966), pp. 167ff.

71. Cited in Hans Stein, *Der Kölner Arbeiterverein (1848-1849)* (Cologne, 1921), p. 97. On Gottschalk see Ernst Czobel, "Zur Geschichte des Kommunistenbundes," *Grünberg Archiv*, 2

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The charge was not fair; yet it located a tension in Marxism which regularly degenerated into a simple affirmation: where capitalism was uncompleted, Marxists were required to finish its work. The evil of retrograde social development was met by blessing capitalist development, which would finally issue into a new social order. This evolutionary logic was more than logic; it brought in its train attitudes and beliefs which corroded the theoretical and psychological impulse to subvert capitalism.

The evaluation of colonialism by Marx displayed these same features. Brutal robbery and exploitation marked colonialism; yet insofar as the material foundations of capitalism were established, colonialism progressed willy-nilly towards socialism. This in brief constituted Marx's appraisal of the English colonization of India. "The devastating effects of English industry, when contemplated with regard to India...are palpable and confounding." But England has a "double mission" in India, destroying the old society "and the laying of the material foundations of Western society in Asia." "Modern industry...will dissolve the hereditary divisions of labor, upon which rest the Indian castes, those decisive impediments to Indian progress and Indian power." [72]

From the *Communist Manifesto* to *Capital*, the same dialectical vision informed Marx's analysis of modern industry. Marx never doubted that the drive for profits constantly impelled the bourgeoisie to revolutionize the instruments of production. "Modern industry never views or treats the existing form of production process as the definitive one. Its technical basis is therefore revolutionary, whereas all earlier modes of production were essentially conservative." Yet the social relations in which the "technical basis of production" was enmeshed constituted the devastating "negative side."[73]

If the terms are clear enough, the substance is not. That it has taken countless scholars to determine exactly what Marx was saying only suggests the difficulty of Marxists faced with political options and choices. The history of Marxism is the history of the loss of the dialectical critique of bourgeois society. The irresistible temptation was to cast the dialectical movements of society into a one-way and upward path. Progress in capitalism was read as progress towards socialism. The texts of Marx could always be interpreted in this light. Marxists were confident that their "science" was grounded in the actual movements of society; this distinguished Marxism from other (and utopian) socialism, which fled into the past or rural enclaves. for the Marxists, however, the critique of capitalism was corroded by the endorsement of its achievements.

Every chapter in the history of Marxism has been rent by this dialectic — or inconsistency: the denunciation of capitalism vied with its affirmation. The beginnings of Russian Marxism conform to this pattern. Appealing to

(1925), pp. 324ff; David McLellan, *Karl Marx* (New York, 1977), pp. 195ff; Edmund Silberner, *Moses Hess. Geschichtes seines Lebens* (Leiden, 1966), pp. 283ff; P.H. Noyes, *Organization and Revolution Working Class Associations in the German Revolutions of 1848-1849* (Princeton, 1966), pp. 118 and passim. The "we" in the quotation is misleading: Gottschalk was a doctor.

72. K. Marx, "The Future Results of British Rule in India" (1853) in *Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization*, ed. S. Avineri (Garden City, N.Y., 1969), pp. 132-139.

73. K. Marx, *Capital*, pp. 617-618.

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economic or cultural grounds, the Populists argued that Russia would or should escape the disaster and evil of capitalism's development. The Marxists retorted that capitalism was, and should, develop in Russia; this laid the foundation for a proletariat, and finally a socialist revolution. For these reasons capitalism could be evaluated as progressive. Lenin's *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* (1900) pursued this in detail.

Inasmuch as the Russian Marxists strained to demonstrate the factual and positive impact of capitalism, they were tempted to minimize its destructiveness. If "more" capitalism was preferable to "less," was the critique of capitalism itself vitiated? Lenin addressed directly this question: "Recognition of the progressiveness of this role [of capitalism] is quite compatible...with the full recognition of the negative and dark sides of capitalism...."[74]

Yet in practice for many Russian Marxists this recognition proved difficult to maintain; they extolled capitalism so enthusiastically they forgot about socialism — or tired with it. They no longer grasped how or where socialism differed from capitalism; this set the stage for a return to religion. The "legal Marxists" were especially prey to these option. Serge Bulgakov exulted, as a Marxist, that "every new factory, every new industrial enterprise carries us forward...," and he ended as a priest decrying the "mechanical necessity" of Marxism.[75] Struve, a legal Marxist, closed his major study with these words: "Let us confess our cultural backwardness and let us learn from capitalism," and ended as a liberal.[76]

The same ambiguity corroded the Marxist opposition to colonialism. The Second International condemned colonialism as a violent appendage of capitalism. Yet to some Marxists insofar as colonialism propelled the colonized along the path of industrialization, it served a necessary and positive function. As one exponent of a "positive" colonial policy put it: "The primitive peoples will reach civilization only by bearing this cross [of capitalism]. It is therefore our duty not to hinder the development of capitalism, an indispensable chain in the history of humanity; we can even favor its appearance...."[77]

74. V. Lenin, *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* in *Collected Works*, Vol. 3 (Moscow, 1964), p. 596.

75. Bulgakov as cited in Arthur P. Mendel, *Dilemmas of Progress in Tsarist Russia: Legal Marxism and Legal Populism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1961), p. 139.

76. Struve as cited in Shmuel Galai, *The Liberation Movement in Russia 1900-1905* (Cambridge, 1973), p. 85. Cf. Richard Kindersley, *The First Russian Revisionists: A Study of Legal Marxism in Russia* (Oxford, 1962); Richard Pipes, *Struve: Liberal on the Left 1870-1905* (Cambridge, Mass., 1970) and his Introduction to P. von Struve, "La Théorie Marxienne de l'evolution sociale," *Etudes de Marxologie*, 6 (1962), pp. 105ff; Bastiann Wielenga, *Lenins Weg zur Revolution. Eine Konfrontation mit Sergej Bulgakov und Petre Struve im Interesse eine theologischen Besinnung* (Munich, 1971); Solomon M. Schwarz, "Populism and Early Russian Marxism on Ways of Economic Development of Russia," in *Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought*, ed. E.J. Simmons (Cambridge, Mass., 1955); Andrzej Walicki, *The Controversy over Capitalism* (London, 1969).

77. The text is included in *Marxism and Asia*, ed. Hélène Carrère d'Encausse and S.R. Schram (London, 1969), p. 126. Cf. *La deuxième internationale et l'orient*, ed. Georges Haupt and M. Reberioux (Paris, 1967), esp. pp. 79-94. For a summary of the debate on colonialism at Stuttgart (1907) see Julius Braunthal, *History of the International*, Vol. 1, 1864-1914 (New York, 1967), pp. 318-319. For a good discussion of the issues see Horace B. Davis, *Nationalism and Socialism* (New

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The evaluation of technology by Marxists succumbed to the same pressures; a dialectical critique was sloughed off. Marxists did not doubt that technology belonged to the greatest achievement of capitalism, distinguishing it from all previous societies. The suffering or misfortune that technology yielded was due to the social context, not the apparatus itself. Such logic stuffed technology into familiar categories of means and ends; technology was as best and worst a neutral endeavor. The evil resided only in the ends to which it was used.

This approach infused orthodox Marxism; nor could it be accused of distorting Marx. Marx was always a sharp critic of utopian, feudal and romantic socialism; each was oblivious or antagonistic towards the technological advances of capitalist industrialization. Little seemed more certain than that Marxists accepted and even accelerated these advances. Nevertheless, a yawning gap between the general principles and the particulars vitiated a critical appropriation of a technological world. Technology everywhere was welcomed as facilitating socialism, and for that reason, was exempted from critical inspection.

Marx can hardly be accused of blindness towards the destructiveness of the labor process. On occasion, however, he had suggested that the divisions of labor within the factory were "planned and regulated" while those in the larger society were unregulated and anarchistic.[78] The notion was attractive and popular because it inferred that the factory and technology were the progressive elements of capitalism. Irrationality was confined to the market place and found its boundary at the factory gate. Furthermore the notion accorded with common sense which could confirm the confusion and lawlessness of the market but was mute before the apparent rationality and efficiency of production itself. Yet such perspectives capitulated to the mystique of technology; it reduced revolution to sacking the bosses while protecting as sacrosanct the technological base.[79]

Lenin's evaluation of technology, and Taylorism in particular, participated in this logic. The weakness of capitalist technology and Taylorism lay in its confinement to the factory. "Capital organizes and rationalizes labor within the factory.... In social production as a whole, however, chaos continues to reign and grow."[80] Lenin recognized that the Taylor system, "like all capitalist progress, is a combination of the refined brutality of bourgeois exploitation and a number of the greatest scientific achievements." The lesson was clear:

York, 1973), esp. pp. 90ff. Davis attacks Abraham Ascher's "Imperialists within German Social Democracy prior to 1914," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, 20 (1961), pp. 397-422. Cf. Max Victor, "Die Stellung der deutschen Sozialdemokratie zu den Fragen der auswärtigen Politik (1869-1914)," *AfSz*, 60 (1928), esp. pp. 165ff.

78. *Capital*, pp. 476-478.

79. Recently attempts have been made to retrieve Marx's critique of technology and the division of labor. See Harry Braverman, *Labor and Monopoly Capital* (New York, 1974), and my review, which elaborates some of the remarks in these pages; in *Telos*, 29 (Fall 1976), pp. 199-207. See also David F. Noble, *America by Design: Science, Technology and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism* (New York, 1977). Herbert Marcuse has made a celebrated interpretation of technology as specific to capitalism; see William Leiss, "Technological Rationality: Marcuse and his Critics" in W. Leiss, *the Domination of Nature* (New York, 1972).

80. V. Lenin, "The Taylor System— Man's Enslavement by the Machine," in *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 153.

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"The Soviet Republic must at all costs adopt all that is valuable in the achievements of science and technology in this field. The possibility of building socialism depends exactly upon our success in combining the Soviet power and the Soviet organization of administration with the up-to-date achievements of capitalism. We must organize in Russia the study and teaching of the Taylor system and systematically try it out and adapt it to our own ends."[81] Stalin later defined Leninism as a combination of "Russian revolutionary sweep with American efficiency."[82]

The uncritical enthusiasm for technology was not grounded simply in the textual complexities of Marx, nor was the plan to adopt and accelerate capitalist industrialization based simply on a misreading of Marx. Such an argument ascribes to the texts too much importance. Rather the social-economic imperatives of backwardness suppressed the dialectical critique of technology. This resounds through Lenin. The work of capitalism was palpably incompleted; and if this was obvious to the Russians, Marxists in Italy, France and Germany were no less convinced.[83]

If today large regions within the industrial advanced countries are "underdeveloped," evidently a century ago this was more striking. Of course, what constituted "under"developed or "over"developed is the essence of the matter.[84] Marx studied England because he was convinced other West European countries would replicate its history. "The country that is more developed industrially only shows to the less developed the image of its future." Germany, in comparison, suffered "not only from the development of capitalist production, but also from the incompleteness of that development."[85]

The "incompleteness" of economic development, as fact or conviction, encouraged the acceptance of evolutionary theories. For the first generation of Marxists after Marx, capitalism proved its ability not only to limp along, but develop and expand. The last part of the century witnessed not only the perfecting of new industrial technology — cheap steel, electric power — but a

81. V. Lenin, "The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government," *Selected Works in Three Volumes*, Vol. 2 (Moscow, 1970), p. 663. See Ulysses Santamaria and Alain Manville, "Lenin and the Problem of the Transition," *Telos*, 27 (Spring 1976), pp. 79-96; Rainer Traub, "Lenin and Taylor," *Telos*, 37 (Fall 1978), pp. 82-92; F.J. Fleron and L.J. Fleron, "Administrative Theory as Repressive Political Theory: The Communist Experience," *Telos*, 12 (Summer 1972), pp. 63-92; F.J. Fleron, ed., *Technology and Communist Culture* (New York, 1977).

82. J. Stalin, "The Foundations of Leninism," in *The Essential Stalin*, ed. B. Franklin (Garden City, N.Y., 1972), p. 186. According to Robert Tucker, Bukharin originated this formulation: R. Tucker, *Stalin as Revolutionary 1879-1929* (New York, 1973), p. 318.

83. For the wider impact of Taylorism, see Charles S. Maier, "Between Taylorism and Technocracy: European Ideologies and the Vision of Industrial Productivity," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 5 (1970), pp. 27-62. Cf. Paul Devinat, *Scientific Management in Europe* (Geneva, 1927).

84. Some years ago Andre G. Frank sparked a debate re-examining the terms and realities of development and underdevelopment; see especially "The Development of Underdevelopment" and "Sociology of Development" in his *Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution* (New York, 1969). Later contributions include Immanuel Wallerstein, ed., *World Inequality* (Montreal, 1975); Arghiri Emmanuel, *Unequal Exchange* (New York, 1972); Samir Amin, *Accumulation on a World Scale*, 2 vols. (New York, 1974).

85. Marx, *Capital*, p. 91.

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transformation of the character of consumption: sewing machines, cheap clocks, bicycles, electric lighting.[86] That these were not equally distributed is not to the point: they never were in the past; they suggested, however, that capitalism had hardly ceased to progress. The evolutionary progress of capitalism called forth and ratified the evolutionary and scientific doctrines of Marxists.

The critique of bourgeois society — Marxism — progressively lost its bite; the distance between Marxism and bourgeois society narrowed. Marxists and their opponents shared the belief in science, progress and success. Revolution was not simply adjourned; rather the Marxist embraced the scientific and industrial rationality as his own. Marxists saw themselves as perfecting and accelerating the advances of capitalism.

The phenomenon of Marxists extolling and finally succumbing to capitalism did not go completely unnoticed. If the participants were blind, those on the outside or margins of Marxism were not. It is hardly fortuitous that *the* historian and sociologist of capitalist rationality, Max Weber, recognized the spirit of capitalism in the lair of the Marxists. He visited a party congress of the German Social Democrats in 1906 and concluded: "These gentlemen no longer frighten anyone."[87] The following year he debated conservative sociologists on the threat of a Social-Democratic electoral victory in several German cities. "I see no danger for bourgeois society in surrendering our cities. . . to the SPD," Weber stated. He noted that "no revolutionary enthusiasm was expressed at the recent SPD congress;" and he anticipated that a victorious SPD would follow a "mercantile policy," encouraging the growth of capital.[88]

The profound complicity of orthodox Marxism in bourgeois industrialization is exposed by an absence: in the Marxist tradition a searching critique of the 'secondary' characteristics of capitalism is lacking. Secondary refers to those features that stand once removed from the primary economic organization of wages, working conditions, imperialism, and the like. It refers to a series of relations, such as urbanism, mass media, psychological life, leisure and so on. These are not necessarily second in importance, but second insofar as they cannot exist apart from the basic political-economic organization of society.

In recent decades these areas increasingly drew the attention of Marxists, but in the past Marxists ignored them. The few analyses offered have been pedestrian and predictable. The secondary features have been disposed of by concepts taken from the basic dictionary of Marxism: superstructure,

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86. For a survey see David S. Landes, *The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present* (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 242ff.

87. Cited in and see Wolfgang Mommsen, *Max Weber und die deutsche Politik 1890-1920*, 2nd edition (Tübingen, 1974), p. 114. Cf. W. Mommsen, *Max Weber. Gesellschaft, Politik und Geschichte* (Frankfurt, 1974), pp. 150ff.

88. *Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik*, vol. 125. *Verhandlungen der Generalversammlung in Magedburg*, 1907 (Leipzig, 1908), pp. 298-300. Cf. Dieger Lindenlaub, *Richtungskämpfe im Verein für Sozialpolitik*, Part II (Wiesbaden, 1967), pp. 282ff.

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relations of production, accumulation, and so on. If none of these concepts has been wrong, none has grasped the specificity of the phenomenon.

The usual explanation for the banality of Marxism here refers to the ills of 'vulgar' Marxism. Vulgar Marxism is vulgar in its economic reductionism; beyond an economic base, everything lacks substance and reality. As an explanation for the lameness of Marxism this does not suffice. Not only vulgar Marxism, but its vulgar critique needs to be surmounted.

The vulgar critique of vulgar Marxism glosses over the complicity between the Marxists and the secondary features of capitalism. This was the reason for blindness. They did not perceive these features as fundamentally changing; hence there was no reason for scrutiny. The Marxist would inherit the cities and the mass newspapers, only the signs and headlines would be changed. Rockefeller Plaza would become Leninplatz. The basic rapport with industrial life paralyzed the critique.

This can be stated in the obverse more emphatically: the most compelling and illuminating analyses of the secondary processes derive from a conservative, sometimes reactionary, tradition. This runs from Nietzsche and Spengler to contemporary — and surely lesser — critics such as Ellul and Illich. This is hardly a coherent tradition, and it is radically flawed in more than one respect. Yet the analyses that are proferred are unmatched — and unassimilated — by Marxists.

To cite a single example: Spengler's analysis of the daily press from 1919 found no counterpart in the Marxists: "English-American politics have created *through the press* a force-field of worldwide intellectual and financial tensions in which every individual unconsciously takes up the place alloted to him, so that he must think, will, and act as a ruling personality somewhere or other in the distance thinks fit.... Man does not speak to man; the press, and its associate, the electrical news service, keep the waking consciousness of whole peoples and continents under a deafening drum-fire of these, catchwords, standpoints, scenes, feelings, day by day and year by year.... The scattered sheets of the Age of Enlightenment transformed themselves into the Press — a term of most significant anonymity.... Today we live so cowed under the bombardment of this intellectual artillery that hardly anyone can attain to the inward detachment that is required for a clear view of the monstrous drama.... The liberal bourgeois mind is *proud* of the abolition of censorship, the last restraint, while the dictator of the press — Northcliffe! — keeps the slave gang of his readers under the whip of his leading articles, telegrams and pictures. *Democracy has by its newspapers completely expelled the book from the mental life of the people*.... The people read the *one* paper, "its" paper, which forces itself through the front doors by millions daily, spellbinds the intellect from morning to night, drives the book into oblivion by its more engaging layout, and if one or another specimen of a book does emerge into visibility, forestalls and eliminates its possible effects by 'reviewing' it.... What the Press wills is true. Its commanders evoke, transform, interchange truths. Three weeks of press work, and the truth is acknowledged by everybody.... The reader neither knows, nor is allowed to

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know, the purpose for which he is used.... A more appalling caricature of freedom of thought cannot be imagined. Formerly a man did not dare to think freely. Now he dares, but cannot."[89]

This assault on ccapitalism can also be found in Nietzsche's analysis of morality and bad conscience or, more recently, Illich's discussion of the medicalization of society.[90] These conservative critics penetrate and grasp phenomena that the Marxists revere and pass over. The sources of their insight are at hand; unlike the Marxists, they find capitalist rationality and progress grating. This allows and encourages insights barred to the Marxists less hostile to the beat of capitalism. The Marxists hear the squeaks and groans, where the mechanisms needs oil and new bearings; to these critics the hum itself is offensive.

To many of the conservatives, Marxism itself appeared as simply another industrialization scheme. Conventional liberalism and wisdom feared Marxism as a threat to capitalist industrialization. These critics feared the opposite: Marxism accelerated industrialization. Spengler considered Marxism a version of the English industrial revolution: it concentrated on business, profits and classes. Marx was an "exclusively English thinker," adopting the terms, ethics and categories of the industrial revolution. "He took his principles from the very thing he was fighting." Marx intended to *extend* capitalism to the working class, turning each worker into a merchant who sells his labor at the highest prices. In the light of the history of Marxism and trade unions. Spengler's judgment cannot be rejected as simply perverse: "Marxism is the capitalism of the working class."[91]

It is not coincidental that the few Marxists who swam against the tide of capitalist rationality did not sever all links to conservatism, romanticism or utopianism; they remained attached to a non-capitalist logic. This includes William Morris in the 19th century, Ernst Bloch, André Breton, and the Frankfurt School of the 20th century. Their intellectual sources enabled them to see through the mirror of the economy; they were alerted not simply to the falling rate of profit, but the falling rate of intelligence and beauty.[92] Their resistance to socialism as a souped-up version of capitalism draws these figures together.

The unorthodox Marxists retrieved the substance of Marx: socialism promised more than a rise in wages or an expansion of cities. A rise in wages, Marx wrote in *Capital*, "only means in fact that the length and weight of the golden chain the wage-laborer has already forged for himself allows it to be

89. Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, one volume edition (London, 1959), volume 2, pp. 460-463.

90. Ivan Illich, *Medical Nemesis: The Expropriation of Health* (London, 1975).

91. O. Spengler, "Prussianism and Socialism," in *Selected Essays*, ed. D.O. White (Chicago, 1967), pp. 95, 99, 100. This position contrasting Prussian to English socialism was not unique to Spengler; it reached back to Fichte and forward to Sombart; see Werner Sombart, *Deutscher Sozialismus* (Berlin, 1934), which juxtaposes German to proletarian socialism; the latter is the theory of Marx and industrialization (pp. 87ff). Cf. Ernst Stutz, *Oswald Spengler as politischer Denker* (Bern, 1958), which locates Spengler within a 20th-century "conservative revolution." For predecessors see Hans J. Schoeps, *Vorläufer Spengler* (Leiden, 1955). Cf. Anton M. Kotanek, *Oswald Spengler in seiner Zeit* (Munich, 1968).

92. See my "A Falling Rate of Intelligence?" *Telos*, 27 (Spring 1976), pp. 141-146.

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loosened somewhat."[93] Neither the elevation nor the equalization of wages was the goal of Marx's socialism; Marx, early and late, denounced "barracks communism [*Kasernenkommunismus*]."[94] Liberation is more than electing the bosses, trading subjugation for self-subjugation. "Criticism has plucked the imaginary flowers on the chain not in order that man shall continue to bear that chain without fantasy or consolation but so that he shall throw off the chain and pluck the living flower."[95]

The idioms diverge, but not the basic thinking of the unorthodox Marxists. Morris cautioned again and again not to confuse "the machinery of socialism" with socialism; to substitute "a business-like administration in the interests of the public" for a laissez-faire and coercive regime would be a great gain, but not the goal.[96] Socialism is not utilitarianism; it is leisure. "The leisure which Socialism above all things aims at obtaining for the worker is also the very thing that breeds desire; for beauty, for knowledge, for more abundant life, in short."[97]

Bloch salvaged the utopian and romantic note in Marxism.[98] The "naked economic orientation" paralyzed orthodox Marxism.[99] If the economy had been analytically subverted by the Marxists, lacking was the "soul" and "belief" to replace it.[100] For Bloch the path from utopia to science — the title of the popular Engels pamphlet — skipped too much; it eliminated not simply the utopian vision, but its driving force. What Bloch called the "warm current" of Marxism must be retrieved, lest it be suffocated by the "cold current" of technocratic Marxism. Breton, like Bloch, refused to sever links to supra-economic logic and terrains; he refused the either-or of orthodoxy: either electrification or imagination. "In the realm of facts, as we see it, no

93. *Capital,* p. 769.

94. "We have tried on the one hand to refrain from all system-making and all barrack-room communism," in "Circular of the First Congress of the Communist League to the League Members, June 1847," in Marx and Engels, *Collected Works,* Vol. 6, p. 598. While this was not authored by Marx or Engels, it was probably written under Engels' supervision, and referred to his "Draft of a Communist Confession of Faith," in *Collected Works,* Vol. 6, pp. 96-103. See also Marx's denunciation of "barracks-communism," in "Ein Komplott gegen die IAA," in Marx-Engels *Werke,* Vol. 18, p. 425.

95. Marx, 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Introduction," in *Early Writings,* ed. Q. Hoare (New York, 1975), p. 244.

96. William Morris, "Communism," in Morris, *Prose, Verse, Lectures and Essays,* ed. G.D.H. Cole (London, 1948), pp. 660-661.

97. "The Worker's Share of Art," in Morris, *Selected Writings and Designs,* ed. A. Briggs (Hammondsworth, 1962), p. 143. E.P. Thompson in his 1976 Postscript to *William Morris* (London, 1977) puts the issue well: "The romantic tradition is not to be defined only in terms of its traditional, conservative, 'regressive,' 'escapist' and 'utopian' characteristics — and hence to be seen as a continual undertow threatening to draw Morris back to 'subjectivism' and 'idealism'" (p. 779). Cf. Michael Levin, "Marx and Romanticism," *Political Studies,* 22 (1974), pp. 400-413.

98. Cited in David Gross, "Marxism and Utopia: Ernst Bloch," in *Towards a New Marxism,* ed. B. Grahl and P. Piccone (St. Louis, 1973), p. 86. Cf. Maynard Solomon, "Marx and Bloch," *Telos,* 13 (Fall 1972), pp. 68-85; Oskar Negt, "Ernst Bloch — The German Philosopher of the October Revolution," *New German Critique,* 4 (Winter 1975), pp. 3-16; Jürgen Habermas, "Ernst Bloch — A Marxist Romantic," *Salmagundi,* 10-11 (Fall-Winter 1969-70), pp. 311-324; Douglas Kellner, Harry O'Hara, "Utopia and Marxism in Ernst Bloch," *New German Critique,* 9 (Fall 1976), pp. 11-34; Helmut Reinicke, *Materiel und Revolution. Eine materialistische-erkenntnis-theoretische Untersuchung zur Philosophie Ernst Bloch* (Kronberg Taunus, 1974), pp. 181ff.

99. E. Bloch, *Durch die Wüste* (Frankfurt, 1964), p. 35. First edition: 1923.

100. E. Bloch, *Geist der Utopie* (Frankfurt, 1973), p. 305. First edition: 1918.

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ambiguity is possible: all of us seek to shift power from the hands of the bourgeoisie to those of the proletariat. Meanwhile, it is nonetheless necessary that the experiments of inner life continue." [101]

In the cant of orthodox Marxism these figures are all charged with the same infractions, violating the code of science. The code adumbrated various subsections, itemizing romantic, pessimistic, subjective and utopian violations. For one guardian *History and Class Consciousness* was "the first major irruption of the romantic anti-scientific tradition of bourgeois thought into Marxist theory." [102] The charge against the Frankfurt School runs: "In the place of revolutionary science enters bourgeois cultural pessimism." [103] Adorno and Horkheimer are accused of "spiritualism" and Marcuse of "petty bourgeois anarchism," a crime that is extended "to all those who have taken him seriously." [104] Wilhelm Reich and his followers did not escape the police raid. "Your starting point is consumption, ours is production; therefore you are not Marxists." [105] The surrealists were indicted for blocking capitalist development. "It is necessary to affirm plainly that the movement that one could call technological [*machiniste*] is destined to develop in the world in an irresistible fashion.... Communists should be one of the principal factors in its development." [106]

Against the dirty words — romanticism, subjectivism, aestheticism, utopianism — the clean ones are invoked: science, objectivity, rigor, structure. Here the final, almost psychological contours of orthodox Marxism come into view. Adorno's characterization of positivism as "the puritanism of knowledge" is valid for orthodox Marxism. [107] The goal is rigorous self-control and self-discipline. The asceticism of orthodox Marxism despises unregulated insight as the threat. The sexual code is internalized as conceptual commandments: suggestions of utopia and romanticism are tabooed as too

101. André Breton, "Legitimate Defense" (1926) in Breton, *What Is Surrealism?* ed. F. Rosemont (New York, 1978), pp. 39-40. "I really fail to see — some narrow-minded revolutionaries notwithstanding — why we should refrain from supporting the Revolution, provided we view the problems of love, dreams, madness, art and religion from the same angles they do." Second Manifesto of Surrealism in Breton, *Manifestoes of Surrealism* (Ann Arbor, 1972), p. 140. See generally Maurice Nadeau, *The History of Surrealism* (New York, 1965). Cf. Herbert Gershman, *The Surrealist Revolution in France* (Ann Arbor, 1968), pp. 80ff; J.H. Mathews, *Towards the Poetics of Surrealism* (Syracuse, 1976), pp. 122ff. The conventional interpretation of the contradiction between surrealism and Marxism can be found in Robert S. Short, "The Politics of Surrealism 1920-1936" in *Left-Wing Intellectuals between the Wars 1919-1939*, ed. W. Laquer, G.L. Mosse (New York, 1966), pp. 3-26.

102. Gareth S. Jones, "The Marxism of the Early Lukacs," *New Left Review,* 70 (November-December 1971), p. 44. Cf. Alvin W. Gouldner, "The Two Marxisms," in his *For Sociology* (New York, 1973), pp. 425ff.

103. *Die Frankfurter Schule im Lichte des Marxismus*, ed. J. Henrich von Heiseler (Frankfurt, 1970), p. 51.

104. Lucio Colletti, *From Rousseau to Lenin* (New York, 1972), pp. 111-140; p. 233.

105. Cited by Reich in his "What Is Class Consciousness?" in *Sex-Pol: Essays 1929-1934*, ed. L. Baxandall (New York, 1972), p. 350. For other criticisms by the Communists, see "Geschichte der deutschen Sex-Pol-Bewegung," *Zeitschrift für politische Psychologie und Sexualökonomie*, 2 (1935), pp. 64-70. See also Constantin Sinelnikov, "Early 'Marxist' Critiques of Reich," *Telos*, 13 (Fall 1972), pp. 131-137.

106. Pierre Naville, *La Révolution et les intellectuels* (Paris, 1927), p. 36.

107. T.W. Adorno *et al.*, *The Positivism Dispute in German Sociology* (London, 1976), pp. 55-56.

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suggestive. Scientific Marxism dreams not of a life without anxiety but of master plans and interoffice memos. Structural Marxism not only examines but is in love with structures: it fears the unstructured.

Asceticism is the conceptual center of gravity of orthodox Marxism. Concepts are multiplied so als to stamp out dissolute thought and thinkers. The object is to become an object; hence the hatred for the subjective. That the dissenters have been regularly derided as infantile from Engels through Lenin implies the psycho-sexual core: authority is threatened.[108] One critic is offended that no where in *History and Class Consciousness* is Marxism recognized as a "real and responsible science."[109] The gun of science is unsheathed whenever thought thinks too much. Another critic growls that unless we "move on from the discovery of the horrors of capitalism to an attempt to understand it scientifically," we will be plagued by "another 40 years of paralyzed virtuosity of the Frankfurt School."[110] The threat of paralyzed virtuosity is met by preventive arrests and five-year plans. "Their first concern," wrote Max Horkheimer about orthodox Marxism, "when they think about freedom is the new penal system, not its abolition."[111]

Not only Ben Franklin but orthodox Marxism as well are infused with the spirit of puritanism. The mental apparatus subordinates the mess of material desire to permanent-press concepts. Orthodox Marxism ironically confirms what Mary Douglas called the "purity rule": an increase in "disemboweling and etherizing forms of expression" correspond to a tightening net of social domination.[112] The dirty words of Marxism — humanism itself — recall the corporal and carnal reality that gives the lie to pristine theories of meta-structures. As a cohort of Althusser put it: "I shall not be satisfied until I either situate it [the word man] ... in the necessity of the theoretical system... or *eliminate* it as a foreign body."[113]

The conformity of orthodox Marxism is a servant of the cold passion for science and authority. Althusser tells us that ideology belongs to the future as well as the past. He means: keep your uniforms. The logic of "so much the worse for the facts" challenged the regulations that have domesticated Marxism. Nevertheless the choices are not between facts and fantasy, conceptual rigor and free association, science and poetry or optimism and pessimism. These are the bad choices that perpetuated Marxism as a caricature. The pieces do not fit neatly together, but neither does society. This suggests at least one guide for a critical Marxism: do not lose the pieces.

108. The charge of infantilism can be found in Engels' rebukes to the "Jungen," the opponents of the German Social Democracy orthodoxy; see Engels, "Antwort an die Redaktion der Sächsischen Arbeiter-Zeitung" (1890) in Marx-Engels *Werke*, Vol. 22, pp. 68-70. See Dirk H. Müller, *Idealismus und Revolution. Zur Opposition der Jungen gegen den Sozialdemokratischen Parteivorstand* (Berlin, 1975), pp. 122ff. and Hans M. Bock, *Geschichte des 'linken Radikalismus' in Deutschland* (Frankfurt, 1976), pp. 24ff.

109. G.S. Jones, "The Marxism of the Early Lukacs," p. 45.

110. Göran Therborn, "The Frankfurt School," *New Left Review*, 63 (September-October, 1970), pp. 65-96.

111. Max Horkheimer, "The Authoritarian State" (1940) in *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader*, ed. A. Arato and E. Gebhardt (New York, 1978), p. 114, and in *Telos*, 15 (Spring 1973).

112. Mary Douglas, *Natural Symbols* (New York, 1973), pp. 100ff. Cf. her *Purity and Danger* (London, 1978).

113. Balibar, in *Reading Capital*, p. 207. I would have missed this revealing passage without E.P. Thompson's discussion of it in his *Poverty of Theory*, pp. 336-337.

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

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THE ETHNIC QUESTION IN THE USSR*

by Victor Zaslavsky

What makes the on-going debate concerning ethnic[1] relations in the USSR so tedious is that one can rather accurately predict the authors' conclusions by just knowing in which country they happen to live: Soviet literature tends overwhelmingly to stress the internationalizing effects of ethnic integration, while American literature emphasizes just as forcefully the disintegrating effects of ethnic nationalism.[2] The Soviet emphasis can, of course, be partly explained by the fact that Soviet sociologists cannot publish anything which fails to substantiate the official proposition that "the integration of nationalities in the USSR proceeds at an increasingly rapid rate." Moreover, Soviet researchers have not carried out comparative studies of ethnic relations and nationalist phenomena in Western and Soviet-type societies — studies which would lead them to a more complex understanding of the issue. Meanwhile, Western students of the USSR, who undoubtedly have their own ideological axe to grind,[3] tend to oversimplify ethnic politics by concentrating mainly on the alienating impact of the Soviet system or by examining only the manner in which the Soviet system generates antagonisms and provokes an ethnocentric response. Comparative analysis of Western neo-nationalist movements would certainly help temper such judgements; so would examination of the ways to contain ethnic separatism that have been developed in the USSR. This paper seeks to provide an analysis of precisely those little known mechanisms that have been elaborated and are being continuously perfected in the attempt to contain the expression of potentially disruptive, ethnic sentiments in the USSR.

Three aspects of the structure and operation of the Soviet political system must be considered in examining ethnic relations in the USSR: (1) The

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1. In this article the terms "ethnic" and "national" will be used interchangeably.

2. The titles of two recent authoritative Soviet monographs are characteristic enough: S.T. Kaltakhchan, *Leninism o sushchnosti natsii i puti obrazovaniia internatsional'noi obshchnosti liudei* (Leninism on the Nature of the Nation and the Formation of an International Community of People — Moscow, 1976); M.T. Iovchuk, ed., *Proletarskii sotsialisticheskii internatsionalism: traditsia, sovremennyi opyt, tvorcheskoe razvitie* (Proletarian, Socialist Internationalism: Traditions, Contemporary Experience, Creative Development — Moscow, 1978). Compare these to G.W. Simmonds, ed., *Nationalism in the USSR and Eastern Europe in the Era of Brezhnev and Kosygin* (Detroit: University of Detroit Press, 1977).

3. As Valerie Bunce and John Echols have pointed out, scholars of the Soviet system "still tend to oversimplify politics in a manner we would not dream of when analyzing American or Western European systems," and "Western biases continue to creep into many of our studies." V. Bunce, T.M. Echols, "From Soviet Studies to Comparative Politics: The Unfinished Revolution," *Soviet Studies*, 31:1 (1979), p. 48.

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system of internal passports used by the regime in order to maintain almost impassable boundaries between nationalities; (2) Soviet federalism as a principle of organization inherited from the October revolution, which was essentially non-nationalistic; (3) The domination of society by a single party, hierarchically organized and committed to the ideology of ethnic unification and assimilation, which in practice, however, has led to Russification.

Nationality and the Passport System[4]

The study of ethnic processes in the USSR must begin with an inquiry into the bureaucratic procedures by which the ethnic membership of the individual is determined. The system of internal passports, introduced in 1932, imposes a nationality on every citizen: this is the famous "fifth point" of Soviet questionnaires and internal passports. According to the original rules, in force during the thirties, the citizen could freely choose his or her own nationality when the passport was issued. The analysis of official documents and the testimony of persons who received their first passports in 1934-35[5] reveal that nationality was recorded on passports on the basis of an oral declaration. Changing one's family name — the operation often necessary for a person seeking to hide his ethnic origin — was also quite simple. However, only a very limited number of people preferred to change their nationality during that period. For this there are three reasons. First, the Soviet regime was genuinely hostile to any kind of nationalism during the first years of its existence. The struggle against ethnic discrimination and the privileges ascribed to minorities by the revolution produced favorable conditions for the free manifestation of ethnic consciousness and for the self-determination of nationality. Secondly, nobody could have predicted the role later played by the passport system in general, and by the entry "nationality" in particular. Finally, the recording of nationality did not have any historical precedent since during the Tsarist period religion rather than nationality was registered in internal passports.

Yet later, the change of one's nationality, as recorded in the passport, became prohibited, and the nationality of a child from then on was determined by the recorded nationality of the parents. This important political act passed totally unnoticed, and even now scholars pay very little attention to it. It is significant that, for example, Edward Allworth does not even *mention* the passport system among the main group support factors bearing upon the nationality question.[6] But it is precisely the passport system which establishes rigid boundaries between ethnic groups. Soviet experts are evidently aware that national belonging is "not a biological but a social category, that it is not determined by birth, but is formed in the

4. I am using here some materials from V. Zaslavsky, Y. Luryi, "The Passport System in the USSR and Changes in Soviet Society," *Soviet Union*, 6:2 (1979), pp. 137-153.

5. I conducted interviews with these people in 1971-73 in the USSR.

6. E. Allworth, ed., *Nationality Group Survival in Multi-Ethnic States* (New York: Praeger, 1977), pp. 3-10.

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process of socialization of the individual and, in this specific case, in the process of conscious ethnic self-identification.."[7] It is equally evident that ethnic belonging or national orientation can change in the course of the life of one individual and, even more so, in the course of the life of several generations. Nonetheless, the ethnic identification of Soviet citizens in the thirties still determines once and for all the legal national membership of their offspring in the eighties. In this way the regime has obtained a unique instrument with which to guide ethnic processes.

In the context of Soviet society, therefore, concepts like "ethnic identity" or "change of ethnic identity" may still be useful, but the meanings of these concepts differ from those we associate with them when applied to conditions in Western industrial society. For example, the situation of an Armenian family who has always lived in Moscow, has adopted the Russian language and culture and has lost all language and other links with its own ethnic group, could be described as a case of changed ethnic identity. Yet, on their internal passports these citizens remain Armenian and their children will be able to register and be treated only as Armenians in all important life situations — admission to university, employment, draft, application for housing, authorization to travel abroad, etc. — in conformity with the "quota" allotted to Armenians at any given time. This fact is never forgotten by the concerned parties and by those in their immediate environment.

Census data concerning the numerical composition of Soviet nationality groups, their increase, etc., do not correspond with the data derived from passports because the former are compiled on the basis of oral declarations. Soviet authors freely admit the discrepancy. As Victor Kozlov, the noted Soviet ethnographer, has pointed out: "these census data should not be considered 100% accurate, and the data concerning the numerical composition of each nationality, even though calculated to the last person, should not mislead anyone."[8] Census data can reflect what certain groups of the population regard as desirable, but they can be very different from the passport reality. Substantial groups of people living in Western Byelorussia, for example, declared themselves Polish in the 1959 census and Byelorussian in the 1970 census. This was not the result of some dramatic change of ethnic identity occuring within a few years: on their passports these people had to maintain their Polish nationality, but being unable or unwilling to move to Poland, and belonging to an ethnic category with few privileges, the members of this group expressed through the census questionnaires their desire or their hope to join a more privileged group.[9]

7. V.I. Kozlov, *Natsional'nosti SSSR. Ethnodemograficheskii obzor* (Moscow: Statistika, 1975), p. 256.
8. *Ibid.*
9. Another case is presented by Soviet Jews. The 1979 census showed that 1,811,000 Jews in the country, although many experts believe that the number should be closer to three million. R. Anderson, "Jews Leader Says Stiffer Soviet Rules Cut Emigration," *New York Times*, June 8, 1980, p. 3.

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Mixed Marriages

Mixed marriages among people from different nationalities are the only case in which the current system of passports permits a choice. The phenomenon is rather frequent. Between the end of the 1950s and 1970 the number of mixed families increased by 50% and today they represent 13.5% of all Soviet families.[10] In the cities mixed marriages are as high as 17.5%. In the final period of Stalinism (1947 to 1954) this choice was not possible; a special regulation established that the nationality of those born from mixed marriages had to be the maternal one. According to current regulations, the child can choose between the nationality of one or the other parent. This is done at the age of sixteen when the first internal passport is issued. The law is formulated in a manner which reduces to a minimum the already limited freedom of choice by stating that "no subsequent change in nationality entry is permissable."[11]

In an advanced industrial society with a great deal of vertical and horizontal mobility the entry of nationality on the passport leads to absurd situations. For example, it is very hard for the child of a Tartar and of a Ukrainian living in a rapidly developing center which attracts people from all over the USSR to choose his-her own nationality, especially if the language and culture assimilated from childhood are Russian. Yet she-he will appear on the passport as "Tartar" or as "Ukrainian" even though she-he does not consider him-herself as either. As Koslov indicates, the nationality entry on the passport "obfuscates the effective ethnic orientation of many citizens of the USSR and in some cases even upsets it, with the result of obscuring the real evolution of the ethnic situation, and particularly that of the processes of assimilation and integration among nationalities."[12] Galina Starovoitova, studying the attitudes of the urban population in relation to determining a person's nationality, observes that a great part of the youth is opposed to the existing passport system as the principal determinant of nationality. Younger respondents place higher value on "the desire of the young person himself." Starovoitova sees this variant as "the most democratic, in that it does not impose dogmatic patterns of behaviour in the sphere of ethnic self-identification,"[13] suggesting implicitly a return to an earlier system of free choice of nationality entry.

During the preparatory phase of the passport reform in 1973-74 some letters written by readers appeared in the Soviet press and went so far as to suggest the abolition of the entry "nationality" from the passport; this was to be replaced by the general category "citizenship" (obviously Soviet).[14]

10. *Itogi Vsesoiuznoi Perepisi Naseleniia 1970 G.*, Vol. 7 (Moscow, 1974).
11. "On Adoption of the Statute on the Passport System in the USSR," *Soviet Law and Government: A Journal of Translations*, 14:3 (Winter 1975-76), p. 70.
12. V.I. Kozlov, *op.cit.*, p. 231.
13. G.V. Starovoitova, "A Contribution to the Study of the Ethnopsychology of Urban Populations From Data of a Survey of the Population of Three Cities in the Tatar ASSR," *Soviet Sociology*, 15:4 (Spring 1977), p. 55.
14. L.I. Maksimov, "Kak byt' s natsional'nostiu Andreiki?" *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, August 15, 1973.

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These kinds of criticisms and suggestions are probably received by the leadership as manifestations of naive moralism. The leadership, in attempting to maintain the current structure of power, has no interest in bringing about some "natural" assimilation or a democratic choice of nationality and they are even less interested in liberating citizens from dogmatic models of behavior. The multinational ruling group is not in the least willing to give up such an efficient means of control and regulation of the relations among nationalities. As Mikhail Kulichenko, the official theoretician on ethnic relations puts it, the danger is not in the awakening of ethnic consciousness and feeling as such. Rather, "the greater danger consists in allowing such processes to develop spontaneously, without any guidance, and in letting the hostile nationalist elements influence the growth of ethnic self-consciousness."[15]

While the number of published empirical studies on ethnic relations is moderate and while the censorship of these publications is particularly harsh, the direct or indirect inquiries conducted in the USSR on mixed marriage assume great importance. They illustrate the *real* behavior of Soviet citizens who are in a position to exercise limited choice. One of the primary causes for this choice is in fact the politically determined social standing of an ethnic group. The analysis of such trends in the sphere of mixed marriages gives us an invaluable insight into the role of the federal policies in shaping Soviet ethnic processes.

Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Stratification

According to the constitution, the USSR is a federal state which includes 15 national republics. The national republic is the highest form of state organization accessible to a Soviet nationality. In addition, there are other territorial units such as the autonomous republics, the autonomous provinces and the national districts. Finally, there are national groups which do not have their own territory, among which Germans, Jews,[16] Poles and Crimean Tartars are the most numerous.

Many political scientists look at Soviet federalism with skepticism, asserting that the Soviet Union is "not a federal but a unitary state."[17] However, the national republics enjoy a relative, although limited, sovereignty over their respective territories. The fact that in the contemporary USSR federalism is indeed a palpable reality can be demonstrated by the analysis of many social processes, such as the subdivision by the republics of the state budget, or the origins and functioning of the national political elites, or ethnic stratification.

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15. M.I. Kulichenko, *Natsional'nye otnosheniia v SSSR i tendentsii ikh razvitiia* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1972), p. 424.

16. The Jewish Autonomous Province created in the 1930s in the Far East on the Chinese border is a fictitious, bureaucratic formation. Fewer than half of one percent of all Soviet Jews live on its territory.

17. H. Seton-Watson, *Nations and States. An Inquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1977), p. 312.

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Ethnic stratification is one of the forms through which social inequality manifests itself when membership in an ethnic group is used as a criterion for the distribution of socially important rewards. Not only is research concerning ethnic stratification not done, but the very existence of such inequality is denied. Soviet scholars use euphemistic terms as "ethnic prevalence" or "differential ethnic attractiveness,"[18] thus evading the suspicion that they are discussing a case of domination over and discrimination against one ethnic group by another. Nevertheless, the fact that up to 93% of the children born from Russian-Jewish mixed marriages choose the Russian nationality does not demonstrate "the strong tendency of Jews to integrate with the people surrounding them,"[19] but rather the existence of discrimination against them. The choice in favor of the Russian nationality in Russian-Jewish mixed marriages is only an extreme example for the general trend observable throughout the whole territory of the Soviet Union: the majority of children from Russian-non-Russian mixed marriages, everything else being equal, choose the Russian nationality on their passports. The only exception to such an imbalance is the case of a mixed Russian-non-Russian family residing on the national territory (republic) of that ethnic group to which the non-Russian party belongs. Thus, the data from the Baltic republics show that more than half of those born in families where one parent is Russian and the other Lithuanian, Estonian or Latvian choose the nationality of their republic.[20] Yet, in almost all those families the children speak not the native language of their republic but Russian and tend in everyday life to define themselves as Russians. The national affiliation they have adopted in accordance with the passport regulation, therefore, does not correspond to the ethnic self-identification of many adolescents from mixed marriages.[21] The persistence of the federal principle offers one of the explanations for such choices: the overall Russian domination is counter-balanced by certain privileges granted to indigenous nationalities. In the republics' territories, the representative of indigenous populations has advantages *vis-à-vis* access to higher education, to the professions, to positions offering greater social rewards.[22]

Official theoretical literature in the USSR does not see any future for ethnic groups and, consequently, for federalism. In the future the merging of nationalities is expected to occur; this is described as a "general process of withering away of ethnic differences, the ultimate result of which will be that the nations will have ceased to exist and will all join an a-national

18. A.A. Susokolov, "Vliianie razlichii v urovne obrazovaniia i chislennosti kontaktiruiushchikh etnicheskikh grup na mezhetnicheskie otnosheniia," *Sovetskaia etnografiia*, 1 (1976), p. 103.

19. V.I. Kozlov, *op.cit.*, p. 240.

20. L.N. Terent'eva, "Ethnic Self-Identification by Adolescents in Ethnically Mixed Families," *Soviet Sociology*, 12:1 (Summer 1973), pp. 34-51.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

22. M. Rywkin, "Central Asia and Soviet Manpower," *Problems of Communism*, 28:1 (1979), pp. 1-13.

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humanity."[23] The rapprochement of nations and their ultimate fusion are characterized as "an objective law of development of socialist society." According to some authors, the process of assimilation has already gone so far that the elimination of the federal principle is the next logical or even necessary step. During the debate on the draft of the new constitution there have been attempts to introduce the concept of the "single Soviet nation," to limit the union republics' privileges and to eliminate their proclaimed right to secession. Behind the usual rhetoric on the fusion of nationalities one can easily detect an ill-disguised dissatisfaction with the economic and social privileges granted to the native populations of the union republics. The Soviet leadership, however, realistically evaluating the existing situation, has judged these proposals untimely and relegated the possibility of their realization to an indeterminate future. The impact of Soviet federal structure, therefore, continues to be strongly felt in the sphere of ethnic relations. At the same time, the Soviet leadership spares no effort to further the process of assimilation of nationalities which takes on the form of Russification.

Voluntary and Forced Russification

In a multi-ethnic society, assimilation may proceed in one direction when there is only one assimilating group or in different directions when various assimilating groups are present. The assimilation that the Soviet regime currently promotes is unidirectional and is intended to lead, in some not so distant future, to the formation of a kind of Soviet Russian nation based upon the Russian people, the Russian language and culture.[24] Characteristically, the word "Russification" is not found in Soviet literature, except for that specific genre of political literature called "critique of bourgeois ideology." The unidirectional assimilation in multi-ethnic society is always partly voluntary and partly forced, while the official doctrine, following Lenin, assigns a progressive character only to the voluntary or "natural" assimilation.[25]

The dominant position of the Russian people, *primus inter pares* in Soviet society, scarcely needs to be demonstrated. Russian prevalence within the Tsarist empire was seriously compromised by the revolution. According to Lenin, it was the task of socialism to promote the internationalization of the economic, political and cultural life of the people.[26] He supported the necessity of struggling against the Great Russian chauvinism and against the legacy of Tsarist nationalism and militarism. His appeals did not remain rhetorical. But in the late thirties, and even more so during World War II, state policy on the national question underwent a sudden shift towards

23. M.I. Kulichenko, *Ukreplenie internatsional'nogo edinstva sovetskogo obshchestva* (Kiev: Politizdat, 1976), p. 54.

24. According to the dominant theory of internationalization, some smaller ethnic groups may undergo the process of assimilation in two stages: first merging with a larger non-Russian nationality and then ultimately assimilating with the Russians.

25. V.I. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, 5th ed., Vol. 24, pp. 125ff.

26. *Ibid.*, Vol. 23, p. 318.

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Russification. The causes of the shift are evident. The Russians, who constitute the biggest ethnic group in the country, populate compactly the largest part of the USSR, forming simultaneously a considerable part of the population in almost all the national republics. It was the Russians who made the major contribution to industrialization and to the military efforts of the country. The Russians constitute the nucleus of the ruling party and hold almost all top posts within the leadership (nearly all positions in the Politburo, the secretariat of the Central Committee, the key positions in the party apparatus and state administration, etc.). The strengthening of the Russian group is considered by the leadership as a means of preserving the present distribution of political power in the country and of furthering the centralized character of the regime.

How can one observe and examine the development of Russification in the USSR? Yuri Bromley, the Director of the Moscow Institute of Ethnography, discussing unifying ethnic processes, particularly assimilation, suggests that the following elements and stages of this process be distinguished: cultural changes (from cultural adaptation to cultural assimilation); linguistic changes (from bilingualism to linguistic assimilation); change of ethnic identity (from dual ethnic self-consciousness to total change of self-consciousness).[27] We still do not have any published Soviet empirical studies on ethnic assimilation which have fully taken into consideration the structure of this process. Nevertheless, since the Russian language and the passport system are the primary and most effective instruments of Russification and simultaneously the most important determinants of nationality, we can use the data on language and on the nationality registered in passports as objective and quite reliable indicators of the development of ethnic processes.

Mechanism of Linguistic Russification

The Russian language is the essential instrument of ongoing Russification. Soviet scholars justifiably point out that national language and national self-identification are closely linked. "Change of the native language, although it does not necessarily mean the full restructuring of national consciousness, attests, however, to the fact that deep ethnic changes have occurred and that processes of assimilation are now taking place. The lack of coincidence between ethnic membership and language use inevitably leads to a change in one's national self-awareness."[28]

Voluntary acceptance of the Russian language must not be confused with its forced imposition, which depends instead upon political decisions of the

27. Yu. V. Bromley, "Towards Typology of Ethnic Processes," *British Journal of Sociology*, 30:3 (1979), pp. 341-348.

28. A.N. Kholmogorov, *Internatsional'nye cherty sovetskikh natsii* (Moscow: Mysl', 1970), p. 141. Some ethnographers also affirm that national awareness is often preserved even after the complete loss of language and culture. I.S. Gurvich, "Nekotorye problemy etnicheskogo razvitiia narodov SSSR," *Sovetskaia etnografia*, 5 (1967), pp. 62-77. They quote as examples Russified Germans and Jews. However, in these cases, nationality registered in the passport and discriminatory practices function as external forces evoking national self-awareness.

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leadership. In the most balanced and thorough research published on Soviet linguistic policy, E. Glyn Lewis observes that the Russian language "has a greater degree of usefulness over a wider range of purposes and situations than the other indigenous languages of the Union."[29] Nonetheless, there can be no doubt that the superiority of the Russian language in the Soviet Union is, for political reasons, strongly exaggerated by the central authorities.

The very structure of Soviet society, with its high degree of centralization, encourages the substitution of Russian for the other languages in many sectors of social life. Social institutions of central importance such as, for example, the military, have a unified rather than a federal base and within the military, into which the entire male population is drafted, the Russian language is used exclusively. University education is highly Russified. In the Ukraine and Belorussia, nations which are linguistically close to Russia, Russian prevails even in elementary school and kindergarten. Already during Stalin's period, even the alphabet of some ethnic languages had been Russified.[30] At that time, some authors proposed a theory of "world languages" related to various socio-economic formations. Latin was presented as related to the economy of slave society, French to feudal society, English to capitalist society, and Russian, correspondingly, to socialist formations. Now Russian is still presented as the only language that Soviet people can use for international communication.[31] The Soviet organization of information also aids Russification. Today the ethnic press publishes information from all over the world with great delay because it must first be translated from Russian. In this way the ethnic population is encouraged to use the Russian mass media and is artificially induced to consider ethnic languages as second-class.[32] The central government, furthermore, attempts to achieve the intermeshing of various ethnic groups through carefully planned migration policy. For example, large construction works are planned in the Baltic area, where there is a shortage of local manpower, and thus Russian and Ukranian workers and technicians are imported. At the same time, the leadership tries to promote migration from

29. E. Glyn Lewis, *Multilingualism in the Soviet Union. Aspects of Language Policy and its Implementation* (The Hague: Mouton, 1972), p. 62.

30. The case of the Kirgiz language is typical. After the revolution, the Arabic alphabet, which according to experts did not reflect the features of Kirgiz language, was replaced with the Latinized alphabet. The population accepted this change. Then, after fewer than fifteen years, the Latinized alphabet was replaced with the Cyrillic alphabet by a Moscow provision. The central authority thereby sought to facilitate the teaching of the Russian language to Kirgiz, to increase the difference between the Kirgiz and the other languages belonging to the same linguistic group, and thus to isolate the Central Asian people from Turkey and other foreign countries.

31. M.I. Kulichenko, "Natsional'noe i internatsional'noe v zrelom sotsialisticheskom obshchestve," *Voprosy filosofii*, 5 (1979), p. 55.

32. See I. Dzyuba, *Internationalism or Russification? A Study in the Soviet Nationalities Problem* (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1970), pp. 164-165. In the 1920s, for example, the Ukranian mass media were often better and more rapidly informed than the Moscow press because the RATAU (radio-telegraphic agency of the Ukraine) had its own correspondents in different countries of the world.

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the densely populated national republics to the Russian republic. The linguistic consequences of these migrations on the members of Russian and non-Russian ethnic groups are quite different. The dominant position of the Russian language does not stimulate Russians to study ethnic languages and consequently bilingualism is a rare phenomenon,[33] while the high percentage of Russians in the republics greatly affects the diffusion of the Russian language. On the other hand, the ethnic migrants to the territory of the Russian republic all learn Russian and rapidly become linguistically Russified.

Finally, from the middle seventies on a new centralist shift in language policy occurred, with the tendency to reinforce the supremacy of the Russian language and to stimulate the substitution of other ethnic languages by Russian. The 1978 decree of the USSR Council of Ministers, "On Measures for Further Improving the Study and Teaching of the Russian Language in the Union Republics," introduces far-reaching reforms into the Soviet educational system, particularly into language instruction. The decree presented as a response to "the numerous requests from citizens of various nationalities" has still not been published in the open press.[34] The decree and the following all-Union conference, "The Russian Language, Language of Friendship and Collaboration among the Peoples of the USSR" (Tashkent, 1979), adopted new measures concerning the expansion of Russian-language study in the non-Russian republics (including the organization of teaching in Russian in preschool institutions, the reduction of hours reserved to teaching ethnic languages in schools while increasing those reserved for Russian, the reorganization of the system of language instruction in universities, and so on). The stated goal of this campaign is to achieve in the eighties complete bilingualism among the younger generations of non-Russian nationalities.

While the data on language affiliation by nationality are available and while the Soviet language policy as a means of Russification has been extensively studied, the analogous role of the Soviet passport system remains largely unnoticed.

The Passport System and Cultural Russification

It has already been pointed out that mixed marriages are today a very widespread phenomenon and that in the majority of cases children born from a mixed marriage with a Russian parent adopt the Russian nationality in their passport because of the advantages this provides. This practice con-

33. S.I. Bruk, M.N. Guboglo, "Dvuiazychie i sblizhenie natsii v SSSR. Po materialam perepisi naseleniia 1970 g.," *Sovetskaia Etnografia,* 4 (1975), p. 25.

34. See the English translation in R. Solchanyk, " 'Russification' to Be Stepped Up," *Soviet Analyst,* 9:1 (1980), pp. 7-8. This quotation gives some idea about the campaign in the Soviet press that preceded the decree: "In recent years, however, there has been a marked intensification of the sincere, objective, and voluntary desire — indeed, a burning wish — of parents for their children to begin to receive instruction in the Russian language long before they enter school." S. Shermukhamedov, "Unfaltering Attention to the Study of the Russian Language," *Soviet Education: A Journal of Translations,* 18:7 (May 1976), p. 55.

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stitutes what may be called the overt dimension of the Russificatory impact of the passport system.

Even more important is the fact that the system which "determines" one's nationality in the citizen's identification document leads to the *hidden cultural Russification* of those ethnic groups who, residing on the territory of the Russian republic, have their own territorial formations, such as autonomous republics, autonomous provinces, or national districts. The registration of nationality in the passports and the system of quotas reserved to the autonomous ethnicities for access to professional and managerial positions on the territories of their state formations protect quite effectively the interests of the new middle class emerging from these ethnic groups. The most educated part of the population thus readily accepts Russian language and culture. Cultural assimilation is rapid among them insofar as the national intelligentsia lacks the incentive to further develop its ethnic language and culture, which in any case could not easily compete with the Russian language and culture. The present system, which often establishes arbitrary but strict boundaries between ethnic groups, currently helps the ethnic group's middle class in protecting itself from competition and in the meantime prevents many ethnic minorities from developing their own national culture, thus contributing to their cultural Russification. Within one or two generations, the only difference between Russians and many ethnic groups residing on the territory of the Russian republic will be essentially the entry "nationality" recorded on the passport. When this entry is removed — and this can be done at discretion of the central authorities, as the recent example with the elimination of the entry "social origin" demonstrates — these ethnic groups will have fully become Russian.

Summing up the above, it can thus be argued that *the interrelation of the passport system, the federal structure and the assimilationist ideology and policy of the centralized ruling party determine the specifics of the development of ethnic processes and the dimensions of ethnic nationalism in Soviet society.*

Types of Nationalism in Soviet Society

The definition of nationalism has always been one of the most difficult tasks of the student of ethnic relations. Hans Kohn, discussing various historical forms of the ideology of nationalism, points out that "what remains constant in nationalism through all its changes is the demand of the people for a government of the same ethnic complexion as the majority."[35] Isaiah Berlin argues in a recent article that any nationalist doctrine preserves the following four characteristics: "The belief in the overriding need to belong to a nation; in the organic relationships of all the elements that constitute a nation; in the value of our own simply because it is ours; and, finally, faced by rival contenders for authority or loyalty, in supremacy of its claims."[36]

35. H. Kohn, "Nationalism," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: The Macmillan Co. and the Free Press), Vol. 11, p. 65; H. Kohn, "Soviet Communism and Nationalism," in E. Allworth, ed., *Soviet Nationality Problems* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), pp. 43-71.

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A further distinction between different varieties of nationalism may be made by taking into account the types of ethnic groups who are their principal supporters. In the Soviet multinational state, nationalism takes two main forms: that of the ideology of ethnocentrism, separatism and disintegration when it concerns an ethnic minority, and that of the ideology of the Russian supremacy and forced assimilation (Russification) when it concerns the dominating Russian group. In this sense, the distinction formulated by Lenin between the oppressive nationalism of the nation and the defensive nationalism of the oppressed nation is still valid.[37] It is significant that, while after the revolution the focus was on the struggle against Great Russian chauvinism, such nationalism has been completely neglected by Soviet theory and propaganda in the post-war period. If we had to rely on contemporary Soviet publications, it would appear as if nationalism occurs only among ethnic minorities, while the Russian majority is completely immune from such "errors."

Dealing with the nationalism of Soviet minorities, Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone recommends subdividing it into "orthodox" and "non-orthodox" varieties.[38] Orthodox nationalism aims at the recognition and extension of national autonomy within the limits permitted by the Soviet political system. It is orthodox insofar as it does not threaten the official doctrine of Marxism-Leninism, but it is nevertheless a certain challenge to the hegemony of the Russian ethnic group. Rakowska-Harmstone believes that since the mid-fifties this type of nationalism has been tolerated by the leadership. As for "non-orthodox nationalism," it "combines national self-assertion with rejection of the actual political system and is frequently coupled with the civil rights movement and separatism."[39] This type of nationalism is severely repressed. To augment this useful distinction, a structural analysis of ethnic groups should be introduced in order to pinpoint which classes and social groups within an ethnic group are the major bases of "orthodox" and "non-orthodox" nationalism.

The work of Soviet sociologists (above all Yuri Arutiunian, Ovshii Shkaratan and their collaborators) published in the past decade demonstrates that Soviet modernization and social mobilization affect in quite different ways the national psychology and the rate of assimilation of different groups and social classes within an ethnic group. As Arutiunian has observed,[40] traditional "folk" type nationalism is present in that part of the population which, because of its low level of education and rate of mobility, has a traditional and strict system of values and avoids contacts with people whose way of life contrasts with their conservative mentality. An increase in the range of cultural orientations and contacts with other ethnic

36. I. Berlin, "Nationalism: Past Neglect and Present Power," *Partisan Review*, 46:3 (1979), p. 349.

37. V.I. Lenin, *op.cit.*, Vol. 36, p. 607.

38. T. Rakowska-Harmstone, "The Dialectics of Nationalism in the USSR," *Problems of Communism*, 23:3 (1974), pp. 1-22; T. Rakowska-Harmstone, "The Study of Ethnic Politics in the USSR," in G. Simmonds, *op.cit.*, pp. 20-36.

39. T. Rakowska-Harmstone in Simmonds, *op.cit.*, pp. 21-22.

40. Iu. V. Arutiunian, "A Concrete Sociological Study of Ethnic Relations," *Soviet Sociology*, 11:3-4 (Winter-Spring 1972-73), pp. 328-48.

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groups and their cultures will certainly contribute to the overcoming of such "backward nationalism." The social mobilization of these strata of the population will accelerate the process of rapprochement of ethnic groups and will weaken their ethnocentrism. The case of the educated part of the population is completely different. The strengthening or weakening of the nationalism of Soviet specialists depends not so much upon their cultural orientation or the degree of internationalization of their ethnic group, but upon the complex combination of their social and occupational interests. The data provided by Soviet sociologists confirm the thesis according to which the new middle class symbolizes, in the modern industrial multinational Soviet society, the "nationalism of convenience" which is used as an instrument of struggle against the other ethnic groups for economic and political privileges.

In this sense, the processes of industrialization and social mobilization can either accelerate or slow down assimilation, producing within certain limits opposite effects on different social groups: these processes promote in the Soviet Union the homogenization of the urban and rural workers from different nationalities; but, on the other hand, they also foster ethnocentrism and the nationalism of the new middle class. These conclusions help us understand both the increase in nationalistic tendencies among certain segments of the various Soviet ethnic groups and the unquestionable success of the regime's strategy in controlling and containing ethno-nationalism.

Modernization and Economic Inequality Among the Republics

The Soviet regime has from the very beginning consistently pursued a policy of equalization among the republics and its attempts to develop the economy and the culture of the most backward ethnic groups have not been in vain. As a result of rapid industrialization, which has affected nearly all of the USSR, differences in the class structure of the national republics have gradually become attenuated. Thus, as M. Dzhunusov calculates,[41] if in 1939 the index of the proportion of workers in the gainfully employed Russian population is assumed to equal 1.0, the following figures applied in the same year to the other nationalities: Ukrainians .8; Armenians .6; Belorussians .5; Georgians, Azeris .4; Uzbeks, Turkmens .3; Kirgizs, Tadzhiks .2. However, by 1970 these figures had changed significantly. They were: Armenians, Azeris, Belorussians, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians .9; Ukrainians .8; Georgians, Kirgizs, Tadzhiks, Uzbeks .6; Moldavians, Turkmens .5. Differences between the nationalities have also considerably diminished in regard to specialists (intelligentsia). If the index of the proportion of the intelligentsia among the Russian population in 1970 is assumed to equal 1.0, the corresponding figures for the other nationalities are: 1.1 for Latvians; 1.0 for Estonians and Ukrainians; .9 for Armenians, Azeris, Belorussians and Lithuanians; .7 for Kazakhs; .6 for Moldavians, Tadzhiks, Turkmens, Uzbeks. The data clearly demonstrate a considerable degree of uniformity in the class structure of the Soviet republics.

41. M.S. Dzhunusov, "Sblizhenie natsii v usloviiakh razvitogo sotsialistma," *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia,* 4 (1976), pp. 47-48.

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Furthermore, the unified system of education and political indoctrination in the Soviet Union, combined with stringent state control of the mass media, has created a considerable homogeneity of attitudes and life styles among analogous social classes of the different nationalities. As Arutiunian observes: "Identical elementary, secondary, and higher educational curricula, rigorously coordinated courses in the social sciences, primarily history and literature in the secondary schools, the uniformity in ideological emphasis of the material disseminated through newspapers, magazines, TV, movies, and theater facilitate the shaping of a unitary worldview among people of diverse nationalities."[42]

There are, however, certain socio-economic data which nevertheless appear to demonstrate the persistence of the traditional ethno-regional fragmentation. Alistair McAuley, for example, in a well-documented research report, provides the following data on per capita income derived from employment:[43]

Table 1

Per Capita Personal Income in the Soviet Republics (%)

	1960	1965	1970
RSFSR	107.8	106.7	108.0
Ukraine	94.5	99.6	97.1
Belorussia	81.2	88.9	93.8
Uzbekistan	77.4	73.0	74.2
Kazakhstan	95.1	89.8	87.5
Georgia	94.2	87.8	89.4
Azerbaijan	73.0	68.1	66.0
Lithuania	107.8	110.3	117.7
Moldavia	69.9	85.7	86.0
Latvia	124.9	122.7	125.1
Kirgizia	71.8	77.6	72.5
Tadzhikistan	66.2	72.7	63.0
Armenia	85.0	83.0	87.1
Turkmenistan	74.0	77.4	78.8
Estonia	129.0	130.0	133.2
USSR	100.0	100.0	100.0
(R per year)	446.0	584.0	799.0

Peter Zwick, to give another example, after an analysis of Soviet budgetary policy, comes to the conclusion that "Soviet national development in the post-war era was characterized by intensified ethno-regional socio-economic

42. Iu. V. Arutiunian, "Ethnosocial Aspects of the Internationalization of Way of Life," *Soviet Sociology*, 18:2 (Fall 1979), pp. 18-19.

43. A. McAuley, *Economic Welfare in the Soviet Union. Poverty, Living Standards, and Inequality* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1979), p. 109. See also A.I. Levin, *Nauchno-technicheskii progress i lichnoe potreblenie* (Moscow: Mysl', 1979), pp. 105-106.

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fragmentation."[44] He even goes so far as to assert that "the persistence of socio-economically based regionalism serves as a constant reminder of the regime's inability to create at least the image of a nation whose residual inequalities can be explained by references to economic underdevelopment rather than discriminatory policies in public benefit allocation."[45] The problem, however, is that Soviet statistics on the distribution of incomes derived from state employment or on socio-cultural budgets of the republics should not, as I shall try to show below, permit a student of Soviet society to jump to such conclusions about regional differences in the standard of living.[46]

First of all, the cost of living in different areas of the country varies considerably due to differences in physical or climatic conditions. Moreover, social inequality in Soviet-type societies, as Zygmunt Bauman emphasizes, derives from two main sources: inequality generated by the actual power structure and inequality generated by the market relations which exist and expand next to the administrative allocation of resources and rewards.[47] The "second economy" is a growing phenomenon in the USSR. "A fundamental characteristic of the present-day Soviet economy," writes Gregory Grossman, "is a two-tiered (or many-tiered) structure of prices and personal incomes, a structure common in countries with widespread black markets for goods and labor."[48] Official statistics by republic on income distribution or on budgetary socio-cultural spending, therefore, cannot serve as adequate indicators of the relative living standards in different parts of the country. Private economic activity in its legal as well as illegal forms must also be taken into consideration. As I shall seek to demonstrate, both inequality generated by budgetary allocations and inequality generated by market relations bear heavily on the exacerbation of ethnic tensions in the contemporary Soviet Union, although the significance of these factors is in fact quite different for the members of the different social classes. It is, therefore, necessary to briefly examine the main social classes and groups which constitute Soviet society — the local political elite, the specialists, the workers, and the peasants (*kolkhozniki*) — for their structurally determined receptiveness to nationalistic ideas.

The Control of Local Elites

The Soviet regime has from the very beginning systematically pursued a

44. P. Zwick, "Ethnoregional Socio-Economic Fragmentation and Soviet Budgetary Policy," *Soviet Studies*, 31:3 (1979), p. 392.

45. P. Zwick, *op.cit.*, p. 395.

46. Even the casual observer of everyday life in the USSR will notice that the Central Asian or Moldavian *kolkhoznik* is often better off than the Russian one. In fact, the Russian nationalistic *Samizdat* derives much of its popular appeal from its harping on the theme of the undeniably lower living standards of the Russian population in comparison to those of the populations of the non-Russian republics.

47. Z. Bauman, "Officialdom and Class: Bases of Inequality in Socialist Society," in F. Parkin, ed., *The Social Analysis of Class Structure* (London: Tavistock, 1974).

48. G. Grossman, "The 'Second Economy' of the USSR," *Problems of Communism*, 26:5 (1977), p. 39.

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policy of "indigenization" of local republican administrations and implemented this policy by reserving a considerable number of seats for the members of the local nationalities and, later, by skillfully exploiting the passport system in order to achieve their representation. As a consequence, representatives of the titular nationalities today hold the majority of leadership positions and higher status jobs in almost all of the republics. Yet, on the other hand, the local political elite does not represent the particular interests of its own ethnic constituency. Since local elites are primarily established through appointment and cooptation by the central party apparatus, the various national political leaderships are responsible first and foremost to the central authority rather than to the local population. A local party leader whose appointment and dismissal depends fully on Moscow can encourage nationalistic sentiments only at a tremendous personal risk. The dependence of the local elite on the central power is further strengthened by a peculiar system of rewards for the membership.[49] The leadership receives a monetary remuneration which is already significantly higher than that of an average specialist, in addition to remuneration in kind (cars, apartments, country houses, use of special shops) together with various types of privileges (access to information, journeys abroad, etc.); these latter are generally regarded as much more valuable than monetary compensation but they cannot be "banked." Such a system, consequently, prevents the elite from accumulating wealth which would permit it a greater degree of independence, and losing a job would thus mean a catastrophic loss of income.

Yet there are some psychological and social mechanisms of ethnocentrism and nationalism that can potentially bind the local elite to its ethnic group. That is why the central power pays great attention to the manifestations of nationalistic sentiments within the local leadership, and takes care to place in positions of major responsibility the most Russified elements which, due to the system of internal passports, still belong to the local nationality. The activities of the local party apparatus are also effectively controlled by the central elite.[50] Thus, the local political elite has little opportunity to carry out a nationalistic policy even if this were its desire: Moscow can adopt quick and harsh counter-measures at any time.[51]

The system of central planning often generates economic tension and conflict over the proportion of the republics' income derived from local resources which will be syphoned off by the state budget. The action of the

49. A. Katsenelinboigen, *Studies in Soviet Economic Planning* (White Plains: M.E. Sharpe, 1978), p. 150.

50. The activities of the local party apparatus are effectively controlled, for example, by the institution of second secretaries. The first secretaries of union or autonomous republics are always representatives of local nationalities, while second secretaries are very often Russians sent in by the central power. The second secretary "functions as an institutionalized check on the first secretary," being in control of personnel and the local KGB apparatus. See T.H. Miller, "Cadres Policy in Nationality Areas. Recruitment of CPSU First and Second Secretaries in non-Russian Republics of the USSR," *Soviet Studies,* 29:1 (1977), pp. 3-36.

51. One of the most recent examples is that of the downfall of the first secretary of the Ukranian Communist Party Petr Shelest, accused of "lyric nationalism."

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local leadership in defense of the republics' economic interests should not, however, be overestimated. The bickering between central powers and the republics for the distribution of resources or the allocation of new plants is a normal phenomenon in Soviet economy. Members of the local leadership avoid going beyond the limits of purely economic bargaining and do not even dare to show much obstinance for fear of bringing on political accusations that would mean the end of their careers. As the official theoreticians state, "the redistribution of resources is closely connected with the patriotic and internationalist maturity of the national consciousness of the workers," while "particularism is akin to nationalism."[52]

In short, the national political elites should not be seen in any case as carriers of nationalistic tendencies. On the contrary, they follow the line of the central authorities, and they often, in fact, appear to be more zealous supporters of Russification than the Russians themselves.

The Control of the New Middle Class

If the national political elite follows the central line, the specialists or the new middle class of Soviet society are more prone to be influenced by "nationalism of convenience." The structural position of this class in society, especially its humanistic stratum, induces it to use the national language and culture as weapons in the struggle for the most prestigious and remunerative jobs. The humanistic intelligentsia within the new middle class is in a more vulnerable position than the technical specialists, and Zbigniew Brzezinski suggests with some justification that "the intellectuals, the humanists, the pseudo-intellectuals (school teacher, run-of-the-mill journalists, and the like) tend to be more nationalistic elements in the different republics, across the ethnic spectrum."[53] The well-being of this stratum depends particularly on the republics' continued financial support of the social-cultural sector. But, as Zwick has shown, while all republics enjoyed noticeable rates of growth in per capita socio-cultural expenditures between 1960 and 1970, the differences between republics did not decline.[54] The continuing preoccupation of the regime with unlimited industrial growth, combined with a policy of centralization and Russification, makes a sudden shift in budgetary policy, which would diminish such regional differences, quite unlikely. Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership is well aware of the nationalistic tendencies of the specialists and expends a great deal of effort on their control and neutralization.

As in the case of the national political elites, the registration of nationality on the passport and the politics of Soviet federalism play an important role in controlling the new middle class. Competition among specialists of various ethnic origins is regulated on the institutional level by a quota system (*numerus clausus*) which gives considerable preference to ethnic

52. M.N. Kulichenko, *op.cit.*, *Voprosy filosofii*, p. 53.
53. Z. Brzezinski, "Political Implications of Soviet Nationality Problems," in E. Allworth, *op.cit.*, 1971, p. 74.
54. P. Zwick, *op.cit.*, pp. 392-395.

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groups residing on the territory of their own republics. Thus, the situation of the potentially most explosive ethnic discontent — when educated members of the minority find their social mobility blocked by members of the majority group — is essentially avoided. Furthermore, the occupational interests of the middle classes are protected by a set of socio-economic measures. The Soviet leadership carries out a policy aimed first of all at creating jobs for the representatives of the local intelligentsia, rapidly strengthening the scientific sectors and so-called "creative unions" (of writers, painters, etc.) in all republics. In a recent essay, Zhores Medvedev describes the republican academies of sciences as follows: "All these academies organized their structure according to certain standards, with presidiums, divisions, and research institutes in all the main fields (physics, biology, chemistry, etc.) and with some specialized local research units. All academies started to publish their *Proceedings* and other journals. The Soviet Union as a state does not need all these provincial academies; there are too many of them, and duplication or low-quality research is inevitable given such structures. Each academy has its own bureaucratic apparatus, with planning and coordinating commissions and much more. In many union republics there were not enough scientists with high qualifications to be elected as academicians, and in many cases provincial 'national' academicians are very mediocre research workers, not well known within their professional fields. The establishment of so many academies was a matter of prestige rather than necessity, a symbol of the equality of national minorities."[55] However, prestige alone is not a sufficient explanation for the existence of these academies: the colossal surplus of researchers is the price the political leadership is willing to pay in exchange for internal stability. It would be naive to think that the specialists of the national republics do no appreciate the efforts of the regime in creating jobs, avoiding intellectual unemployment, and assuring them privileged positions. Also, the success of the struggle against middle class nationalism is due to the Soviet political structure which practically prohibits the emergence of any type of ethnic organization that recruits its members exclusively from the members of a single nationality. All the republican organizations are tightly integrated into the all-Union bureaucratic system. Furthermore, the solidarity of a national group depends on the intensity of communication and interaction that exists among its members. The social and territorial barriers erected among classes, in part aided by the passport system, seriously limit the capability of the new middle class to increase national self-consciousness within their ethnic groups, to intensify interaction, and to achieve ethnic solidarity.

All of this notwithstanding, the growing new middle class of the national republics, expecially but not exclusively its humanistic segment, remains the main reservoir of ethnic nationalism. The policy of intensified Russification on the part of the central authority triggers ethnic response on the part of the non-Russian specialists.

55. Z. Medvedev, *Soviet Science* (New York: Norton, 1978), p. 197.

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Workers and Peasants of the National Republics

The "traditional" nationalism among certain strata of peasants and workers is as a rule oriented not so much towards the dominant Russian group as towards the population of the neighbouring republics. In Georgia the prevailing feeling is anti-Armenian, in Armenia anti-Azerbaidzhan, in Azerbaidzhan anti-Armenian and anti-Georgian, etc. These local nationalisms, based on centuries of prejudice, do not constitute a unifying ideology able to compete with the official doctrine of centralism and gradual elimination of national differences.

In general, the social position of peasants and workers makes them more indifferent to nationalist ideas. The members of the *kolkhoz* usually live in an ethnically homogeneous environment, and their contacts with the external world are infrequent and irregular. But even if traditional ethnocentrism and nationalism were widespread among them, this in itself would not constitute a threat to the regime since the *kolkhoz* population is not a coherent political force. Moreover, the operation of the "second economy" which has been gaining momentum since the late sixties has changed the economic situation of many collective farmers in the non-Russian republics. The perennial shortage of agricultural products that troubles the country permits some people in warmer regions to obtain substantial additional income. However, those market incomes are not uniformly distributed among the inhabitants of the national republics. On the contrary, the income is concentrated in the hands of certain social and territorial groups, foremost peasants and various middlemen, resulting in the considerable increase of economic inequality both within the republics and in the Soviet Union as a whole. Under the existing conditions it is legitimate to expect that if the central government will not embark on some drastic anti-peasant policy, the participation of the non-Russian peasants, even as a silent reserve, in some kind of ethnic movement remains unlikely.

As to workers in the non-Russian republics, the nationalist idea also does not have the same appeal to them as to the members of the new middle class. First of all, the nationalist ideology developed by some strata of the national intelligentsia does not represent a real alternative to a regime with a credible program of economic and social reforms for the republics. Unlike specialists, workers and peasants do not need to use their own language or any other cultural marker in the competition for more lucrative jobs: given their low social status and the chronic shortage of labor power in the large and medium-sized towns, the problem of competition does not exist. The life chances of the ethnic workers are not at all affected by their membership in a non-Russian ethnic group. Programs of cultural revival, including the publication of books in the national languages, the development of the language itself and its use in education on various levels, and above all in the universities, are not a priority for the peasants and workers of the republics. Furthermore, skilled workers are generally more removed than the intelligentsia from a romantic vision of the advantages

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that would result from the creation of an autonomous national state.[56] There is evidence indicating that the population of most republics (excluding, perhaps, Belorussia) believe that they return to the Soviet treasury more than they receive.[57] In practice, however, the workers are so removed from any form of participation in decisions on investments, management, etc., that these problems do not seem pressing enough to provoke an active response on their part.

Class barriers and contradictions also weaken ethnic solidarity in Soviet society. The general decline in the rate of social mobility that characterized the Brezhnev period hit workers hardest. "The rapid growth of the cadres of the national intelligentsia," admits Mikhail Kulichenko with rather unusual candor, "occurs mainly through its self-perpetuation and through recruitment from the *kolkhoz* peasantry. Only to a very insignificant extent are these cadres drawn from the working class."[58] The differential access to such an important resource as the system of higher education which in Soviet society is the main channel for upward social mobility increases the social distance between the workers and the new middle class, thereby enhancing the class awareness of the working class as a whole. As Michael Hechter puts is, "if an individual perceives his class origin to be more important for the determination of his life chances than his ethnicity, he is more likely to be class than ethnically conscious."[59]

An analysis of the class location of the supporters of ethno-nationalism and the previous discussion of the specifics of ethnic processes in the USSR are useful in evaluating the state of national relations and conflicts in the country in the 1970s. In order to understand the capacity of the Soviet political system to control ethnic relations and to neutralize ethnic movements, it is worth examining the cases of some typical republics, such as those in the Baltic and in Central Asia, as well as consider the case of one national movement, that of the Crimean Tartars.

Ethnic Relations and Conflicts in the 1970s

The Baltic Republics. The Baltic republics have always been considered the stronghold of ethnic nationalism in the Soviet Union; they have old and strong cultural traditions, and a recent, although brief, experience of national independence. Their relatively large population occupies a vast territory at the border of the Soviet state, where they can enjoy some exchange of information with Sweden, Finland and Poland. Their advanced

56. One Soviet sociologist, who was involved in a research on ethnic relations in the USSR, told me about his talk with a Ukranian worker with whom he was on friendly terms and could speak openly. Being asked what he thought about a possible separation of the Ukraine from the USSR, the worker answered: "Unless we have democracy, we will not be able to separate. And if we should have it, why separate?"

57. A. Katsenelinboigen, *op.cit.*, p. 96.

58. M.N. Kulichenko, *op.cit., Voprosy filosofii*, p. 54.

59. M. Hechter, "Group Formation and Cultural Division of Labor," *American Journal of Sociology*, 84:2 (1978), p. 308; see also S. Lieberson, "Stratification and Ethnic Groups," *Sociological Inquiry*, 40 (Spring 1970), pp. 172-181.

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economies and the high percentage of specialists in them create the major preconditions for the possibility of a nationalist movement. In fact, however, the Baltic example demonstrates how the Soviet regime manages to neutralize the nationalist threat by means of the centrally planned economy, federalism, and the passport system.

The degree of Russification of the Baltic republics, which results not so much from the process of modernization but rather from political factors, is increasing steadily.[60] The local party apparatus is fully controlled by the central organization, and consists only of reliable, often highly Russified, elements.[61] The central authority deliberately requires the construction of huge plants in the Baltic republics, where available labor power is insufficient. Substantial economic incentives are granted to workers and specialists immigrating from other republics, above all Russia, the Ukraine and Belorussia. The passport system permits the importation and concentration of aliens in all main strategic areas of the Baltic republics: these areas are generally declared "closed cities," where residence rights and housing distribution are strictly controlled by the party apparatus and the militia. As a result, Latvians today constitute barely more than half of the population of their republic, and are essentially concentrated in agricultural areas. In the early 1970s, they constituted 47% of the urban population and in the capital, Riga, they comprised only 40%.

The local languages are still spoken by all native Baltics; but Russian is widespread everywhere as the second language. Schools and universities give the formal right to choose *any* foreign language. But if anyone, in fact, attempted to choose, say, English over Russian, they would be declared "bourgeois nationalist" and suffer serious consequences. On the other hand, local science, literature, and arts are actively supported. The various unions of writers, artists, composers, film makers, etc., are supported by the state. An independent Estonia, for example, could not afford such a large number of writers, painters, and scholars, and the local intelligentsia is fully aware of this.

The effectiveness of this state of affairs for the purpose of neutralizing any separatist aspiration is evident. As Allworth has aptly noted: "For a time after 1944, Baltic ethnic reliance rested considerably upon memories from the immediate past. By the 1960s, the nationalities had shown an inclination for change in this respect. Responding to more than external threats, a real or sensed need to transfer reliance from past supports soon developed

60. V.S. Vardys, "Modernization and Baltic Nationalism," *Problems of Communism*, 24:5 (1975), pp. 32-48.

61. Thus, among the members of the Politburo of the Latvian Communist Party were, in 1970, only two persons out of 13 with non-Latvian names: only three of them, however, were born in Latvia. As Juris Dreifelds (in "Latvian National Demands and Group Consciousness Since 1959," Simmonds, *op.cit.*, p. 144) has justifiably pointed out, "many party and government positions in the 1970s have retained an apparently high representation of Latvians," but "all these statistics are misleading if they are used to assess the degree of Latvian political 'clout' or representation of their interests in the republic. Many of the above positions have been filled by people whose only connection to Latvia is their family name" (and, one should add, the inscription "Latvian" in the nationality entry of their passports).

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among several Baltic nationalities. That new realism conceivably represents a movement away from nostalgia toward maturity in the local reading of current domestic affairs in the USSR."[62]

The Central Asian Republics. The situation of the Central Asian republics is followed with particular interest in the Western world because of the disproportionally rapid population growth in that part of the USSR. Many authors locate in this phenomenon a major threat to the Soviet regime. In the 1970s, the population of the Slavic republics (Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia) grew by only 6%, while in Uzbekistan a growth rate of 30% was recorded, and 31% in Tadzhikistan. Many observers seem to attribute a special significance to the fact that the Russians will soon form a minority of the Soviet population; they forget that within the Tsarist empire they constituted less than 44% of the population, but nevertheless played the dominant role. Also, according to various scholars, Soviet Moslems,[63] who amounted in 1970 to about 50 million, will soon be 85 and then 100 million strong by the year 2000. This growth, they believe, will cause an "Islamisation" of their way of life, the dissolution of the six republics "artificially created" in Central Asia, and their unification on the basis of Islam and of the intensification of the struggle for national independence. At this point, it is inevitable, at least if we follow their reasoning, to refer to the example of the "Islamic revolution" in Iran.[64]

The major defect with this type of argument consists in arbitrarily drawing a political conclusion from a demographic premise. Demographic growth is identified with growth of political activity and the social power of a group is assessed solely on the basis of its size, without taking into account the level of organization and the degree of control exercised by the group over resources. Sociological analysis does not legitimize such a conclusion. Thus, in recent research concerning the degree of non-work activity (participation in cultural, political, educational activities) of the various social and demographic groups in the Moldavian republic, Arutiunian arrives at some interesting conclusions. (See Table 2.)

These data, rare for Soviet society, demonstrate that the rural population is less active socially almost by a factor of five than the urban population; that individuals with two or more children are five to ten times less active than those without children; and that manual workers are considerably less active than intellectual workers. The validity of these data obviously depends upon the survey methods used by Arutiunian and on that basis could perhaps be questioned, but the tendency to which he points is nevertheless unquestion-

62. E. Allworth, "Flexible Defenses of a Nationality," in E. Allworth, ed., *Nationality Group Survival in Multi-Ethnic States. Shifting Support Patterns in the Soviet Baltic Region* (New York and London: Praeger, 1977), p. 16.

63. But the term itself is questionable, if we consider the real situation of religion in the Soviet Union.

64. Cf. J. Amalric, "The Soviet Union: A Crumbling Monolith," in *The Guardian*, Feb. 11, 1979. The claim that the Soviet regime is opposed to Khomeini's regime because it fears the contagious example of the "Islamic revolution" may spread to the Central Asiatic republics is very naive in the same way that, for example, the claim that the defection to the West by Soviet ballet dancers will serve as an example for the defection to Moscow of Western ballet dancers.

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Table 2[65]

Diversely Active Population in Different Social and Demographic Groups (as % of Total Number in Each Group)

Population groups	Urban			Rural		
	I	II	III	I	II	III
Men	40.4	24.6	6.5	8.2	5.2	1.7
Women	33.6	16.3	3.7	9.3	3.6	1.3
18-29	56.5	12.1	0.6	17.0	4.3	0.4
30-49	35.1	30.8	8.6	7.6	6.1	2.9
50 and over	14.9	12.3	4.4	0.9	0.7	0.3
Engaged in Physical labor	18.3	10.2	2.2	4.5	1.5	0.4
Engaged in Mental labor	62.1	34.1	9.2	50.9	31.8	13.2

I: percentage of persons possessing five or four of the characteristics for diversity of activity.

II: same, but with children.

III: percentage possessing all five characteristics and having two or more children.

able. In this sense, if the population of the Central Asian republics should remain prevailingly agricultural, maintain high birth rates, and show little inclination to migrate, its growth from 50 to 100 million will not in the least affect its social behavior and will not seriously threaten the regime.

It is quite obvious, however, that the Soviet leadership, driven by the deterioration of the demographic conditions, will attempt to induce a massive migration of the central Asian population. In this attempt the regime is likely to deploy in Central Asia the same mechanisms and tactics it successfully used against the Baltic, Ukrainian, Georgian, and other nationalisms. And the results of such policy will in all likelihood be the same: the emergence of a "new realism" seeking to increase the material and cultural standard of living within the Soviet system and replacing the nostalgia for independence.

The claim that the "Islamisation" of the Soviet Central Asian republics is an inevitable scenario for the future is unwarranted. To expect that Moslem religion should suddenly exert a strong solidarizing effect on these republics, i.e., to state that religion should become a determining force in the life of Soviet industrial society, means to apply once again two different criteria to Soviet and Western industrial society. There may be some augmentation of the influence (through example, propaganda, etc.) of the increasingly powerful oil-producing Moslem countries and the religious-political movements taking place there. We still do not have, however, any example of

65. Yu. Arutiunian, "Ethnosocial Aspects of the Internationalization of Way of Life," *Soviet Sociology*, 18:2 (Fall 1979), p. 25.

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socio-cultural influences of the developing countries on the advanced industrial countries of such magnitude that these influences would have led to major internal changes in the latter. What evidence is there that the Central Asian republics should become just such a first case?

The Crimean Tartars. The advantages enjoyed by those ethnic groups which have their own state within the Soviet federation become evident if we consider the position of those ethnic groups that lack a semi-sovereign territory. The latter include: the "deported groups" (Germans and Crimean Tartars), which were deprived of their national territory during Stalin's time; those who have legally been assigned a territory where they never actually lived (Jews);[66] those who for various reasons never had a national territory within the USSR (Poles).[67] All these groups, except the Polish, are engaged in a bitter struggle for the recognition of their national rights, including the right to emigrate (Jews and Germans), and to return to their ancestral territory (Crimean Tartars).

The case of the Crimean Tartars is most illustrative. They, along with some other groups, were accused of high treason by the Stalinist leadership. On the 17th and the 18th of May 1944 almost 200,000 Tartars were deported from Crimea to remote regions of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. A great part of them died during the journey.[68] After Stalin's death, the Crimean Tartars were "rehabilitated" from the charge of treason, but they were not allowed to return to the Crimea where they had lived for many centuries (the Crimea having been annexed to the Ukraine). Lacking their territory, they have a very limited access to the system of higher education (the above-mentioned system of "quotas" for the indigenous population does not apply to them) and are essentially deprived of a national intelligentsia. This socially homogeneous ethnic group clearly aspires to the recognition of their own historic territory and to their share of self-government. The resulting conflict gave rise to one of the strongest national movements — alive now for a quarter of a century — in the USSR. The Crimean Tartars sent individual and collective letters of protest to all possible Soviet and international authorities; for some petitions they gathered more than 120,000 signatures. Activists attempting to organize demonstrations in Moscow are prevented from arrival in the capital through various devices, including a prohibition against the sale of train and plane tickets to Tartars. If they

66. It should be pointed out that many Soviet experts do not consider the Jews a truly ethnic group but, rather, "a heterogeneous conglomerate of various ethnic groups and nationalities, kept together party by a common religion and partly by a certain historical inertia of ethnic self-consciousness." Cf. *Sovetskaia Etnografiia*, 4 (1973), p. 45.

67. The precarious situation of ethnic groups lacking their own territory can be further illustrated with the example of the gypsies. In 1956, the year of the XX Congress, the Supreme Soviet approved a decree containing the following article: "To forbid gypsies to practice nomadism and induce them to shift to a sedentary and laborious way of life." In *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, 21 (1956), cited by V. Chalidze, *Prava celoveka i Sovetskii Soiuz* (New York: Khronika, 1974), p. 185. The gypsies who did not follow this decree were condemned to five years in exile. Later, this penalty was abolished.

68. A.M. Nekrich, *The Punished People: The Deportation and Fate of Soviet Minorities at the End of the Second World War* (New York: Norton, 1978).

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somehow manage to enter in spite of these obstacles, they are arrested and fined or imprisoned. A certain number of Tartars have nevertheless managed to return to the Crimea where they legally bought houses (sometimes the very ones they owned in the past). But a disposition by local authorities prohibits the employment of Tartars and the schooling of their children. Troops, aided by the immigrant population often destroy the houses bought by Tartars and send their owners back to Central Asia. The reasons for the obstinate refusal on the part of the central leadership to recognize the rights of the Crimean Tartars are economic and political in nature.[69] Particularly, weighing the protest of the Tartars and the potential dissatisfaction of the Ukrainians if the Tartars were to return, the leadership pragmatically decided in favor of the strongest. Furthermore, since the Soviet democratic movement was weakened in the 1970s by repression and emigration, the voice of the Crimean Tartars lost some influence all over the world. After 25 years of struggle, the movement of the Crimean Tartars still has not scored any major success.

The 1970s saw a seemingly unlimited capacity of Soviet institutions in containing and harnessing ethnic nationalism and national movements. However, by the early 1980s some new phenomena appear to be discernible in the area of ethnic relations. The deterioration of the internal situation in the USSR began to have repercussions on the relations between the Soviet nations, mainly for two interdependent reasons: economic difficulties and an intensification of Russian nationalism.

Economic Difficulties and Ethnic Relations

The slow but steady increase in the standard of living continued until about the middle '70s and was the main reason for the legitimacy which the Brezhnev leadership enjoyed in the eyes of large sectors of the population.[70] But in the past four or five years, a new situation has become evident, both in the economic arena and in the mood of the population. During the 24th Congress of the CPSU, Brezhnev declared that, for the first time in Soviet history, group "B" (the production of consumer goods and services) would be given priority over group "A" (the production of means of production). Yet, even before the 25th Congress, this policy was reversed under pressure from the sectors of heavy industry and the military. The ensuing slowdown of investments and productivity, above all in the fields of light and food industries and in services, entails a deteriorating standard of living. The inertia of Brezhnev's policy, concerned with the stabilization and maintenance of the *status quo*, and the gerontocratic character of the leadership, lead the population to believe that the regime will neither be able to carry out the promised economic reforms nor give the people new economic

69. After all, except for the Germans and the Crimean Tartars, all other ethnic groups accused by Stalin of treason and later rehabilitated have been allowed to return to their respective territories.

70. V. Zaslavsky, "The Problem of Legitimation in Soviet Society," in A.J. Vidich and R.M. Glassman, eds., *Conflict and Control. Challenge to Legitimacy of Modern Governments* (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1979), pp. 180-196.

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incentives to increase productivity. Even official Soviet literature tends today to admit that "in the phase of mature socialism, the rhythm of economic growth might slightly drop."[71]

Another important cause of the deterioration in the standard of living is the growth of inflation. The following table indicates the relations between the supply of consumer goods and the money deposited in savings accounts and records the increased rate of inflation.[72]

Table 3
The Ratio of Commodity Stocks to the Population's Deposits in Savings Banks (in billion rubles)

Years	Commodity stocks	Total deposits	Ratio of total commodity stocks to deposits (in %)
1950	9.8	1.85	530
1960	24.5	10.9	224
1970	45.7	46.6	98
1973	52.2	68.7	76
1975	58.2	91.0	64
1977	61.0	116.6	52

Savings increased by approximately 15 billion rubles per year over the past several years. Such savings are defined as "deferred demand" by Soviet experts. In fact, there is a ravenous appetite for goods, but products manufactured by light industry are often of such poor quality that the people do not buy them but put their money instead into savings, even though banks pay very low interest rates (from 2% to 3% per year). As Birman has calculated, "the money accumulation of the population is now about 200 billion rubles, at a minimum."[73] This places a permanent strain on the entire system of consumer goods distribution, to the point that some form of rationing is necessary. During the 1970s crowds, alarmed by rumors of an imminent price increase or the devaluation of the ruble, frequently invaded stores in total panic, buying all available goods, provoking the immediate exhaustion of stocks, the formation of interminable lines, and so on. In this situation, the importance of various markets — legal, semi-legal, and illegal — grows enormously, leading to a rapid increase in the price of food products and in the consumer goods sold.

The general deterioration of the economic situation has a direct effect upon ethnic relations in the Soviet Union. Thus, during the 1960s and the 1970s, the central administration was constrained by the rapid growth of the Central Asian population to invest heavily in those republics to create new

71. See A.M. Kovalev, "Razvitoe sotsialisticheskoe obshchestvo — zakonomernyi etap kommunisticheskoi formatsii," *Voprosy filosofii*, 6 (1979), p. 50.

72. A. Katsenelinboigen, *op.cit.*, pp. 147-148; I. Birman, 'The Financial Crisis in the USSR," *Soviet Studies*, 32:1 (January 1980), pp. 84-105.

73. I. Birman, *op.cit.*, p. 86.

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jobs, social services and schools in order to avoid another increase in the already existing inequalities of per capita income between different regions of the country. Though politically justified, such investments are obviously of small productive value and under existing economic conditions it is unlikely that they can be continued. It is more likely that the leadership will direct investments toward those regions which might guarantee the maximum return. It sould not be forgotten that productivity per capita in Estonia, Latvia and the RSFSR is more than three times higher than that of the Central Asian republics.[74] At the same time, the government must adopt serious measures to intensify migration from Central Asia and from Moldavia, where there is a surplus workforce, toward the RSFSR to counterbalance the extremely low birthrate. One might note, in this regard, that several years ago no one criticized the arguments advanced by some economists from the national republics who insisted on the social importance of developing the periphery, of limiting the emigration of skilled workers and orienting universities in the national republics toward the priority of satisfying local exigencies.[75] Today, the same arguments are attacked insofar as they "artificially limit the relations among peoples and hinder the policy of bringing together the nationalities."[76]

Inflation and the increased importance of markets also influence relations between the nationalities. As I have observed, certain groups among the population of the national republics are the primary producers of meat, wool, vegetables and even textiles (if we consider the development of these industries in the periphery and the relative weakness of state control over their activity). The Russian population views itself as ever more dependent on a market whose prices continually increase and which is dominated by representatives of the southern republics. Russian workers who compare their incomes with those of Southern "trading people" — the marketplace being the principal place of contact — feel envy and irritation. What derives from this is a notable embitterment in relations, at the interpersonal level, between Russians and other ethnic groups.[77]

Russian Nationalism and Brezhnev's Politics

It is not surprising, therefore, that Russian chauvinism and nationalism have been substantially reinforced during the 1970s. As Rakowska-Harmstone has justifiably noted, "the study of Russian nationalism has been largelv neglected in the analysis of the Soviet ethnic scene, research being

74. N. Penkaitis, *Der Finanzausgleich in der Sowjetunion und seine Bedeutung für die Wirtschaftsentwicklung der Unionsrepubliken* (Berlin, 1977), p. 191, cited in *Osteuropa*, 6 (1979), p. 451.

75. See, for example, T.K. Koichuev, *Ekonomicheskoe razvitie Kirgizii i faktory ego uskoreniia* (Frunze, 1973); S.I. Kirke, *Tempy i proportsii ekonomicheskogo razvitiia soiuznoi respubliki* (Kishinev, 1973).

76. *Voprosy filosofii*, 5 (1979), p. 53.

77. It is worth noting that such Russian derogatory terms as "chernozhopye" (black asses), used in the past to refer to the people of Central-Asiatic origin, are now used also for those from the Caucasian republics and from Moldavia.

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concentrated mainly on manifestations of nationalism among minorities."[78] The revival of Russian nationalism, documented by numerous observers,[79] makes such a position of the student of ethnic relations untenable. The discontent generated by diminished social mobility in the country, by the economic situation, by the scarcity of consumer goods — discontent which develops in a context of the atomization of the working class and limited communication between the workers and the specialists — easily changes its object, turning itself toward an external object. Also contributing to this is the reaction to Soviet propaganda which for years has exploited the theme of giving priority to the development of national republics and the necessity of sacrifices to render "fraternal help" to Czechoslovakia, Cuba, Vietnam, Egypt, Afghanistan, etc.

The reinforcement of Russian nationalism is also favored by the growth in the number of low-skilled workers who, after the abandonment of the 1960s reforms, have lost any incentive whatsoever to raise their level of education and qualification. Within this stratum, the ideas and tempers of traditional nationalism, typical of other groups of the population, are readily transformed into the ideas of chauvinism, of the Russian nation's superiority, of the cult of Stalin and military victories — a cult which is maintained by propaganda from the military-industrial complex. As I have written elsewhere, Stalinist tendencies have also taken hold among the highly-skilled workers, in particular among those who work in "closed" enterprises favored by a special statute.[80]

As for the specialists, the growth of nationalism may be related to diminished social mobility and to an overproduction of specialists. Among those Russian specialists who are frustrated by this blocked mobility there might well be a need to displace frustration on ethnic minorities, while using to their own advantage the passport registration of ethnic origin.[81] Moreover, one part of the Russian humanistic intelligentsia is sincerely preoccupied by the scarce attention given in the country to the development of Russian national culture and, to obtain more widespread support, have formed something similar to a nationalist lobby. The crisis of Soviet Marxism as a dominant system of values also has led a sector of the Russian intelligentsia to seek a new system of values wherein the ideology of Orthodox religion and the search for so-called roots play a notable part.

As Isaiah Berlin has observed, nationalism — as distinct from merely

78. T. Rakowska-Harmstone, "The Study of Ethnic Politics in the USSR," in Simmonds, *op.cit.*, p. 22.

79. A. Yanov, *The Russian New Right: Right-Wing Ideologies in the Contemporary USSR* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); and A. Sinyavsky, "Solzhenitsyn and Russian Nationalism," in *New York Review of Books*, November 22, 1979.

80. V. Zaslavsky, "The Rebirth of the Stalin Cult in the USSR," *Telos*, 40 (Summer 1979), pp. 12-13.

81. Thus, from the early 1970s, some institutions of higher education in Leningrad, following a secret circular, have stopped accepting Georgians as students. This measure was justified in terms of the need to react to the practice of bribing the members of the selection commissions for admission exams. In reality, it was an obvious response to the popular myth about the rich Southerners corrupting morally unstable Russian officials.

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national consciousness — is often born as "the result of wounded pride and a sense of humiliation in most socially conscious members, which in due course produce anger and self-assertion."[82] This social-psychological atmosphere is today readily apparent in the Russian intelligentsia. Alexander Yanov, in his analysis of the major theorists of present-day Russian nationalism, aptly emphasizes their characteristic sense of profound national mortification derived from the feeling that in the USSR "the Russians are disdained by all."[83] In the *samizdat* of the right it is continually emphasized that Russian nationalism is a reaction to preferential treatment afforded to ethnic minorities in Soviet society or to anti-Russian separatist movements in the republics.[84] Besides being a mass psychological tendency of certain sectors of the Russian working class and of the new middle class, Russian nationalism also manifests itself and finds support in that neo-Stalinist wing of the leadership which is closely tied to the military establishment and the repressive apparatus. With this support one can understand how the most nationalist wing of the Union of Writers assumed control over some important, mass-circulation periodicals like *Ogonek, Molodaia gvardiia, Nash sovremennik*, etc., as well as control over such popular publishing houses as *Sovetskaia Rossiia, Moskovskii rabochii*, etc. The recollection of past military victories, from those of Imperial Russia to those achieved under the guiding hand of Stalin during World War II is a major theme in this important branch of contemporary Soviet art and literature.[85] One might also view, in this regard, preparations to commemorate the sixth centenary of the Battle of Kulikovo (the victory of the Russians over the Mongols in 1380, the event resonant today with obvious anti-Chinese overtones) which will be solemnly celebrated as a national holiday.[86]

All this notwithstanding, Brezhnev's leadership actuates a politics of equilibrium between the diverse factions of the apparatus. On the one hand, it does not permit the Russian nationalist wing to get too far out of line: the "right" dissidents are persecuted with the same diligence as the liberal-democratic dissidents.[87] On the other hand, Brezhnev's leadership does not tolerate even the most minimal open criticism of Russian nationalism in the press — it is as if the phenomenon did not exist.[88]

82. I. Berlin, *op.cit.*, p. 349.

83. A. Yanov, "Ideal'noe gosudarstvo Gennadiia Shimanova," *Sintaksis*, 1 (1978), p. 34.

84. A. Agursky, "Neonatisizm v SSSR," *Novyi zhurnal*, 118 (1978), pp. 213-214.

85. Here one might note the recent grandiose exhibit of paintings by Ilia Glazunov in Moscow, or browse through the pages of Ivan Stadniuk's novel *The War*, serialized in the weekly *Ogonek*, or look at the innumerable photographs and reproductions in the same weekly portraying Russian troops, military victories, Orthodox churches and monasteries — all major stereotypes of Russian nationalism.

86. See *Pravda*, October 27, 1979.

87. Characteristically, two influential members of the Politburo, Dmitrii Polianskii and Alexander Shelepin, considered closely tied to the nationalist faction, have been removed. Also the editor of the journal *Molodaia gvardiia* has been replaced by someone more moderate.

88. When, at the beginning of the 1970s, a decision had to be made as to who would occupy the important post of chief of propaganda for the Central Committee, the then assistant director A. Yakovlev, representing the ideas of the internationalist wing of the apparatus,

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The revival and reinforcement of Russian nationalism are beginning to have a noticeable impact on national relations in the Soviet Union. Many measures enacted by the central administration to consolidate the existing system and not to encourage Russian nationalism have nevertheless begun to appear as concessions to this nationalism and have provoked appreciable reactions not only on the part of the middle class in the national republics, but also, within certain limits, on the part of political elites, preoccupied with their positions. Particularly, the growing Russian nationalism enables the humanistic ethnic intelligentsia to mobilize such a powerful force as the fear for ethnic survival within groups that have always been in a minority in the country.[89] For the moment, Russian nationalism has not yet aroused true ethnic conflict, but the foundations for this are certainly being laid.

Two Perspectives for the Future.

In light of what has been said, one might conclude that the Soviet regime has succeeded up until now in controlling the difficult problems regarding ethnic relations in the USSR. Policy is oriented toward developing and modernizing the peripheral republics, toward satisfying the interests of the political elites and of the new middle class of the ethnic minorities, toward engineering a migration of the Russian population to the national republics, and toward promoting a gradual "voluntary-coercive" substitution — through bilingualism — of Russian for the local languages. Such policy has undoubtedly been successful. National conflicts within Soviet society have never reached the bitterness found in Spain or Northern Ireland. In 1968 Brzezinski wrote: "It is not inconceivable that in the next several decades the nationality problem will become politically more important in the Soviet Union than the racial issues have become in the United States."[90] Ten years

published a long article severely critical of the Russian nationalists' position ("Against Anti-Historicism," *Literaturnaia Gazeta,* November 15, 1972). Yakovlev lost his post in the apparatus of the Central Committee. The former first secretary of the Central Committee of Komsomol, Tiazhel'nikov, noted for his Stalinist sympathies, was appointed chief of propaganda.

89. Let me take, for example, provisions favoring a broader diffusion of the Russian language. The central administration, not satisfied with the results achieved, insists upon a further dissemination of the Russian language and limitations on non-Russian language instruction in the schools. There might be two reasons for this policy: first, for the next 15 to 20 years, one out of three soldiers in the Soviet army — where Russian is spoken almost exclusively — will come from Central Asia; second is the need to organize massive migrations toward the territory of the RSFSR. However, the reactions of many ethnic groups demonstrate that this policy came to be interpreted not as an attempt to prepare society for the tasks that were set for the 1980s, but rather as the determination of the Russian national group to utilize its language as an instrument of control over access to the most pretigious positions and professions. Thus, in 1978, demonstrations took place to protest against proposals in the draft of the Georgian constitution that would have omitted the provisions making Georgian the official language of the republic (*Khronika tekushchikh sobytii,* 49 [1978]; *Zaria Vostoka,* April 15, 16, 1978). There is considerable evidence that Georgian schoolteachers were among the prime organizers of the demonstrations. As a result, the provisions declaring Georgian the official language of the Georgian republic were retained. Similar provisions were retained in the constitutions of other Caucasian republics.

90. Z. Brzezinski, in K. Chornovil, *The Chornovil Papers* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 7.

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later, H. Carrère d'Encausse published a book with the sensational title, *L'empire éclaté. La révolte des nations en URSS.*[91] None of this has yet happened.

There has been a growth of national consciousness among many ethnic groups. Not even Soviet researchers deny this, explaining that authentic integration is dialectically associated with differentiation. But this growth in national consciousness is placed within the context of the dominant institutions and ideology without the unity of the Soviet state itself being discussed. The ethnic groups, particularly those having their own governing institutions, strive to attain the most advantageous distribution of resources, something completely normal in a centrally planned system in which territorial entities are units of planning. True nationalism and separatism are supported by some groups of the new middle class, but a considerable part of the specialists with non-Russian ethnic origins accept the Soviet system and support it. Nationalist ideology has little support among workers for whom the vision of national independence is far less romantic than for the intelligentsia.

Until now ethnic conflicts have played an insignificant role in the evolution of Soviet society. Nevertheless, one might expect that under certain circumstances the situation will change. This will depend far less upon the development of national relations itself than upon policies enacted by the successors of Brezhnev. Maintenance of the *status quo* and stability without change — the tack of Brezhnev's leadership — seems now exhausted. In the country there have accumulated a great quantity of economic and political problems which call for answers. If the leadership chooses the path of reform and the liberalization of economic life, problems like the redistribution of investments or the more efficient use of manpower in the national republics, obtained through the organization of voluntary migration, will be resolved without shocks and will not assume the character of ethnic conflicts. In Soviet society, contradictions will acquire primarily *political and class characteristics.* Competition between the various sectors of the economy, conflicts between planners and executors over the definition of planning objectives, and even the class conflict between social groups of the organizers and the workers will begin to assume a major role.

Still, one should not exclude the possibility — as recent events in Afghanistan clearly demonstrate — that among Brezhnev's successors a group will prevail which is oriented toward the tightening of social discipline, a strengthening of the repressive apparatus and an ever more intense militarization of society. To succeed in such a policy, the directing group will have to exploit ever more the resources of Russian nationalism and chauvinism. The policy of conquest will be presented to the population for some time as a policy of defense against the possibility of Chinese or American aggression. To ensure the success of such a policy, the

91. Paris: Flammarion, 1978. It should be pointed out that the content of this serious and balanced book has nothing in common with its sensationalist title. Evidently, in the choice of a title, scientific rigor has been sacrificed to commercial interest.

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propaganda apparatus will be concentrating on the promotion of "Soviet patriotism" as a unifying factor in the face of external threats against the integrity of the country.

Yet, as Brus aptly notes, recourse to nationalism in the concrete situation existing in Eastern Europe is enormously conflict-laden.[92] One might predict that, under present conditions, an expansionist policy will rather rapidly become blocked. On the other hand, the militarist tendencies of the Soviet ruling group and the end of detente would leave little margin for internal economic liberalization. A new investment policy based on criteria no longer political but economic would inevitably worsen the economic situation of many Soviet republics, depriving them of important sources of social and economic benefits.

This policy could be enacted through administrative measures and should provoke more active opposition from ethnic minorities, who, because of their structural position in society, would be constrained to develop particular nationalisms (Ukrainian, Georgian, etc.) based to a considerable extent on anti-Russian sentiments. Intense preoccupation of many ethnic groups with their relationships with the dominant Russian group would also have sources other than simply unequal economic treatment. While in the past Russian domination could have been perceived as bringing both advantages and drawbacks, in the presence of strong Russian nationalism, cultural and linguistic subordination would imply the extinction of ethnic communities. In this case, the intensification of *ethnic conflicts* appears increasingly more probable, and the title of Carrère d'Encausse's *L'empire éclaté: La révolte des nations en URSS* closer to reality.

92. W. Brus, "Political System and Economic Efficiency: The East European Context," *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 4:1 (March 1980), p. 54.

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

INTRODUCTION

by Martin Jay

To the extent that the core members of the Institute for Social Research have been perceived as constituting a coherent school of thought, recognition of their individual achievements has tended to be obscured. No one has perhaps been more the victim of this process than Leo Lowenthal, one of the Institute's earliest members and a central

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figure in its intellectual life on two continents for nearly a quarter century. In most treatments of the Frankfurt School, Lowenthal is faithfully listed as its expert on literary issues, while the actual content of his work is ignored. Zoltan Tar, for example, pauses only long enough to misstate the date of Lowenthal's entry into the Institute before passing on to other matters.[1] Little more of a really substantive nature appears in most other general studies of Critical Theory, such as those by Slater, Connerton, Söllner, or Apergi.[2] And although the editors of *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader* are insightful enough to include Lowenthal's masterful critique of Knut Hamsun, they turn his birthdate into a mystery and wrongly credit Adorno with his epigram that mass culture is "psychoanalysis in reverse."[3]

Part of the reason for Lowenthal's relative neglect must be attributed to the seriousness with which he took the Institute's collective identity. Of all his colleagues, only Friedrich Pollock matched Lowenthal's dedication to the communal project envisaged by the Institute's founders. In a variety of roles — managing editor of the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* and director of its extensive review section, editor of the third part of the *Studien über Authorität und Familie* devoted to individual studies, co-director of the Institute's New York branch after Horkheimer and Adorno left for California, informal American archivist of many of its documents following its return to Frankfurt — Lowenthal was at the center of its institutional existence. He was no less active in the communal stimulation of its intellectual work, that dialectical interaction of *Darstellung* and *Forschung* recently analyzed by Helmut Dubiel.[4] His regular participation in the discussions surrounding the work published under his colleagues' names is attested to by the abundant appearance of his own in their acknowledgements. Horkheimer and Adorno, for example, credit him with co-authoring the first three sections of the "Elements of Anti-Semitism" chapter of *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. Adorno thanks him for contributing to the chapters in *The Authoritarian Personality* written under Adorno's name. And as late as *The Aesthetic Dimension*, Marcuse praises him for once again proving "his reputation as a fierce reader and critic."[5]

In general, throughout his career, Lowenthal seems to have been comfortable with the kind of collaborative scholarship practiced by the Institute. His own volume in the series of *Studies in Prejudice, Prophets of Deceit*, was co-authored with Norbert Guterman. In later years, he worked collectively with Marjorie Fiske, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Joseph Klapper.[6] And he was an active member of the committee led by Charles Muscatine that produced the widely discussed report, *Education in Berkeley*, dealing with the university crisis of the 1960s. In short, Lowenthal was clearly skilled in

1. Zoltan Tar, *The Frankfurt School: The Critical Theories of Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno* (New York, 1977), p. 17.

2. Phil Slater, *Origin and Significance of the Frankfurt School; A Marxist Perspective* (London, 1977); Paul Connerton, *The Tragedy of Enlightenment; An Essay on the Frankfurt School* (Cambridge, 1980); Alfons Söllner, *Geschichte und Herrschaft; Studien zur materialistischen Sozialwissenschaft, 1929-1942* (Frankfurt, 1979); Francesco Apergi, *Marxismo e ricerca sociale nella Scuola di Francoforto* (Florence, 1977).

3. *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader*, ed. with intros. by Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt (New York, 1978), pp. 529, 118.

4. Helmut Dubiel, *Wissenschaftsorganisation und politische Erfahrung; Studien zur frühen Kritischen Theorie* (Frankfurt, 1978).

5. Herbert Marcuse, *The Aesthetic Dimension; Toward a Critique of Marxist Aesthetics* (Boston, 1978), p. vii.

6. See the bibliography of Lowenthal's works elsewhere in this issue.

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the type of cooperative, often interdisciplinary work that is more frequently urged as a goal than celebrated as a reality. And perhaps as a result, his own intellectual profile has remained less distinct than it might have otherwise been.

There is, to be sure, a substantial body of work that appeared solely under his name. Indeed, if the Frankfurt School's main contribution to Western Marxism is identified with its investigations of cultural and aesthetic issues, as it sometimes is, Lowenthal's studies in these areas must be considered central to that endeavor. As pure examples of Critical Theory applied to literature, they are arguably more typical than the work of Benjamin and Adorno, for they were more directly composed under the theoretical guidance of Horkheimer's seminal *Zeitschrift* essays. As such, they are powerful statements of the Frankfurt School's ideology critique at a time when its members still held to relatively traditional Marxist expectations about the probable course of history. If they have perhaps received less attention than those of Adorno and Benjamin, it is likely because of their more direct and straightforward approach to the relationship between society and culture. Despite Lowenthal's early religious interests and his abiding philosophical concerns, there is far less of a mixture of profane theology, anti-metaphysical metaphysics and critical sociology in his writings than in those of his two Institute colleagues. If, as a result, Lowenthal's work seems at times less startlingly and provocatively unique than theirs, his also suffers from none of the occasional perversity and arbitrariness that mar their texts. Here, too, paradoxically, may be a source of their respective reputations, for Lowenthal's writings do not lend themselves to the wildly divergent, often antithetical readings that have characterized the reception of Benjamin and Adorno.

The recognition of their work has also, of course, gone through cycles of intensity. And so to many familiar with the history of the Frankfurt School, it has only seemed a matter of time before Lowenthal would also find a wider audience. Happily, the moment has come while Lowenthal himself, the last surviving member of the Institute's inner circle, is still among us to enjoy it (and, one suspects, to be somewhat embarrassed by it, for Lowenthal has always been made uncomfortable by the monumentalization of Critical Theory and the concomitant cultish reception of its spokesmen). The Suhrkamp Verlag has just announced the imminent publication of his collected works in Germany. A lengthy biographical interview with him was conducted by W. Martin Lüdke in the *Frankfurter Rundschau* on May 17 of this year. Helmut Dubiel turned a much more extensive series of interviews into a lively auto-biographical volume — characteristically teased out of Lowenthal by collaboration — entitled *Mitmachen Wollte Ich Nie*.[7] And now a heterogeneous group of Lowenthal's admirers has accepted *Telos*' offer to present him with a series of essays on the occasion of his 80th birthday, which falls on November 3 of this year.

Jürgen Habermas, the most notable inheritor of the tradition that Lowenthal helped found, has contributed his preface to the new paperback edition of the *Zeitschrift*, which the Deutsche Taschenbuch Verlag will publish shortly. In it, he details the importance of the journal's massive review section, which Lowenthal directed. Ferenc Feher and Agnes Heller, like Lowenthal deeply but not uncritically indebted to Lukacs' forays into materialist culture criticism, have written an essay on "Comedy and Rationality." Lüdke, who co-edited a recent anthology of essays on

7. Leo Lowenthal, *Mitmachen Wollte Ich Nie; Ein Autobiographisches Gespräch mit Helmut Dubiel* (Frankfurt, 1980). In addition to the interviews, this volume contains several very interesting letters between Lowenthal and a variety of figures in his life, including Franz Rosenzweig, Siegfried Kracauer, Walter Benjamin, Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer.

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Adorno's aesthetic theory,[8] has used Lowenthal's discussion of early Romanticism as a stimulus to reflections of his own on that subject. Robert Sayre has compared the work of the other major Marxist sociology of literature, Lucien Goldmann, with that of Lowenthal. And David Gross has contrasted him with Adorno and Roland Barthes, concentrating on the issue of mass or popular culture. Prefacing these essays is the chapter entitled "Scientific Biography" from *Mitmachen Wollte Ich Nie*, which was selected over another dealing in greater detail with the Institute, because it gives a greater sense of the sweep of Lowenthal's entire career.

In addition, an essay by Lowenthal himself, written for the *Zeitschrift* in 1932, is translated into English here for the first time.[9] The earliest substantive application of Critical Theory to literature, appearing shortly after Lowenthal's programmatic statement in the journal's inaugural issue, "Conrad Ferdinand Meyer's Heroic View of History" has been chosen for its exemplary qualities. With a confidence in the relatively direct relationship between society and literature that in later years he would come to qualify, Lowenthal skillfully explored the ideological implications of Meyer's novellas. Employing content analysis buttressed by reference to Meyer's non-fiction writings, he detailed the ways in which this seemingly historical Swiss author expressed the defensive worldview of the upper-bourgeois-Junker alliance of the Germany of his day. Interestingly, many of the traits he detected in Meyer's novellas were to reappear in the 20th-century forerunners of fascism, those purveyors of "heroic-folkish realism" examined by Marcuse two years later in the *Zeitschrift* in his seminal essay on "The Struggle Against Liberalism in the Totalitarian View of the State."[10]

Lowenthal's analysis not only anticipated Marcuse's essay, but also contained many of the same arguments that were to appear in Lukacs' treatment of Meyer in *The Historical Novel*, written in Moscow in the winter of 1936-37.[11] Whether or not Lukacs read Lowenthal can't be verified, although it is likely he did. What is certain is that he shared Lowenthal's insight into the essentially pseudo-historical, anti-populist hero-worshipping impulse behind Meyer's work. Two important differences, however, can be discerned in their analyses. Whereas Lowenthal, true to the Frankfurt School's generally positive attitude towards psychology, contends that Meyer's ineffable characters are presented in a psychologically opaque way, Lukacs, as ever hostile to psychology, argues that Meyer's concentration on the inner life of his protagonists is "no less psychologistic than the writings of those of his contemporaries who were open adherents of psychological analysis."[12] For Lowenthal, there is a crucial difference between true psychological characterization and the attribution of ineffability to individuals, a difference that seems to have escaped the more insistently sociologistic Lukacs.

Secondly, Lukacs compares Meyer to Flaubert as a forerunner of the modernist destruction of realism, whereas Lowenthal, lacking Lukacs' unqualified hostility to

8. Burkhardt Lindner and W. Martin Lüdke, eds, *Materielen zur ästhetischen Theorie Theodor W. Adorno; Konstruktion der Moderne* (Frankfurt, 1980).

9. The translation is taken from the slightly revised version in *Erzählkunst und Gesellschaft; Die Gesellschaftsproblematik in der deutschen Literature des 19. Jahrhunderts*, introduction by Frederic C. Tubach (Neuwied and Berlin, 1971).

10. Herbert Marcuse, *Negations; Essays in Critical Theory*, Jeremy J. Shapiro, trans. (Boston, 1968).

11. Georg Lukacs, *The Historical Novel*, Hannah and Stanley Mitchell, trans. (London, 1962).

12. *Ibid.*, p. 226. For a more recent view closer to Lowenthal's, see W.D. Williams, *The Stories of C.F. Meyer* (Oxford, 1962), p. 20.

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modernism, traces no such lineage. Here, ironically, Lukacs is closer to contemporary non-Marxist criticism, which tends, to be sure, to honor Meyer for just those ambiguities and equivocations that Lukacs reads as signs of decadence.[13] Although Lowenthal seems to have shared Lukacs' distaste for naturalism,[14] he never extended his critique of its inadequacies to include later forms of modernism. In fact, for reasons he defends in his interview with Dubiel, Lowenthal never applied his sociology of literature to works of the avant-garde. This neglect may in some ways be regrettable, but in the case of his critique of Meyer, it had a salutary effect. For as a consequence, the ideological function of Meyer's work is more concretely situated in the specific historical conjuncture of Wilhelmian Germany and not made into yet another example of that secular decline of the bourgeoisie after 1848 into decadence, so tiresomely rehearsed in Lukacs' work. Although as any reader of *Literature and the Image of Man* or *Erzählkunst und Gesellschaft* can attest, Lowenthal had no objection to situating specific authors in the context of long-term developmental tendencies, he was far more modest than Lukacs, or most other Marxist critics for that matter, in abstaining from doing so for the literature of the present or recent past.

This prudence, it might be noted in conclusion, can also be detected in Lowenthal's general political attitudes during his long career. Without ever fully abandoning the Utopian yearnings of his youth, he consistently expressed the characteristic Frankfurt School aversion to concrete political movements. "Mitmachen" of any kind has never attracted him. Yet, Lowenthal refused to allow his practical abstinence to degenerate into an unintended apologia for the *status quo*. It was more than just personal ties of friendship that bound him far closer to Marcuse than to Horkheimer during the 1960s and early 1970s. There is perhaps some symbolic value in the fact that in 1969, Lowenthal gave refuge to Marcuse in his Carmel Valley home when death threats in southern California grew particularly virulent.

During the heyday of the student movement in Berkeley in the 1960s, Lowenthal was active in the faculty struggle to effect academic reform as a leader of what he describes as the "left-wing of the Muscatine committee."[15] Unlike many who attempted to mediate in a difficult time, he emerged with the respect and affection of most combatants in both camps.[16] In the years since the Free Speech Movement, his stature has, if anything, increased. Continuing to teach on a part-time basis long after his official retirement, offering among other courses a private seminar that attracts applicants well beyond the confines of the sociology department, Lowenthal remains a potent intellectual force for new generations of students who would otherwise know Critical Theory only through the printed word. Although generalizations of this nature are often hazardous, it is really taking only a small risk to say that there are few figures on the Berkeley campus today who are as widely admired and deeply loved as Leo Lowenthal. Most of those who know his extraordinary physical and mental vigor would be astonished to learn that he has reached the age of 80. But none would want to be excluded from the very genuine expression of affectionate tribute that informs the essays presented to him on the following pages.

13. See, for example, Marianne Burkhard, *Conrad Ferdinand Meyer* (Boston, 1978), chapter IX.

14. For Lowenthal's views on naturalism, see "Individuum und Gesellschaft im Naturalismus," in *Notizen zur Literatursoziologie* (Stuttgart, 1975). This article was originally written in the later 1930's for the *Zeitschrift*, but was not published until 1975.

15. Löwenthal, *Mitmachen Wollte Ich Nie*, p. 217.

16. See, for example, the tribute to him on his 70th birthday in the *Berkeley Journal of Sociology*, XVI (1971-72).

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INTERVIEW WITH LEO LOWENTHAL*

by Helmut Dubiel

Dubiel: "In the early 1920s, you wrote a good deal — in part politically oriented, in part dealing with the history of ideas — which could be summed up under the bibliographical rubric 'Judaica.' In Jewish newspapers and community bulletins you published articles on Lassalle and Marx, on Tolstoy and the German spirit, and on the Jewish philosophy of religion of Hermann Cohen; some of these writings on the history of ideas were systematically collected in a long omnibus article, 'Judaism and the General Spirit.' These are all articles that if taken together remind one of a thematically similar but short article by Walter Benjamin on the role of the Jews in recent German history of ideas. Could you tell me what the link was that united these essays on the history of ideas?"

Lowenthal: "My intellectual and political interest in Jewish affairs developed very strongly in my student days by contact with the philosophy of Hermann Cohen, and under the influence of his student Walter Kinkel, through contact with the Zionist student movement in Heidelberg, and under the great influence of the charismatic Rabbi Nobel. I believed that Jewish philosophy of religion, especially of Maimonides, contains a progressive rationalism with strong secular tendencies, which, though garbed in religious symbolism, also connote the idea of a paradise on Earth. It was a motif in my thoughts at the time to capture in this secular-oriented redemptive thinking the Utopian element that Marx, Heine and also Freud display, at least inherently. It is probably not by chance that I often gave lectures in Jewish communities and in synagogues about these secular personalities in order to pay tribute to my conviction that there is a Jewish element in the socialist Utopia. However much I have tried to convince Martin Jay that absolutely no Jewish motifs were present among us at the Institute, now, after mature consideration in my old age, I must admit that the subterranean influence of Jewish tradition was co-determinative."

Dubiel: "I found among your papers the draft of a project with the title 'Judaism and Jewishness in Recent German Philosophy.' I also read this short manuscript in your collection of documents together with a few letters from Franz Rosenzweig and Martin Buber, who reacted very positively to this idea. Was it the intent of this project to gather together in one volume your scattered works in this field as a sort of German-Jewish history of ideas and of philosophy?"

Lowenthal: "Do you have a particular year in mind?"

Dubiel: "Yes, 1925."

Lowenthal: "That is just one year before my association with the Institute for Social Research began. This project was an attempt to undertake an intellectual, perhaps even an academic career. At that time I was not yet thinking of a professorship: it was only two years after receiving my doctoral degree. The project was an attempt — with Buber's and Rosenzweig's help — to obtain a grant from the Moses Mendelssohn Foundation. The Moses Mendelssohn Foundation was a kind of Jewish Volkswagen Foundation. I don't recall why that failed; maybe it was not judged favorably. Maybe Leo Strauss didn't like it (he was very influential in this foundation at that time). In any case, the association with the Institute for Social Research followed soon after. I would have liked to work on a philosophically and politically detailed study of the

*Translated by David J. Parent.

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interrelations of Jewish and non-Jewish philosophy and Jewish and non-Jewish intellectual life. That also was connected with my earlier work on 'The Demonic' and my dissertation on Franz von Baader. Even though nothing came of it, the moral impulses that moved me to the project remained alive."

Dubiel: "Leo, I would like a few more comments from you on those articles of yours with a purely political aim, especially those you wrote in the *Jüdisches Wochenblatt* published by Ernst Simon. Judging by their titles, the articles are often mainly about current affairs, e.g., 'The Situation of the Jews in Poland' or 'The Concession Law in Poland.' But I'm especially interested in the essay "The Lessons of China,' which contains a very sharp critique of the Jewish settlement policy in Palestine. As a reminder, I want to read you a few sentences from that article, dated June 25, 1925: *'China's revolution must be a lesson for Palestine.* If, especially in earlier years, one looked at Zionism's ideological products, then an ironic remark could easily slip from one's lips as to what bloody laughter it would cause in the world if, for instance today, a remnant of Celts scattered on a remote island would travel to France and claim this land as a national property belonging to them by historical right. Zionism's dangerous vice, its naiveté in historical matters, which generally runs wild only on Jewish history, here again found copious activity — probably impelled by its world-diplomatic engagements. The *Arab Question* was, therefore, asked in about the same way as the Central Association [of German Citizens of the Jewish Faith] pictures its relation to the anti-semites: How shall we deal with this unpleasant, numerically so superior element? In other words, one could say that Zionism's borrowings from the arsenal of European diplomatic weapons was ill-suited to it, i.e., that it borrowed more there than it had originally intended: for it was carrying on a European colonial policy against the Arabs.... And if one keeps the eyes open, then one knows that today Arab youths are studying at European universities and working to prepare for the hour that has now struck in China. Here too a national majority is screaming for justice. Here too a tremendous 'danger' is approaching. It will require the concerted moral energy of the entire Zionistic generation living today, indeed of absolutely all Judaism, to show whether it can succeed in changing not its tactics, but its attitude. We are not so politically naive as to unhesitatingly come out with a favorable prognosis.' "

Lowenthal: "You know that in my student years in Heidelberg I was a member of the Zionist student organization. But I was so because I very strongly believed in Judaism's messianic mission, its Utopian political task. I had hoped the Erez Israel would be a model for the just society. Things went the same way for me with Zionism as they did later with the Communist world movement and the Communist Party. I experienced a great disappointment; I felt how the Zionist movement was being infected more and more by what my friend Ernst Simon at that time so convincingly called the 'intoxication with normality.' I was not so ideologically blind as to refuse critically to analyze the settlement policy of the Jewish organizations in Palestine. As I saw it, the Jewish land-purchase was an alliance of big Arab landowners and Jewish money at the expense of the Arab peasants and farmworkers. I instinctively foresaw that this could lead to bad conflicts, if not catastrophes. My comparison related to China's occupation by the European powers and the establishment of extra-territorial zones. I believed that it had to be possible to learn from the pre-history of the Boxer uprising that one has to come to terms with the population and not simply rape it. This article, which I signed 'Hereticus,' resulted in my abandoning the Zionist movement but also, quite concretely, the newspaper. This does not mean, I repeat, that I had given up my relation to Jewish motifs or my support of Israel."

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Dubiel: "As I was going through your papers from the 1920s, I found, in addition to the manuscript of your dissertation, many other manuscripts testifying to your philosophical activity. One feels in all your writings that you not only studied philosophy but that philosophical orientations are present in all your scientific works, even though you wrote no philosophical publications in the strict sense, apart from your dissertation. In the 1920s you wrote about the political philosophy of the Enlightenment. I also found a manuscript on Thomas More and Campanella, and one on 'Power and Law in Rousseau's Philosophy of State and in German Idealist Philosophy.' Then I found a longer manuscript on Helvetius' philosophy — a manuscript that was projected to be your inaugural dissertation, but could not be completed because of your emigration. So, first tell us about the works I just mentioned."

Lowenthal: "You have tracked down something decisive in my intellectual life. You know that here in America often one has to present one's professional calling card. Someone asks, 'What do you do?' and then I say, 'I'm really a philosopher.' My relation to philosophy began very early through my father's influence, and especially through his recommended reading of Schopenhauer, and it continued throughout my intellectual youth. There is no semester in which I did not register for a few classes and seminars in philosophy. As a very young man I went to Giessen just to study neo-Kantian philosophy. Hermann Cohen was very reactionary and nationalistic, but it must not be forgotten that one of his greatest students was Paul Natorp, who at the time was a socialist. Walter Kinkel was himself a socialist. Natorp and Kinkel have shown that Kantian ethics and socialist consciousness are compatible. The interest in Enlightenment philosophy you were just speaking of came about mainly through my Marxist orientation. You know that Marx was indebted to the Enlightenment; what he criticized in Enlightenment philosophers was only that while they postulated the right goals of society theoretically, they did not indicate in practice how those goals could be translated into revolutionary praxis. This subject has always interested me. Thus, I studied intensely the left wing of Enlightenment philosophy: Holbach, Helvetius, La Mettrie, Diderot. You see here in my library the first editions of Holbach, La Mettrie and Helvetius, which were dearly paid for with my scanty savings. In the mid-1920s there were no good German books about the French Enlightenment available. There were hardly any modern translations. For example, there were no translations of the introduction to the *Encyclopedia*, no translation of Helvetius, hardly any of Diderot. If you look at my bibliography in the Helvetian manuscript you'll see how scanty the secondary literature was. It also seemed to be politically interesting that in Germany, trivial German Enlightenment philosophers such as Wolff were praised to the sky while the French Enlightenment was almost totally ignored. After all, Helvetius was one of the sharpest critics of German class society.

Thus, the philosophical motifs always remained alive in me. Look at my later literary studies. When I write about Corneille, I also write about Descartes. When I write about Molière, I also write about Gassendi, and when I write about popular culture, I also write about Pascal and Montaigne. For me, philosophy is still the queen of the sciences and, like most who think as I do, I mourn the present situation when philosophy is in decline. If metaphysics is still being taught in universities here, it is mostly by arrogant, old, dried-up, boring 'nuts,' while fashionable interest leans toward linguistic analysis, which in most (not all) cases is a technically oriented methodology of the sciences and shares with authentic philosophy only the name."

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Dubiel: "In the years 1928 and 1931 you wrote a few works that were published, I believe, only in 1971, under the title *Narrative Art and Society*. These essays show Lowenthal as he would later be known. Indeed, these writings comprise a first and very self-confident realization of a program of a materialistically oriented study of literary history. The volume contains something of a critical reconstruction of bourgeois class-consciousness in terms of its most prominent literary representatives."
Lowenthal: "Yes, with the exception of the first essay in this volume, on the social situation of literature, which first appeared in 1932 in the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*. The other essays originated from a compendious series of lecture activity, which I developed in the 'League for Popular Lectures.' I gave lectures on all areas of European literature, although my main interest concerned German literature. As a good old Marxist, I acted according to the principle of beginning with criticism at home — and Germany had caused me to lose a lot of sleep at that time. In methodology, this work is characterized by a still — how should I put it? — unmediated Marxism. Maybe I am doing myself an injustice by this judgment, for in these works I do also go into the psychological mechanism of mediation and into the private reactions of the characters depicted in literature. Most of what I wrote or began writing in Germany before my emigration is an expression of the attempt to track down the decline and disintegration of the bourgeois consciousness and to outline it in a critique of ideology. My special interest concerned the documents of literature and the documentations of literary influence. And if you take a look at the subtitles added 50 years later to these sections, they express this theoretical intention, where, for example, for the chapter on Goethe I choose the title 'Bourgeois Resignation'; for Keller, I speak of 'Bourgeois Recession,' etc. These works belong to the context of the effort to describe and analyze the specific course of bourgeois consciousness in Germany, and why there was no bourgeois revolution there. As I said, these articles were written from an attitude of political critique. As far as I can remember, I stopped working on this material in 1930 because I was then too burdened with Institute business, especially with the founding of the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*."
Dubiel: "On reading these old works I had the impression of a specific continuity and discontinuity, similarity and dissimilarity to the essays that appeared a few years later in the *Zeitschrift*. I would speak, concerning your early work, of a methodological unconcern. But the studies that appeared in the *Zeitschrift* can be summed up under the intention of a study of literary history based on a materialist and social-psychological account of the history of literature. What I liked about these early works was the freshness and lack of concern with which cultural processes were related to the substructure. I always asked myself, how does he do that, what methodological authorities does he refer to, do these works comprise a sort of zero-point or in what theoretical or, more precisely, literary-critical tradition does he really stand? You yourself name Georg Brandes in connection with these questions, and, of course, Franz Mehring; you also name contemporary Russian literary studies — very heterogeneous points of reference in time and content. So, in brief, I had the impression that you were just rolling up your sleeves and beginning to write."
Lowenthal: "Precisely, Helmut, a fresh dilettantism, if you will, though originating in a political attitude and on the basis of a more or less solid knowledge of literature, but still in the sense of a fresh impressionistic discourse — I let myself be carried by my own enthusiasm. That is a little like with the work on Baader or the works on Enlightenment philosophy. Although, at that time, I did not yet know Walter

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Benjamin's wonderful statement that history is always written by the winners, I was always interested in writing the history of the losers. Baader was such a loser — a lone figure of German Restoration philosophy.

"In the book we have been talking about, *The Art of the Narrative and Society*, I talk about the literature of the 'Young Germany' movement in light of the history of the revolution that didn't take place. The essay on Mörike traces the state of melancholy of the great German poets, who were far from getting from their public the resonance that would have been matter-of-course in France or England. There was no public in Germany such as Victor Hugo had in France, or Shelley and Lord Byron in England. And finally, last but not least, Friedrich Speilhagen, who, though he was no great artist, was a very conscious, independent and radical analyst of bourgeois society. I was fascinated with dealing a blow to this widespread foolish repetition of the so-called greatness of Gottfried Keller and C.F. Meyer and with honoring the lost and neglected streams of German literature."

Dubiel: "So, again and again documenting the thesis that there was no genuine bourgeois consciousness in Germany or, in sociological terms, that there were no significant and influential exponents of a liberal worldview."

Lowenthal: "And consequently also no exponents of a political liberalism and also no historical chance for an alliance between socialists and enlightened liberals, who could have prevented the disaster in Germany. That is again the theme of my works on the biographical fashion."

Dubiel: "Leo, now I would like to come to the essays you wrote in the *Zeitschrift*. First of all, the essay 'On the Social Situation of Literature,' which appeared in 1932, then the 1933 essay on Conrad Ferdinand Meyer, then in 1934 the study on Dostoevsky, in 1936 the essay on Ibsen entitled 'The Individual in Individualistic Society,' and in 1938 the famous essay on Knut Hamsun. The 1932 essay does, to a considerable extent, contain a methodological program in which literary history is conceived and required as critique of ideology. Compared to those earlier works in *The Art of the Narrative,* it can be said of the articles in the *Zeitschrift* that under the influence of Horkheimer's ideas on ideology-critique they have a sharpened methodological self-consciousness. Would it be right to say that?"

Lowenthal: "Yes. You know how these things originated historically. The first volume, no, the very first number of the *Zeitschrift*, was supposed to contain a sort of program, a position adopted by all main collaborators of the *Zeitschrift* as to what united them, i.e., the materialistic conception of history, focused on and applied to the field they understood best. Horkheimer wrote about philosophy, Adorno about music, Pollock about economy, Fromm about psychology, and I about literature. I challenged established literary science, its idealistic arrogance, its distinctively political reactionary function. At the same time I tried to develop a kind of program for a type of study I considered important. When the next essays appeared — you have just named them, the one on Conrad Ferdinand Meyer and the study of Dostoevsky reception — this was, so to speak, a pioneer work — they also belong to the context of the analysis of the decline of the bourgeoisie: C.F. Meyer's heroes as their exemplary attempt to magnify themselves as symbols of the superior, sovereign and leading class; and the reception of Dostoevsky, who was the most read author after Goethe or at least the most printed novelist in Germany, as a reflection of what Fromm called the anal and sado-masochistic character of the petty bourgeoisie, if not the broad strata of the middle classes in general."

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Dubiel: "Does your work on Ibsen also fit into the framework of the critique of the disintegrating bourgeois consciousness?"
Lowenthal: "Yes! I was not naive about Ibsen's patriarchal character. The essence of Ibsen's drama, his method, so to speak, consists of taking bourgeois consciousness seriously on the level on which it articulates itself and then showing how hollow, fallacious and in every sense untenable it is. Death, deception, bankruptcy and the smashing of all inter-human relations between friend and friend, husband and wife, parents and children, are the price that must be paid for the bourgeois system of competition. His decisive statement is that the bourgeois principle of competition penetrates into the intimacy of human relations and destroys them and — very important in Ibsen — that those who are furthest removed from the competitive struggle and at the same time most deprived of rights in a society based on the principle of competition — namely women — are the bearers and heralds of a better system. This, then, belongs to the context of my theory of marginality, which we should yet speak about when we come to *Literature and the Image of Man.*"
Dubiel: "Yes, let us now speak about your Hamsun study! This study to some extent goes beyond the methodological program of a substantive ideology-critique. I have more frequently found in the literature that it is listed under the heading 'Theory of Fascism' and not as an immanently literary-sociological work, which it claims to be. Well, fine, Hamsun, to my disgrace I must admit that in my late puberty I was a great, almost rapturous admirer of Hamsun. . . ."
Lowenthal: "A pardonable offense. You weren't the only one!"
Dubiel: "Your essay had an enormous prognostic capacity. For Hamsun's sympathy with the Nazis became manifest — as far as I can see — only in 1940 when the German troops invaded Norway."
Lowenthal: "Yes, precisely. This prognosis of mine did not at all go uncontested in our circle. Marcuse and Benjamin both defended Hamsun. But I insisted that the subtitle of this essay was not accidentally 'On the Prehistory of Authoritarian Ideology.' I tried to document my thesis not only with what Hamsun had produced in manifest political statements, but also by an immanent analysis of his characters and principle of literary construction. It was an immanent critique, an attempt in the sense of Adorno's beautiful statement: 'Art does not come to society, but society comes to art: society should originate in the work of art and not the other way around.' In the Hamsun essay and even in the Ibsen essay, a few of my methodological convictions are developed, i.e., that the private is unmasked as the socially mediated. Works of art can give us information about the social dimension in the private sphere of men, how society is present in the love relation of two people, in friendship and in their return to nature. Hence: literature as documentation of social representation in the psyche of the individual. In later works I once formulated this to the effect that literature provides the best source of data for information on a society's pattern of socialization."
Dubiel: "May I rephrase this once to appropriate it? So, literary sociology not in the sense of a sociology of literature, its production and circulation, but literature understood as the material, along with other cultural documentations, in which social and cultural structures can be identified. This kind of literary study uses literature as the medium and material for an analysis of society.

"That period, the second half of the 1930s, is also when those discussions in the *Zeitschrift* about the relation between aesthetics and politics appeared. I am referring to Benjamin's essay 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction' and Adorno's essay criticizing it, 'The Fetish Character in Music and the Regression of

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Hearing.' Besides, if I'm not mistaken, Marcuse's essay on 'Affirmative Culture' appeared in the same volume as your Hamsun essay. All these essays, even if they are not so explicitly interrelated as is often stylized today in secondary literature, really form three sides of the same problem, so to speak. This could be designated as the relation of art and science, second, the relation of art and mass culture, and third, the relation of art and politics. I want to describe only once, in a very crude simplification, the picture of three possible accesses to this problem and would like to hear from you how you classify yourself there. Marcuse defended the thesis, and actually maintained it until his death, that art has a dual function in bourgeois society, an ideological and a Utopian one. Art is ideologically functional in the sense that it constitutes the realm of all collected imaginations and wishes, whose political realization is denied in society. All unrealized possibilities of action in bourgeois society are repressed in their political-practical frame of action and banished to the realm of art. The great classical bourgeois works of art represent at the same time the bourgeoisie's Utopian consciousness. Marcuse, at least in his 1930 writings — and this distinguishes him then from Benjamin and especially from Adorno — was not interested in the way in which the aesthetic consciousness of bourgeois society could be transposed into politics directly and without consideration of the evolutionary difference between culture and politics. I am alluding to the fascist propagation of mass art, indeed, to the aestheticization of political life and war noted by Benjamin in fascism in general. Thus, fascism represents the false abolition of the relation between art and politics. Benjamin — and this is his most famous thesis — interpreted the development of the relation of esoteric art and the new, now technically possible mass culture with political optimism. In crude terms, the smashing of the uniqueness and almost cultic aura of artworks brought about by the new techniques of reproduction released new historical opportunities for the politicization of art. All the same, no one saw more clearly than Benjamin himself the danger of a political instrumentalization of mass art in fascism. This portrayal I have now provided can be found primarily in the stylization by Adorno, who formulated exactly the opposite thesis. Adorno can think of mass art only as the degeneration of art, only in the framework of a repressive ideological exercise of domination, and logically he attaches political import only to that art and art-forms that refuse to serve mass culture. The Utopian functions of art noted by Marcuse in the late bourgeois epoch, i.e., under the conditions of mass culture, can be carried out only through extremely esoteric art. I came across this problem very surprisingly when I saw your book *Literature, Popular Culture and Society*. I didn't know that the phenomenon of mass art was not primarily a phenomenon of late-bourgeois society. In fact, you show that mass culture, as well as the political problem of the relation of the esoteric and exoteric, goes back far into the 18th century. This problem is not one typical only of mass societies. The three previously mentioned authors apparently assume that the problem first arose through the technical revolution of the means of reproduction. Now, Leo, can a point be located in the history of bourgeois society, and particularly in aesthetics, where autonomous art saw itself at all forced to define its relation to mass culture? Or is it just a matter of the gradual evolution of an intrinsic tension?"

Lowenthal: "It is like the leap from quantity to quality. But I first want to go into what you said before. I naturally find it very hard to take as clear a stand as you demand. Of course, I agree with many things that Adorno, Benjamin and Marcuse said, although I never wrote systematically about it, except the foreword to the book

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you just named. So, first of all, on the Benjamin thesis, he seems really to say that the dissemination of works of art made possible by mechanical and electronic means of reproduction can also have politically positive effects. I consider this wrong. It runs counter to all our political experiences. If you look at this Benjamin essay, he himself moves away very quickly from the positive aspects of this technical revolution and describes the aesthetization of politics that had become real in fascism. He definitely saw this more clearly than others. But he also said that in Communism art is politicized. I don't believe either.

"I believe that the truth lies between Marcuse and Adorno, whose positions are in no way incompatible. Art is really the message of tension, of the socially unredeemed. Art is in fact the great reservoir of the structured protest against social unhappiness that allows the possibility of social happiness to shine through. I myself, indeed, tried to show this even in works of art whose authors ideological proclivities and whose audience are very conformist and conservative — for example, Lope de Vega in Spain, Corneille and Racine in France, and even in Goethe in many respects. The protest still shines through. The most important thing about bourgeois art is that it depicts the individual as threatened by bourgeois society. The best works of art are, in my opinion, those that do not stand in a conformist framework — Cervantes, most of Shakespeare, Racine and later Ibsen, not to forget Romanticism. Minor marginal characters in such great works often become decisive bearers of Utopian protest, of the search for redemption. I therefore have essentially tried, as Adorno says, to proceed 'micrologically' and to analyze intimate, private, personal situations and modes of behavior, in order to bring out in them the Utopian unredeemed elements that await social happiness. For I really believe that Benjamin's thesis that history is always written by the victors is inapplicable in artworks. The artwork speaks with the voice of the losers in the world process, who hope someday to be the victors. A non-religious philosophy of redemption is at work in this theoretical linkage of aesthetics and politics. In mass culture, on the contrary, nothing is ever redeemed, everything always stays the same, because it ought to remain the way it is. In Hamsun, for example, even the minor characters are scoundrels; there is absolutely no redemptive phenomenon, no announcement anywhere that it could and has to be different. And that was a touchstone for me to distinguish between what is and what is not a genuine work of art.

"But now, to the other part of your question, let me deal with the relation of art and mass culture. Since art has existed as an institution, there has also existed its opposite. Already in Greek antiquity and in the Middle Ages, for example, jugglers and performers entertained the masses in the churchyard after religious services. But the essential thing is the development of this relation of high and low art, which can be observed in the 16th and 17th centuries when in many European countries the predominantly agricultural mode of production is complemented by the urban forms of production — manufacturing and industry. In short, with the beginning of bourgeois forms of life and thought, an ambiguous philosophy also begins to develop about the role of art — perhaps one would have to say of leisure, of which art seems to be an essential part. In my book I expressed this symbolically through the counterposition of the philosophies of Pascal and Montaigne. Montaigne suggests that man needs relaxation and distraction under the pressure of modern life, while Pascal says that if you seek distraction you lose your life's meaning. This motif of Montaigne's that the greater burden of life in the bourgeois age is eased through distraction — namely distraction through art — occurs again and again in literature, for example in

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Schiller, in the speech of the 'weary citizen'; Goethe, too, in his 'Prologue at the Theater' speaks of how 'the men arrive bored, the women to show their beautiful fashions.' "

Dubiel: "But the funny thing about this linkage of art and leisure against mass culture is probably that this function of distraction must not be detached from the ethical function of art, no?"

Lowenthal: "Exactly. Art is here a kind of mental hygiene, an ethically important occupation of one's free time. In 18th-century England, where bourgeois forms of life and ideology develop fastest and strongest, there is quite clearly a great movement among intellectuals to educate citizens to better taste. Many of these authors, like Richardson and Oliver Goldsmith, are quite schizophrenic on this point; they are uncertain whether what they produce literarily is art or not, written for the market or for art's sake. Goldsmith says that the time of literary patrons is over and that the market is now the patron. With Marjorie Fiske, I studied the literary scene in 18th-century England. There already existed literary genres that have become quite popular today, as for example books on love, on how to win friends, how to obtain a big dowry, popular and popularized versions of Homer and other items of classical literature, a whole world of journals and libraries with literature for entertainment. In short: all these phenomena of an ultimately market-oriented mass culture were already taking shape at that time."

Dubiel: "Can a reasonably accurate dating of the origin of this contrast between art and mass culture be given?"

Lowenthal: "Certainly. That begins with the *Spectator* and the *Tatler*, Addison and Steele's journals, and reaches its peak in Romanticism and also in German classicism. Wordsworth and Coleridge then first declared war on melodrama and the shallow entertainment literature. They speak of the fact that now everything is written from the standpoint of quick comprehension and enjoyment, so that one doesn't have to exert himself."

Dubiel: "But the development of this relation of high and low art, of esoteric art and mass culture can be derived not only from the perspective of the development of mass art itself, but especially from the perspective of its opposite. For the phenomenon of an autonomous art following only its own laws is a relatively late product of bourgeois consciousness. I am thinking of Kantian aesthetics. In the *Critique of Judgment* art doesn't actually appear as an autonomous phenomenon; it speaks of carpet painting, of garden music, etc. Art appears, among other things, in an ornamental function of distraction and edification. In the development of philosophical and aesthetic self-reflection, the point where art is understood as a context- and purpose-free phenomenon is first reached in Hegelian aesthetics. So, if it is true that an esoteric art conscious of its own laws arose only late, then that must affect their relation to so-called low art. I mean that in the time we were talking about — the 17th and 18th centuries — the difference between high and low art must have been much more indefinite than in the late 19th century."

Lowenthal: "Yes, much more indefinite. But the very concept of mass art is not quite applicable to the phenomenon we are talking about. When we speak of masses, we mean of course only certain bourgeois strata in a few cultural metropolises, although Ian Watt holds the interesting thesis that the reading strata in 18th-century England were not only the well-to-do housewives, but also their personal maids. But aside from that, of course, there can be absolutely no question of reading among the proletarian masses. For they were completely overworked and did not even have the money to buy

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candles for reading. Of course, there is a leap from quantity to quality with the introduction of electronic media. But quantity was already very pronounced, for after all the highly developed printing technology existed. In the 19th century there were countless very widely disseminated popular books and writings before radio and cinema were introduced. But I want to go back again to what I was just saying. I believe Marcuse and I have a similar position on this, although there was once a period in the development of Marcuse's thinking in which he set greater value on tendentious *belletristique* and spontaneous political art. He later abandoned this view and again held firmly to the Utopian character and independence of the great work of art. Adorno's position that art has been pressed more and more into defensive positions is in my view perfectly justified. The greater the dangers and seductions become for an artist — who after all is also a member of the bourgeois capitalist world — to earn money through the circulation figures, film rights, etc., the more difficult it becomes to preserve the integrity of artistic consciousness. Nineteenth-century artists and writers were worried about this. I mean, it is trivial, but in such a situation the technique of esoteric communication becomes the weapon for the integrity of the artist; I am thinking of Kafka, Joyce and Proust, who in a certain regard are 'incomprehensible,' but this is precisely their aim. The same thing applies to abstract painting. But bourgeois society has a big stomach; we have always underestimated how much it can assimilate and digest."

Dubiel: "If we examine the objects of your literary analyses, it is always a matter of paradigms of bourgeois consciousness that didn't come about in Germany. That is really relevant only in the framework of the critique of ideology. In positive paradigms, for example in Ibsen, it is only the depiction of immanent bourgeois self-critique. What we have just been saying positively about the political purpose of esoteric art is in your case — in contrast, for example, with Adorno — not positively executed in individual studies. You have never written about avant-garde literature. Sometimes I ask myself, when you make such an emphatic distinction between the cognitive and the symptomatic valences of art, whether that can still be maintained at all about avant-garde literature."

Lowenthal: "Yes, I plead guilty. Adorno urged me repeatedly to write about contemporary literature. I didn't do it. Perhaps I am more a specialist in literary science in the conventional sense. At any rate, to this day I refuse to make binding 'sociological' statements about modern literature. I have two reasons for that. The first is that modern literature has not yet passed through the sieve of history and it is more difficult to distinguish what, in the Lukacsian sense, will one day be meaningful for knowledge of social contexts. The other reason is that, precisely from my social-philosophical and social-scientific perspective, I would like my way of seeing literature to be supplementary to purely aesthetic contemplation. If, for example, I want to know how the relation of the sexes to one another or of the generations is now changing, I do not need literature, which is really just an indirect access. I can study this directly. It is accessible, while what I have analyzed in my writings has become inaccessible; they are, if you will, great obituaries to the patterns of socialization and acculturation of former centuries. I can only repeat: other sources are available to analyze our modern situation."

Dubiel: "Let me see whether I have understood you correctly. The specific nature of your social-scientific study of literature consisted in using literary historical documents as material for your sociological interpretations. To judge the representativeness of these materials, the filter of history — as you so beautifully put it — is indeed

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indispensable. Now, this kind of study of contemporary and avant-garde art is impossible, not because it would be impossible to distinguish whether we are dealing with real art or not, but because it is undecidable to what extent these documents of modern art really stand in a reciprocal connection with significant social tendencies. The self-assuredness with which Adorno identified, for example in Stravensky, deciphered sound patterns with political options sometimes bothered me. Adorno was totally unacquainted with the scruples you have just outlined. The combination he practiced of immanent analysis of avant-garde art and political attribution sometimes seems questionable to me."

Lowenthal: "Well, I don't know. Of course, I was very happy when he was so friendly as to add a footnote on Sibelius to my essay on Hamsun, showing that Hamsun's symptoms are also in Sibelius. I wanted to say one more thing, since we happen to be engaged in assigning grades. Of course I always asked myself whether I'm too stupid to apply my analysis to modern materials. Let's take Kafka. It is said: this or that in his work reflects the alienation of the modern world, the entanglement in bureaucratic chaos of highly industrialized civilizations, the administered world. It is said: absurd theater critically reflects the impossibility of real communication in the modern world. It is said: Thomas Mann reflects the disintegration of the bourgeoisie — so what? What is said by this? First, I wouldn't have said anything about the artistic value of these products and would have really produced banalities — measured by the standards of socio-philosophical discussion."

Dubiel: "I'm glad that our prejudices on this point coincide. I've noticed especially in the existentialist study of literature that the theories of society and culture implied in it are very trivial and primitive. . . ."

Lowenthal: "I merely apply to this literature something I have already experienced elsewhere. That is quite different when I write about Shakespeare. I know what happens to Romeo and Juliet only from this source."

Dubiel: "I would now like to talk with you about your two biographical studies. By that I mean first the essay on the 'Biographische Mode' that appeared in 1955 in the volume *Sociologica I* — the Horkheimer *Festschrift*, although it was written much earlier. The English version of this essay had appeared in a *Festschrift* for Marcuse. The other essay I am alluding to is the one with which you made a name for yourself here in America. I mean the essay 'Biographies in Popular Magazines.' How did you come to write these?"

Lowenthal: "Well, the essay that appeared then under the title 'Die biographische Mode' deals mainly with popular biographies of German writers, such as Emil Ludwig and Stefan Zweig. I would like to mention here two motives for writing it. The first is interest in the genre. I asked myself in what kind of literary form popular literature is presented. One of the least understood problems of the sociology of literature is precisely genre. This was first developed magnificently in Lukacs' *Theory of the Novel.* Generally, in the sociological analysis of literature it is a matter of content aesthetics. My biographical works thus parallel my Dostoevsky study. Dostoevsky was the most widely received novelist in Germany, at least shortly before the end of World War I. And biography was the most widespread literary form of non-fiction writing. And so I asked myself why that is so, and thus the second motive for writing about this. For the real common denominator of those people at the Institute was the concern for the fate of the individual. Horkheimer's 'Egoism and the Freedom Movement' or Marcuse's 'Affirmative Character,' some works by Fromm and my own literary studies are variations on the theme of the threatening of the bourgeois individual at the time

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of its decline. And in this, biographies seem to me to be an especially characteristic genre, in which the appearance of individuality was taken up and at the same time destroyed. German popular biographies describe the heroes as if they had created something completely unique and they are surrounded with tremendous superlatives, while at the same time they are brought down to the level of ordinary men. This *coincidentia oppositorum*, that on the one hand they are unique and on the other exactly like us, deadens man's consciousness of history and politics. The repetitiveness of this literature has a lulling effect. As one could, for example, exchange the various works of Hamsun for one another, so it is also with the biographies. What they wrote at that time about Hindenburg and about Jesus was really not very different. You know that I put these catalogues together with a great deal of pleasure. What was done there was a mechanical aggregation of history into a catalogue of clearance-sale commodities. These biographies were and are really a clearance sale of culture and of the individual. I finished writing the essay by the 1930s. We did not publish it then out of courtesy, for a good part of the authors I analyzed were German-Jewish emigrants for whom things were often going very badly. Some, like Stefan Zweig, even committed suicide. So I first published this work when the direct references to contemporary authors were somewhat less current."

Dubiel: "Let us now get to the second work on biography, the 'Biographies in Popular Magazines.' The extraordinarily positive reception of this essay by American social science somehow illustrates its genesis. Wasn't this essay the result of a suggestion by Paul Lazarsfeld?"

Lowenthal: "Lazarsfeld knew of the unpublished biographical essay we were just talking about. He then asked me whether I would be interested in doing that sort of thing in the framework of American literature. This coincided with my experience at the time, that every single number of *The Saturday Evening Post* and *Colliers*, extraordinarily popular consumers' magazines then, always contained biographies. I looked at all the issues from 1901 to 1940, and with the method I called 'symptomatic' I reflected on the extent to which these market products could be an indicator of what is going on in society. And then I found that in the first 20 years of this century the heroes of these biographies were men in the field of production, successful merchants, doctors, inventors and entrepreneurs. In brief, it soon became clear to me that these biographies had an indirect political-pedagogical incentive. Their motto was, 'It can be done.' It was basically the unbroken Horatio Alger myth. These heroes were models, and to follow them meant to step into the competition of the free enterprise system. Not everyone could be a general, but every dishwasher had a chance to acquire the bank account of a millionaire. That changed radically at the end of the 1930s. The so-called heroes were suddenly people from show business, movie actors, radio stars, famous impresarios, singers, i.e., people from the entertainment field. A good number of sport heroes were also there, also a whole group of freaks, i.e., people who were carrying on some kind of business or had invented something that is quite absurd or strange. In short, the heroes are no longer the heroes of production. The theme is no longer the industriousness of individual enterprise, but it is a matter of heroes who are supposed to entertain us. But that is only one side of it. The other side is that the categories in which people are portrayed biographically change, especially their consumer habits and hobbies. While in the first phase there is the emphasis on producers and their productive qualities, no matter how banal; in the later period the focus shifts to the consumer hero, his consumer needs and preferences. This corresponds exactly with two modern tendencies, i.e., first that in the society of

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corporate capitalism the rise of the entrepreneur is a pure fiction and, secondly, that bourgeois society has become a consumer society. People are interested only in consumption. This theory of consumption heroes can be harmonized with Riesmann's typology, and also with Fromm's type of a 'market-oriented personality.' Anyway, Robert Merton, one of the most cultured and progressive American sociologists of the late 1940s, praised this essay as one of the few successful examples of a synthesis of the European theoretical stance and American empirical research. I was very proud of this. My dear friend Lazarsfeld, who unfortunately died a few years ago, said at the time, with his typical empirical positivism, 'By now you have shown what a bad biography is; now you would have to write also about what a good biography is.' Thus he failed to see the political and analytical meaning of this matter."

Dubiel: "I would now like to discuss the *Prophets of Deceit*. This book was first published in German in 1966, and only in a partial translation under the title *Agitation und Ohnmacht. Auf den Spuren Hitlers in Vorkriegsamerika.* This study appeared here in America in 1949, as a single volume in the series *Studies in Prejudice.* In 1970, *Prophets of Deceit* underwent a new edition in the United States with a very *au courant* introduction by Marcuse. I will not first try to characterize this book and if this description stimulates or annoys you, feel free to react to it. It is a reconstruction of the typology of fascist agitators, collated from materials from speeches and articles of American agitators of the period between the wars. Do you agree with my characterization that in this book you essentially limited yourselves to typologically grasping and collecting the usual *topoi*, figures of argumentation and rhetorical figures of agitators?"

Lowenthal: "Yes, we tried in that book to collect the rhetorical stimuli on the basis of speeches, pamphlets, journals and similar materials. I would characterize the technique of agitation basically as turning psychoanalysis on its head. Moreover, I'm saying this of mass culture in general. It makes people neurotic and psychotic and finally completely dependent on its so-called leaders. I tried to translate the manifest stimuli of these agitators into what they really and actually mean. My purpose was to unmask the murderous, aggressive and destructive impulses hidden behind that rhetoric. The American edition has as an introduction to this book a kind of montage, so to speak, an ideal-typical montage of an agitator's speech. This montage, incidentally, was constructed according to our detailed instructions by Irving Howe, who is today one of the country's best known intellectuals. At the end of this book we then added a speech showing what the agitator really means: Kill the Jews, destroy the democratic institutions, follow me and no one else, etc."

Dubiel: "A little work of this time which impressed me very much despite its small size was an essay which, as far as I remember, appeared in January 1947 in *Commentary*. Its title was 'Terror's Atomization of Man.' In it you write about the disintegration tendencies of man under the terroristic conditions of concentration camp internment. As far as I know, this essay goes back to a lecture you gave at Columbia University during the war."

Lowenthal: "Yes, that was in 1944 as part of a whole series of lectures that we of the Institute gave at Columbia. That was a series of lectures on National Socialism by Pollock, Marcuse, Otto Kirchheimer and myself. This essay, which stemmed from that lecture — I don't find it easy to talk about it — is an analysis of the first terrible reports about what was going on in the concentration camps. I got hold of this material even before the end of the war. I then tried to describe it as documentation for how, under

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the conditions of totalitarian terror, the individual is completely broken to pieces, how he almost becomes like the murderer, how under such conditions every solidarity of men with one another evaporates so that men are pressed back into an animal phase. I was much inspired by Bruno Bettelheim's important article on behavior under extreme conditions. Apparently, my lecture had been very impressive. The audience consisted mainly of Columbia University students and professors, i.e., people of good will who were very shaken by what they heard. One of the best known professors, Robert Lynd, author of the famous study *Middletown*, said to me that I absolutely had to publish my manuscript. At his suggestion it was then sent to the *American Journal of Sociology* in Chicago for publication. The editor at that time was a teacher of a whole generation of American sociologists. He sent the manuscript back to me with the statement that it unfortunately could not be published because the empirical data basis was too slight. I then wrote back to him and sarcastically excused myself that I was not in the concentration camp myself and thus could not gather my data right on the spot. I often since had to shake my head at this political-historical naiveté typical of American social scientists. I then sent the piece to a friend of mine, the editor and founder of *Commentary,* and that is where it was published."

Dubiel: "Leo, can you provide us with some information on *Studies in Prejudice* in general? The institutional framework in which these studies were made consisted of the research department of the American Jewish Committee. Did this integration of many members of your former group really mean a substantial break with your theoretical past?"

Lowenthal: "No, the task of this scientific department consisted basically in applying to the area of anti-semitism all the decisive theoretical and empirical insights that we had developed in the Institute over the decades. It was also similar to the Institute's format in that the work was done essentially by members of the group, but other intellectually friendly scholars could be called on to collaborate. We had already worked with Marie Jahoda; then came Bruno Bettelheim, with whom we also had contact, Morris Janowitz in Chicago and the psychoanalyst Nathan Ackermann. We wanted — really quite in line with Critical Theory — to achieve scientifically meaningful work in such a way that it could also be applicable to political praxis. Horkheimer's dream, never fulfilled, was that each of these books in the series *Studies in Prejudice* should be rewritten in the form of small booklets in popular format for distribution in a given situation of anti-semitic political outbreaks or the like here in America. Namely, to teachers, students, politicians, i.e., to the so-called multiplicators. That was sort of the idea of a political-pedagogical mass inoculation program, a 'fire brigade,' as Americans say. Unfortunately, it never materialized."

Dubiel: "That's interesting. I wasn't aware of that. I do remember the introduction to *Authoritarian Personality*, where the idea of a preventive democratic mass education is expressed, but I considered that to be just a rhetorical ornament."

Lowenthal: "No, that was meant quite seriously. You're talking about a foreword by Horkheimer that can be found not only in *Authoritarian Personality,* but in all volumes of *Studies in Prejudice.* We meant that quite seriously."

Dubiel: "Were these various volumes of *Studies in Prejudice* attuned to one another only in their original conception, or also in the actual work of writing? Whether in the method, or in the exchange of materials or in the work at the analytical framework? Did you, for example, try to adjust yourself to the works in the *Authoritarian Personality*?"

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Lowenthal: "Now, first of all, those are different questions. On the whole, it was a research strategy about which Horkheimer consulted a few leading people in the American Jewish Congress and us. The *Authoritarian Personality* is really an exact continuation of our interests, which started with the *Studies on Authority and the Family*. It was great luck that Horkheimer in California met Nevitt Sanford, the founder and first president of the Wright Institute, who is my good friend. Sanford took a great interest in our problems and he then also brought us together with his two colleagues, Else Frenkel-Brunswick and Daniel Levinson. I played a role in the plays for the *Authoritarian Personality*. At Horkheimer's wish, I came to California and discussed with Sanford the general organization of the research."

Dubiel: "The *Prophets of Deceit* became quite known in its time. You once showed me the folder in which the reviews of this book were collected. It got a lot of attention not only in scientific circles but also in the non-scientific general public. Can it be said that *Prophets of Deceit* is better known in the United States than the *Authoritarian Personality*, or is that a false compliment?"

Lowenthal: "I must reject that complement in all modesty and with indignation. The most important book was the *Authoritarian Personality*, which still has strong influence today. Compared with that, the *Prophets of Deceit* had a relatively modest influence; perhaps it can be said even that it stood in the shadow of *The Authoritarian Personality*. But I don't want to understate my book's influence. It did have an influence, especially among students and instructors in the field of mass communications research."

Dubiel: "Now we come to the 1950s. The appearance of the *Studies in Prejudice* coincides with the beginnning of your work with the Voice of America. We have spoken on another occasion on all the things you did in the framework of this activity. But I may say that basically the nature of your work there was research organization and that consequently in that period there are only a few literary products credited individually to you. Do you agree that we should now skip that time?"

Lowenthal: "Yes, let us speak of the time after that, when I have a much better conscience about my output. So, that was 1955-56, when I was working in Stanford at the Center for Advanced Studies. My ever faithful friend Paul Lazarsfeld, who had been a great help in getting me invited to the center, said to me then: 'In this research year you have the alternative of having what Americans call a good time. Then after this year is over you can become a dog catcher here in Palo Alto. Or you can write a few books and become a professor.' This advice really proved to be sound. Since I don't like to catch dogs, I sat down and worked. In that year I wrote the book *Literature and the Image of Man*. The German title is *Das Menschenbild in der Literatur*, and it originated in part from the revision and systematization of older essays that had appeared in the *Zeitschrift*. The Shakespeare chapter in the book was completely new, as was the chapter on the French drama. The chapter on Goethe already existed in a rough version, but had not yet been published anywhere. In addition, I wrote the longer study on the relation of art and mass culture in England during the 18th century. Immediately afterward, in the fall of 1956, I was appointed a professor at the University of California at Berkeley."

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CONRAD FERDINAND MEYER: AN APOLOGIA OF THE UPPER MIDDLE CLASS*

by Leo Lowenthal

Meyer's prose fiction appears at first to have nothing to do with sociological categories in either form or content. The presence of sociological information will, however, be the subject of this investigation. The question will be whether the meanings and functions noted by the sociologist could in retrospect have been intended or sanctioned by the author, and whether their effect among the readers can be traced.

The study of Meyer's concept of society is both challenging and simple: simple because all his stories are of an exclusively historical nature, challenging because the subjects of these stories are consistently taken from the more distant past, never from the present. If one considers merely the titles of his stories, one notes that they often contain the names of historical personages, such as Gustav Adolf, Pescara or Jürg Jenatsch. Otherwise they emphasize certain types of individuals — *The Saint, the Judge* — or refer to unusual situations — someone shoots from the pulpit, a monk marries. Everything is out of the ordinary, and the stories are consistently centered around an extraordinary individual.

All of Meyer's prose fiction can be considered novellas, even *Jürg Jenatsch*, which is often categorized as a novel. A novel covers the whole breadth of a network of relations, grasps the wealth of phenomena in human life and institutions, in short, "records" the world, as Zola put it. Meyer's novelistic approach, however, as even the titles indicate, is very particularly characterized by selection. The process of selection in itself would not be enough to justify sociological conclusions. The history of the novella's development in the Renaissance is closely tied to the selection of and emphasis on certain situations. In the Renaissance context, however, subject matters that already have been given a literary form by tradition are retold. Further, unusual events are also depicted in the German novel of the 19th century — by Kleist, for example. But it is characteristic of Meyer that his novellas confine themselves to certain times, characters, situations and types. In his novellas the individual is neither cradled in a basically harmonious, ordered world, as in Goethe, nor is the individual driven out in search of fulfillment. Rather, the stylization of place, time and character represents the construct that an ordinary man would like to impose upon the world.

In order to make the sociological meaning of the selection process clearer, let us look more closely at the subject matter itself. An especially fitting and clear example is provided by the story *The Amulet*. The author selects in three areas — in history, landscape and characters — until the sole object of importance presents itself. Next the time is chosen. The view is narrowed among the turbulent struggles of the 16th and 17th centuries to the especially adventurous locale of the Huguenot battles. In this manner, an episode is again chosen that ultimately centers on a certain great personality. Amid all the confrontations of the opposing groups, in the form of heated argument or bloody man-to-man combat, the author takes neither side. In regard to

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the thought process in question, this means that the contents of these great historical struggles are totally insignificant. They are only important in their role as colorful and fascinating foils for Admiral Coligny.

The choice of locale is matched by the choice of time. In this regard one might speak of the shrinkage of spatial distance. If characters travel in these stories, it is related to the off-hand tone with which a wealthy merchant speaks of his business trips. At the beginning of the third chapter, the narrator travels through Burgundy, then along the Seine to a small village outside Paris. This journey, certainly requiring days and weeks, is dispatched in three lines.[1] The only sentence relating the journey would even have had enough steam left to reach Paris, had the narrator not encountered an adventure in Melun, which already points to the true hero. For the description of Paris by a man of simple rural origin, the author has only this single line at his disposal: "The first week passed with viewing the grand city." Paris reveals its external contours only when the admiral's home and thereby the admiral himself enter the narration.

This tendency toward abbreviation of the landscape is visible also in the description of a journey that the narrator takes on Coligny's behalf: "Coligny dispatched me on a mission to Orleans where German cavalry were stationed. When I returned and entered my lodgings Gilbert [of the admiral's party] came toward me with contorted features."[2] Here, the purpose of the concentration becomes clear. The journey — described in half a sentence — begins with Coligny and logically ends with him. Time and place are not heroicized in the sense of a romantic mythology, but are styled into ornaments for the hero, for he alone is important. This reveals, thirdly, the selection of character material. Coligny rules over everything. He is both leader and hero, always superior. At the same time, he is gifted with the inscrutability of dominance, which we have yet to analyze. The first-person narrator retreats completely into the background.

Such stylization and selections can be traced throughout. Consider, for instance, the abruptly dramatic presentation of Henry's apparently final break with Becket, which disposes of every detail: "Finally, Sir Henry came to a decision. He summoned the primate before a court of his barons, had him condemned as a traitor to the kingdom, and banished him forever from his territories. But on the same day that Sir Thomas was forced to flee across the ocean like a criminal, Lady Ellenor left her husband and Windsor Castle with a cry of woe that was heard far and wide."[3]

The same heroic stylization is revealed in the composition of *Jürg Jenatsch*. It treats an episode from the Thirty Years' War, but in such a way that the milieu of a world war develops. All powers, interests and passions of this turbulent epoch are concentrated in the Swiss landscape and the figure of Jürg Jenatsch. The Reich, Italy, France, Spain, Switzerland itself purge their conflicts. Great generals and politicians lust for glory, love, greed, ambition, "fire and ice" — all can be felt in every sentence. The dynamics of the story are similar to *The Amulet*. It is constructed in individual, isolated images of greatness or stark contrasts to it.

The material provided here should suffice to illustrate that the selections are made according to a heroic concept of history. History becomes a stage for heroes, an

1. Cf. *Das Amulet* in *Sämtliche Werke in vier Bänden*, intro. by Robert Faesi, Vol. 3, p. 19. English translations are from *The Complete Narrative Prose of Conrad Ferdinand Meyer* (2 vols.), translated by George F. Folkers, David B. Dickers, and Marion W. Sonnenfeld (Bucknell University Press: Lewisburg, 1976). English references will be provided when available.
2. *The Complete Narrative, op.cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 61.
3. *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, p. 334.

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opportunity for the portentous games of great individuals. In *The Amulet,* a French officer plays the highest members of the Court against each other without confiding in anyone. Pescara also plays a political game. This is true even of such a seemingly innocuous story as *The Shot from the Pulpit.* Here the old general has no opportunity for heroic action but only for a successful prank. But at the end, enough light still falls on the dying hero, who in his best years was a hero of life, so that he remains the hero of this story. The people who "move the world" are those who matter.[4] Pescara lets the following phrase slip out at one point: "The finest thing in life is to move men and objects with invisible hands, and whoever has known that will long to taste nothing else."[5] For the history of heroes, time is not recorded according to centuries or epochs but according to geniuses. History becomes a hall through which the great man roams. "Anteroom" is the title of one group of poems. "God," "Pious and Impudent," "Genius," "Men" — all these titles of poetry collections reveal what is paramount — never the common, never the group. Only the hero is the endlessly varied theme of history. Therefore it is not the duty of the characters celebrated by Meyer to act as the times require. Instead, it is their great deeds that constitute time in the first place. Morone exhorts Pescara to action: "My dear Pescara, what a constellation above you and in your favor! The cause is ripe, and you, yourself, are mature! A decisive time, a desperate struggle, gods and titans, freedom rearing up against rule by force [today the world still in motion and flux, tomorrow, perhaps, freezing to lava!]. And a deed that is prepared for you and for which you were born! Does not your forming hand twitch for this deed?"[6] But Pescara does not act, and thereby "the world freezes to lava."

One could be tempted to compare Meyer to Friedrich Hebbel. They have in common not only the love of historical themes, but to a great degree also the principles by which they choose these themes from history. Hebbel's dramas tend to take place at those turning points in world history where one epoch gives way to another. Transitions from Germanic tribes to Christianity, from barbarism in Asia Minor to Greek culture, from a feudal social order to bourgeois liberalism — these are Hebbel's characteristic themes. Meyer prefers such turning points as well: Germanic tribes and the Carolingian Empire, Renaissance and Reformation, the Three Estates and Absolutism provide the background for a few of his stories. Hebbel wants to show that the individual is basically subservient to overall historical processes, even if he strives in the opposite direction. World history runs over the individual blindly, and precisely these great situations of historical conflict show that even a great man is finally crushed by the wheels of events. For Meyer, on the other hand, the historical junctures exist for the sole purpose of giving the great ones their greatest chances, to let them show what they truly are and can do. Indeed Meyer's stories express the opinion that it is the "Men" out of whom the dialectics of history arises. In this way Meyer stands Hebbel's Hegel on his head. The transformation of historical period into functions of the heroes even influences the nomenclature of chronology. A historical date is found in the first line of *The Amulet,* for instance, but there only with the significance of an autobiographical reference. A truly chronological manner of speaking in Meyer's work generally takes the form "In those days..."[7] The exclamation of a short-tempered Armbruster in the same story is also very revealing: "Leave me alone with your

4. *Die Versuchung des Percara* in *Sämtliche Werke, op.cit.,* Vol. 4, p. 159.
5. *Ibid.,* p. 184.
6. *Ibid.,* p. 205 (English Vol. 2, p. 261).
7. *Der Heilige, op.cit.,* Vol. 4, p. 75.

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meaningless numbers!"[8]

This sovereignty in face of the variety of people and situations renders the true course of history a matter of indifference to the author. His access to history therefore bypasses research into sources but he takes it over in mediated form, such as provided by Gregorovius and Burckhardt.[9] Theirs is a treatment of the past compatible with his own views and appropriate as a background for heroic history. The social role of the historian passed through various stages between the end of the 18th century and Meyer's time. In the Enlightenment — Arnold Heeren, for example — historical research supported bourgeois progress. The history of states was pursued in order to refute the inevitability of Absolutism and to reveal the hollowness of its structure of domination.

During the great era of bourgeois defeat in the Romantic period, scholarly approaches to history aided in a transfiguration of the past, which could transport one out of the desolation of the present. At the beginning at least, Ranke does not seek anything in history that would be of significance to the present. He pursues instead a perception of the "past as it really was." Turning to the proletariat, historical materialism searches for laws of history in order to understand and change the present. Writings in Renaissance history in the second half of the 19th century are connected to the spread of bourgeois ideology. The history of Great Men and the discovery of the "Renaissance Man" in contemporary life provided models for contemporary rulers. For this view, the Renaissance offered welcome objects of admiration. In concrete correspondence to the bourgeois *Führerideal,* this epoch appears to be a powerful proof for a heroic concept of history.

From the standpoint of the revolutionary bourgeoisie or the proletariat, the 15th and early 16th centuries are seen primarily as the times in which secularization first met with success in European culture. The Renaissance is therefore seen as the first stage of the great bourgeois Enlightenment in modern history — indeed, this was the view of the 18th century and the Hegelian Left. The above being the case, then the works of Gregorovius and Burckhardt can be termed romantic insofar as their concept of history finds a higher reality behind the "crude and transitory facts." This higher reality is the enduring, influential and exemplary role — for better or worse — of great men. It must of course be noted that Renaissance historians, above all Burckhardt, did indeed include other, even materialistic elements. But the influence they have had, and have yet today, still lies in the direction of fascination with the Great Man. And this is the influence they had on Meyer.

One of the more interesting consequences of Meyer's heroic concept of history is its application to the relation between nature and history. The following should illustrate it as clearly as possible.

The relation between history and nature has always been topical for the philosophy of history, whether it bears the label of natural, mythical or archaic. For the triumphant bourgeois consciousness in the Enlightenment, with its stress on accumulation, nature appears as unquestionably material and physical. It is there for one-sided service to an unending enjoyment by the human community. The importance of the rise of the Third Estate lies in the fact that it made possible a direct and unembellished approach to nature, in order to further social development

8. *Ibid.,* p. 106.

9. Cf. the letter to Spitteler (1884?): "I have never looked for subjects, nor have I ever done so-called 'preliminary research.'" *Briefe C.F. Meyer,* Adolf Frey, ed. (Leipzig, 1908), Vol. 1, p. 427.

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through its exploitation. Behind the concept of nature, which emerges in the French Enlightenment as something good and well-ordered, is hidden also its function as economically useful resource. It may well be that Rousseau depicts nature as both a real and a fictional historical quantity, and a natural state as a factual or conceivable historical social order. But it would be entirely beside the point to find a mythological thought construct in this, as if for Rousseau life in nature made ontological realities visible which are suppressed in a technically and organizationally structured society. On the contrary, the natural state is the way of life in which nature has an economic meaning as a practical provider subservient to human purposes. Only in a physical-chemical sense did humanity "redeem" nature with the rise of the bourgeoisie. In Romanticism, an epoch of depression for this class, the polarized confrontation of nature and man is removed. The dominating Enlightenment relation becomes its opposite. Rather than nature being the servant of historical progress, man abandons history to serve nature. The true home of humanity is seen as the ancient empire of myth, legend and a heavenly age as well as the merely vegetative quality in the world of children or in the image of the earth found in physical atlases. This submission of man to "naturalness" is seen as the very key to becoming human.

The rejection of the bourgeoisie by the late feudal and absolutistic society in the times of the Congress of Vienna is transformed by ideological magic into the bourgeoisie's rejection of a contemporary reality constituted by such hostile forces. One could even venture to suppose that in the historical school, in German philology, and in the writings of Ranke and related historians, history takes on absolute being and immutability. Such a categorical treatment permits historical reality to be treated as another "natural" element with nature itself. For even the organicism of the Romantics subscribes to a static concept of nature. Neither the idea of laws of history on the one hand, nor the organic view on the other, may conceal the fact that for both these sides of bourgeois thought nature is seen as completely given and fore-ordained. For the 18th century this certainly has ideological significance in guaranteeing the endurance of society. For the Romantics and their audience it is an emotional guarantee, within a contemptible world of appearances, to have a link to the more beautiful "reality." Only art sees "progress," as witnessed by Schlegel's concept *progressive Universalpoesie*.

Meyer does not place nature and myth before, but rather within or even beyond, history. Meyer's position can be described as follows. Gone are the battles of great warriors, whether as individuals or whole peoples. Gone is the Hero, who can bestow on human life the blessing of reality. Now heroism, the secret of history, flees to nature, or rather it takes the new morphological form of nature itself. History is not a continuation of nature, but rather nature is the continuation of history by other means. Rock and tree are the legitimate successors of Alarich, Saracens, Hohenstaufens and Caesar Borgia. Nature as well points to the grandiose, unique, victorious elements in every segment of life.

This becomes especially clear in *Jürg Jenatsch*. The disturbing conversation with Waser carries over into the gathering clouds and the darkening sky.[10] The shared journey of Jürg and Lucretia is accompanied by a sky of "a southerly blue, deep and clear."[11] Towards the end, as the hero's fate is sealed, the foehn wind is raging.[12] Shortly before the catastrophe, "pale yellow lightening tore through the low-hanging

10. *Jürg Jenatsch* in *Sämtliche Werke, op.cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 15.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 110.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 229.

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clouds."[13] Nature simultaneously continues the heroic history.[14] From here the sociological line runs straight to the Stefan George Circle, where the glorification of historical singularity found its last serious expression in Ernst Kantorowicz' book on Friedrich II.

There has been no want of attempts to make a religious writer out of Meyer.[15] But neither his studies of Pascal nor his ties to Protestantism can hide the fact that his heroes are guided by neither religion nor morality. On the contrary, they are characterized by an amorality that tends toward the demonic. As we shall see, it is even misleading to speak of Meyer's heroes in this way, since what really animates the souls of his heroes finally cannot be divined. Critical analysis reveals, however, that the rule of conventions and practical moral precepts is a pale contrast to the dictates of a life of greatness.

All of Meyer's heroes meet with temptation. That is, they face conflict between overpowering personal desires and prevailing social norms. The hero resolves his conflict by surrendering as it were to his own demon and thus his own genius triumphs over conforming concepts of right and wrong. Giving way to convention becomes the sign of failure. His defeat in the battle with forces of tradition becomes, at best, a consolation provided by the historian, because it confirms the hero's character. Individuality is all that counts.

In *The Amulet*, the French admiral Coligny dictates the following letters to the Prince of Orange: "To bring about war with Spain at any price and without any delay is our salvation,' " the admiral wrote. 'Alba is lost if he is attacked simultaneously by us and by you.' .... 'My plan is the following: A Huguenot volunteer army has invaded Flanders during these last days. If this army can hold out against Alba — and this depends in great measure on your attacking the Spanish general from Holland simultaneously — then this success will move the King to overcome all obstacles and to proceed in a determined way. You're familiar with the magic of initial success.' "[16] This passage permits a look into the world of Meyer's heroes. Momentous undertakings are planned, always a daring gamble with high stakes. The French officer is engaged in high-level politics. He plays the high members of the Court against each other without confiding in anyone. He resorts to illegal means by arming irregular troops — in short, he goes right to work as any of Meyer's heroes would in the face of temptation.

This completes the process of individualizing selection: the lives of many depend on this hero and his decisions, and only thus are they worthy of the author's attention. Where history is produced by the acts of a few "big boys" — the machinations of a few figures — the author can confine himself to a small ensemble of characters. In the confusion of the Paris streets a person seldom appears with a memorable face — unless it is a hero.

The novella is formally a framed story — a tale within a tale. Even the framing device points out the central theme from the beginning. The narrator enters on the very first page,[17] or rather rides into the scene, to provide sharp contrast to a calculating

13. *Ibid.*, p. 242.

14. The poem "Die Schlacht der Baume" ("The Battle of the Trees") expresses it in similar terms. Nature is the last conservatory of the heroic, after historic diversity has failed.

15. See, for example, Walter Köhler, *C.F. Meyer als religiöser Charakter* (Jena, 1911), as well as Otto Frommel, *Neuere deutsche Dichter in ihrer religiösen Stellung* (Berlin, 1902), p. 143ff.

16. *Das Amulett, op.cit.*, p. 39ff. (English Vol. 1, p. 53).

17. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

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and petty man of money, who in reality leads no life at all. The 58-year-old narrator is not an old man, but one with a strong bond to his livelier years. His memories are not pale ghosts of the past, but sharply articulated images.

The category of the image plays a considerable role in general. In Lessing's aesthetics, presented mainly in *Laokoon,* literature has primarily to do with plots that are thoroughly fitting to the chronological form of language. Presentation belongs to the realm of the visual arts and the image is banned from literature. It must be added that Lessing's spirited and exhortative *Hamburg Dramaturgy* reveals how much the variety of action in dramatic literature meant to him as a sign that change was possible in a world badly in need of it. A passage such as the following from *The Amulet* would never have been tolerated by Lessing: "I had time to observe his face, sympathetically, which had been indelibly impressed upon me by means of a very good and expressive woodcut that had reached as far as Switzerland. The admiral at that time might have been fifty years of age, but his hair was snow-white, and a feverish pink showed through his emaciated cheeks. On his powerful forehead and on his lean hands the blue veins appeared, and there was a terrible seriousness in his mien. He looked like a judge in Israel."[18] Coligny shares many traits with Jürg Jenatsch. Again, the hero is in a position of temptation. Jürg Jenatsch is a great maker of history, but he does it objectively through treason. The conventionally evil is completely vindicated as good, because it is grandiose, powerful and victorious. The decisiveness of Jenatsch is superior to the morality of Cardinal Rohan, whose trustfulness is less a virtue than a sign of weakness, deserving of defeat. Granted, even this raises Rohan into the sphere of heroic internationalism. When forced into a conflict of loyalties, his spotless good name stands above the fatherland: "The duke's hand went to his heart. He knew already, but today he was being told for the first time: he had lost his fatherland." "If it is impossible for me to be a Frenchman and a man of honor at the same time,' he remarked softly, 'then I choose the second, even if it means I am without a country.' "[19]

Pescara's *Temptation* expresses even in its title the typical situation of all Meyer's heroes. Even the virtuous Angela Borgia does not care much for virtue.[20] All conventional moral precepts are irrelevant when the men who determine the course of history confront reality: "Violence, bribery, deceit. . .and wicked means. . .rule the empires of the world."[21]

Difficult as it would be to catalogue the virtues of Meyer's characters, patriotism is certainly not among them. In a letter to his friend Julius Rodenberg, publisher of the *Deutsche Rundschau,* Meyer himself claimed to have removed all "ornament and chauvinism" from the second edition of "Hutten."[22] It has been said that for Meyer love of the fatherland was the key to the character of Jenatsch.[23] Doubtless the key to this character is instead the drive to power and domination in a personality that accepts every great gamble that comes along. The fate of Switzerland is such an opportunity, but Lucretia represents an absolutely equal alternative. This is precisely

18. *Ibid.,* p. 28ff.
19. *Jürg Jenatsch,* Vol. 1, *op.cit.,* p. 206 (English Vol. 1, p. 46).
20. *Angela Borgia,* Vol. 1, *op.cit.,* p. 316 (English Vol. 1, p. 200).
21. *Der Heilige,* Vol. 4, *op.cit.,* p. 87. Cf. Meyer's thoughts on southern German politics, closing with the remark, "You see, that is very egotistical, but isn't that true of all politics?" written to Haessel, August 5, 1866, in *Briefe,* Vol. 2, *op.cit.,* p. 6.
22. *Conrad Ferdinand Meyer und Julius Rodenberg: Ein Briefwechsel,* August Langmesser, ed. (Berlin, 1918), p. 200, August 24, 1884.
23. Robert Faesi, *Conrad Ferdinand Meyer* (Leipzig, 1925), p. 71.

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what makes the story singularly intriguing, that the lover and the fatherland play equal roles in initiating Jenatsch's actions. It is even difficult to decide whether the religious conversion and betrayal of Rohan occur only for the sake of the country and not also to help win Lucretia's affections. Lucretia represents an even more intimate counterpoint to Jentasch than Cardinal Rohan. Although the spark of the chosen personality is struck in him at the last minute, Lucretia is just as much a creature of demonic powers as the beloved and despised Jürg. In Mörike's *Maler Nolten*, death is linked to the defeats of the bourgeoisie in his generation, and transitoriness is seen as the essence of life. In Meyer's story as well, death becomes a highly intensified moment amid the fullness of life. Lucretia kills Jürg Jenatsch, and we may suppose that this act is the beginning of her physical destruction as well. But this implied double murder is only the expression of heroic life. Only these two are worthy of each other, bonded to each other by fate and character, and only they have the right to eliminate each other. The solidarity of the leading international minority proves itself in this case literally to the death: "With trancelike resolution she now raised the family weapon with both hands and brought it crashing down with all her strength upon the head she loved so much. Jürg's arms fell; with eyes full of love he looked at her standing tall before him; somber triumph flashed across his face; then he collapsed heavily."[24] The same international atmosphere referred to regarding Cardinal Rohan is evident in *The Saint*. It is present as the young Armbruster consoles the half-Arabian Becket with a quotation from the Koran,[25] or as the rich rug merchant Ben Emir is introduced [26] into court society in Ferrara, or finally when the papal functionary Guicciardini praises that "great Germanic heretic Luther."[27] Against this atmosphere of internationalism, where is the glorification of patriotism in Coligny or Leubelfing or Becket or Pescara or Wertmüller? In the case of Gustav Freytag the importance of nationalism is unmistakable. The creation of a unified customs network, a policy of protective tariffs and the development of an administrative state were necessarily tied to the rise of the German liberal middle class. The upper middle class merchant and industrial interests require expansion of international relations.

Certainly, Meyer's stories are not psychological. In fact, to exaggerate only slightly, one could term them anti-psychological. That is to say, the hero is not at all susceptible to psychological interpretation. He is a lord and master, and therefore inscrutable. The inscrutability of the great ones is so great that it seems they are inexplicable to themselves as well.[28] No one can guess how Pescara will react, "as such a wall against us arose within him, just as we believed we had won his soul."[29] To his political partners as well as his own wife he is "impenetrable and his thoughts and beliefs are concealed."[30] Someone such as Don Juan is therefore all the less able to know what Pescara will do.[31] Even the author does not know what motivates his heroes: "And he [Morone] embraced the general's knee with such a fervent gesture that the latter, springing to his feet, withdrew from such adoration, but still appeared inwardly touched. Perhaps it was because his great intelligence involuntarily formed a viable whole from the hinted traces of his and Italy's possible greatness."[32] Pescara's

24. *Jürg Jenatsch,* Vol. 1, *op.cit.,* p. 256 (English Vol. 1, p. 231).
25. *Der Heilige,* Vol. 4, *op.cit.,* p. 244.
26. *Angela Borgia, op.cit.,* p. 244.
27. *Die Versuchung des Pescara, op.cit.,* p. 160.
28. Cf. Morone's exclamation, "But you know not even yourself, Pescara!" *Ibid.,* p. 211.
29. *Ibid.,* p. 179. Cf. also p. 169, "If Pescara will not...," etc.
30. *Ibid.,*p. 184.
31. *Ibid.,* p. 187.
32. *Ibid.,* p. 212 (English Vol. 2, p. 266).

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soul remains an "abyss and a mystery" to all.[33] One would expect the love-hate relation of Jürg Jenatsch and Lucretia to be a rewarding object of psychological analysis. But the author's interest in them lies elsewhere. These two are exposed to no critical appraisal at all, but rather are extremely rare and unique beings, who must be accepted as they are.

One might mention the role of chance in this context, especially in *The Saint* and *The Judge*. At times, chance functions merely as a symbolic representation of invisible interior processes. But there is also a mythic side to chance that eludes human influence as well as probing of its origins. The latter trait of the myth of greatness is indeed the impenetrable riddle of such figures. Here, again, an ideological element may be suspected. Symbols and myths devalue the process of history. Their emphasis is not on events to be taken as they are, as social reality with natural, material consequences. Instead, they have a higher purpose, and are merely functions of the singular individual and his fate.

The inadequacy or even rejection of a psychology of great individuals raises the possibility if not the demand to psychologically approach the masses, the little people, the objects of history. They can be understood without much trouble.[34] Consider the relation of the Italians to Pescara.[35] Waser, the good citizen of Zurich, is the object of psychological study in *Jürg Jenatsch*. He embodies narrow bourgeois caution and pedantry with all his categories and computations. To his mediocre mind it is even possible to envision Jenatsch "leading his troubled soul onto more peaceful paths by founding home and hearth on his Davos estates."[36] This philistine is well suited to psychological analysis. In the literal sense of the phrase, it serves him right. By reporting one of Waser's dreams, Meyer wishes to expose the petty and insignificant world he symptomizes: "In a short time Waser was stretched out on the bed trying to sleep, but sleep wouldn't come. He dozed for a moment; dream figures materialized before his eyes, Jenatsch and Lucretia, Professor Semmler and the old woman at the stove, the Moloja innkeeper and rough old Lucas, all of them seemed to mingle together in the strangest relationships. Suddenly they were all seated at a school desk. Remarkably, Semmler was lifting the huge powderhorn to his mouth as though it were the Greek musical instrument. From it came the oddest lamentations, which were greeted on all sides by peals of diabolical laughter."[37]

Not only this stuffy *Bürgermeister* but also the candidate in *The Shot from the Pulpit* tell of dreams. The latter possesses willful independence and powerfully dispatches extraordinary tasks, not as a hero but as a scared rabbit. He awakes "not covered with his own blood, but bathed in a cold sweat."[38] Hans Armbruster tells of a dream[39] he has just before the catastrophe that seems to promise a good outcome. The horizon recedes grandly when the dreams of the great are at issue. As a matter of fact, none of their dreams is reported at all. They have, figuratively speaking, no time to sleep. Dreaming is itself an element of their activity — for instance, there is reference to a "dreamlike" decision as Lucretia kills Jürg Jenatsch.[40] The enticing speech of

33. *Ibid.*, p. 236.
34. Franz Ferdinand Baumgarten's conclusion is much too simplistic: "Meyer rejected psychological analysis. . . ." in *Das Werk Conrad Ferdinand Meyer: Renaissance-Empfinden und Stilkunst* (Munich, 1917), p. 171.
35. *Die Versuchung des Pescara, op.cit.*, p. 170.
36. *Jürg Jenatsch, op.cit.*, p. 242.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 29 (English Vol. 1, p. 90).
38. *Der Schuss von der Kanzel* in *Sämtliche Werke*, Vol. 3, *op.cit.*, p. 105.
39. *Der Heilige, op.cit.*, p. 61ff.
40. *Jürg Jenatsch, op.cit.*, p. 256.

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Morone, offering the Italian crown to Pescara, receives Pescara's retort, "Dream on, Morone!"[41] One can speak of a psychological function of dreams for the hero. One may, of course, speak of a candidate such as Rosenstock or Wacholder in a psychological, that is almost to say a mocking, way. Imagine Rosenstock transported into a novel by Stifter or Mörike. Nothing but compassion would be due a man who refuses to become a "Venetial field chaplain" to avoid leaving his vineyard.[42] But Meyer says at the same time that this "rooted man"[43] with his ties to home and fatherland, is "in spite of his youth, almost corpulent."[44] For him, "reason" is reduced to the nervous, cautious and petty aphorism of a chance participant: "Stay in the country and feed yourself well."[45]

These people and their vacuous way of life are fully condemned in the character of Krachhalder.[46] This is not merely the mocking of a single farmer and his community. Rather, it mocks any moderate way of living that is capable of enjoying the advantages of material well-being and social responsibility through balanced harmony of interests. Here is the literary predecessor of the modern petty bourgeois, a Babbit or figures from Sternheim. This is to show the mediocrity, insubstantiability and corruptibility of middle or lower bourgeois mass existence. The morally enraged Krachhalder sells out his principles for a considerable expansion of the common forest.

When one recalls Gustvav Freytag's glorification of bourgeois commerce, accumulation and ostentatious lifestyle, Meyer's position is clearly the sociological opposite. Not that Meyer is a critic of bourgeois society or that he even shows an awareness of the phenomenon of crisis as Spielhagen does in his social philosophy of consistent liberalism. Such interest and deep concern for the actual life processes of society are completely missing from Meyer. Instead, as seen from elevated command posts, all battles and skirmishes among the many who are not holders of power appear merely as illusion or as the motions of puppets to the great ones. For the upper middle-class consciousness, the order of the world is indeed produced by individuals, not by classes or by tradition. In the composition and content of Meyer's novellas, the little people, the masses, occupy an exclusively servile position. There is perhaps only one point at which the author devotes more than a few words to the broad lower strata. It is found in *Angela Borgia*. During a visit he pays to the blinded Don Giulio, Ariosto's impressions are described thus: "From remarks of that sort, the poet deduced that young Este was beginning to make a place for himself in a new stage of life, amid a class of people, different from the class to which he had belonged until this time, amid the unhappy and suffering, the deprived and disinherited, in a sphere of life subject to a different set of conditions and laws than the sphere of the voluptuous people entitled to enjoyment."[47] This passage is perhaps exceptional because *Angela Borgia* is Meyer's latest novella and, due to impending old-age melancholy, does not correspond in all respects to the rest of his prose. Still, it is interesting to note this exaggerated and historically distorted reference to a certain lower social stratum. Not only is this conglomeration of pitiable manifestations of misery not applicable to the population

41. *Die Versuchung des Pescara, op.cit.*, p. 209.
42. *Sämtliche Werke*, Vol. 3, *op.cit.*, p. 75.
43. *Ibid.*
44. *Ibid.*, p. 74.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 75.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 116ff.
47. *Angela Borgia, op.cit.*, p. 311ff. (English Vol. 2, p. 343).

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of Italy toward the end of the 15th century, but the manner of referring to the "other class of people" is reminiscent of descriptions of wild tribal peoples by European explorers. This inclusion is motivated by folklore, not compassion. Similar tendencies are behind Armbruster's words, "It is one thing when kings and saints oppose each other, and another when brawlers stab and howl in our Swabian taverns."[48] Only a declassed man such as the King's son Hans can laugh so hard that the earnest narrator says, "I have never in my life heard such a depraved laugh, neither in inns nor at the market place."[49] The author's concern is for those "with command of their senses and entitled to enjoyment." To them belongs "the jewelled world smiling to itself in the mirror," as one reads a few pages earlier in the same novella.[50]

In a letter to Rodenberg,[51] Meyer refers to this central impulse, the "connection of the small life with the life and struggle of humanity." The word "small" is to be taken literally here. The little people are indeed only present when they are somehow foils for great events. We would never have heard of Hans Armbruster if his "little boat" had not taken a sudden turn "out of the channels of his own life and into the tide of a greater one."[52] The narrator of *The Amulet* would never have been noticed if his life had not fallen within the circle of the great Coligny. Petty private worries and joys mean nothing; the universally human is all too human to have a place in the life of genius. Aside from the function of the framing story elucidated earlier, in these two cases it also serves to emphasize the distance between the great and the small. The little people have no business in this world except to tell about the great ones, and in the process to reveal that they are only objects of the great. "The best of existence, beauty and strength of heart"[53] does not belong to them, they are not entitled to enjoyment. But the great are thereby also the only ones to run the risk of a tragic fall. They display "tortuous struggles and two pain-distorted human countenances," while such a small-spirited man as Burckhardt of Zurich looks only for "a few stories and personages from the life of the saint."[54] Meyer unabashedly sent his publisher Haessel the following sentence for an autobiography: "In German literature, Meyer is the representative of the historical novella and the chronicler of the forces of world history."[55] But these "forces" are basically nothing other than the strong personalities.[56] In summary, one can say of Meyer's concept of history that the formation of history depends on the deeds of single individuals. As they meet with the resistance of their adversaries, one can never predict what will develop from the conflicts.

For Meyer, nothing essentially new occurs in history. All that is important in it are the great deeds of great individuals. What kind of deeds these are, whom they serve and whom they injure is completely irrelevant. As far as we hear of the masses, they express only the pettiness of their needs and concerns. We do not need to bother with their concerns because it would not further our understanding of history if we did. For

48. *Der Heilige, op.cit.*, p. 18.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
50. *Angela Borgia, op.cit.*, p. 263.
51. December 14, 1877, in *Briefwechsel, op.cit.*, p. 11.
52. *Der Heilige, op.cit.*, p. 27.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 252.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 138.
55. October 3, 1887, in *Briefe*, Vol. 2, *op.cit.*, p. 139ff.
56. In the words of Louise von Francois, Meyer "has turned his gaze to the pinnacles of life," and seeks "to portray the problems of tempestuous times and exceptional people." A. Schaer, "Betty Paoli und C.F. Meyer," in *Euphorion*, Vol. 16 (1901), p. 499.

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history is the history of the struggles of individuals, not of groups protecting their interests. Economic questions, power struggles and social revolutions are left out, despite the wide range of material treated by Meyer's historical tales, and despite the fact that these stories from the Renaissance and the age of Absolutism would have lent themselves especially well to a treatment of class struggle.[57]

If we ask ourselves what ideological needs are served by such a view of history and society, there is no doubt that it is the world view of the ruling class. One can see this most readily through a negative argument. The opposite of the points just presented would be the wishes of the others, of those not in power. For them, everything depends on important changes taking place in history, especially insofar as they have meaning for the future. The "meaning" of their life does not consist of chosen deeds, but in ongoing labor, the only way to secure their existence. Daily physical, social and mental struggle for existence makes up their world. But here we are dealing with the literature of the liberal upper middle class. As one of its members, C.F. Meyer sees the world only as a chance for the "personality" to raise himself above the petty mundane worries of the little people. He is constantly preoccupied with grand designs and grand ideals.

I do not use the term "bourgeois upper middle class" as a mere economic category. True, the social stratum most likely to identify with the lifestyle Meyer depicts consists mainly of southwest German industrialists, northern German merchants, bankers and the appending intellectual circles. This 19th-century upper crust bourgeoisie has some traits in common with contemporary ruling groups, for instance, tremendous economic influence and contempt for the average existence. They also share the wider perspective of time and space and thereby are independent of moral, philosophical and religious reifications. These common elements, however, arise from contrasting situations and have different meanings. Our monopolistic upper class, unlike its liberal predecessor, is no longer part of a broad middle class, convinced of its mission in society, even though it did arise through the same process of rapid concentration and centralization. The modern economic ruling class no longer accommodates vigorous, independent small entrepreneurs, but is on the way to becoming the sole moving social force — one of the power groups now ruling all over the globe. With the ever-increasing gulf between these rulers and the rest of society, their functions and ideology have become transformed. Meyer's positive view of education, today completely antiquated, reflects a time when both individuals and society could expect real advancement by increasing their scientific knowledge. Meyer's open admiration of the religious and national nonchalance of his Renaissance Men is anachronistic now, given the organizational responsibility of the upper middle class within the larger society. The current view even tries to restrict the humanistic and revolutionary elements of the Renaissance by emphasizing the traditional. But the German upper middle class of Meyer's time and of the present does present a sociological concept that can be related to a literary work, as in the present essay, even without previous economic analysis.

Of course, a serious objection could be raised here, namely that the link between Meyer's concept of history and the ruling class of his time is improper, since he was far from a typical representative of the modern elite, but rather a carry-over from the

57. We are confident that our analysis has shown Baumgarten's view to be untenable. As he formulates it in the decisive passage of his book, "The irony of life is the atmosphere which shapes Meyer's characters. Historical man is for Meyer the ironic tool of fate and no hero. Heroes shape the world according to their own laws. The course of history for Meyer's figures is a role in which fate twists and turns their lives, and this role often becomes their nemesis." *Op.cit.*, p. 84.

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dying Swiss patriciate. But since Meyer does not draw his view of society from traditional sources, his patrician background does not lead him to glorify the history of this class. Instead, he can approach social contradictions from a disinterested perspective. The speech of General Wertmüller is evidence of this, where he rejects the arrogance of aristocracy and patriciate and is proud of the simple name Müller, which receives its power not from the past, but from the extraordinary deeds of the one who bears it.[58]

The importance of Meyer's travels,[59] especially his stay in Paris, is a further example. In his biography, Robert Faesi writes of Meyer's opinion of Paris: "He had to condemn it ethically and praise it aesthetically."[60] This represents an accurate distinction. For despite his pronouncedly Protestant super-ego, Meyer still felt the grandness of bourgeois self-confidence in France. He confronted it predominantly in the Paris lifestyle of worldly elegance and the depictions of it by Balzac, Stendhal and other writers. What he found in Paris was complemented by his visit to Rome in 1858. "Come to Italy and taste of life," he wrote later in *Engelberg*. The lively image of Paris is complemented in the south by the grand style that he appreciates in Italy. His friendship with Ricasoli, the Italian statesman, and his unqualified admiration of Bismarck belong entirely to this period. In both men he found the synthesis of what his novellas preach: grandiose history, strong individual personality and extraordinary style.[61]

There are even more interesting and convincing examples of Meyer's ideological function that have as yet been largely ignored by literary history. An analysis of his correspondence, especially with Rodenberg, belies the image of the isolated, hermit-like poet and exposes it as a legend Meyer was thoroughly acquainted with contemporary political as well as social issues. He and very specific views on such issues, and his social impact is strikingly visible as well. One could sum up Meyer's politics by saying he would have belonged to the National Liberal Party as it was pursuing its cartel policy with the conservatives. This policy promoted a large united national state with a very consciously pursued and consciously economic class character. It united industrial and merchant classes with big agrarian interests and the military while maintaining a liberal cultural policy.[62] This is more or less the hallmark

58. *Der Schuss von der Kanzel, op.cit.*, p. 91. One might suppose that the relative well-being of the Swiss industrial proletariat inhibited Meyer from developing a guilty conscience, which one would otherwise expect, given his psychological make-up. But thus the rigidity of his social thought can continue undisturbed.

59. Even the eulogy in the *Beilage zur Allgemeinen Zeitung* (Munich, November 29, 1898) stresses the significance of the fact that Meyer "was a well-travelled man whose material independence made most incisive studies possible."

60. *Conrad Ferdinand Meyer, op.cit.*, p. 16.

61. Adolf Stern describes *Jürg Jenatsch* and its reception as follows: "As true as the historical setting appears, it was doubtless Meyer's personal experience of history through figures such as Cavour, Ricasoli and Bismarck, the greatest of all, which provided him an awareness and understanding of characters of political action who were guided by passionate yet impersonal feelings. The readers of *Jürg Jenatsch* were also unconsciously moved by this harmony between old and new atmospheres." *Studien zur Literatur der Gegenwart: Neue Folge* (Dresden and Leipzig, 1904), p. 51.

62. He had a decided distaste for the bourgeois-democratic opposition. This may also have clouded his relation with Graf Platen, of the neighboring estate. Cf. the letter to Haessel below, in *Briefe*, Vol. 2, *op.cit.*, p. 41, and the letter of January 29, 1889, *op.cit.*, p. 168: "I admit I am as unenthusiastic for Baron Roggenbach, who is supposed to have bought land here, as I am for Geffcken. Please in the name of Hell let Bismarck make you into a great imperial nation!" Further, after the election defeats of the Free-Thinkers in 1887 to Rodenberg, "I pity the

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of the politics of the upper middle class after the foundation of the Reich. Meyer's positive view of Bismarck, with whom he would go "through thick and thin," is already known.[63] He said his main interest in Bismarck was psychological.[64] In a conflict between Bismarck and the Kaiser he speaks of being in total sympathy with the Kaiser,[65] but adds later that it may have been a grave error for the Kaiser "to give up Bismarck."[66] In this context, it is of more significance that he claims to be worried about "the young ruler sometimes, because, for example, I think Bismarck was clearly right on the social issue."[67]

This is clearly a class orientation, which can be further illustrated in other passages. After the elections in Saxony and Swabia in February 1887, he expressed satisfaction at the "defeat of socialism in the one case and sectionalism in the other."[68] He wrote to Haessel, his publisher, "Italian democrats (and democrats in general) interest me as little as they do you. In fact, in Davos I cut off short a Russian (so-called nihilist) democrat who was boring me with his verbiage."[69] One sees a similar detachment from the general populace as he writes in July 1878, the time of the Socialist Laws, "I can easily believe that things are not running smoothly out there in the Reich. Here we have had a popular veto of the Gotthard Subsidy (an unparalleled vulgarity), floods, hail, and I personally have had a complete change of servants."[70] These associations of personal and general maladies concerning the proletariat and related groups are characteristic not only of Meyer's highly individual idiosyncrasies, but of his class consciousness as well.

Aside from the exaggerated passage on the farmers from *Angela Borgia*, I know of only one other instance where Meyer made any positive reference to subservient groups. Out of concern about the printing of *Angela Borgia* due to the great Leipzig printers' strike of 1891, he wrote to his friends Wille, "The young managers are applying Draconian measures and many a poor devil who had been able to shuffle along in a big publishing house is now being mercilessly dismissed. Neither clever nor Christian."[71] Management is condemned, not out of consideration of economic justice, but out of a clear sense of self-interest.[72] His class consciousness in economic

erstwhile secessionists Forkenbeck, Bamberger, etc., but by God they deserved it." February 27, in *Briefwechsel, op.cit.*, p. 239. It is also interesting here that Meyer supported Wille's attempt to remove the passage in Heine's *Germany: A Winter's Tale* condemning the cowardice of the Prussian Junkers. Meyer called them "undignified verses." Cf. Karl Emil Franzos, "Konrad Ferdinand Meyer," in *Deutsche Dichtung*, Vol. 25 (1898-1899), p. 247, note.

63. To L.V. François, November 25, 1881, *ibid.*, p. 32; cf. also the letter to Calmberg, November 29, 1877, in *Briefe*, Vol. 2, *ibid.*, p. 232.

64. To Wille, March 1, 1886, in *Briefe*, Vol. 1, *ibid.*, p. 183.

65. To Rodenberg, March 28, 1891, in *Briefwechsel, op.cit.*, p. 297; cf. also the letter to Wille, January 16, 1891, in *Briefe*, Vol. 1, *ibid.*, p. 210ff.

66. To Wille, December 7, 1891, in *Briefe*, Vol. 1, *ibid.*, p. 220.

67. To Wille, August 28, 1890, *ibid.*, p. 207.

68. To Rodenberg, February 27, 1887, in *Briefwechsel, op.cit.*, p. 239.

69. To Haessel, October 5, 1871, in *Briefe*, Vol. 2, *op.cit.*, p. 41.

70. To Haessel, June 15, 1878, in *Briefe*, Vol. 2, *ibid.*, p. 77; cf. also Meyer's lament over "the miserable state of our trade and railroads," to Meissner, April 14, 1877, in *Briefe*, Vol. 2, *op.cit.*, p. 270. Max Nussberger incomprehensibly identifies Meyer's German sympathies in the war of 1879 with "the century's cherished democratic ideals." *Conrad Ferdinand Meyer: Leben und Werke* (Frauenfeld, 1919), p. 110.

71. To Wille, October 17, 1891, in *Briefe*, Vol. 1, *op.cit.*, p. 219.

72. Köhler, cited above, succeeds in finding in Meyer "the deepest impulse of religious socialism... forward-moving love of mankind." *Op.cit.*, p. 230ff. He naively says of Meyer's stand on social issues, "The aristocratic and proper Zuricher that Meyer remained was repelled by the raw and calloused hands of workers. One might even infer a purely aesthetic antipathy on

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questions can be generally shown to be absolutely anti-revolutionary. In some places he refers to himself as conservative.[73] But this is not merely a sectarian, politically Swiss point of view, nor even a sign of resistance to German bourgeois liberalism. Rather it is another formulation of the static, comfortable upper middle class attitude.[74] His love for Germany was — "in the last analysis" — the longing for upper middle class *Lebensraum*, "the longing and the need. . . to belong to a larger whole."[75] He wishes he could have lived in a German city, if social circles in Germany were as accessible as in Italy. If one reads the lists of recipients of complimentary copies of Meyer's works[76] or if one studies his half-aristocratic, half-upper middle class associations, one will realize that Meyer saw himself as a member of the same circles that read his works.[77]

It is unmistakable that Meyer's love of the upper middle class lifestyle led him, after France and Italy, to Germany only after the founding of the Reich. It is a kind of affinity with the splendor of power that induced Meyer for reasons of class to change his chosen homelands. In the "Authors' Album" of a German publishing house, Meyer wrote in 1881, "A Swiss writer should possess in equal degree the consciousness of his homeland's state sovereignty and the consciousness of its national affinity with Germany." In 1887 he referred to this affinity as an "immeasurable treasure" and to the strengthening of it as the "exact barometer of a thorough education."[78]

Another indication of Meyer's class consciousness is his opinion of other writers. He wanted to hold himself above the "brutal immediacy of contemporary topics." This is a very transparent ideological choice, since the atmosphere of his novellas is lacking neither in brutality nor in personal opinions on contemporary topics. But this is entirely compatible with the inattention to detail in his stories when it comes to the sufferings of the majority of mankind.[79] Therefore he was also against those artists of his time who tried to expose the brutality of contemporary topics. He was an opponent

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the part of this genteel poet of the aristocracy to anything related to 'workers.' For purely aesthetic reasons, Conrad Ferdinand Meyer would never have been able to write an *Arbeiterroman* or a social novella. That would mean alleys; he needed Renaissance palaces, the courts of sovereigns, warriors of course, but never the farmer." Köhler is doubtless correct in adding, "Socialism can therefore not count this author as one of its own." [1] *Op.cit.*, p. 230.

73. E.g., to Rodenberg, December 9, 1881, in *Briefwechsel, op.cit.*, p. 101.

74. To Haesse. September 5, 1866, in *Briefe,* Vol. 2, *op.cit.*, p. 11.

75. To Rodenberg, August 23, 1881, in *Briefwechsel, op.cit.*, p. 89.

76. Cf. letter to Haessel, November 18, 1887, in *Briefe,* Vol. 2, *op.cit.*, p. 145ff. (a list of people who received a copy of *Pescara* with a card of dedication).

77. Cf. the description of his contact with Frau D. of the "upper bourgeoisie" to his sister in Ghent in 1857, quoted by Adolf Frey, *C.F. Meyer, Sein Leben und seine Werke* (Stuttgart, 1900), p. 89. Cf. also in this volume the importance of the relationship with François, Wille and Ricasoli. Also the letters to Wille, August 8, 1877, in *Briefe,* Vol. 1, *ibid.*, p. 157ff., and to Rodenberg, July 12, 1883, in *Briefwechsel,* p. 147. Cf. also the poetic phrase of W. Bolza: "The bitter misery of life never beat upon his door." "Keller und Meyer," in *Literarisches Echo*, Vol. 2 (1899-1900), p. 1348. Similarly, Heinrich Kraeger, *Beilage zur Allgemeinen Zeitung,* 1900, No. 12, p. 5.

78. Cf. Paul Wüst, *Gottfried Keller und C.F. Meyer in ihrem persönlichen und literarischen Verhältnis* (Leipzig, 1911), p. 6. Relevant as well is Pescara's sympathy with the Swiss, who, "lacking both leadership and the consciousness of a state, have given away what world position and foreign policy they had already won," p. 5. Cf. also the letter to Rodenberg, Easter, 1887, in *Briefwechsel,* p. 242: ". . . I am treating my present Holy Father [i.e., Clemens VII of *Pescara*] purposely somewhat more gently than I otherwise would, because I will stand by both Kaiser and Reich through thick and thin." See also the letter of December 9, 1881, *op.cit.*, p. 107.

79. Cf. Paul Wüst, *ibid.*, p. 37: "Meyer alone has a weakness for such beatings and brutality. When he hears or reads such things, he cries out, 'Excellent!' " Keller described with these words a trait that would become of great consequence in C.F. Meyer's art: " 'tragic desire' often, carried to the point of cruelty, an apt description employed by a later scholar."

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of the naturalists because he was their class enemy. Even if Zola, Tolstoy and Ibsen might achieve a certain notoriety, whatever the German imitators did was "pure horse manure."[80] He finds only contemptuous words for Spielhagen, a very critical and radical thinker in the bourgeois sense. Spielhagen faced great obstacles, since he allegedly exploited his writing skills in Berlin and continued to do so, while Meyer in his own words was devoting himself to "grand style" and "fine art."[81]

As already mentioned, the reception of Meyer's writings corresponded to his own position. Where his stories were published was no accident. Almost all appeared initially in the periodical *Deutsche Rundschau* and were later published by Haessel. Both publishing houses, the brothers Paetel and the book publisher, counted among their clientele the highest levels of the bourgeoisie and the leading political and military circles. The *Deutsche Rundschau* especially had a thoroughly international readership among the upper crust. Rodenberg asserts correctly that "hardly another German periodical could offer such an audience as ours, an audience made up of the best of all nations. Our distribution is universal: aside from America, Russia, the Scandinavian North, Holland and England, where we caught on from the start, we have gradually even penetrated into France. . . ."[82] One can follow especially well in Rodenberg's reports the gathering of more and more of an upper middle class audience around Meyer. As *The Saint* was published, he reports the enthusiasm of the publishers who "represent the general public, a wide echo, and are themselves two highly intelligent, educated men."[83] Only a few weeks later he can already report, "Politicians and business people, men and women — they all seem to feel equally attracted by your work."[84] A notable illustration of this upper middle class audience is also given by the following anecdote: "Recently at a ball given by Postmaster General Stephan a young lady said to me, her face aglow, that she had read *The Saint* all day long and even while dressing, and that she could not get it out of her thoughts."[85] In 1883 Rodenberg, himself a well-situated intellectual, called Meyer's poems, which "go their way victoriously," a "book for home and family in his entire circle."[86] By the end of the year he is again citing "the best audience and the leading press."[87] In the next year it is mainly respected intellectuals such as Julia Schmidt, Dilthey, Hermann Grimm[88] and Preyer, "a fine and critical reader"[89] who are praising Meyer. In 1885, "distinguished art circles" join in,[90] until one finally reads, "Your novellas and your

80. For the class-conscious opinion of naturalism, the following is also typical: February 12, 1890, Meyer writes to Rodenberg, "L. Tolstoy is probably the most prominent of the literary innovators (as far as he *is* one, since his is the religious impulse of rationalistic mysticism), but *The Power of Darkness* has greatness about it." *Briefwechsel,* p. 282. On the 15th Rodenberg answers, "You are right that we must not let the naturalists or realists take Tolstoy away from us." *Ibid.,* p. 283. But Meyer hadn't asserted it at all that clearly. It is as if the two great upper middle class writers had unconsciously agreed on the enemy and his positions.

81. To Haessel, June 16, 1879, in *Briefe,* Vol. 2, *op.cit.,* p. 86.

82. July 13, 1880, in *Briefwechsel,* p. 73. Cf. here also Rodeïnberg's report of his latest visit to Paris where he was pleased "to find the *Rundschau* so well respected in the leading circles of science and politics. Professors and high civil servants whom I met there spoke to me of the *Rundschau* in a way that showed me how carefully they read it, and how highly it is esteemed."

83. November 13, 1879, in *Briefwechsel,* p. 59.

84. December 6, 1879, *ibid.,* p. 61.

85. February 6, 1880, *ibid.,* p. 64.

86. February 5, *ibid.,* p. 138ff.

87. December 21, *ibid.,* p. 184.

88. January 1, 1884, *ibid.,* p. 186.

89. January 4, *ibid.,* p. 187; cf. also March 13, *ibid.,* p. 188.

90. November 26, *ibid.,* p. 216.

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poems already are among the indispensable possessions of all our educated people."[91] For this National-Liberal writer, "educated" is only a collective term for the upper class. This includes the "enthusiastic admirer" Geheimrat Geffcken, and the military author Max Jähns, "one of our leading general staff officers," who has Meyer's poems on his desk, so that he can be "daily strengthened and edified, as if by the view or by the air in the Alps."[92]

One might argue that it is untenable to attribute upper middle class ideology to Meyer because a heroic view of history is irreconcilable with the prevailing bourgeois liberal theory of history. Here a study of Meyer can produce an important reappraisal: in Germany, liberalism was never properly the expression of ruling class consciousness. Instead, due to economic and political conditions, large landowners, merchants, and the military formed an alliance that was eminently susceptible to heroic irrationalism. At first glance, one might have assumed that Meyer's patrician background might create an imbalance between modern bourgeois ideology and the Swiss in him. But a closer analysis shows that, on the contrary, the bourgeois-patrician mixture has been extraordinarily effective in ideologically reflecting and glorifying the alliance of the German upper classes.

91. *Ibid.*

92. January 3, 1887, *ibid.*, p. 234ff. A few references will show the close correspondence between the class-reflected reception by later ciritics, the reception by contemporary readers and Meyer's own intentions. Friedrich Dorn speaks of the "golden holiday mood" which "does not let the soft undertones of day-to-day suffering come through"; "the common man is missing from C.F. Meyer's writings," in "C.F. Meyer. Zu Seinem siebzigsten Geburtstag," in *Die Nation,* Vol. 13 (1895-1896), pp. 19, 12. K.E. Franzos finds him "fine and elegant," *op.cit.*, p. 138; the "genteel artist" is no "democratic genre painter" and has "resisted the temptation to flatter the taste of the times." To Richard Specht as well, he is a "timeless artist" to those who come to him "from the confusion and the confusing noise of the much-too-living." In *Die Zeit*, Vienna, December 3, 1898, p. 152. His art "will not reach the common readership, but will remain confined to the circle of the truly educated," in W. Bolza, "C.F. Meyer," in *Das Literarische Echo,* Vol. 1 (1898-1899), p. 419. He can "never become a writer for the growing spread of the generally educated." Adolph Stern, "C.F. Meyer," in *Westermann Monatshefte,* Vol. 43 (1899), p. 702. Franz Ferdinand Baumgarten's interpretation is familiar, which speaks in sociologically unclear terms of the "opposition of a spiritual elite against realistic art and mechanistic life." *Op.cit.*, p. 12. "Meyer was a misplaced bourgeois. . . the seductions of his artist's blood troubled his bourgeois conscience." *Op.cit.*, p. 54. Hans Corrodi says of Meyer's Novella, "it expresses, if not the outlook toward living of many people, then the 'ego' and 'world view' of a great and genteel poet," in *C.F. Meyer und sein Verhältnis zum Drama* (Leipzig, 1922), p. 118. Similar is Harry Mayne's formulation that "C.F. Meyer is not a writer for everyone," in *C.F. Meyer und sein Werk* (Frauenfeld and Leipzig, 1925), p. 337. Werner Kaegis' introduction to Ernst Walser's collection, *Geistesgeschichte der Renaissance* (Basel, 1932, p. xxx), asserts that "the novellas of C.F. Meyer were understood by few in their tragically affirmed tension between the aesthetic and the ethical life." Expanding upon Baumgarten's position, cited above, Thomas Mann attempted to interpret C.F. Meyer along the lines of his Tonio Kröger: "To be Christian, bourgeois, German. . . these are the central features of his artistry." *Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen* (Berlin, 1919), p. 158ff. This selection from the literature will at this point be neither continued nor interpreted in detail. It should serve, however, to point out that Meyer's reception exactly corresponds to the "principle of selection" that we illustrated as his construction scheme for both form and content. We saw it again in his personal attitudes and reflected in his first readers. Selection is the glorification of the elite, but this elite is none other than the upper middle class. Its ideology can also serve as an example for imitation by other bourgeois social strata.

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THE INIMITABLE *ZEITSCHRIFT FUR SOZIALFORSCHUNG:* HOW HORKHEIMER TOOK ADVANTAGE OF A HISTORICALLY OPPRESSIVE HOUR*

by Jürgen Habermas

Ten years ago, the Kösel Press reprinted the nine volumes of the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, which had appeared between 1932 and 1941, complete with an introduction by Alfred Schmidt and a general index. Now, the DTV [*Deutsche Taschenbuch Verlag*] is making this reprint available to a wider stratum of buyers in a light blue cassette. At first sight this may not seem so unusual. For, after all, the journal does contain the classical texts of the collaborators of the Institute for Social Research, which in 1933 had to emigrate via Geneva to New York. Till the beginning of World War II, the journal continued to be published in German by a Parisian publisher; the last four issues appeared in New York, in English.

The journal was of vital importance for that group of emigrants whom public opinion has in retrospect associated with the name of Critical Theory actually only since the end of the 1960s. It was the organizational core and the intellectual center of their work. Scientific discussions usually took place in the form of editorial meetings; research assignments were closely connected with publication plans. The journal was more than just the organ of a group of scientists; it played a constitutive role for a school. Horkheimer, the editor, never let his readers doubt this. In the preface to Volume VI he bluntly justifies the selection of the main articles as follows: "We have decided to continue a philosophical tradition, also insofar as the selection of articles is decided both on the basis of scientific soundness and especially of mentality and direction of interest. The main articles in the various fields should develop and apply a common philosophical view. Though in other areas of life indifference toward universal human concerns and the renunciation of rational decision are taking root and relativism is becoming the avowed intellectual attitude precisely among candid thinkers, science itself must therefore all the more resolutely face up to certain thoughts." These words are by no means signs of dogmatism, but they do indicate a decisive preference for research interests that had already been expressed in the themes of the first issue.

The Theoretical Focus

Horkheimer had opened the first issue with an essay on "Science and Crisis," in which he developed the main features of a *critique of science,* outlining a dual front until the positivism dispute of the 1960s: a stand against scientism and metaphysics. These two opposite variants of an understanding of theory rooted in the same traditions form the background against which in the next issues Horkheimer, together with Marcuse, would elaborate the beginnings of a critical theory of society. Like Husserl in his investigation *The Crisis of European Sciences,* Horkheimer wanted to penetrate beyond the objectivistic self-understanding of the empirical sciences in order to expose the lifeworld context of research, the threads extending from social praxis to methodology. The other articles of that first issue, still published in Franfurt, are also typical points of departure for later theoretical developments. Fromm writes on the

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task of an analytical social psychology, Lowenthal and Adorno on the sociology of literature and music, Pollock and Grossmann on capitalism, economic crisis and the "prospects of a new order with a planned economy."

With less energetic assumptions, Fromm outlines the foundations for a fruitful *Marxist appropriation of psychoanalysis.* The revolution that never came, the success of the fascist dictatorship in Germany, the bureaucratic distortion of socialism in Stalinist Russia — all these were contemporary events that had sharpened the sense for the psychic mediations between changes in consciousness and socio-economic changes. Now, psychoanalysis was to show how the pressure of economic conditions on the instinctual structure was converted into behavioral modes and ideologies. Only Talcott Parsons later brought about an equally momentous integration of Freudian developmental psychology. All collaborators of the inner circle of the Frankfurt School soon were using this tool developed by Fromm.

This applies to *cultural theory*, too, of which Lowenthal's, Adorno's and Benjamin's works are representative. In his very first essay, Lowenthal bemoans the "bad relationship" of literary criticism to psychoanalysis, history and sociology, as well as the inclination to transform its objects metaphysically. On the other hand, the "connection between cultural and economic processes" should by no means be investigated empirically. The Frankfurt School approach confines itself to the work at hand," but it radicalizes the investigation of aesthetic form so much that the social driving forces, the psychodynamics with roots in economic factors, can be deciphered out of the apparently most remote, esoteric and mysterious cyphers of the artwork. Lowenthal's ideology critique in the area of the novel and drama of the European bourgeoisies pioneered the methodology that has since become commonplace. Lowenthal just as persistently investigated the formal elements, e.g., the framework narrative and dialogue development, as the organization of the material and the selection of motifs. The method of an almost detective-like search for the social content of aesthetic form is even more pronounced in Adorno's studies on Schoenberg and Wagner or in Benjamin's essay about Baudelaire, fascinating documentation of an aesthetics elaborated as a theory of society, for which parallels can be found, if at all, in the works of Lukacs. The most conventional among the theoretically decisive works are the contributions on the fourth theme, which is first struck by Pollock's and Grossmann's essays. Otherwise, political economy is the core of this Marxistically oriented journal. In fact, surveys of the literature on planned economy (by Kurt Mandelbaum and Gerhard Meyer) form the most solid stock of the journal's articles; and information on the workers' movement is given in a book review section presented under the title "Social Movement and Social Policy." But economic theory is not really developed further; Pollock's interesting theses on state capitalism (and Wittfogel's famous studies on oriental despotism) are, rather, a confirmation of the symptomatic shift of theoretical perspective. Less attention is paid to the conflict-producing mechanisms of the economic system than to the post-crisis interceptive mechanisms of state conflict-management and cultural integration. Neumann and Kirchheimer's works on political science and the theory of law point in this direction; the two law-experts, who first joined the institute as emigrés and who with their Social Democratic orientation remained somewhat on the periphery of the narrower circle, made original beginnings for a theory of democracy that has remained relevant down to this day.

The long essays reflect the incomparable productivity of a small circle of scholars, who in the more cramped space of emigration banded around the journal's standard.

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The journal provided a sort of focus — if there ever was a single datable and localizable Frankfurt School it was in New York, between 1933 and 1941, in a house on 429 West 117th Street, provided by Columbia University.

What Gives the Journal Documentary Value

Of course, it is precisely the previously mentioned main part of the journal that has been terribly plundered. In 1970, when the reprint first appeared, all important essays by Marcuse, Adorno and Benjamin, by Lowenthal and Fromm, by Neumann and Kirchheimer had been published in separate editions. Finally, even Horkheimer had, after years of hesitation, consented to a reprint of his essays from the journal. He wrote in advance a distancing foreword to the two volumes, which appeared in 1968. He no longer wanted to admit the validity of the "economic and political ideas" that had comprised the horizon of his reflections in the 1930s. He warned students: "Careless and dogmatic application of critical theory to praxis in the changed historical reality can only hasten the process that it ought to denounce" (*Critical Theory* [Frankfurt, 1969], vol. I, p. ix). But if everything important — with this caveat — had already been published, why then a reprint of the magazine with all its paraphernalia?

By chance, Horkheimer himself put me into the fortunate situation of being able to answer this question. For during my assistantship at the Frankfurt Institute in the 1950s, it was the just-mentioned reservations that led Horkheimer to discourage us from reading the journal. A complete copy was kept in a crate in the institute's cellar, nailed shut and out of our grasp. So it happened that at that time I became acquainted with only scattered issues and never got the journal as a whole in my hands until substantial parts had already been published elsewhere. I assumed that I knew all the essentials; and so I was surprised to discover what the story was with those "compendious review sections" that had been announced on the back of individual issues: for a journal is, after all, quite a different thing from the key theoretical articles it contains.

Books have their destinies. They can be lost, forgotten, reappear. Even books that remain present for a time have their destinies. New editions are like the shorelines against which, with every changed situation, with every new generation of readers, a wider stratum of unforeseen reaction sediments. It is different with periodicals: they themselves present such a reception. Journals limit their own actuality with the rhythm of their appearance. Every new number devalues the preceding one; and with its last number a journal wanders into the archives. Periodicals are more intimately bound up with their date of publication than monographs with the year of their first printing. Instead, they have a different fortune: they can, if only they have absorbed enough of the spirit of time, become a document. And sometimes even documents have destinies. Perhaps that is a key for the analysis of the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*.

Essays defining the Frankfurt School's standpoints take up less than half of each issue. The book review section occupies more than a third of the space. And since the review section consists of short, extremely concentrated reviews, every year more than 350 publications were reviewed — a total of almost three and a half thousand titles over the years. Among the guidelines of the book review policy that Horkheimer explained in the foreword are not only the elaboration of a theoretical standpoint: "When because of intellectual confusion the undaunted pursuit of certain ideas in various fields of social theory is especially necessary, still every sort of philosophical thinking needs constant observation of work in the individual sciences. This orientation should be made easier for the reader of our journal mainly by the book

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reviews. We try to at least mention every publication of any importance for the theory of society, even in remote fields. The main articles section is supplemented by such studies by specialists, which have some connection with questions of social science. Differences of theoretical attitude here play a far lesser role than the clarification of particular contents. Critique of positivism does not prevent us from recognizing and promoting its technical achievements" (Vol. 6, No. 2).

Articles by Otto Neurath and Paul Lazarsfeld appear in the same volume with the works of Horkheimer, Marcuse and Fromm; Neurath comes from the Vienna Circle, the other specializes in social upheavals, in techniques of social research. The understated allusion to "the constant observation of work in particular sciences" refers mainly to the book review section; concealed behind it is Lowenthal's impressive achievement as the one who expertly managed the editorial strings. Without him, without the book review section he ran, the idea Horkheimer had developed in the foreword to the first issue under the heading "social research" could not have been realized — the idea of a theory of society oriented to the present epoch, and subject to the criterion of empirical research in all social-science disciplines.

The Unity of the Social Sciences

The background philosophy of the German historical school had for two or three generations of the social sciences developed a unifying power, which was conceptualized by Dilthey. Horkheimer achieves something similar with this journal, though only for the span of one short decade. The literature deployed and discussed in the book review section provided the difficult material that fits almost naturally into the theoretical framework; it provided a test for the organizing power of the central research interests. The book review section was divided into Philosophy, General Sociology, Psychology, History, Social Movement, Social Policy, Specialized Sociology, and Economics. Subdivisions of Specialized Sociology included political science, cultural anthropology, and theory of law. Never again have both disciplinary and national distances been bridged so strikingly in the social sciences; never again has the unity of the social sciences been so convincingly portrayed as here, from the perspective of an unorthodox modified "Western" Marxism, as Merleau-Ponty said, which fused the heritage of German philosophy from Kant to Hegel with the tradition of social theory from Marx to Durkheim and Max Weber.

Yet, the inner Marxist discussion plays hardly a role there. Of course, Lukacs or Borkenau wrote there about the old Marx-Engels Complete Edition [MEGA], Korsch about Lenin, Paul Mattick about the early Sidney Hook, Marcuse about Cornu and Marxological topics from France. Labriola was reviewed, as was Natalie Moszkovski's famous article on crisis theory. But all this was free of the emphases of the otherwise usual conflict of opinions between the factions. Korsch, for example, was more interested in Donoso Cortes, in the buildup of state power in fascist Italy, in Michael Freund's studies of Sorel, in the instructive ambivalences in the book of a young conservative author such as Wilhelm Eschmann (on the "revolution" of 1933).

Horkheimer and Lowenthal could not have achieved the ambitious goals of their editorial policy without winning the collaboration of internationally renowned experts such as Alexander Koyré, Maurice Halbwachs, Raymond Aron, and George Friedmann from Paris, Maurice Ginsberg and T.H. Marshall from England, Charles A. Beard, Margaret Mead, Harold D. Laswell and Otto Lipmann from the United States.

The journal had enviable resources; it attracted many of the German emigrés to

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collaborate. Of course, there are characteristic gaps; Ernst Bloch and Hannah Arendt are missing, as well as Hans Morgenthau and, of course, the conservatives. From the circle of the New School, only Adolf Löwe and Hans Speier are present. Still, the list of reviewers includes: Ernst von Aster, Otto Fenichel, Paul Honigsheim, Karl Landauer, Karl Löwith (first from Rome, then from Japan), Ernst Manheim, Siegfried Marck, Paul Massing, Hans Mayer, F. Neumark (from Istanbul), Arthur Rosenberg and Günther Stern. Individual articles were contributed by Ossip Flechtheim, Hans Gerth, Bernhard Groythuysen, A.R. Gurland, Herta Herzog, Ernst Krenek, Frieda Reichmann, also Ernst Schachtel and Paul Tillich.

The editors can use this wealth of experts to observe carefully the most varied research orientations. The journal can familiarize the German public with the newer foreign movements, for example, the functionalist school of American cultural anthropology (Malinowski, Mead, Benedict), with social developments whether of the Durkheim school or the Chicago school, with A.C. Pigou and the beginnings of welfare economics, with the pragmatism of G.H. Mead and Dewey, with the great historical works of Pirenne or Toynbee. But the journal is especially able to react critically to theoretical innovations: to Kurt Lewin's field theory, to the beginnings of analytical ego psychology, to the revolutionary work of Keynes and the works of Joan Robinson, or to the Unified Science movement with its roots in logical empiricism. These are a few examples of the integrating power and the ability of an unusual instrument; they also illustrate the wide range of intellectual stimuli for which the journal had an especially distinguishing antenna.

If it had achieved only this: with philosophical inspiration to make the unity of social science present for a historical moment, the journal would by that alone have become an influential document. But I doubt that this achievement would have succeeded at all without the impulse of contemporary history. Helmut Dubiel, in an exemplary study (in *Studies on Early Critical Theory* [Suhrkamp, 1978]) traced how the historical political experiences, with the end of the revolutionary workers' movement, with the Nazi regime and Stalinism, deeply affected the development of Critical Theory itself, how they gradually crushed the hopes that had fueled the beginning of the project and drove them to that negative dialectical variety of theory of totalitarianism with which Horkheimer and Adorno, having only the critique of instrumental reason left, then returned to Germany. The journal as a whole reflects this process.

The Current Events Motive

The foreword that Horkheimer wrote for the first English-language issue in July 1940 betrays the journal's motive till then: "We have till now not published the journal in America mainly because in the last eight years most of our readers were Europeans. Since almost all articles appeared in Germany they could fulfill their real purpose; philosophical and scientific traditions that could no longer be followed in Germany were continued here in the mother tongue. The language articles are written in does not remain without influence on the ideas they contain. But this consideration must now recede before our wish to place our work, even in its external form, at the service of American social life. Philosophy, art and science have lost their homeland in almost all parts of Europe" (Vol. 8, p. 321). Whoever takes a look at the book review section of the four English-language issues sees why the journal folded — the umbilical cord to the scientific culture of the homeland was cut through. Till then the emigrés had looked to Germany with that peculiar look in which love and dependency were

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mingled with bitterness and horror. In the many alarmed looks something is caught that makes a reading of the reviews a depressing experience for everyone to whom the names still mean anything: this part of the journal reflects the spiritual decomposition in the German universities.

The first issues published in Frankfurt still lived in the academic world of the 1920s. The abundance of short reviews gave an overall view of a familiar terrain: famous social scientists such as Vierkandt, Tönnies and Thurnwald, Karl Mannheim, Alfred Weber, Emil Lederer, Robert Michels, Theodor Geiger or A. von Martin. Discussed in the same breath were C.G. Jung and Freud, Hans Freyer and Neurath, Ludwig von Mises and Lenin, Kurt Breysig and Franz Mehring. The arch spans from Eugen Rosenstock to Nicolai Hartmann, from Lujo von Brentano to Kautsky, from Alfred Schütz and Eduard Heimann to Kuszynski, from Malinowski via Bergson to Croce. Only a few sharp tones could be heard in this peaceful, amicable circle. Adorno spoke of Spengler's noisy, profuse pathos; the young Dolf Sternberger had an unperturbed political sense for Othmar Spann's time-symptomatic valency. Rix Löwenthal was also critical: still a Marxist at the time, he tore to pieces the theory of democracy inspired by Schumpeter and Weaver, to which he himself was later to retreat. But Karl Korsch still stressed the strengths of Carl Schmitt's theory; and Hans Speier first cautiously expressed his reservations about the reduction of politics to friend-enemy relations.

Two issues later, the atmosphere was suddenly changed: when the same book, Carl Schmitt's *Begriff des Politischen*, appeared in its third edition, Marcuse restricted himself simply to enumerating the partly opportunistic, partly inflammatory textual changes that the author had considered necessary to undertake tacitly after Jan. 30, 1933.

At the same time, however, Horkheimer warned against blanket judgments by alluding to the "sociologically extremely complicated intellectual currents presently prevailing in Germany." The reviews of German-language publications actually present a complex picture. Naturally, the journal followed the works of the emigrés, including those with whom there seemed to be no personal contact, for instance the works of Karl Mannheim, Ernst Heller, Helmuth Plessner, Leo Strauss, E. Vögelin, W. Hallgarten or Gotthard Günther. But attention was paid mainly to authors who could continue German scientific traditions in Germany: Jaspers, Litt, Nicolai Hartmann in philosophy or Franz Schnabel, Friedrich Meinicke, Erich Kahler, Hermann Oncken among the historians. Progress of editions (Hegel, Dilthey) was just as diligently recorded as the complicated political differentiations within well-known schools (such as the Heideggerian one in Freiburg or that of Felix Kruger in Leipzig). With Marcuse, Löwing and Günter Stern (who became famous after the war under the name Günter Anders) the journal had three philosophers who had received their intellectual formation in Freiburg under Husserl and Heidegger. Not without a sigh of relief, Marcuse at the end of 1936 began a group review with the statement that a few works from Heidegger's circle, though they would not belong within the scope of a journal for social research, deserved reviewing because without accommodating the dominant ideology, "they are striving for an objective treatment of their object." One can readily recognize the effort to see the blurred contours from a distance.

Not untypical is what Adorno wrote about Erich Rothacker's book *The Strata of Personality*, the same book that we, as Rothacker students, used in our psychology studies after the war without the sharp-sighted distinctions made by the observer from New York in 1938: "The book shows the scholarly character of the Dilthey school and

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is well organized. Its political reserve is noticeable. The customary practical application of the organically stratified personality is omitted. The chapter on the psychology of nations can be considered a disguised polemic against the race doctrine because of its emphasis on historical factors over the invariables. Authors like Bergson, Koffka, W. Stern, Geiger, Kurt Goldstein are named. Of course, Freud is not. We miss him all the more since the only idea that goes beyond the textbook framework, that of the 'strata' of the person and their relation, is directly based on the Freudian theory of the 'systems': unconscious, preconscious and conscious, and on Freud's statements about their topological and dynamic interpretation" (Vol. 7, p. 423).

On another page, one reads Günter Stern's bitter remarks on C.J. Jung's American lectures, which were also published in 1938, in which the psychologist had expressed himself more cautiously than "right after the New Order" in Germany: "It would be unjust to hide Jung's talent for geographic variations under a bushel." On a different page we find all the more readily Erich Trier's reports from Frankfurt on the newest developments in Protestant theology (Barth, Gogarten, Müller) or even Hugo Marx's reports from Zürich about that sad travesty which Carl Schmitt and his students, and people such as Ernst Anrich, E.R. Huber, Ernst Forsthoff, Otto Koellenreutter, Herbert Krüger and Karl Larenz were putting on in German penal law.

Marcuse's article on "The Struggle against Liberalism in the Totalitarian Concept of the State," published as early as 1934, stands in this context. This work marks Marcuse's first break with his teacher Heidegger, whose inaugural speech and article in the Freiburg student newspaper of Nov. 10, 1933, had immediately made the rounds among his exiled students. Marcuse breaks with Heidegger by an artifice. Carl Schmitt's decisionism was considered the solution to the riddle of an abstract existential ontology that turns its back on the context of social life: "Existentialism breaks down at the moment when its political theory is realized." And, ironically agreeing with Carl Schmitt's statement that on the day of the seizure of power "Hegel had died," Marcuse wrote, "Existentialism has rejected the greatest spiritual heritage of German history. Not with Hegel's death, but only now does the titanic fall of classical German philosophy take place" (Vol. 3, p. 194).

An End with Two Continuations

This mode solidified in the course of years. It undermined the normative foundations of critical theory itself and so led to the end of the journal. Martin Jay, in his comprehensive historical portrayal of the Frankfurt School (*The Dialectical Imagination* [Boston, 1973], p. 168), mentions the financial difficulties that made it impossible to continue all the institute's programs. But the journal folded because an inner clock had run down.

The decision to reorient the journal toward an American readership was on the surface the expression of the desire to engage the institute more intensely in empirical research and to integrate it with the scientific system on the spot. The radio research group around Paul Lazarsfeld presented the point of contact; one issue of the journal was dedicated to problems of mass psychology. Horkheimer's "Notes" in the same issue are even more revealing. They display not only a certain helplessness, but especially a half-heartedness in the declared effort to insert the critical contents of theoretical concepts like hidden explosives in techniques of revolt. This attempt came too late, namely at a time when critical theory had already lost the ground under its feet and surrendered to the suction of a dialectics of enlightenment that eroded reason and faith in reason. Resignation was too far advanced by 1941.

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In the next to last issue, Horkheimer published his essay "The End of Reason," which in a nutshell already anticipated the *Critique of Instrumental Reason*. All confidence had been lost in the power of philosophical tradition, in the Utopian content of bourgeois ideals, i.e., in the rational potential of bourgeois culture that would, under the pressure of developed productive forces, be unleashed in social movements. The rationalistic core of critical theory that had believed it could, by means of an immanent critique of the forms of objective spirit, distinguish "between what man and things can be, and what they in fact are" (Vol. 5, p. 2ï) had been undermined. Marcuse had rightly called this distinction the "central lever of theory." But now all reason seemed to have fled from reality. The productive forces had turned into the destructive forces of the war machinery; and where was the social movement which, having remained a "subject," was to "carry" theory — "the consciousness of certain groups and individuals engaged in the struggle for a rational organization of society"? What is left, since 1941, is the diagnosis of a process of self-destruction of reason, anticipating all important motifs of the critique of progress that was revived in the 1970s — though of course without the cheekiness of those who today transform the dialectics of enlightenment into a simple philosophy of post-enlightenment.

Two lines lead from this point, when the journal ceased to exist and the classical form of the theory fell apart, to the late 1960s. Adorno and Marcuse drew opposite conclusions from the "dialectics of enlightenment." While Marcuse relegated reason's historically darkened claim below the threshold of culture by a theory of instincts, Adorno set his empty hope on the solitary exercise of a self-negating philosophy. Lowenthal, who was overshadowed by the two others, represented a third possibility: one can object to the accusatory thesis of the end of reason without having to choose between metaphysics on the one hand and one of the fashionable or scientifically promoted forms of the liquidation of reason on the other. The philosophical exhaustion that cripples the intellectual scene today — and not only in West Germany — is arousing curiosity again about critical theory's attempts that broke off in the early 1940s. Perhaps, the breaking off of the undertaking can also be explained by the fact that even those who have given Marxism the pseudonym of critical theory still did not proceed in an unorthodox enough manner. Because they understood what Marx had called "productive forces" too traditionally, they soon had to discover that the growth of the forces of cognitive-instrumental rationality do not of themselves guarantee forms of life worthy of man. For perhaps the real productive forces, the rational potentials, are based more on a state of communication than on working conditions.

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LOWENTHAL, ADORNO, BARTHES: THREE PERSPECTIVES ON POPULAR CULTURE

by David Gross

Popular Culture in History

"Popular Culture" has been defined in various ways, but essentially it means two things: (1) the system of shared meanings and values that unite most of the people in any given society, and (2) the actual embodiment of these qualities and attitudes in particular objects or performances that can then be exchanged, consumed, observed, or otherwise experienced by other members of the community (e.g., paintings, plays, books, songs and the like).[1] The first refers to the cultural "tone" of a society, and the second to the objectification of this tone in cultural artifacts. From the beginning, therefore, an obvious split needs to be noted in the realm of culture. On the one hand, there is now and has always been a majority of the population that partakes in and identifies with the values embedded in the objects of popular culture, and on the other hand, there is a small minority of individuals who actually produce these cultural objects and make them available to the public.

Traditionally, popular culture has been viewed as the opposite of high, or elite, culture. Consequently, it has usually been dealt with negatively as something inferior or unsophisticated — a kind of culture which by its very nature lacks elevated qualities. Also, popular culture has been seen as the culture of the lower orders, or what Gramsci called the "subordinate classes" (and it has certainly been true historically that the center of popular culture has been among the peasants and artisans, the rural and urban poor). For this reason, when one speaks of popular culture up until modern times the term refers to the folk entertainment and festivals, songs and ballads, broadsides and chap-books, folk art and folk tales that were indigenous to these strata of the population. At least until the 17th century, virtually everyone was familiar with popular culture, even if a few separated themselves from it and, through formal learning, acquired the trappings of high culture as well. But even this minority, which was bi-lingual so to speak, had the choice of moving freely between the two cultures, as Villon, Shakespeare or Rabelais did with little difficulty. Those confined solely to popular culture were of course denied this freedom; they knew only one cultural modality and for them it became their whole way of life.

Serious attention to popular culture as a subject worth investigating in its own right hardly goes back more than 200 years. Before this time few people took any notice of it. Even now, much of what is known of earlier periods is known only indirectly, through fragmentary observations, many of which were made by foreigners who undoubtedly missed important local nuances and allusions. The only extant text of 17th-century Russian songs and stories, for example, was made by two English visitors, and much of what is known about the carnivals of Rome and Venice between 1500 and 1800 comes from the description of such outside observers as Montaigne or Goethe.[2]

The first individuals to show a more sustained interest in popular culture at the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries were wholly favorable in their attitude

1. See Peter Burke, *Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe* (New York, 1978), p. 1.
2. Peter Burke, *ibid.*, pp. 65-66.

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toward it. They believed that many of the forms of popular culture were on the verge of disappearing, and they took it upon themselves to collect and preserve the remnants before it was too late. This concern represented the folklorist side of their interests. But more than this, they also asserted — and this had never been argued before — that popular culture was intrinsically *superior* to elite culture because it was far more natural, creative and expressive than the artificial and pseudo-elegant high culture that had lost touch with the people and their "folk soul" (*Volksgeist*). Hence scholars and poets such as Herder, Goerres, Arnim, Brentano, the Grimm brothers, and others became collectors of popular lore for ideological reasons. A sharp distinction was made, in Herder's terms, between the "culture of the educated" (*Kultur der Gelehrten*) and "popular culture" (*Kultur des Volkes*), and the latter was said to be inherently more authentic or "genuine" than the former.

Despite this initially positive interest in popular culture, most discussions of it throughout the 19th century were dominated by middle-class intellectuals who assumed a hostile attitude toward it. Matthew Arnold is a case in point. He spoke for a whole group of like-minded critics when he complained that popular culture was not sufficiently uplifting for modern (bourgeois) tastes. Furthermore, it contracted rather than broadened one's awareness of life since its forms were by definition static and repetitive. Worse yet, popular culture was nothing but stale entertainment; it simply pandered to the commonplace attitudes of the masses and did not present itself as something difficult to obtain. (The middle-class assumption was that all important things must be achieved through struggle, effort, and will.) Nevertheless, one of the fundamental realities of 19th-century life that Arnold tried to address was the fact that social and political power was falling into the hands of the people; somehow they would have to acquire the qualities that would allow them to rule responsibly. This would mean being dedicated and far-sighted, moral and idealistic, restrained and self-controlled. But traditional folk culture did not encourage any of these attributes. Only high culture did that. Consequently, the masses would have to become suffused with what Arnold called the "sweetness and light" of high culture, with "the best that had been thought and known" in the world.[3] By this means, classical culture came to be defined as culture *as such*. Popular culture, by contrast, was considered too low and mean to merit the inferences of elevation the word itself must imply. All of this ultimately led to an important cultural task for Arnold and others like him: namely, to see to it that the standards of high culture replaced the trivialities of popular culture so that the masses would become spiritually fit to exercise power.

However, by the late 19th and early 20th centuries the terms of the discussion changed markedly. Now it was seen that the problem was no longer popular or folk culture in the old sense but an entirely new phenomenon: mass culture. Comparatively speaking, mass culture might seem to be located somewhere between elite and folk culture, but actually it appears to decompose both into a "slushy compost" wherein neither is immediately recognizable on its own terms. Mass culture, so the argument goes, levels and standardizes all value. It does not grow out of life as an autochthonous expression of popular attitudes but is rather imposed upon people. Therefore one's relation to the objects of culture is essentially that of ingesting, taking in, devouring, and not that of really participating in shared, intersubjective meanings except to the extent that these qualities can be obtained by owning and consuming things.[4]

3. See Matthew Arnold, *Culture and Anarchy*, J. Dover Wilson, ed. (Cambridge, 1932).
4. As Raymond Williams put it, culture gradually became something *for* people and not *by*

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The phenomenon of mass culture emerged for several reasons having to do mainly with the standardization of production and the revolution in distribution and marketing. This permitted businessmen who were not themselves cultural creators to enter and even dominate the field of culture strictly for reasons of profit. When this happened, popular culture was turned into commercial culture. As critics like Simmel, Veblen, and Lukacs complained at the time, cultural values were being reduced to monetary ones precisely to the extent that the sphere of culture, which should be autonomous, was collapsing into the sphere of a capitalist money economy.

When the methods of cheap mass production and reproduction finally took hold around the end of the last century, something new appeared in Western cultures that can only be described as *kitsch* — a fabricated, ersatz culture that is forged by technicians and media experts hired by businessmen. Basically, it is designed to satisfy the tastes of that large element of the population that hungers for "culture," but which does not know how to approach it except through its commodity form. *Kitsch* provides for this need by presenting to the masses a vulgarized imitation of high culture. It takes the most appealing elements of what is at hand in the mature cultural traditions and mines them like "an improvident frontiersman, . . . extracting its riches and putting nothing back." It always operates in the only way it knows how, by gimmicks and mechanical formulas, "vicarious experience and faked sensations." Because of its parasitical relationship to both high and popular culture, *kitsch* threatens to destroy all cultural boundaries. And to the extent that it has now become practically a universal culture — "perhaps the first universal culture ever beheld" — it may someday be capable of eliminating all independent sources of value and judgment, just as it is at present slowly defacing autonomous native cultures all over the world. This at least was (and still is) the fear of some of the first observers of this aspect of mass culture in the 20th century.[5]

Despite these developments, mass or popular culture broadly speaking has not often been carefully and critically analyzed. Until relatively recently, those who closely analyzed everyday culture were not critical of it, and those who were critical did not analyze it.

In the first camp must be placed not only Herder and the German Romantics but also, a little later in the 19th century, a number of middle-class writers who, unlike Arnold, were enthusiastic and uncritical supporters of the newly emerging mass culture. They supported it because they saw (correctly) that mass culture, unlike folk or elite culture, was permeated by middle-class tastes, assumptions, and stylized habits of mind which, if widely accepted, would serve as a mode of integrating other classes into the status quo. This was especially true in the realm of print media (newspapers, self-help books, popular novels and romances) which seem to have been major conduits for bourgeois values. To the degree that writers of such works wanted a middle-class worldview to be hegemonic, they not only pushed for the advancement of mass culture by encouraging popular education, the campaign against illiteracy, and free lending libraries. They also defended the whole process of the commodification of

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them. See his "On High and Popular Culture," in *New Republic*, Vol. 171, No. 21 (November 23, 1974), p. 15.

5. My discussion of *kitsch*, including the quotations cited, comes primarily from Dwight McDonald, "Masscult and Midcult," in *Against the American Grain: Essays on the Effect of Mass Culture* (New York, 1965), pp. 3-75; and Clement Greenberg, "Avant-Garde and Kitsch," in *Mass Culture: The Popular Arts in America,* Bernard Rosenberg and David Manning White, eds. (Glencoe, 1959), pp. 98-107.

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culture that was already well under way, that is, they encouraged the notion that "being cultured" meant the possession of cultural goods (what Baudelaire called "the fanaticism of utensils") rather than the possession of diffuse and unquantifiable spiritual qualities, which by now had become an increasingly obsolete and unreliable way to measure the cultural status of an individual.[6]

In the second camp — among those who were critical of culture without actually studying it in detail — the opposite problem existed. The attack on the culture of the age was thoroughgoing, but it was not informed by enough carefully gathered information to make it valid. In the case of conservative critics like Jacob Burckhardt, or more reactionary ones like Paul de Lagarde or Julius Langbehn, the critique was made almost from an Archimedean point outside existence. From this perspective the condemnation of modern culture was total and uncompromising, but at the same time it was largely inaccurate and superficial.

Only now, in the last few decades, has there been an enormous explosion of interest not only in modern mass culture, but in the popular culture of all periods. The best of this work promises, perhaps for the first time, to be at once truly critical and analytical.

There are two reasons for this widespread interest in culture. One has to do with the greater amount of historical material available to work with, which has made it possible to study vast areas of peasant, working-class, and primitive cultures with a thoroughness hitherto unimagined. The other reason for the new focus on culture is ideological. Many critics, particularly on the Left, have begun to argue that it may be at the level of popular culture that a society most firmly and decisively implants its values and maintains the norms it considers desirable (including those of mass conformity and hostility to revolutionary change). If this is so, then more attention would need to be paid to the modalities of cultural life, especially to the processes by which individuals are integrated into the status quo, as well as to possible points of resistance or liberation that might be opened up within the interstices of modern industrial society.

It is only this second approach to popular culture that will be of concern in the following pages. In the space provided here I have chosen to center the discussion on three recent cultural critics: Leo Lowenthal, T.W. Adorno, and Roland Barthes. Each is on the Left to one degree or another, and each has written most if not all of his work on culture since the 1940s. In turning to these figures I intend to keep a single purpose in mind: that of carefully examining the specific methodologies each offers for the study of the configurations of contemporary popular culture. I am not so much interested in the contents of their analyses (although this is obviously important and must be discussed) as I am in their methods and procedures, that is, in *how* they approach their material and in how much what they conclude is shaped by what their methodologies have permitted them to see.

In order to focus more sharply on the major issues, I have concentrated most of my attention on a single, influential work by each author. In the case of Lowenthal it is his *Literature, Popular Culture and Society* (1951), for Adorno *Minima Moralia* (1951) and for Barthes, his *Mythologies* (1957). Nevertheless, when necessary to complete an argument, I have felt free to cite various other works by all three authors.

6. On this see my "Toward a Radical Theory of Culture," in *Radical America*, II, No. 6 (November-December, 1968), pp. 3-5.

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Lowenthal

In order to understand Lowenthal's method, it is first of all necessary to grasp one of his central assumptions. This assumption, almost always implied but rarely directly stated, is simply that man is the center of the social and cultural world he lives in.[7] He is a subject, and as such he creates a world of objects into which he puts his subjectivity. Consequently, these objects are more than mere "things"; they are at the same time containers of subjective feelings, values and meanings. Social and cultural life is therefore stamped and shaped from the outside by the inward attitudes of individuals. Goethe, whom Lowenthal quotes approvingly, summarized this view as follows: "Life lies before us, as a huge quarry lies before the architect: he deserves not the name of architect, except when, out of this fortuitous mass, he can combine, with the greatest economy and fitness and durability, some form, *the pattern of which originated in his spirit*. All things without us. . . are mere elements; but *deep within us lies the creative force*, which out of these can produce what they were meant to be."[8]

Hence things have a double existence. On the one hand they are concrete objects that, though produced by human beings, nevertheless achieve a kind of independent existence from us and can be viewed as autonomous artifacts. On the other hand, they are receptacles of subjectivity, vitally alive with inner meanings projected out of our own "creative force." This implies that objects, if read correctly, could be made to reveal the human subjectivity contained deep within them. It follows, too, that a hermeneutics of objects would become possible whereby one would start with some particular cultural artifact, discover in it the expression of an individual or collective consciousness, and then move from there to the "prevailing value system" that undergirds even this consciousness.[9] The inner essence, the hidden secret, of all cultural things *is* human subjectivity, but even this is shaped at a deeper level by more generalized social values, attitudes and predispositions.

When one raises this same question of subjectivity with reference to contemporary popular or mass culture (Lowenthal seems to use the terms interchangeably), the sources that appear to reveal inward values most adequately are literary materials, including newspapers, novels, popular biographies, family magazines, and book reviews. To Lowenthal, these are the best ciphers available for capturing the symbols, subtle moods and "taken for granted" assumptions that characterize everyday life.[10] In this respect he quotes de Bonald: "Were one to see the literature of a people whose history one does not know, one could tell what this people had been [like]."[11] So much does he focus on written material for clues to cultural attitudes that popular literature almost becomes synonymous with popular culture. But since, as Lowenthal admits, the print media have historically been associated with the middle- and lower-middle class, popular culture is treated as the folk art of the middle class since it is chiefly this stratum that produces and consumes the products of the mass media.[12] The key to

7. This notion is also implicit in the German tradition of *Geisteswissenschaft* going back at least to Dilthey and Simmel. Lowenthal himself has always been closely tied to this tradition and frequently speaks from its point of view, as he has acknowledged on more than one occasion. See his "Humanistic Perspectives on the Lonely Crowd," in *Culture and Social Character*, Seymour M. Lipset and Leo Lowenthal, eds. (Boston, 1957), p. 28.

8. Goethe, cited in Leo Lowenthal, *Literature and the Image of Man* (Boston, 1957), p. 154 (my italics).

9. Leo Lowenthal, "Humanistic Perspectives on the Lonely Crowd," p. 28.

10. Leo Lowenthal, *Literature, Popular Culture, and Society* (Palo Alto, 1961), pp. 144-45.

11. *Ibid.*, p. xi.

12. See *ibid.*, p. xviii; and Leo Lowenthal, "An Historical Preface to the Popular Culture Debate," in *Culture for the Millions?*, Norman Jacobs, ed. (Boston, 1971), pp. 30, 32.

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culture, in other words, is literature, and the key to modern literature is the middle-class ethos that informs it. One looks in vain for any signs of a working class *Weltanschauung* in the literary sources Lowenthal discusses, presumably because mass culture has become middle-class culture and *vice versa*.

For Lowenthal, there are two different kinds of literary materials that can be used to uncover the attitudes embedded in popular culture: the "market-oriented" commodity and the genuine work of art. The former is a good indicator of the "socio-psychological characteristics of the multitude" because it is such an integral part of mass society and therefore exposes "the typical forms of behavior, attitudes, commonly held beliefs, prejudices, and aspirations of a large number of people." Though it may not contain insight or truth, it "cannot be overestimated as [a] diagnostic tool for studying man in contemporary society."[13] The true work of art, however, is even more revealing. As an expression of exceptional creativity and imagination it always breaks through to the essence of things underneath the surface, thereby manifesting the deepest truths of an age (that which "is more real than reality itself"). Great art, by which he means especially literary art, is a barometer not only for the otherwise immeasurable "insecurities and frustrations" of an epoch, but also for the most intimate "hopes, wishes, dreams and fantasies" that animate most individuals within a society.[14] Consequently, the superior work of art becomes Lowenthal's main source for getting a grip on and ultimately critically assessing the basic patterns of cultural life.[15]

One of the reasons that the work of art appears to be so important as a cipher of the age is that it helps Lowenthal bypass a difficult methodological problem. That problem is as follows. In mass society cultural objects are produced, as Raymond Williams has said, not by the people but for them. Therefore disclosing their subjective contents would presumably not reveal autochthonous popular values but rather the imposed values of an entirely different subject, namely the entrepreneurs, media-managers and middle men who have entered the sphere of culture solely for profit. To be sure, they create and distribute "goods" designed for mass consumption and entertainment, but these may have a form, content, and message peculiar to the subjectivity of this clique alone. If there happens to be a perfect fit between the producers of cultural commodities and the population at large, there would be no difficulty. But no one can be sure that this is not the case. Perhaps the cultural entrepreneurs are giving the people something *other* than what they really want, or as Lowenthal put it, taste may be "fed to the consumer as a specific outgrowth of the technological, political, and economics conditions and interests of the masters in the sphere of production."[16] If a value system is in fact being foisted upon the masses through the spread of cultural commodities, it is imperative to know whether these values are actually becoming second nature to most people, or whether they are only lightly received and capable of being cast off at will. Lowenthal recognizes the importance of this issue but does not pursue it in great detail. The implications of his

13. Leo Lowenthal, *Literature, Popular Culture, and Society*, p. xii.

14. *Ibid.*, p. xiv.

15. There is, for Lowenthal, a third approach to the ethos of a culture which cannot be dealt with here. This is to study the *reception* of literary works on the assumption that what a society consumes approvingly must reflect something essential about its tastes and predisposition. For this approach see especially his "The Reception of Dostoevski's Work in Germany, 1880-1920," in *The Arts in Society*, Robert N. Wilson, ed. (New York, 1964), pp. 122-47; and "German Popular Biographies: Culture's Bargain Counter," in *The Critical Spirit: Essays in Honor of Herbert Marcuse*, Kurt Wolff and Barrington Moore, Jr, eds. (Boston, 1967), pp. 267-83.

16. Leo Lowenthal, *Literature, Popular Culture, and Society*, p. 12.

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work would seem to incline toward pessimistic conclusions regarding the ability of people to resist outside cultural forces since he accepts many of Adorno's notions (to be discussed later) concerning the decline of the autonomous individual and the power of a manipulative elite to impose "entire systems of opinion and attitude" on the population it controls.[17]

All these problems Lowenthal partially avoids by focusing his study of culture either on great literary works, which allegedly reflect the true tenor of the age, or on popular literary sources, which do the same though somewhat more superficially. Assuming that the temper of a culture can be known by one method or another, what attitude should one take toward it?

Lowenthal is often ambivalent here. There is a tendency in much of his work simply to describe dispassionately what he finds — to remain, in other words, a neutral observer. This appears especially true of many later essays where he emphasizes the need to broaden academic disciplines by bringing social scientists and humanists together in the investigation of popular culture. Here, in addressing academic colleagues, he seems consciously to speak not as a radical critic but as a "sociologist of literature."[18] In other works, however, Lowenthal displays a much more critical tone, indicating that he thinks it important to go beyond mere description and actually *indict* what he discovers about modern culture and society. One finds this particularly in his *Zeitschrift* articles of the 1930s but also in later pieces like "Terror's Atomization of Man" (1946) or "Historical Perspectives of Popular Culture" (1950). By the 1960s his critical edge appeared to weaken somewhat though it did not disappear. Still, Lowenthal was clearly correct when he pointed out (in 1964) that his early work was more directly "moral" and "political."[19]

These two divergent perspectives create some tension in Lowenthal's work, a tension vaguely resembling the Montaigne-Pascal dispute to which he frequently refers. For Lowenthal, Montaigne represents a position which is sympathetic to the human need for diversion and entertainment and which therefore affirms the configurations of popular culture even when they are not elevating. Any device that helps socialize the individual, according to Montaigne, should be treated in a positive way. Pascal, as Lowenthal views him, takes the opposite position. He strongly condemns popular culture not only because it is banal and wasteful of time but also because it diverts people from their highest goal, the salvation of their souls. Pascal's moral and denunciatory stance toward popular culture has been the dominant one among intellectuals from the 17th century until the present. Lowenthal, however, tries to bridge these two perspectives without fully entering either camp. As a cultural critic, he wants neither to merely "understand" the needs popular culture fulfills and leave it at that, nor to condemn it *tout court*. Both sides need to be acknowledged, though Lowenthal seems to incline somewhat more toward Pascal (though without his extremism) by insisting that the study of culture must be placed in a "moral context" if it is going to be a meaningful undertaking. Furthermore, cultural phenomena must

17. Leo Lowenthal, "Terror's Atomization of Man," in *Commentary*, I, No. 3 (1946), pp. 1-8.

18. See, for example, Leo Lowenthal, "International Information: Research and Policy," in *World Politics*, April, 1958, pp. 438-48; and "Some Problems in the Administration of International Communications Research" (with Margorie Fiske), in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XIV, No. 2 (Summer, 1952), pp. 149-59.

19. Leo Lowenthal, "The Reception of Dostoevski's Work in Germany, 1880-1920," *op.cit.*, p. 124.

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ultimately be judged to some extent if one is to assess either their personal value or their social effects.

How, then, does one judge popular culture in order both to understand it and to take some kind of critical position toward it? Lowenthal suggests several procedures. First, one should start with the given facts of popular culture, just as empirical research does. But from there one should go on to locate these facts in a *moral and aesthetic framework* in order to evaluate them by some transcendent criteria rather than mindlessly accepting them at face value. Second, one must put the facts of popular culture in a *historical context* as well, since every object of culture has to be understood within its historical situation. Third, one then needs to grasp the *social climate* within which the cultural object subsists, including a sense of the audience that appropriates it; what, subjectively speaking, the object means to them; where this audience is in terms of social class; and whether it is a rising or falling class, and what this says about its relation to the cultural object. Here an *iconology* of popular culture would have to be undertaken where not only cultural "things" and their objective social meanings are studied, but also the attitudes and values the things represent to those who have an integral relation with them. Fourth and last, one must interpret cultural phenomena through the filter of an *adequate theoretical framework* which, for Lowenthal, is obviously critical theory, though this is not stated explicitly. Discrete cultural facts need to be mediated through a comprehensive social perspective in order to understand not only what they are, but what they *mean* "within the total process of society."[20] Lowenthal's critique of most American media research is precisely that it lacks such an encompassing perspective and hence cannot see how "objective elements of a social whole are produced and reproduced in the mass media."[21]

By these methods Lowenthal discovers several characteristics about modern popular culture that cannot be gone into here, but which are not that different from many of the conclusions arrived at by the Frankfurt School in general.[22] Nevertheless, his analytical procedures often differ markedly from those developed by another central figure of the school: T.W. Adorno. This is immediately evident if, for purposes of comparison, one examines the methodology that Adorno devised for assessing the character of popular culture.

Adorno

Both Adorno and Lowenthal came from roughly the same German intellectual traditions. Both eventually found their way to the Frankfurt Institute (though Lowenthal did so much earlier than Adorno). And both developed a pivotal interest in literary and aesthetic questions from the beginning of their careers. Nonetheless, in their approaches to culture, they diverged in significant and often striking ways that would be worth recounting briefly.

To begin with, Adorno renounces in nearly all his works any appearance of neutrality. He never identifies himself as a "social scientist," as Lowenthal sometimes

20. Leo Lowenthal, *Literature, Popular Culture, and Society, op.cit.*, p. 11.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

22. For example, he finds in twentieth century Western cultures a loss of a sense of the mythical; a growing mass conformity; a shift in cultural emphasis from production to consumption values; an increasing standardization of life; the "actual elimination of free choice" through the "institutional repetition" in the mass media; an erosion of the capacity to experience; and a "disappearance of the autonomous individual." See Leo Lowenthal, "Terror's Atomization of Man," *op.cit.*, p. 1-8; and "The Triumph of Mass Idols" (chapter IV of *Literature, Popular Culture, and Society,* pp. 109-40).

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does; if anything he sees himself as an artist who uses sociological materials rather than a sociologist who uses artistic material. Therefore, with the mask of objectivity off, Adorno becomes not merely a cultural commentator but an aggressive and even intrusive cultural critic. (Lowenthal could never have written a book, as Adorno did, entitled *Eingriffe — Intrusions.*) The other side of this assertiveness in Adorno is a greater willingness to indulge his subjectivity. In *Minima Moralia* he says that he is writing the book from "the standpoint of subjective experience" — and a "damaged" experience at that.[23] This places him a long way from the usual social scientific approach, but at the same time it gives him an extraordinary amount of freedom that he clearly relishes. For instance, it allows him a reprieve from the normal requirements of form, narrative consistency, or apodictic argumentation. It also permits him to be at will ironic, mannered, playful, hermetic, moody, sardonic or, if he chooses, totally indifferent to his reading audience — all qualities denied Lowenthal when he writes as a sociologist of literature.

This excessive concern with style is another point that separates Adorno from Lowenthal. For Adorno, the main message of a piece is often embedded in its language and form, which partly explains why a work like *Minima Moralia* is so epigrammatic and aphoristic. If language is to be effective, Adorno argues, it must be deviant and disruptive *vis-à-vis* the existing universe of discourse. "Defiance of society includes defiance of its language"[24] — a statement that places him at a far remove from Lowenthal's approach. For Adorno every sentence has to be mediated through the totality of the work, which means that his style is thoroughly dialectical not only in intention but in execution (even within the small frame of a sentence or paragraph). This is the reason for the purposely unreconciled tensions in his style: a style densely packed with both elevated ideas and minute observations, with firm assertions and then the reversal of those assertions. All of this "passion for language" may require a closeness of reading and a capacity to perceive linguistic nuances and ambiguities, which may itself be disappearing (there can be a regression of reading as well as of hearing!). Sometimes Adorno, unlike Lowenthal, seems to be addressing a *gebildeter Stand* which hardly appears to exist anymore. This is unfortunate, because many who might profit from his discussion of popular culture are simply unable to understand him, even with the best intentions.

Adorno and Lowenthal also differ on *how* cultural phenomena reflect the mood of a society or culture. Generally speaking, Lowenthal treats cultural objects (usually literary ones) as ciphers of underlying social processes; hence it is their content that is most important and revealing for him. Adorno, on the other hand, is often more interested in what happens to a cultural object or work after it leaves the hands of its creator and is consequently exchanged, distributed, consumed or reproduced. Here the creator's original meaning (his "intentionality") is distorted if not wholly contraverted, and the cultural meaning of the object becomes something other than the initial meaning given it by the creator ("un-intentional truth"). For Adorno, then, what is most revealing about a cultural commodity is not how its inner content captures prevailing social attitudes, but how *what happens to the object* (including the meaning or use imputed to it) becomes itself the key cipher of the cultural climate of an age.[25]

23. T.W. Adorno, *Minima Moralia*, E.F.N. Jephcott, trans. (London, 1974), p. 18.
24. T.W. Adorno, cited in Martin Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination* (New York, 1973), p. 176.
25. Lowenthal also takes this approach in the two essays cited in footnote 15 above.

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Another divergence in method between Adorno and Lowenthal has to do with what Hans Mayer has called Adorno's "secret hostility toward history."[26] Adorno is adept at pointing out the immediate social origins of certain aspects of popular culture, but little interested in placing them in a historical context. Where Lowenthal occasionally traces a cultural artifact such as a newspaper over a period of time,[27] Adorno is relatively indifferent to this approach. "Universal history must be construed and denied," he once wrote.[28] Lowenthal, especially during his years at the institute, would not have been so sure. The ability to carefully note subtle changes in popular culture through a *durée* is one of Lowenthal's greatest strengths.

Finally, Adorno is unlike Lowenthal in that he continually speaks up for moments of non-identity, however fleeting, and takes every occasion to defend negativity in whatever form he finds it. One of Adorno's purposes in analyzing culture in the first place is to salvage moments of autonomy or radical subjectivity, to vindicate the particular over against the general, to rescue the unassimilated detail, and to redeem all that is rejected or "damaged" in the face of universal standardization. Adorno seems to find the quality of modern life more bleak and unbearable than Lowenthal does, and his call for "negative dialectics" becomes all the more urgent for this reason. Only rarely does one find such strong positions (including prescriptive messages) in Lowenthal's work.

When turning to *Minima Moralia* the differences just mentioned become immediately obvious. The book is composed mainly of *aperçus,* fragmentary observations, and random reflections. Most of these jottings are prompted by the minute and seemingly trivial things of everyday life: an unusual word, the lines of a poem, a cultural object, the interior of a room, or the shoddiness of someone's speech. Then by a process almost of free association, Adorno begins to play with the thing that stimulated his impression, turn it inside out, and assume, where possible, a negative attitude toward it. By these means he is able to draw wholly unexpected implications out of commonly accepted values and assumptions. From here Adorno goes on to examine the texture of popular culture with greater specificity than Lowenthal does. Consequently, he gives more thorough attention than Lowenthal to the meaning both of cultural practices (gift-giving, occultism, tact, conviviality) and of cultural institutions (films, zoos, highways, the residence versus the house, etc.). Nonetheless — though Adorno starts with everyday experience — he quickly assumes a theoretical distance from it, thus creating a dialectical tension between immersion in the concrete and abstraction from it, between exact description and conceptual understanding. As Adorno expressed it: "Nothing less is asked of the thinker today than that he should be at every moment *both within things and outside them.*"[29] This formulation, based upon his views of non-identity, summarizes much of Adorno's approach to culture. Though observable facts are the starting point, he feels compelled to disengage himself from them since "only at a remove from life can the mental life exist and truly engage itself with the empirical."[30]

In one sense, *Minima Moralia* is simply a collection of disparate perceptions and observations, often written in a tone of conservative lament.[31] But a closer reading of

26. Hans Mayer, "Theodor W. Adorno," in *Der Repräsentant und der Märtyrer* (Frankfurt, 1971), p. 165.
27. See his *Literature, Popular Culture, and Society,* pp. 20, 37-38, 48-50, 54-55.
28. T.W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics,* E.B. Ashton, trans. (New York, 1973), p. 320.
29. T.W. Adorno, *Minima Moralia, op.cit.,* p. 74 (my italics).
30. *Ibid.,* p. 126.
31. The nostalgic sense of cultural loss in *Minima Moralia* is unmistakeable. In Adorno's

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the book, combined with a knowledge of other of his works, reveals the structure of a larger argument that goes to the heart of Adorno's approach to culture. This argument may be summarized as follows. There is no "collective constitutive subject" directly perceivable in mass cultural phenomena — no discernible subject, in other words, whose traces can be detected in the objects of popular culture. One of the reasons for this is that subjectivity itself is disappearing in the midst of an increasingly administered, reified world. Modern life simply militates against subjectivity, and in fact is in the process of systematically eliminating it in all its remaining forms. The result is what Adorno alternately calls the "dissolution of the subject" or "the liquidation of the autonomous individual."[32] This is happening because the very grounds on which a real subjectivity might be constructed are themselves eroding: namely, the capacity for genuine experience. Without *Erfahrung* in the deepest sense of the word there can be no individuality, no authentic subjectivity. But under the onslaught of modern mass society, there is a profound "withering of experience" everywhere in contemporary life. People no longer have any conception of what genuine *Erfahrung* is, and lacking this, they are unable to forge a genetic center inside themselves, let alone express it in cultural forms.[33]

If the objects of popular culture do not reflect subjective experience, what do they reflect? Adorno's answer is: administered consciousness, or the manipulated pseudo-experience fabricated by the culture industry. (Lowenthal also acknowledges this to some extent, but never fully explores its implications.) In *Minima Moralia* and other works, Adorno argues that the culture industry has achieved near hegemony over modern consciousness. As the prime shaper of cultural values it implants its own ideological perspective in people's minds for the sake of social control; the result is that popular culture becomes a major instrument of domination. But most people do not seem to recognize that their social and cultural relations are reified. They embrace, and cling to as "theirs," what is inhuman, what in fact "mocks" them.[34] "They make common cause with the world against themselves."[35] Even when the culture industry gives people what they want, it actually gives them what they have already been conditioned to want, and hence it gives them what the cultural manipulators want for them. In Adorno's words: "The culture industry not so much adapts to the reactions of its customers as it counterfeits them. It drills them in their attitudes by behaving as if it were itself a customer.... 'Music does the listening for the listener,' and the film perpetuates on trust-scale the odious trick of grown-ups who, palming something off on children, belabor the recipients with the language it would suit them to hear from them, and present the usually dubious gift with the expressions of lip-smacking delight that they wish to elicit. The culture industry is geared...to

view, the world that is passing away (even if bourgeois) is infinitely preferable to the world coming into existence. Hence his conservative complaints that the "residence" in the traditional sense is disappearing (p. 38); books are not what they used to be (p. 51); intellectual self-discipline is in a state of decomposition since the conditions which made it possible in the past are vanishing (p. 29); civility and gentility have become obsolete, which is why the "ability is lost...to close a door quietly and discretely" (p. 40); casement windows have been replaced by sliding frames, and "gentle latches" have given way to turnable handles, all of which affect the quality of experience (p. 40); the days of ceremony, formal conversation, and social distance are over, which leaves the world open to more directness, vulgarity, and brutality (p. 42). Similar laments pervade the entire book.

32. T.W. Adorno, *Minima Moralia*, pp. 15-17, 63.
33. *Ibid.*, pp. 40, 54-55, 65-66.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 147.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 146.

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anticipate the spectator's imitation of itself, so making it appear as if the agreement already exists which it intends to create."[36]

Though this sort of perspective is suggested by Lowenthal (usually in the form of a "problem" to think about) it is never fully elaborated.[37] The conclusion would seem to be too awesome, namely, that if there is any subjectivity in popular culture it is the subjectivity of the managers of the culture industry, not that of the people who simply appropriate cultural commodities. Adorno *is* willing to accept this conclusion, at least in *Minima Moralia*.[38] Cultural life does seem to him totally manipulated from above, and he condemns this development in the strongest moral and aesthetic terms. For this reason Adorno clearly falls into the Pascalian tradition of uncompromising resistance to the forms and rituals of popular culture, while Lowenthal remains more accepting of many of them.

There is a final point concerning Adorno's perspective on popular culture that needs to be mentioned. Despite his severe critique of modern mass culture, he does not consider all cultural objects hopelessly one-dimensional. The one exception to his blanket condemnation is what he calls the "authentic artwork." In this resides practically his only hope for the future.

Just as Lowenthal makes a distinction between the "market-oriented commodity" and "art," so Adorno makes one between the ordinary "cultural artifact" and the true "artwork."[39] The cultural artifact is simply a product of the culture industry. As such, it is an integral part of existing relations and is capable of nothing more than tying one to society by exactly mirroring its values. In itself it contains no traces of imagination or conceptual thought since its sole function is that of an ideological instrument of social integration. Moreover, a cultural artifact is by its very nature hostile to what is unique or different; it stands permanently for the general against the particular, and is eager to subsume everything that is "angular" into that which is eternally the same.[40]

An "artwork," by contrast, is the product of a true creator who still knows what *Erfahrung* is and who possesses genuine subjectivity that he can objectify in his work. The result is an autonomous expression that stands completely outside the process of rationalization, domination and reification which envelop and destroy the cultural artifact. The artwork can be recognized by the fact that it speaks out against the existing administered world, embodies non-identity, and represents the promise — or anticipation — of something better for the future. For this reason there is a transcendent, Utopian moment in genuine art, but this does not mean that it turns away from the present. On the contrary, it addresses its own age but mainly

36. *Ibid.*, pp. 200-201.

37. One exception to this is his piece on "Terror's Atomization of Man," cited in footnote 17 above.

38. Later he had some reservations. See his "Culture Industry Reconsidered," *New German Critique*, No. 4 (Fall 1975), pp. 12-19.

39. A more elaborate discussion of these distinctions can be found in Richard Wolin, "The De-Aestheticization of Art: On Adorno's *Aesthetische Theorie*," *Telos*, No. 41 (Fall 1979), pp. 105-128; and Russell Berman, "Adorno, Marxism and Art," *Telos*, No. 34 (Winter 1977-1.78), ppp. 157-168.

40. The picture of mass culture depicted here is bleaker than Adorno sometimes indicates. In places he leaves room for the possibility of negation and non-identity emerging from *within* the frame of popular culture, not just from the higher qualities of the autonomous work of art. See, for instance, T.W. Adorno, "Sociology and Empirical Research," in *Critical Sociology* (New York, 1978), pp. 252-257; Martin Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination*, pp. 180, 188, 192; and Andreas Huyssen, "Introduction to Adorno," *New German Critique*, No. 4 (Fall 1975), pp. 3-11.

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negatively: by focusing on the ruptures, dissonances, disjunctures and even absences that are part of contemporary life but which the culture industry has a vested interest in hiding. As Adorno put it: "A successful work. . . is not one which resolves objective contradictions in a spurious harmony, but one which expresses the idea of harmony negatively by embodying the contradictions, pure and uncompromised, in its innermost structure."[41]

On the surface, then, Lowenthal and Adorno make somewhat similar distinctions between the work of art and the cultural commodity, but the use they make of these distinctions is noticeably different. Lowenthal treats the artwork primarily as a cipher to better perceive the configurations of popular culture, whereas Adorno is more interested in the foreward projections it may contain — in its anticipatory possibilities and its ultimate promise of redemption.

Barthes

With Barthes' *Mythologies* one immediately finds oneself on an entirely new terrain. His starting point is not the Frankfurt School, nor any part of the Germanic tradition that informs the work of Lowenthal and Adorno. It is rather semiology and structural linguistics (especially as derived from Saussure), and this fact has repercussions on all aspects of his treatment of popular culture. Barthes is, for example, opposed to any type of *Verstehung* methodology; he takes objects exactly as they present themselves, and does not try to penetrate into them in order to discover their alleged "true core." A cultural artifact is nothing more than what it appears to be. There is simply no other reality hidden inside of it.

Similarly, Barthes is noticeably a-historical. Tracing the durational pattern of a cultural object may be interesting, but in his view it adds little to our knowledge of things as they are now. Consequently, his approach to culture is synchronic rather than diachronic. Everything worth exploring in popular culture can be understood horizontally by studying the lateral relations that define and in fact *constitute* cultural objects. Since these relations envelop everything in contemporary experience, the sharp distinctions between high and popular culture (so important for Lowenthal and Adorno) all but disappear in Barthes' work. If anything, the direct study of popular culture is more revealing precisely because this culture is at once so superficial and so ubiquitous. The analysis of the surface codes of things draws one immediately into the "actual praxis" and the manifest "structural patterns" of an age, and it is on this level that the major cultural modalities of a system most clearly reveal themselves.[42]

In terms of personal background, Barthes likewise comes from a different milieu than the other two. Lowenthal's origins lay in literature and literary sociology so it was natural for the "written word" to become his primary medium for the study of culture.[43] Adorno's background lay more in music, especially the a-tonal, modernist

41. T.W. Adorno, *Prisms*, trans. Samuel and Shierry Weber (London, 1967), p. 32.

42. On this point see Hayden White, "Structuralism and Popular Culture," *Journal of Popular Culture*, No. 7 (1974), p. 771.

43. This may have created in Lowenthal some biases regarding the reflective power of literary documents that need to be questioned. What if the values embedded in literary works do not in fact mirror the underlying attitudes of society? If this were the case, Lowenthal's method would be considerably weakened. George L. Mosse, for one, has argued just that. In his view, the whole spectrum of "German popular literature — the literature read in the millions before and after 1914 — [was]. . .liberal, tolerant, philo-semitic" while the real mood of the country was moving in the opposite direction. To judge German culture by its literature would therefore be to receive an incorrect impression of what was happening. See George L. Mosse, *Nazism* (New Brunswick, 1978), p. 34.

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neue Musik of the 1920s. This gave him the leeway to play down the privileged status of language as an index to popular culture. For him language became, as one commentator put it, "merely one of several available codes of imparting meaning."[44] Barthes' origins, by contrast, are rooted not only in linguistics and semiology but also in the theater (in his youth he was an actor and later a theater critic). This perhaps partially explains his fascination with outward forms, appearances, gestures, and illusions — all of which seem to have had some effect on his method of analyzing popular culture.

Barthes' method is interesting to observe in light of what has already been said about Lowenthal and Adorno. He begins by immersing himself in the immediacy of everyday culture, at least as much as Adorno does. (In *Mythologies*, for instance, he engages in detailed discussions of the cultural meanings of toys, wrestling matches, margarine, soap commercials, cars, beefsteak and french fries, and the like.) But Barthes does not attempt to "judge" these things as Adorno does, but merely to explicate or interpret them. He considers his job done when he has first described the structural relations that bind cultural objects together, and second, when he has reconstructed the relevant codes and values that constitute the system of cultural communications within which everyone lives. To be sure, Barthes is opposed to the modern capitalist society whose culture he analyzes in *Mythologies*. His sympathies are leftist (though only vaguely Marxist) and he betrays a strong dislike for the "petty bourgeois" attitudes and "received opinions" that pervade modern commercial culture. Nevertheless, methodologically he claims to operate from no privileged position from which he would be qualified to pass judgment on anything. His task, as he sees it, is not to polemicize but simply to make the world *intelligible* through cultural analysis. After the world has been "understood," some sort of *praxis* might follow, but he never says exactly how and assumes no responsibility for it. This curiously irresponsible attitude may partly explain Barthes peculiar literary style, which, in comparison to Lowenthal and Adorno, is extraordinarily playful, seductive, and full of *jouissance*. The sensuous pleasure he takes in writing is obvious. With the exception of only one work,[45] he never expresses himself in a heavy-handed way as Adorno sometimes does. In this respect Susan Sontag appears correct in saying that perhaps Barthes' deepest impulses are celebratory and not combative. Even in his critical work, he often assumes more of an amorous than a disputatious relationship toward his material.[46]

When one turns from Barthes' style to his overall approach to culture, several points stand out. Most immediately noticeable is the fact that he rejects the validity of the search for a subject hidden behind or within objects. To Barthes, the concept of a subject is "merely an effect of language."[47] There is, for him, no congealed subjectivity locked inside of things which can be released through the right kind of hermeneutic interpretation. Instead, things are only "a constellation of interactions without a specific origin."[48] The very notion of subjectivity needs to be thrown out

44. See the review of his *Noten zur Literature* in the *Times Literary Supplement*, Feb. 16, 1962; cited in George Lichtheim, "Adorno," *From Marx to Hegel* (New York, 1974), p. 137.

45. That work is his *Système de la Mode* (Paris, 1967), a study of the language of fashion written in practically impenetrable jargon.

46. Susan Sontag, "Remembering Barthes," *The New York Review of Books,* May 15, 1980, p. 21.

47. Roland Barthes, *Roland Barthes*, trans. Richard Howard (New York, 1977), p. 79.

48. This apt phrase is Martin Jay's, though not in reference to Barthes. See Martin Jay, "The Concept of Totality in Lukacs and Adorno," *Telos*, No. 32 (Summer 1977), p. 132.

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along with the two assumptions on which it rests: essentialism and expressivism. Essentialism is the supposition that there is an essence behind every appearance, an interior to every exterior, a content to every form; it is the assumption that no surface can exist without an inward presence to which it is reciprocally related, even if this is not obvious at first sight. Expressivism is a parallel belief that everything in the social world contains human intentions, i.e., that all cultural things are objectifications of some kind of active, expressive individual or collective will. Barthes denies these two premises that have sustained so much German thought since Hegel. Instead, he accepts the world exactly as it is, even in its reified state. The very concept of reification makes sense only on the basis of the two terms just mentioned. But since Barthes rejects both of them, he also rejects the use of reification as an automatic indictment of contemporary social reality (because it has allegedly "forgotten" its essence, its human origins, its true subjectivity, etc.).[49]

In place of the search for the subjectivity behind things, Barthes substitutes the analysis of the "language" of the things themselves, entirely apart from their genetic origins. This project implies studying the semiological codes of objects, or what they signal laterally in reference to other objects in a system. The system is the cultural world as a whole, that is, modern capitalist society. But Barthes approaches this society not as an economic but as a communications system held together by mutually signalling objects, all reinforcing one another. Cultural "meanings" within this system are grasped when one understands first of all the structural, syntactical relations that exist between things; second, the significations things emit by virtue of their place or function within the code; and third, how these significations are *perceived* by a public which relates to cultural goods on the basis of their imagined symbolic value. In this regard, the physical reality of a cultural commodity is not as important as how it is read. Things are only texts "infinitely citing one another."[50] Their surfaces alone really matter since in practical terms a culture operates on the level of "significations apart from their contents."[51] Where Adorno attempts a "physiognomy of appearances" (in that he tries to point out the relations between outward form and underlying process), Barthes might be said to attempt a phenomenology of appearances — that is, a pure description of cultural messages confined to the realm of the forms alone.[52]

49. It is true that in *Système de la Mode,* Barthes admits that "fashion" may be created by the people who control the media. This would be in line with Adorno and Lowenthal. But, unlike them, Barthes does not attempt to define this group or hypothesize about its intentions, interests, or general worldview. See Philip Thody, *Roland Barthes: A Conservative Estimate* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1977), p. 109. This is because once the cultural objects or values that this group creates get circulated, they live a life of their own, and communicate other (and perhaps more important) messages than those represented by the individuals who originated them. This is of course exactly opposite the approach of Adorno, who believes that one cannot understand modern culture unless one understands the values and intentions of the media manipulators who have left a decisive stamp on contemporary mass culture.

50. Roland Barthes, *Image-Music-Text,* trans. Stephen Heath (New York, 1977), p. 168.

51. Roland Barthes, *Mythologies,* trans. Annette Lavers (New York, 1972), p. 111.

52. In this he also differs markedly from Lowenthal. This is perhaps most evident in the one case where they both did careful studies of magazine articles. Lowenthal's was a "content analysis" of the biographies in the *Saturday Evening Post* and *Collier's* between 1940 and 1941, and Barthes' was an investigation of four fashion magazines — *Elle, Vogue, Le Jardin des Modes,* and *L'Echo de la Mode* — during a six-month period in the 1950s. See Lowenthal, "The Triumph of Mass Idols," *op.cit.,* pp. 109-140; and Barthes, *Système de la Mode* (Paris, 1967). In Lowenthal's study, the focus was on the attitudes that underlay the stories in the articles; his assumption was that the values contained in the stories mirrored the values of American society at

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Though appearances become his main focus, Barthes is nonetheless sure that these appearances speak not one but *two separate languages*. This notion becomes perhaps the central motif of his mode of cultural criticism.

The first language communicated by cultural objects Barthes calls the "primary system." It contains the manifest content of the code, the message strictly as it appears to be in its "apparent literalness." Here soap is simply soap, margarine nothing but margarine, and toys nothing more than toys. They present themselves exactly as they are, and denote all the things directly associated with their function in the system. But attached to the primary system of communication is a parasitical "secondary system" that harbors a latent message that is both ideological and "cynical." This system speaks, too, but *sotto voce*. It slips its meanings across by the "duplicity" of leaning on the primary system in disguised ways. Its discourse is therefore a "false discourse" that needs to be exposed, since it is by means of this imposition that the cultural values of modern society get circulated and internalized. The task of cultural criticism is to decipher this spurious language, make its grammar and syntax intelligible, and thereby help dismantle the system of myths that prevail in bourgeois society. Precisely such a science of false discourse is what Barthes undertakes in *Mythologies*.[53]

The book contains numerous examples of this kind of analysis. Barthes demonstrates, for example, how French wines mean one thing just by being wines; but they also communicate a second network of meanings in support of a mythology concerning the supremacy of the French 'race" and the superiority of the French way of life.[54] Likewise the new Citroën is simply a late-model car, but it is also a triumph of tactile signalling leading to a subtle but elaborate commercial aesthetics for the masses.[55] Toys, too, are more than playthings; in both their functions and their substances they prefigure the adult world to which the child is shrewdly taught to adjust.[56] Even the picture of a black soldier in military uniform on the cover of *Paris-Match* becomes the subject of Barthes' analysis. The soldier has his eyes uplifted and is saluting the tricolor. At first glance the immediate message is: a young black soldier is giving the French salute. But there is a second, surreptitious message: "that France [in 1954] is a great empire, that all her sons, without any color discrimination, faithfully serve her flag, and that there is no better answer to the detractors of French colonialism than the zeal shown by this Negro in serving his so-called oppressors."[57]

Only semiology, Barthes thinks, can provide a thoroughgoing methodology for explicating the second crucial message. If used critically it can show, first of all, how hidden values are grafted onto the primary system of meaning, and second, how these values are then unwittingly appropriated by cultural consumers. The result of such an appropriation is, of course, that the central attitudinal patterns of bourgeois society — what Barthes calls the *doxa*: the fixed ideas and assumptions, the "all-that-goes-without-saying" in a culture — gets solidified and permanently

large. Barthes, on the other hand, did a semiology of the codes of fashion by focusing mainly on pictures rather than stories. He did not actually deal with fashion as such, but with the way it talked about itself, i.e., with its language, and how this language was then read by the fashion-minded public. Both methods yielded significant insights, but the first was based on a *Verstehen* approach and the second on a structuralist one.

53. This facet of Barthes' methodology is discussed more extensively in *Mythologies*, pp. 117-137.

54. *Ibid.*, pp. 58-61.

55. *Ibid.*, pp. 88-90.

56. *Ibid.*, pp. 53-55.

57. *Ibid.*, p. 116.

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embedded in everyday life. What are, or should be, transitory values are being turned into eternally valid meanings by certain forces within contemporary society which have a vested interest in this deception. On this point, at least, Lowenthal, Adorno and Barthes would all agree. What are in fact historically evolving forms in popular culture are, in their view, increasingly presented as natural and timeless truths — truths as incontrovertible as nature itself. The only way this illusion can be dispelled is through cultural criticism. Though none of the three claims to know exactly how a radical praxis (what Barthes calls a "language of action") might evolve out of a critique, they all agree that modern culture has to be more fully interpreted and understood before it can be fundamentally transformed. All would acknowledge, therefore, that Marx's Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach might need to be reformulated to some extent, since the power of popular culture to perpetuate false consciousness has turned out to be much greater than Marx ever imagined when writing in the 1840s.

Conclusions

Each of the three approaches discussed here is valid on its own terms, and each is useful to the extent that it provides significant, critical knowledge about the processes of modern culture. However, each approach has its own peculiar strengths and weaknesses, which, by way of conclusion, it might be helpful to summarize.

The great advantage of Lowenthal's method, as has been pointed out, is his historical perspective. More than Adorno or Barthes, Lowenthal is able to explain how and why cultural norms emerge at one point and vanish at another because of his facility in tracing the rise and fall of values or institutions over time. Perhaps there is no other way to determine what is authentic or inauthentic in a culture except from a comparative-historical point of view. Though Barthes also strives to expose the disingenuousness of contemporary culture (e.g., in his attempt to show that what is seen as fixed and eternal is actually fleeting and relative), he does not succeed very well because his synchronic method and his indifference to history make it difficult for him to prove his case.

If providing an invaluable historical context for his discussion of culture is Lowenthal's finest virtue, he also has what may be a major shortcoming. He does not convincingly establish why literary texts in particular hold the key to unlocking the dominant attitudes of popular culture. It is possible that literature mirrors only a small portion of what goes on in a culture, and maybe a misleading portion at that. If this were true, then all of Lowenthal's ability at finding social meanings in literary works and explicating them with finesse would miss the point if literary culture is not synonymous with or even very indicative of the cultural tone that inheres in the non-literary realms of society as a whole.

Adorno's great strength, in comparison with Lowenthal, is his *theory* of culture. Though only alluded to above, Adorno's speculations about culture are far more radical and audacious (also more all-encompassing and totalizing) than Lowenthal's. For this reason they may also be more fundamentally erroneous in several respects, especially in the theoretical formulations found in a work like his *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. Nonetheless, Adorno's theory of culture is crucially important for all his work because it provides the necessary framework within which the individual details make sense. Without the theory, the disparate parts (for example, all the apparently unrelated observations in *Minima Moralia*) would not cohere, and in fact would appear quite meaningless by themselves. Only Adorno's theoretical power — or rather the dialectic he establishes between the particular and the general, the part and

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the whole — holds his cultural criticism together and gives it force and integrity. With the passage of time, much of Lowenthal's work on popular culture will probably be able to stand by itself, due to the care he takes in substantiating his analysis through painstaking research. But this may not be the case with Adorno. The bulk of his comments on modern culture might ultimately stand or fall solely on the merits of the theory that undergirds them. The difference between the two is that, for Lowenthal, theory merely informs his work but does not carry it, while for Adorno theory suffuses the details to such an extent that they have no independent life of their own apart from the framework that sustains them. If Adorno's theory of culture were rejected *in toto*, many of the random observations he supplies in support of it would become merely subjective curiosities.

In some ways, Barthes' approach to culture is the most interesting of the three. It also seems to provide the most promising guidelines for future work, perhaps because the semiological method is relatively new, and the entire range of its critical power has yet to be fully explored. Still, there are serious drawbacks to Barthes' approach, some of which have already been pointed out. For one thing, Barthes operates for the most part in an "atemporal matrix," and this practically eliminates any sensitivity to historical dialectics. For another, he makes no effective use of the concept of reification and therefore deprives himself of an invaluable tool of critical analysis. Too easily he reduces everything to surface codes alone, and then often becomes enraptured, almost in spite of himself, by the very "play of signifiers" he sets out to criticize.

In the same way that he abandons reification he also revokes ontology. In Barthes' work most ontological questions are replaced by questions of function,[58] just as the problematic of essence is replaced by the problematic of relation. This may be one reason why Barthes is excellent at de-construction but weak in sensing how things should be. In all his writings on culture he suggests no alternatives to the given and projects no ideals — not even ideals expressed negatively in the manner of Adorno.

Finally, although Barthes is aware of the steady diminution of the individual in modern society, he does not seem to notice that his method partly reinforces this tendency. In his view, the individual does not create culture, the culture creates the individual (just as the language speaks the speaker, and the text creates the author). Everyone enters at birth, and is subsequently locked into a pre-existent communication system that one is helpless to change significantly, though variations can be played out on the code. In this conception there is little room for self-initiation. The system itself shapes (or provides the boundaries for) the interactions of its members, and there is not even a genuine subjectivity to fall back upon. In Barthes' words, subjectivity is merely "the wake of all the codes that constitute me, so that my subjectivity has ultimately the generality of stereotypes."[59] This is precisely what Adorno feared was happening in mass society, and what he described as the dissolution of the autonomous individual. Not only is Barthes not disturbed by this, but he finds it attractive and liberating, so long as some social space is left for play and imagination — for a kind of personal *parole* within a larger *langue*.

On the whole, Barthes' semiological method, like any other method, gives him insights into some aspects of modern culture while blinding him to other, equally important, aspects. It allows him, for instance, to explain relations of sequence,

58. On this see Denis Donoghue, "French Structuralist Theories," *Partisan Review*, 47:3 (1980), p. 401.

59. Barthes, cited in *ibid.*, p. 401.

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contiguity, and function, but it hinders him in explaining those of generation, development or transition (relations, incidentally, that Lowenthal is far more skilled at explaining). The most hopeful new directions for the study of popular culture may lie in a fusion of these two divergent approaches — semiology and critical theory — since both are needed for sound critical analysis. The beginnings of such a fusion are now being elaborated by such critics as Lefebvre, Eco, Baudrillard, and others. But the theoretical starting point for much of this new work lies in the earlier efforts of the three critics discussed in this essay.

THE FADED BLUE FLOWER OF ROMANTICISM: LOWENTHAL ON EARLY GERMAN ROMANTICISM*

by W. Martin Lüdke

"All men should become
capable of ruling." — *Novalis*

It can also be seen this way: with a soaring flight, apparently weightless they took off, in a neck-rising act that — as one could expect — ended in a mighty plunge. Wherever Romanticism had appeared, so enthusiastic, exuberant, eloquent and firmly linked with the contradictions of its time, it put on a different face: through the lobbies of power it landed on the back steps of history. This much can be gathered from the biography of Romantic poets and thinkers. After setting out for new horizons they very soon reached the lowlands of monotony. The "holy revolution" found its quick end in the profane haze of Prussian and Austrian reaction.

Of course, one suspects that this end was not accidental and that the late development of German Romanticism was already contained in its early beginnings. According to the Marxian insight that the anatomy of the ape can be explained only by man's anatomy, it can be assumed that the way the Romantic movement ended was the inevitable outcome of the development of its own innermost tendencies.

Here, the parallel with the French Revolution is striking. What became a powerful historical reality in France in 1789 petered out impotently in Germany — that fragmented community that was not really a community, but a heap of principalities, free imperial cities, counties and kingdoms, a grumpy cluster of petty states, pressed by pure necessity to ever higher spheres of the mind.

In the *Critique of the Hegelian Philosophy of Right*, Marx accurately described this state of affairs: "When I see the German conditions in 1843, I stand according to the French calendar barely in the year 1789, far less in the focus of the present. Yes, German history boasts of a movement which no nation in the historical sky can either display or care to imitate. For we have shared the restoration of modern nations without having a share in their revolutions. We were restored, first, because other nations dared a revolution, and secondly, because other nations suffered a restoration, the first because our masters were afraid and the second because they had no fear. We,

*Translated by David J. Parent.

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and our shepherds at the top, found ourselves in the society of freedom only once, on the day of its burial."[1] It is unlikely, however, that the Romantics (Novalis and Tieck, the Schlegel brothers, or Schleiermacher) were such "shepherds at the top": torchbearers of reaction who shifted the German revolution inward, transfering chaos into thoughts and, with resounding words, forcefully imposing the restorative order into social reality. In a fragment of *Pollen,* Novalis writes: "The mysterious path leads inward; eternity, with its worlds, past and future, is in us or nowhere."

In the third volume of his *History of the Most Recent Poetry and Philosophy,* Arnold Ruge writes: "I call our Romantics the writers who oppose the Age of Enlightenment and Revolution with the means of our culture and who condemn and combat the principles of self-satisfied humanity in the field of science, art and ethics."[2] In the tradition of Hegel and equally severe, Ruge's verdict hits the Romantics, but it also misses the mark. German Romanticism, especially early Romanticism, is and remains a paragon of critique of ideology.

But Romanticism is hard to grasp. Even the distinction between early and late Romanticism (to counterbalance the already mentioned names with a few others: Brentano, von Arnim, Chamisso, Eichendorff, E.T.A. Hoffmann) is burdened with all the difficulties typical of every historical periodization — especially if it remains on the level of mere literary history. Boundaries fluctuate and are hard to establish. In the case of Romanticism, there is another difficulty: i.e., the problem of first determining what Romanticism is. There are countless contradictory definitions that in part coincide, complement one another or overlap, stressing and isolating individual aspects. "There is something indefinite about this word," writes Giovanni Papini, "but when we are dealing with great phenomena, tremendous movements, nothing is more precise than an indefinite word." Of course, this leaves the wolf to tend the sheep, or raises the problem to the level of the solution. This confusion can be readily found in a volume that is part of a series calling itself "Paths of Research" [*Wege der Forschung*]. Right in the introduction, Helmut Prang, the editor, concedes that "even this large number of clever observations and important particulars contributes but little to a final definition of the concepts of 'Romanticism' and 'Romantic.' Even if one professes that in science it is often more a question of posing stimulating questions than of answering them, still in this case we are left with an uneasy feeling of dissatisfaction and bewilderment toward a phenomenon called 'Romanticism' by many people, learned and unlearned, and concerning which almost everyone has a different idea."[3]

Wherever the theoretical or, more generally, the methodological differences may lie, most available definitions (and their confusion) harks back to an idealistic understanding of literature and literary history. Thus, in the foreword to his two-volume study of *The Romantics,* Friedrich Gundolf writes: "The title of the book designates the common ground of these five essays: they stemmed from a unified view of all Romanticism and should be understood in terms of this unity. But historical movements seem to me understandable only in and by men, their creators, agents and victims, not in methodical exercises or self-satisfied intellectual tasks, which use real beings as reaction or only as metronomes."[4] So Paul Kluckhohn, in his book on *German Romanticism,* writes at about the same time, as a comment on the limitation

1. Karl Marx, *Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie, Einleitung,* in *MEW,* Vol. 1 (Berlin, 1969), p. 379ff.
2. Quoted in *Romantik in Dutschland,* R. Brinkmann, ed. (Stuttgart, 1978), p. 22.
3. *Begriffsbestimmung der Romantik,* H. Prang, ed. (Darmstadt, 1972), p. 1.
4. F. Gundolf, *Romantiker,* Vol. 1 (Berlin, 1930).

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of a few competing definitions, that "Romantic in the narrow or strict sense designates just a temporally fixed and determinate movement or trend of German cultural life, which could also practically be called the Romantic School and which stems from the strong influence of a very few personalities."[5]

Even René Wellek, much later, still says: "But on the whole there really was no misunderstanding about the meaning of 'Romanticism' as a new designation for that literature which turned against Classicism and found its inspiration and model in the period from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance. That is how the word is understood throughout Europe, and everywhere we find references to August Wilhelm Schlegel or Madame de Staël and their particular formulations in which 'classical' is opposed to 'romantic.' "[6]

Only in this context can one appreciate Lowenthal's achievement. Lowenthal is one of the founders of a sociology of literature that should not simply be ranked in the series of specialized sociologies such as sociology of medicine, of sport, of business, etc. In Lowenthal's sense, sociology of literature means to explicate the social concept of the object.

Always committed to the Hegelian procedure of determinate negation, Lowenthal's critique is not external to the object, but internal to it. He shows how in traditional analyses of literature the object of investigation is first uncritically isolated and then, consequently, simplified: "Authors and works are detached from the historical implications and constructed into a unity of some kind from which the stream of multiplicity flows off; they gain a dignity of which other phenomena cannot boast."[7] Authors and works are elevated to a higher realm of being, separated from social processes and detached from all references essential to their historical understanding. If Kluckhohn — at that time a reputable Germanist — understands German Romanticism as a temporally limited trend of German cultural life and traces it back to the influence of a very few personalities, if Gundolf, who comes from the George school and was one of the most important Germanists of the first half of the century, can recognize the unified overall feature of Romanticism only in and by man, i.e., ultimately also wanting to ascribe it to the strong influence of some personalities, then it is clear that the isolation and simplification of his object of study was part of the literary historian's daily routine. Kluckhohn's and Gundolf's works date back to the time of Lowenthal's first studies in the sociology of literature. Wellek's bold thesis that every misunderstanding of Romanticism is out of the question because the opposition to Classicism and the medieval inspiration provided sufficient limiting criteria shows once again how little a history of literature limited to its own resources can explain even its own problems. "To study the history of literature," Lowenthal writes, "means to explain literature historically. Its possibility of explanation presupposes a developed theory of history and society."[8] In terms of specialized academic disciplines organized under a division of labor, this is a demanding program, overtaxing every individual scholar working by himself. Fortunately, the concept of social truth is not bound to the contingent capacity of individual scholars. The Institute for Social Research, the headquarters, as it were, of the Frankfurt School, took this circumstance into account in the organization of its work, which can be detected in the Institute's organ, the

5. P. Kluckhohn, *Die deutsche Romantik* (Bielefeld & Leipzig, 1924), p. 2.
6. R. Wellek, *Grundbegriffe der Literaturkritik* (Stuttgart, 1965), p. 110.
7. L. Lowenthal, "Zur gesellschaftlichen Lage der Literatur," in *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung,* Vol. 1 (1932), p. 86.
8. *Ibid.,* p. 92ff.

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Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. In the Institute, under the directorship of Max Horkheimer, scholars from the most diverse disciplines worked together at a critical theory of society. Many of the collaborators later became famous: Horkheimer and Adorno as philosophers and sociologists, Fromm as a psychologist, Marcuse as a social theorist, and last but not least, Lowenthal as a sociologist of literature.

This work concerning a theory of society — a concept of the social whole — always remained connected with individual disciplines. "That does not mean," Lowenthal later writes, "that one has to deal with just any connections between poetry and society, nor that we must speak quite in general of social conditions needed so that such a thing as literature can exist at all, but the historical explanation of literature has the task of investigating what particular social structures are expressed in the individual work and what function the individual work fills in society."[9]

This program already contains an intrinsically social concept of literature that does not contrapose artworks and society. Rather, they are understood as already intrinsically mediated. It finally becomes possible to grasp even the most formal aspects of aesthetic form in their social constitution. "Art is," as Adorno later said, "the social antithesis to society, not directly deducible from it."[10] Thus, the autonomous artwork, the hermetically sealed structure that consciously and completely rejects every society, can be deciphered as the product of social development.

However, as Lowenthal says: "Every 'social' science that appeals to the autonomy or at least the autonomous interpretability of social superstructures violates the field of human socialization. Literary history as mere cultural history can in principle make no binding statements, though in practice the talent and empathy of the literary historian have made valuable contributions. A genuine explanatory literary science, however, must be materialistic."[11] Thus, the "task of literary history" is, to a "great extent, ideological research," i.e., critique of ideology.[12] Not accidentally, in his compendious introduction to the reprint of the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung,* Alfred Schmidt characterizes Lowenthal's work as the "expression of a concrete critique of ideology."[13]

It may be useful here to provide at least a few basic traits of the concept of ideology, as it was developed by the Frankfurt School and applied in Lowenthal's studies. For things are hardly better with ideology than with Romanticism. Everyone understands by it whatever he wants to. The concept of ideology in Critical Theory is clearly different from that of Diamat in "socialist" countries. Dialectical materialism understands by ideology all spiritual phenomena and therefore even itself. Also, in contrast with Mannheim's concept of ideology, which describes "everywhere the connection between the situation of social reality and perception," i.e., likewise classifies all knowledge as ideology, the concept of ideology in Critical Theory relates to the Marxian critique of political economy, and ideology is therefore understood as socially necessary appearance.

"As objectively necessary and, at the same time, false consciousness, as the interconnection of truth and falsehood, which is separated as much from complete truth as from sheer lie, ideology belongs, if not just to the modern, at any rate to a developed

9. *Ibid.*
10. T.W. Adorno, *Aesthetische Theorie* (Frankfurt, 1970), p. 19.
11. L. Lowenthal, *op.cit.*, p. 93.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 95.
13. *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* (Munich, 1980), p. 38.

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urban market economy."[14] Ideology is thus the product of a particular mode of production, i.e., that of bourgeois capitalism. Critical Theory's concept of ideology thus combines the insights of the Marxian critique of political economy with Lukacs' ideas in *History and Class Consciousness* — especially in the section on reification — and applies them to analyze a society still in need of justification. "For ideology is justification. It presupposes both the experience of an already problematic social condition that needs defending and also the idea of justice itself, without which such an apologetic necessity would not exist. Its model is the exchange of comparable values. Where mere direct power relations exist [e.g., in fascism, or in archaic societies, or in part also in the Middle Ages] there are really no ideologies."[15]

Where falsehood is total, where domination appears without any semblance of legitimation, no element of truth, which is contained in every ideology, can be distinguished. "Consequently, the critique of ideology, as the confrontation of ideology with its own truth, is possible only insofar as ideology contains a rational factor on which critique can work." Critique of ideology thus follows a dialectical logic. "It is determinate negation in a Hegelian sense, confrontation of the spiritual with its realization, and presupposes both the distinction of truth and falsehood in the judgement and the claim to truth in the criticized content."[16]

Ruge's verdict on Romanticism is still identified with the widely-held opinion that "Romantic" and "reactionary" are synonymous, that Romanticism resisted the Enlightenment and thereby social progress. This seems to be the reason for Claus Träger's point of view in his "Origins and Setting of Romanticism." Träger finds it necessary to devote much effort to the idea that Romanticism must under no circumstances be "just left alone on the right."[17] Especially in a tradition of criticism that rests on materialist theory — beyond Hegel — it seems difficult to abandon the concept of linear progress and thereby to carry out a critique of ideology. Those who dismiss Romanticism in general miss the very point of the critique of ideology in terms of the distinction between true and false, progress and regression, critique and affirmation. In his study *Erzählkunst und Gesellschaft*, Lowenthal, on the other hand, describes German Romanticism as a "repressed revolution," and thus develops a rigorous model of critique of ideology.

Against Arnold Ruge's one-sided critique of Romanticism as anti-revolutionary and anti-Enlightenment, Lowenthal begins by describing Romanticism as a bourgeois movement. From this viewpoint, it becomes possible to explain the gaps and contradictions, anticipations and confusions, or even to recognize them. Further, Lowenthal distinguishes between political and literary Romanticism in addition to early and late Romanticism.

Thus, Lowenthal claims that Romantic literature has little to do with such political trends as fostered by Schlegel — in the context of Metternich's policies. In judging Romanticism, he finds it vital to keep bourgeois interests separate from those of feudal absolutism — although the two are often interwoven. "For political Romanticism, the central concern is the inviolability of the status quo. Bourgeois Romantic literature, however, simply ignores this contemporary reality, because bourgeois consciousness sees in it no opportunity to develop."[18] Lowenthal also sees dialectical elements that

14. T.W. Adorno and W. Dirks, eds., *Soziologische Exkurse, Frankfurter Beiträge zur Soziologie*, Vol 4 (Frankfurt, 1956), p. 168.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 168.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 169.
17. *Weimarer Beiträge*, No. 2 (1975), p. 37.
18. L. Lowenthal, *Erzählkunst und Gesellschaft* (Darmstadt & Neuwied, 1971), p. 69.

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bridge this social resignation in artistic Romanticism. Not only are the Romantics' biographies contradictory, but so is their work as well as their epoch. Although bourgeois society had progressed out of feudalism and established itself through the French Revolution, in Germany it was still tied to circumstances more related to the late Middle Ages than to the modern era. Lowenthal outlines three routes the German bourgeoisie could take out of this: while Lessing, the most radical, translated the social conflict into theater, and Goethe harmonized the socio-historical contradictions, the Romantics had nothing left to do but to ignore the contradictions. "Romanticism moves the contradictions from the real situation, from the practice of everyday life, into the world of beautiful illusions. We shall label this a process of the indirect creation of ideology."[19]

If ideology is a socially necessary appearance, it is puzzling for Lowenthal to speak here of the indirect creation of ideology. The French Revolution wrote "Freedom, Equality, Brotherhood" on its banners and thereby posed the goals of bourgeois liberation. Of this, Hegel writes enthusiastically, "The thought, the concept of justice legitimized itself all at once, and the old props of injustice could offer no resistance. According to the idea of justice, a constitution has now been established, and all is to be built on this basis from now on. For as long as the sun has stood in the heavens and the planets have circled it, this has never been the case. Mankind stands on its head, i.e., on thought, and builds reality accordingly."[20]

In the French Revolution the goals of bourgeois emancipation were realized. Freedom and equality (before the law) became social realities. The bourgeoisie, which declared its own class interests to be the general interest of society as a whole, could not yet see that equality before the law, freedom in commerce, and freedom of contracts only removed the barriers to the development of capitalist relations of production. This did not mean that true equality or freedom had already been achieved. The claim of bourgeois emancipatory ideals to universal legitimacy was only partially fulfilled, although it still had to be claimed to be universal. It is here that we find the ideological element. Bourgeois freedom is both freedom and domination at the same time, disguised by the mask of freedom. What had clearly happened in France, appeared much more confused in Germany. German Romanticism — especially early Romanticism — is also an expression of this confusion.

This may be the reason Lowenthal speaks of the indirect creation of ideology: German provinciality, faith in authority, a bourgeoisie just emerging, the accompanying underdevelopment of the forces of production, and the remaining feudal imprint on the relations of production. Lowenthal uses what he calls the "basic Romantic pattern" to describe the Romantics' reaction to these conditions. "Mediated reality, ordered in space and time, has no existential meaning. Instead, such meaning is solely attributed to the past. The past includes every frozen condition not subject to dynamic change in the future. The commonplace world of adults is rejected and one returns to the early child-like stages of human existence, which one attempts to articulate in art. This alone is seen as a happy, fulfilled and worthwhile condition of life. In this sense, the Romantic obsession with the Middle Ages is related to the love of fairy tales. History and pre-history are equally attractive escapes from the harsh reality of the environment. They allow people to escape a reality characterized by tensions, conflicts of interests, entrenched struggles,

19. *Ibid.*, p. 72.
20. G.W.F. Hegel, *Philosophie der Geschichte*, F. Brunstäd, ed., p. 69.

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and contradictions between what is and what should be."[21] In Romanticism, the bourgeoisie takes "possession of the world, in the ideological sense."[22] Sociologically, this situation means the following: "The bourgeoisie finds itself and its interests in radical, apparently inescapable contradiction with the existing feudal order of domination."[23] This collective side of Romantic ideology has an individual counterpart: it is "precisely because bourgeois individuals do not reach a consciousness of common interests that their class position appears so hopeless during the historical period of Romanticism. We have already mentioned that an individual is subject to regression when he returns like a child to the world of fairy tales. The same process is repeated in the Romantics' passion for nature."[24]

What must be explained is why Romanticism, especially early German Romanticism, is presently undergoing a revival, as can be seen by the rising number of publications on the subject. What is rhetorically and uncritically celebrated in the cultural pages of the West German press as the "new subjectivity" and is often linked with a so-called "change of trend," i.e., the turning away of contemporary German literature from dealing with explicitly political themes and interests, shows distinct parallels with early German Romanticism. Today, the euphoria of a worldwide student movement has died out once and for all. Traces of revolutionary hope set on Cuba, China, Vietnam or other Third World liberation movements, have faded. The Utopian horizons that once seemed to have opened up have long since disappeared. Resignation has spread all over. Contemporary German literature is now said to have Romantic traits. The basic Romantic pattern, as Lowenthal describes it, seems to apply to a good part of contemporary West German literature.

But this is deceptive. In his essay on "Rulers' Words: Money and Valid Statements,"[25] Jochen Hörisch called attention to the remarkable closeness of Critical Theory and early Romanticism. Bloch's *Spirit of Utopia*, Lukacs' *The Soul and the Forms, The Theory of the Novel*, Marcuse's dissertation on *The German Novel* (in which Novalis' *Heinrich von Ofterdingen* already appears as a prominent example of a "poetic critique of rationality"), Benjamin's famous dissertation on *The Concept of Art-Criticism in German Romanticism,* and Lowenthal's study, were all written totally independently of one another. Yet, they all have one thing in common: an intense discussion of early German Romanticism. From this, Hörisch concludes, as early as 1920 all of these theorists who later composed the Frankfurt School had dealt with early German Romanticism because of the failure of the revolution. "Early Romantic and Critical Theory, both of post-revolutionary origin, are as anachronistic as the post-revolutionary conditions themselves, which destroyed the confidence in the equation of enlightened rationality and liberated life."[26]

Surprising as this may appear, it requires an examination of the reasons for it. In comparing the respective historical situations, considerable caution must be exercised.

21. L. Lowenthal, *op.cit.*, p. 72ff.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 74.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 77.
24. *Ibid.*
25. In B. Lindner and W.M. Lüdke, eds. *Materialien zur ästhetischen Theorie Th. W. Adorno. Konstruktion der Moderne* (Frankfurt, 1980).
26. *Ibid.*, p. 40L. On this, Hörisch quotes the first sentence of Adorno's *Negative Dialectics*, which says: "Philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, is kept alive because the moment of its realization was missed" — and he therefore justifies a return to early Romanticism: "This explains in terms of the history of philosophy as well as the philosophy of history the recurrence of central early Romantic patterns of thinking in Adorno's *Aesthetic Theory*."

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When early German Romanticism confronted the failure of the French Revolution, it was reacting to the disappointment of the hopes connected with it — including the hope of exporting the revolution to Germany. Yet, even in its failure the French Revolution succeeded as a bourgeois revolution: as the victory of bourgeois society over feudal conditions that had stood in the way of complete capitalist development. Even if in the course of the French Revolution it became evident that bourgeois claims of universal validity were actually only the expression of particular class interests, for that very reason the Revolution must be regarded as the decisive stage in the history of the emancipation of bourgeois society from feudal conditions. Hegel always understood and emphasized this. In Germany as well as France and everywhere else, the moment for the realization of philosophy was not missed: it had not even appeared on the horizon.

But the disappointment of Critical Theory was a disillusionment with the failed realization of philosophy. For, even where the revolution had succeeded, failure was visible as part of its success. Fascism, the final defeat of West European labor movements, Stalinism, and finally the development of the culture industry by advanced American capitalism required a revision of the Marxian critique of political economy. Critical Theory regressed beyond the critique of political economy and, in terms of the domination of nature, tried to describe what took place below the progressive development of the productive forces. This can be summarized in a formula: "The curse of incessant progress is incessant regression."[27] The progressive domination of nature implies at the same time man's own subjugation. The world-historical identity of the two processes, progress (domination of nature) and regression (through progressive domination, i.e., the repression of the subject's nature) meant that the reification of subjects went hand in hand with that of external nature.[28]

This thesis not only abandons the relation bewteen progress and the level of the domination of nature, but it even regards the domination of nature as an indicator of a regression associated with progress. This means that Critical Theory challenges one of the fundamental theses of the Marxian critique of the political economy, which ascribed an emancipatory role to the dialectic of the productive forces and the conditions of production. It also supports Critical Theory's claim that it rejects the theory of revolution implied in the critique of political economy as well as supporting Critical Theory's attempt to explain capitalism's various transformations.

From this viewpoint, consider what Lowenthal has called the "basic Romantic pattern." If, as he says, in Romanticism the bourgeoisie "takes possession" of its world ideologically, then truth and falsehood should be clearly distinguishable. When present reality is deprived of all meaning, which is ascribed only to the past, and when every frozen condition no longer susceptible to future change is conceived as past, then anticipatory insights can also be located. Even regressions to childhood and enthusiasm for the Middle Ages and fairy tales must be considered progressive.

In fact, the Novalis fragment (from *Pollen*), which recurs modified in *Heinrich von Ofterdingen*, represents not only the well-known flight into interiority — the retreat from all social relations — but also the critique of social conditions necessitating this retreat and, even more, the critique of structures that nowadays even prevent such a retreat. "The mysterious road leads inward; eternity with its worlds, the past and the

27. M. Horkheimer, T.W. Adorno, *Dialektik der Aufklärung* (Frankfurt, 1969), second edition, p. 42.

28. Cf. also A. Wellmer, *Kritische Gesellschaftstheorie und Positivismus* (Frankfurt, 1969), p. 140ff.

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future, is in us or nowhere." As a poetic image, the blue flower that Heinrich von Ofterdingen sees in a dream — the quintessesnce of humane hopes and desires — is also the critique of that "petrified reason" characterized by the imprint of reified conditions in consciousness. Novalis' blue flower may seem wilted today. This makes the recourse to Romantic literature so problematic and our present-day neo-Romantics so anachronistic.

According to Hörisch, the return of Romantic themes in Adorno's aesthetic theory can be explained by Adorno's recourse to the Kantian category of natural beauty. Having turned against Hegel while still completely within the Hegelian tradition, Adorno returned to Kant to preserve the non-identical — that which is not exhausted by the concept. Of course, Adorno's critique of Hegel applies also to Kant. Brought into aesthetics by Kant, the category of natural beauty vanished from aesthetics through the spreading domination of the concept of freedom and human dignity. Inaugurated by Kant and first coherently transplanted into aesthetics by Schiller and Hegel, this concept held that nothing in the world is of value except what the autonomous subject owes to himself. The truth of such freedom, however, is at the same time a falsehood: "unfreedom for the other."[29]

Adorno seeks this "other" in natural beauty, which thus appears as the paradigm of non-identity. It should open access to a historically and socially concealed nature, which, however, can be seen not before but only through socialization. Kant, whom Horkheimer and Adorno's *Dialectic of Enlightenment* reproached for having banned thought from the circle drawn by the domination of nature in *The Critique of Pure Reason*, had at least left open the "thing in itself." Only the *Critique of Judgment* was to fill this gap, since there Kant based the judgment of aesthetic taste on the free play of the faculty of knowledge, the power of the imagination and reason. This judgment, sharply distinguished from all theoretical judgments, leaves room for the particular: that which does not fit into the concept's coercive identity — the non-identical. This moment of definite indefiniteness, which can convey the experience of natural beauty, refers not to nature but to nature as appearance. Thus, only when nature is observed in an aesthetic perspective, in terms of the four factors of the Kantian judgment of taste, i.e., free from the coercion of the principle of self-preservation, can its appearance be experienced as beautiful and understood as the paradigm of the non-identical. "Natural beauty is the trace of the non-identical of things under the ban of universal identity."[30]

In this perspective, art is not the imitation of nature, but the imitation of natural beauty. Adorno, however, emphasizes that: "Art does not imitate nature, nor even individual natural beauty, but natural beauty as such."[31] This obligation of art to the non-identical, to the imitation of natural beauty as such, reveals the context within which Adorno places art and philosophy. "Philosophy and art converge in their truth-content: the progressively developing truth of the work of art is none other than that of the philosophical concept."[32] That is, "genuine aesthetic experience must become philosophy or it does not exist at all."[33] On the other hand, now philosophy must itself become aesthetics in order to grasp what the concept means — even when that escapes it. "Art, as something separate from the empirical, constitutively needs an insoluble,

29. T.W. Adorno, *Aesthetische Theorie, op.cit.*, p. 98.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 114.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 113.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 197.
33. *Ibid.*

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non-identical factor; it becomes art only by that which it itself is not."[34]

Schlegel's novel — or the fragment of one — *Lucinde* describes a "relation" that not only goes against the conventions of its time, but especially opposes the petrifactions of one's own consciousness, i.e., the reification of human relations in general. Whatever objection can be made to Schlegel's novel, its form shows specific traits of modernity: petrified relations become enlivened. " 'Those were only external appearances,' said Julius' protector [in the allegory of insolence] 'and soon you will see within yourself. Incidentally, I am a real person and the true joke, I swear to you by myself, without stretching my arm out into shamefulness.' Everything now disappeared and the joke too grew until he no longer was. I believed to find him no longer before and outside me, but probably in me — a piece of myself yet different from me, alive and independent." But the companion warns Julius: " 'You must not want to communicate the immortal fire purely and crudely,' said the familiar voice of my friendly companion. 'Build, invent, transform and preserve the world and its eternal shapes in the constant alternation of new separations and couplings.' "

As Lowenthal wrote, for the Romantics the given reality had "no existential meaning, it is rather only ascribed to the past." That is correct, but it must be emphasized. For the Romantics are not concerned with the past as such, i.e., simply with a regressive Utopia, but with a critique of their present, which must use the images of the past to describe the regressive moment in progress. And Lowenthal also says: "The same process is also repeated in the Romantics' enthusiasm for nature." But that too must be read accordingly. The Romantics themselves already saw progress and regression as inextricably connected. Early German Romanticism anticipated insights which were taken up again, long after Marx, by Critical Theory and applied against Marxian and Hegelian theory.

Adorno defined dialectics as coherent consciousness of non-identity, and, accordingly, the interest of philosophy in the most particular: the non-identical. Systematically logical, philosophy had to depend on aesthetics, the philosophical reflection of art. This is the reason for the recourse to the Kantian category of natural beauty. This is the reason for the affinity with early Romanticism. Adorno wanted to place a quote from Schlegel at the beginning of his *Aesthetic Theory*: "In what is called the philosophy of art, generally one of the two is missing, either philosophy or art." For Schlegel already knew: "It is equally fatal to the spirit to have a system and to have none. It will probably have to decide to combine the two." Critical Theory decided to do so with the *Dialectics of Enlightenment*. Thus, Lowenthal's point of departure in his literary sociology, i.e., the critique of ideology, would have to be explicated only epistemologically if its work were to be continued.

But the course of things seems to be against this. For the blue flower has wilted. Lowenthal understood Romanticism as a bourgeois movement, and thus pointed to the barricade that separates us from it. Whether philosophy manages to stay alive or not, if the moment for its realization was really missed, then the promise that history carried with it also can no longer be realized. What remains is Schlegel's advice: "The board has to be bored where it is thickest."

34. T.W. Adorno, *Drei Studien zu Hegel* (Frankfurt, 1963), p. 115.

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LOWENTHAL, GOLDMANN AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF LITERATURE

by Robert Sayre

In the development of the sociology of literature, there has been considerable disagreement over the definition of the field and over the boundaries of its intellectual domain. While this generates important ideological debates within the diversity of literary and sociological theory, the field can be seen as characterized by critical discourse that *in any way* links literary with social phenomena. But precisely what links are most significant remains undeterminate. To enumerate all possible variations suggested by sociologists of literature would be impossible here. Instead, I will analyze and compare the conception of the discipline in the work of two pioneering sociologists of literature, Leo Lowenthal and Lucien Goldmann. Inasmuch as Lowenthal's 80th birthday is the occasion for these remarks, I will present his approach first and introduce Goldmann at the points where the two diverge. By showing how each dealt with some of the many topics that may be important to the sociology of literature, I hope to demonstrate their distinctive contributions to the general field.

Lowenthal's reflection on literature and society spans over a half century, from his first association with the Institut für Sozialforschung in the late 1920s to the present. Lowenthal and Benjamin were the members of the Frankfurt School most concerned with literature. Adorno and Marcuse, of course, also dealt with literary subjects, but both situated their analysis at the level of aesthetics or culture. Lowenthal and Benjamin, on the other hand, focused sepcifically on literature and its relation to society — or on the sociology of literature (although Benjamin did not use this term). After his departure from the Institut, Lowenthal wrote dozens of essays on the subject and regularly taught courses — at Columbia and Berkeley — in the sociology of literature. Like all of the Institut memebers who sought refuge from Nazism in the United States, Lowenthal's original German-Jewish intellectual culture clashed with American academic sociology, but Lowenthal was perhaps the adherent to Critical Theory most profoundly influenced by American sociology.

Many of his writings are collected, often in revised form, in three books. The first two deal with "high" art. *Erzählkunst und Gesellschaft,* published in Germany in 1971, presents essays on 19th-century German narrative written between 1928 and 1931, during Lowenthal's early years in Frankfurt. *Literature and the Image of Man,* published in the United States in 1957, contains chapters on several 16th and 17th century Spanish writers, Shakespeare, the classical French dramatists, Goethe, Ibsen and Knut Hamsun. These chapters come from two sources: the last three are versions of articles written originally in the 1930s (the Ibsen and Hamsun essays date from the late 1930s, when Lowenthal was already in the United States), and the others were written in the year preceding publication (1955-56). The final collection is concerned mainly with "popular" literature. Published in 1961, *Literature, Popular Culture and Society* contains four chapters treating popular literature and the debate over it, which were taken from essays first published in the 1940s and 1950s. The fifth and last chapter, entitled "Literature and Society," is a discussion of the sociology of literature in general. Indeed, from his article in the first issue of the Institut's *Zeitschrift für*

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Sozialforschung in 1932 to the 1971 foreword to *Erzählkunst und Gesellschaft*, Lowenthal has periodically written such general statements throughout his career.[1]

Although Lowenthal has articulated certain overall themes in generalizing theoretical statements, on the whole theory and method play a relatively minor role in his work. Such considerations are treated only in certain essays, and even there they are not extensively elaborated. Like other members of the Frankfurt School, he has been reluctant to make programmatic statements. For Goldmann, on the other hand, theory and method are fundamental, and questions relating to them are thoroughly intertwined with his particular, empirical studies. He conceives of the relation between the theoretical and empirical as a perpetual dialectical *va-et-vient*.

Lowenthal did not approve of this approach. In 1968, he argued that an "obsession" with method is a manifestation of positivism and that method should only be implicit in concrete analysis. Moreover, the sociology of literature should not aim to develop a general theory, but only to make specific contributions.[2]

For his part, Goldmann recognized the value of Lowenthal's work, but pointed to significant limitations in his approach. In an article on the sociology of literature in the *Encyclopaedia Universalis*, Goldmann singles out Lowenthal as a significant representative of one of three contemporary trends in research (the other two are exemplified by Escarpit on the one hand and Lukacs and Goldmann on the other). In his view, Lowenthal's work concentrates on *partial* elements of texts and on their content rather than structures. In Goldmann's response to Lowenthal at the Royaumont colloquium, he charged that the latter's sociology of literature throws light on society, but not on literature.

Lowenthal's work clearly supports Goldmann's charge. Lowenthal aims primarily at the elucidation of social rather than literary phenomena, and he speaks of literature as "one of the essential sources for studying the relation between man and society." For him, the analysis of literary works reveals "those central problems with which man has been concerned at various times, permitting us to develop an image of a given society in terms of the individuals who compose it.... Literature tells us not only what a society was like in a past age, but also what the individual felt about it."[3] Moreover, as Goldmann suggests, Lowenthal often emphasizes content analysis in treating both popular and elite literature. He does not accept, however, the narrowly quantitative form of content analysis advocated, for example, by Bernard Berelson, and calls instead for "critical, qualitative, and value-oriented research."[4] Here we

1. They are, in chronological order: "Zur gesellschaftlichen Lage der Literatur," in *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, 1 (1932), reprinted in *Erzählkunst und Gesellschaft. Die Gesellschaftsproblematik in der deutschen Literatur des 19 Jahrhunderts* (Berlin & Neuwied, 1971); "The Sociology of Literature," in *Communications in Modern Society*, W. Schramm, ed. (Urbana, 1948), reprinted in *Literature, Popular Culture and Society* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1961); "Social Meanings in Literature," introduction to *Literature and the Image of Man;* "Literature and Sociology" in *Relations of Literary Study — Essays on Interdisciplinary Contributions*, J. Thorpe, ed. (New York, 1967); "Vorwort" to *Erzählkunst und Gesellschaft.*

2. From the unpublished acts of the Third International Colloquium on the Sociology of Literature, Royaumont, 1968, in the *Centre de Sociologie de la Littérature* of the *Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes* in Paris. To my knowledge, the only other comment that Lowenthal made about Goldmann is in the annotated bibliography that concludes his 1967 essay, "Literature and Sociology." There, although he labels Goldmann's *Dieu caché* an "excellent study," he sees Goldmann, along with Sartre, as attempting to join existentialism and orthodox Marxism and is also highly critical of the "existentialist pronunciamentos" in his more recent work.

3. *Literature, Popular Culture and Society, op.cit.*, pp. xii, xv.

4. *Relations of Literary Study, op.cit.*, p. 96. In advocating content analysis here he also

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have both the influence of American sociological methods and his underlying loyalty to the critical perspective developed before emigration to the United States.

Lowenthal also gives a privileged place to psychology, social psychology and psychoanalysis in the interpretation of literature. As early as 1932 he pointed out that Freudian psychoanalysis has important implications for a socio-historical approach.[5] More specifically, he felt that it is necessary to pass through the intermediate level of the individual and collective psyche in order to deal adequately with the relation between literature and society. Thus psychology is a crucial "auxiliary mediational discipline" (*Hilfswissenschaft der Vermittlungen*),[6] and Lowenthal often makes use of psychological categories in his literary studies. For example, in discussing Shakespeare's *The Tempest*, he identifies Caliban, Ariel and Prospero with the Freudian concepts of Id, Superego and Ego.[7] Likewise, when he wrote about Knut Hamsun, he drew on the social psychology of the authoritarian personality elaborated by the Frankfurt School. Unfortunately, however, Lowenthal does not consistently employ a single, coherent, psychological theory. As a consequence, his application of psychology to the sociology of literature remains somewhat arbitrary and eclectic.

Deeply concerned with the social definition of literatures and especially the characterization of "popular" literature, Lowenthal has provided only a sketchy answer to the more basic question of what literature itself is. According to him, "Literature is the historical reservoir of elements of individual experience, including the most personal experiences, such as love, friendship, the experience of nature; but this experience is determined by the social system. That is the secret of the artistic imagination." And in the introduction to *Literature and the Image of Man*, Lowenthal finds that the special contribution of literature as a historical source is that it "reveals what it was like to live this experience."[8] Social *consciousness* — attitudes and feelings about social reality — is more important in literature than the portrayal of that social reality. Literature transmits *lived* experience that is both personal and socio-historical, and "the artist tends to justify or defy society rather than to be its passive chronicler."[9] While the writer's consciousness may be affirmative, it is more often critical: "The artist's voice, in sum, is most often not the voice of the victors who arrogate their spoils. His is the voice of the losers."[10] Thus, Lowenthal's answer to the question of aesthetic value follows from his definition of literature. "Good" literature is that which most profoundly reveals lived socio-historical experience, and "the writer achieves greatness because of the depth of his insight into the human condition."[11] A passing comment suggests that he also accepts as his own the classical German aesthetic criterion of the "inner, necessary, inseparable connection between form and content."[12]

Goldmann agrees with Lowenthal's basic concept of literature, but develops all his points more fully. Like Lowenthal, he gives precedence to the writer's aspect of

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adds the proviso: "as long as the critic does not neglect the analysis of the structure and the work as a whole. . . ." However Lowenthal is specifically addressing literary scholars in this article, and is clearly concerned to allay any fears regarding the crudity of sociological analysis.

5. *Erzählkunst und Gesellschaft, op.cit.*, pp. 27-28.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
7. *Literature and the Image of Man, op.cit.*, pp. 63-64.
8. *Ibid.*, p. x.
9. *Ibid.*, p. xi.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 42.
11. *Ibid.*, p. xii.
12. *Literature, Popular Culture and Society, op.cit.*, p. 132.

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consciousness, but he also provides a theoretical elaboration of the problem in the concept of worldview. Great literature is that which most adequately represents a worldview — that is, which gives the highest degree of coherence and unity to a complex of attitudes toward the multiplicity of reality. This is Goldmann's version of German classical aesthetics, with its dialectical poles of unity and multiplicity, form and content. For Goldmann as well as for Lowenthal, literary consciousness can be critical or conformist, but the most important works tend to have a significant critical dimension. Goldmann offers analyses of the social underpinnings of attitudes of conformism or critique more frequently than Lowenthal does — as, for example, in Goldmann's linkage of the tragic (critical) vision in Pascal, Racine and Kant with the specific situations of the contradictory *noblesse de robe* and the *misère* of the German bourgeoisie.

While Goldmann's understanding of literature is more elaborated and sophisticated than Lowenthal's, it is also more exclusive, for its focus is restricted to established literary masterpieces. Goldmann ignores mass culture and its relation to "high" culture — an important aspect of the sociology of literature that Lowenthal treats in detail. In the 1940s, the Frankfurt School focused its attention on mass culture, and Lowenthal was the member most active in this effort.[13] In addition to the essays in *Literature, Popular Culture and Society*, he also published a study of German popular biographies in the Marcuse *Festschrift*.[14] Lowenthal uses the terms "popular" and "mass" culture or literature almost interchangeably, although he suggests a difference in historical extension between the two. "Popular" culture, in the sense of cultural artifacts produced by an elite for consumption by a large audience, "is probably as old as human civilization. We have only to think of the differentiation between esoteric and exoteric religious exercises in early Oriental and Occidental civilization."[15] On the other hand, "mass media" in the sense of "marketable cultural goods produced for a substantial buying public," originated in 18th-century England.[16] Thus "mass culture" properly refers only to modern culture *marketed* by the culture industry described by the Frankfurt School, although Lowenthal often uses the more general term "popular" in dealing with this culture.

Lowenthal opposes several terms to "popular" or "mass" culture: "high" or "elite" art, "genuine art," and "art" *tout court*. "The counter-concept to popular culture is art."[17] Clearly, popular culture does not represent a truly aesthetic phenomenon, and in modern society this can be realized only in high culture. Lowenthal also distinguishes between popular-mass cultural forms and "folk" art. He does not define folk art even cursorily, and references to it are fleeting. But, by implication, folk art is characterized as consumed by the same strata that produce it, in contrast to popular culture, which is handed down from above. For Lowenthal, folk art is *art per se*, and so shares qualities with high art — an opinion that Lowenthal traces back to Montaigne.[18] Although the theme is never systematically developed, high, folk, and genuine art are ranged together in opposition to mass and popular culture.

Using as a source the American and German popular biographies that he studied exhaustively, Lowenthal defines mass culture in several ways. It is generally

13. Martin Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination* (London, 1973), pp. 172, 212.
14. "German Popular Biographies: Culture's Bargain Counter" in *The Critical Spirit: Essays in Honor of Herbert Marcuse*, K.H. Wolff and B. Moore, Jr., eds. (Boston, 1967).
15. *Literature, Popular Culture and Society, op.cit.*, p. xvii.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 52.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

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characterized by a lack of the critical dimension Lowenthal finds in much genuine art. It effects "a manipulated reproduction of reality as it is; and, in so doing, popular culture sanctions and glorifies whatever it finds worth echoing."[19] Its uncritical presentation of reality represents at the same time a reflection of that reality and a model leading the reader to accept the status quo and adjust his behavior to it.[20] Reification is another defining characteristic of popular culture. Works of this type are reduced to pure commodities, and in turn they commodify the human reality they portray. In addition, Lowenthal discovers an authoritarian tendency in his sources. American biographies institute "a reign of psychic terror, where the masses have to realize the pettiness and insignificance of their everyday life."[21] German biographies reveal ideological roots in the same *Lebensphilosophie* that paved the way for German fascism.[22] They have much in common with the works of Knut Hamsun, whose proto-fascist tendencies Lowenthal discussed elsewhere. These links between fascism and popular culture are part of the general Frankfurt School's perception of mass culture's replacement of overt terror as a new form of authoritarianism.

While the main thrust of his treatment of popular culture is thus a severe critique of it as a degraded cultural form, Lowenthal's interpretation was sometimes more favorable. His later writing reveals a partial retreat from the Frankfurt School under the influence of American intellectual trends. The introduction to *Literature, Popular Culture and Society* shows a decided openness to the views of American proponents of popular culture: he is willing at least to entertain the possibility that "the mass media at their best may be evolving art forms which fall between folk and 'high' art."[23] This shift may be explained by the fact that the introduction was written considerably later than most of the essays, in the early 1960s, when the positive view of popular culture was particularly strong in the United States. Earlier, Lowenthal had made a different and subtler positive evaluation, which is evident in a letter to Horkheimer in 1942. Lowenthal wrote that the masses "show by their very occupation with these people [the subjects of popular biographies] and with their ways of 'consumption' a longing for a life of innocence." Both German and American biographies "represent distorted utopias.... They both imply the unconditional importance of the real, living, and existing individual: dignity, happiness." And Horkheimer in turn comments in a subsequent letter: "We cannot blame people that they are more interested in the sphere of privacy and consumption rather than [in] production. This trait contains a Utopian element; in Utopia production does not play a decisive part. It is the land of milk and honey."[24] Here, the dialectical character of popular culture is recognized: it possesses a Utopian as well as an ideological aspect — a hidden critical moment as well as a more readily visible, conformist one. Thus, although in his published work Lowenthal lays almost exclusive emphasis on the latter characteristics, he is aware of a fundamental ambiguity of popular culture.

Lowenthal's interest in popular culture is closely related to his concern with another aspect of the sociology of literature ignored by Goldmann: the process of the production, distribution and consumption of texts. In Goldmann's view, the most essential element of the sociology of literature is the study of internal literary structures

19. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 11, 128.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 131.
22. *The Critical Spirit, op.cit.*, p. 276.
23. *Literature, Popular Culture and Society, op.cit.*, p. xx.
24. Cited in Jay, *op.cit.*, p. 213.

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in relation to the social, and he saw the literary circuit, with its emphasis on structures external to the text, as the domain of positivist, non-dialectical sociologists of literature such as Escarpit and H.N. Fügen. For Lowenthal, on the other hand, the literary circuit is an important area of study. While neither of the two is concerned with the technical infrastructure of literary production, Goldmann gives less attention to questions involving the social classes, groups and milieux of writers than Lowenthal because in his view there is no necessary relation between the writer's actual social class or milieu and the worldview represented in his works.[25] Furthermore, neither Goldmann nor Lowenthal pays any significant attention to distribution, the element of the literary circuit most distant from specifically literary concerns. But the final element, consumption, plays an important role in Lowenthal's thought, and none whatsoever in Goldmann's.[26] At the beginning of his essay on American biographies, Lowenthal comments that their immense popularity around World War I "forces the conclusion that there must be a social need seeking gratification by this type of literature. One way to find out would be to study the readers' reactions, to explore by means of various interviewing techniques what they are looking for.... But it seems to be rather premature to collect and to evaluate such solicited response until more is known about the content structure itself."[27] In the ensuing analysis, Lowenthal draws implicit conclusions about the public based on the works' content. The unstated assumption is that an internal analysis of works that have the greatest success with a certain public will reveal characteristics of that public's consciousness. Thus, "an analysis of the popular biography is first of all an analysis of its reading public, and as such comprises a critique of late European liberalism."[28] Reception also plays a role in the Hamsun study, which originally included a discussion of the reception of Hamsun's work after World War I by groups with different political tendencies, even though Lowenthal dropped this section from the version of this essay that appears in *Literature and the Image of Man.*[29]

Lowenthal studied the subject explicitly and at length in only one article, "The Reception of Dostoevsky's Work in Germany, 1880-1920."[30] Here, again, reader responses *per se* are not studied. It is literary criticism rather than the work itself that is taken as the object of study. The underlying assumption (made explicit in Lowenthal's introductory paragraphs to the later American republication of the article) is that the criticism destined for a certain public reflects the response of that public to the works it criticizes. Lowenthal finds a tendency to mystify and mythologize reality in the criticism of the "middle class," or petty bourgeois, public; the upper bourgeois and proletarian critical response to Dostoevsky exhibits a far truer understanding both of

25. See *Recherches dialectiques* (Paris, 1959), pp. 47-48. Goldmann does include a section on Pascal's life (but not Racine's) in *Le Dieu caché*, but emphasizes that he is doing so because of striking correspondences between life and work in the case of Pascal. A student of Goldmann, however, has studied the social milieux frequented by Stendhal: Cf. Geneviève Mouillaud, "The Sociology of Stendhal's Novels: Preliminary Research" in *International Social Science Journal*, XIX, 4 (1967).

26. Near the end of his life, however, Goldmann and his research team undertook a reception study jointly with a Hungarian team. The study had not been completed at Goldmann's death.

27. *Literature, Popular Culture and Society, op.cit.*, p. 110.

28. *The Critical Spirit, op.cit.*, p. 268.

29. See Jay, *op.cit.*, p. 141; *Literature and the Image of Man, op.cit.*, pp. 190, 194.

30. In *The Arts in Society*, R.N. Wilson (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964). Originally published as "Die Auffassung Dostojewskis im Vorkriegsdeutschland" in the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, III, 3 (1934).

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Dostoevsky and of reality itself. Interestingly, Lowenthal did not draw the seemingly obvious conclusions that different social classes are able to interpret literary works more or less adequately in accordance with their particular situations in the social configuration, and that this ability is related to their general capacity to comprehend social reality. Lowenthal eventually came to have serious doubts about this study. In its 1964 republication, he comments: "Had I known at the time about advanced methods of opinion research and projective psychology, I would probably have never designed this study, for it attempts to accomplish the same ends as these methodologies in a primordial fashion."[31] While it is true that Lowenthal's approach is naive, this does not invalidate its results or negate the fact that Lowenthal was one of the first to address problems of reception.[32]

While Lowenthal investigated fields ignored by Goldmann, the primary concern of both critics was with the effects of social reality on the internal structures of "high" or "genuine" works of literary art. Moreover, both focused on the ways in which social consciousness is expressed in literature. Yet the question of how social reality itself is portrayed was answered differently by each one. To Lowenthal, objective social phenomena appear only through the subjective; social reality is primarily subjective. For Goldmann, the reverse is true. The structure of a realist text is homologous with the structure of social reality.

Lowenthal recognized the "realist" function of at least some literature, attributing realist characteristics to some authors, including Cervantes, Shakespeare, Molière and Ibsen. Elsewhere, he also attributes them to the *Bildungsroman* as a whole.[33] Although he does not employ the term, Lowenthal is clearly referring to the tradition of "critical realism"; for instance, he calls Cervantes "realistic in method and idealistic in intention."[34] Nevertheless, the reality in question is limited almost entirely to *attitudes* in certain historical situations — in other words, to social consciousness. "The writer is not concerned with a bare reality of objects, events, or institutions, but with a *human* reality that involves attitudes and feelings which are never neutral."[35] Thus, Lowenthal's remarkable analysis of the opening shipwreck scene in *The Tempest* shows the ship to be a symbolic microcosm of the society of Shakespeare's time. But the social reality of this microcosm is embodied in a range of attitudes that typify the main social classes of the period. The treatment of Ibsen as a realist similarly concentrates on the subjective aspect of reality; "specialization" in modern society, for instance, is to be found in Ibsen's work through its penetration of the psychology of his characters.

Goldmann's analysis of realism is more structurally oriented. Although Goldmann's main concern is clearly with consciousness as manifested in worldview, his later work is largely based on the concept of realism.[36] He develops the hypothesis that in the modern period there has been "a fundamental modification in the nature of the

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31. *Ibid.*, p. 125.
32. Levin Schücking's *Soziologie der literarischen Geschmacksbildung* (1923), which was a source of inspiration for Lowenthal at the beginning of his career, is one of the very few earlier works. See *Erzählkunst und Gesellschaft, op.cit.*, p. 9.
33. *The Critical Spirit, op.cit.*, pp. 268-69.
34. *Literature and the Image of Man, op.cit.*, p. 39.
35. *Literatur, Popular Culture and Society, op.cit.*, p. xvi.
36. "Goldmann and Modern Realism: Introduction to the *Balcony* Article" in *Praxis*, 4 (1978); also "Goldmann et le problème du réalisme," a paper given at the Lukacs-Goldmann colloquium in Cerisy-la-Salle, France, in August, 1979 (to be published).

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relations between the work and the society with which it is connected."[37] This relation no longer goes through the mediation of a worldview, but exists directly in the structural homology between socio-economic reality and work. While Goldmann never adopted this thesis wholeheartedly and continues to entertain the possibility that modern literary works may be associated, like their classical predecessors, with the worldviews of social groups, nonetheless he often studied modern authors as exemplars of literary realism. Thus, he invoked his definition of realism in reference to the *nouveau roman:* "If one gives to the word realism the sense of creation of a world the structure of which is analogous to the essential structure of the social reality within which the work was written, Nathalie Sarraute and Robbe-Grillet are to be counted among the most radically realistic writers in contemporary French literature."[38] At the same time, however, he made it clear that a work need only reflect certain aspects of the social essence in order to meet his definition of realism. Goldmann's realism thus differed from Lukacs' in that it does not require the dialectical unity of essence and appearance, general and particular: only general and essential social structures need be transposed in a realistic work. This allows Goldmann's definition to include "abstract" modernist works as well as the 19th century novels praised by Lukacs. But, like Lukacs', Goldmann's definition focuses on *objective* social reality, and, for example, Goldmann studies Genet's *The Balcony* as a rigorously realistic transposition of "essential transformations of industrial society in the first half of the 20th century."[39] In this respect, Goldmann stands with Lukacs in opposition to Lowenthal.

In Lowenthal we find two ways in which social consciousness may be exhibited in a literary text. First, a plurality of consciousnesses may appear and interact in a particular text. Here the social consciousness expressed is very similar to the social reality depicted in a work, since the plural interplay of consciousness within it is such an important component of a given social reality. But a second type of social consciousness in literary texts requires a distinction between the two categories of consciousness and reality: a singular consciousness may inform the *entire* text in question. The overall meaning of the text then involves the articulation of a given social viewpoint, set of attitudes, or ideology — one which may be more or less realistic in different cases. Lowenthal's treatment of the shipwreck scene in *The Tempest* reveals how these two modes of social consciousness may interact. He discusses the plurality of consciousnesses in play within the scene and shows at the same time how that plurality is incorporated within a single unifying perspective. "If we bring to the scene what we learn from the rest of the play, it is apparent that Shakespeare uses the progressive ideas and moral concepts of his day to define his heroes, and leaves his villains in a reactionary, or at least non-progressive, torpor."[40] In the struggle between the opposing attitudes of a declining nobility and a rising bourgeoisie, Shakespeare sides with the latter; he inscribes his own attitudes on the play by his implicit evaluation of the characters. Lowenthal's analysis, therefore, sees the scene not only as subjective realism, but also as an expression of the newly developing bourgeois ideology.

In his essays of the early 1930s, Lowenthal employed the limiting definition of ideology as false consciousness and perceived literature as expressive of the ideologies

37. Goldmann, *Cultural Creation in Modern Society* (St. Louis: Telos Press, 1976), p. 80.
38. Goldmann, *Pour une Sociologie du Roman* (Paris, 1964), p. 324.
39. Goldmann, "Genet's *The Balcony:* A Realist Play," in *Praxis,* 4, p. 126. The article was originally published in *Les Temps Modernes,* 171 (June, 1960).
40. *Literature, Popular Culture and Society, op.cit.,* pp. 144-45.

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of social classes or segments of them. Ideology mystifies, throws a veil over social reality; it "transfigures" (*verklärt*) reality in that it "blocks access to the understanding of the contradictions in bourgeois society."[41] Lowenthal identifies authors with ideologies, claiming that literary history is "in large part investigation of ideology [*Ideologieforschung*]."[42] In the Dostoevsky essay he alludes to "a central factor in the construction of every ideology, namely, the glorification of existing social contradictions. This is the essence of the mechanism."[43] And he identifies ideologies with particular elements of social classes: "Just as Stendhal is the novelist of the Napoleonic bourgeois aristocracy, so Gustav Freytag is the bard of the liberal German bourgeoisie in the middle of the century."[44] This line of analysis follows well-established Marxist practice. Indeed, although Lowenthal later criticizes Goldmann's orthodox Marxism, his own early work is in fact closer to orthodoxy than Goldmann's.

In later essays Lowenthal significantly modified his approach. This change was probably at first a largely pragmatic response to violent postwar anti-communism in the United States. But American sociological thought seems to have slowly effected a bona fide evolution in Lowenthal's intellectual framework. His later work often substitutes the notions of "attitude," "norm," and "value" for "ideology" and replaces "social class" with broader and less clearly defined entities. In *Literature and the Image of Man,* his discussion is couched in terms of "man," or "European man," at different socio-historical junctures. Thus a speech by Don Quixote is shown to incarnate modern "democratic beliefs" and to be "a document of the Renaissance intellectual"; Corneille is defined as "a poet of the new nationalism"; and Hamsun's anti-intellectualism is identified only with "broad social strata in Europe."[45] Literary authors are more often related to philosophical systems than to social groupings: Corneille to Descartes, Molière to Gassendi, etc. Although Lowenthal continues to make occasional class identifications in passing, using the modern American term "middle class" instead of "bourgeoisie" or "third estate," on the whole *Literature and the Image of Man* presents the authors as representatives of a general *Zeitgeist*, and much of the work is in fact quite close to traditional intellectual and literary history.

Both forms of Lowenthal's analysis of social consciousness in literature are at variance with Goldmann's theory and practice. Goldmann's concept of worldview offers an instructive contrast to Lowenthal's use of ideology and norm. Goldmann avoids the narrowness of the "demystification" approach often used by Lowenthal in his early essays and common in orthodox Marxist criticism. While the latter defines ideology negatively in opposition to the proletariat's "true" consciousness, Goldmann's worldviews are dynamic structures of consciousness produced by all social classes in the process of relating to their environment, all adequate in some measure but none possessing the final truth. Both Lowenthal and Goldmann's approaches have their strengths and weaknesses. Goldmann's concept is less susceptible to the reductionism implicit in demystification and it also avoids the vagueness that marks *Literature and the Image of Man.* The practice of demystification is most appropriate when applied to the second-rate works, which were often the subject of Lowenthal's early scrutiny, whereas the fluidity and imprecision of his later method tends to diminish the sociological import of his discussion of the important works of world

41. *Erzählkunst und Gesellschaft, op.cit.*, p. 37. See also *The Arts in Society, op.cit.*, p. 128.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
43. *The Arts in Society, op.cit.*, p. 130.
44. *Erzählkunst und Gesellschaft, op.cit.*, p. 37.
45. *Literature and the Image of Man, op.cit.*, pp. 5, 54, 55, 99, 216.

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literature in *Literature and the Image of Man.* Goldmann, on the other hand, is able to do justice to the greatest literary works while also integrating them into a precise, coherent sociological framework. The concept of worldview is a structural notion better adapted to comprehending the complexity and unity of important literary works. Moreover, a worldview is related in a specific way to a well-defined social collectivity. But Goldmann's virtues are also his weaknesses: the concept of worldview applies *only* to the literary summits. Lowenthal's far less clearly defined approach has allowed him to treat a wider range of literary phenomena from a variety of viewpoints.

Turning now to the more specific issue of whether society primarily affects literary form or literary content, the opposition between Lowenthal and Goldmann is not quite as clear cut as the latter claimed. As already mentioned, Goldmann saw Lowenthal as one of the best representatives of a sociology of literature dealing with content. However, Lowenthal has been seriously interested in the social determinants of form throughout his career, beginning with his first essay.[46] But he is not concerned with the same form as Goldmann. Lowenthal largely ignores the question of genre and its relation to social reality that was a primary concern of both Lukacs and Goldmann; he also does not attempt to analyze the overall structure of literary works. Lowenthal's formal concerns are primarily with style, or the use of language, although in *Erzählkunst* he also deals with narrative devices. In the introduction to *Literature and the Image of Man,* he comments: "Sometimes the style of the artist provides significant clues, as when Ibsen's people use almost identical terms to describe competition between husband and wife and competition in the professional world."[47] His treatment of *The Tempest* in the same book includes an analysis of the language of its major characters, and in both the essays on popular biography he discusses the social significance of the use of superlatives. Thus, while Goldmann is correct in his claim that Lowenthal does not deal with overall formal patterns, Lowenthal *is* nonetheless concerned with form at a level that Goldmann's method entirely bypasses.

The further problem of social effects on literary change is considered by both critics, but it plays a relatively larger role in Lowenthal's sociology of literature. While Goldmann dealt with the evolution of the novel and developed a theory correlating three stages of modern capitalism with literary transformations, his general methodology emphasized synchronic over diachronic analysis, and he focused on structures at a given moment rather than their changes over time. Lowenthal, on the other hand, took pains to situate his project within literary history as well as literary sociology. His intentions are revealed in *Literature and the Image of Man,* which is structured according to the progressive development of the concept of the individual: "As social history, it suggests an arc, curving upward in the first tentative gropings toward modern individualism, rising to a plateau of confidence in the individual, and finally declining at the point where the individual feels threatened by technological and social forces."[48]

The effect of literature on society, a final dimension of the sociology of literature, plays virtually no role in Goldmann's work, but is important to Lowenthal. Goldmann, to be sure, postulates a two-fold function of the literary expression of worldviews. On the one hand, this aids "men to become conscious of themselves and of their own affective, intellectual and practical aspirations"; this is the actualization

46. See *Erzählkunst und Gesellschaft, op.cit.;* pp. 33ff.
47. *Literature and the Image of Man, op.cit.,* p. xi; see also pp. 173-74.
48. *Ibid.,* p. xiii.

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of virtual class consciousness. On the other hand, it "affords the group's members a satisfaction on the imaginary plane which must and can compensate for the multiple frustrations caused by the inevitable compromises and inconsistencies that reality imposes."[49] This second function suggests that literary effects might be either progressive or conservative, but Goldmann does not develop the argument any further. Nor does he introduce the question of effects in his studies of particular works.

Lowenthal, in contrast, has addressed the issue of the effects of literature in several specific instances. For example, he sees Hamsun's writings as providing ideological compensation for the dominated, urging them to "accept life as it is, and that means the existing relations of domination and subordination."[50] Then, when writing of the reception of Dostoevsky in Germany, he concludes that: "The study of the reception of works of fiction thus becomes important from a new point of view. It contributes to the study of those factors which, over and above the mere power apparatus, exercise a socially conservative and retarding function through their psychological power. Desires do not disappear entirely, but they must be diverted, and art may help to transform the instincts."[51] Thus Lowenthal indicates that literary works expressing conservative ideologies may have conservative effects in society at large. It may be inferred that the converse is true for critical and rebellious works.

Without attempting an evaluation of the particular strengths and weaknesses of Lowenthal's and Goldmann's analyses, which would require so detailed a discussion of literary history as to be out of place here, I have tried to locate Lowenthal's work within the general categories of a literary-sociological framework and to compare it to Goldmann's. Of course, Goldmann's theoretical contribution is far greater, but Lowenthal deals with crucial areas neglected or ignored by Goldmann. Lowenthal's work could gain from Goldmann's rigorous theoretical and methodological reflection, while Goldmann's work could gain from Lowenthal's breadth and flexibility. Together they provide a complementary influence on the general development of the sociology of literature.

49. Goldmann, *Cultural Creation, op.cit.*, p. 77.
50. *Literature and the Image of Man, op.cit.*, p. 218.
51. *The Arts in Society, op.cit.*, p. 137.

COMEDY AND RATIONALITY

by Ferenc Feher and Agnes Heller

The following is a study of the relation between the *rational* and the *comic* in modern comedy in terms of recurring types of human behavior, patterns of rational attitude and their problems. As all great analysts of the comic have argued, laughter, the ridiculous, the satyrical, the ironical, and the like, both in life and in literature, are inextricably related to rationality. Without indulging in extensive definitions, it is clear that comic phenomena are generated by "disturbed relations" to certain historically-given types of rationality. Where there is a comic personality, there is also rationality. Otherwise, there would be no way to gauge the 'disturbed relation' to rationality in the artistic world. The question, then, is *what type* of rationality appears in the comedy, and how is it constituted? In order to investigate this subject, the

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following analysis will focus on a few classics of the comedy, each of them a symbol for a period: 1) *Shakespeare*, because he symbolizes the dynamics of the Renaissance triggered by new social relations, with its moral "no man's land" on which the past appears as still vivid nature but not as collective morality. 2) *Molière*, because he is the symbol of bourgeois society confined within the hostile framework of an absolutism based on estates — a situation which he accepts, while resisting any attempt to impose what civil society regards as unreason. 3) *Beaumarchais* and *Lessing*, because they symbolize the Enlightenment's rebellious reason: rationality's high hopes and self-delusions to redeem the world. Finally, 4) *Bernard Shaw*, because he is the symbol of satyrical socialist irreverence towards triumphant bourgeois society — a sceptical rationalist unmasking the degradation of reason by both bourgeois sincerity as well as its hypocrisy.

I

The status of rationality in Shakespeare's comedies can be best understood if one considers that he accepted the world of estates far more than Molière, but only in a semi-natural form and not as moral authority. For Shakespeare, people in low ranks are ugly, repulsive, and almost always stupid. As such, they are proper objects of laughter. This is almost a Greek-Roman streak in Shakespeare: Dogberry and Verges in *Much Ado About Nothing* are the best, but not the only examples. If not totally stupid, those on the lower rungs of hierarchy represent a pedestrian type of rationality which may work in everyday situations. Since, however, it is ultimately still Dogberry's and Verges' rationality, it cannot become a moral authority. Had Shakespeare, as a comic poet, been just the creator of Dogberry and Verges, he would have been simply a resurrector of the ancient spirit: a recycler of Aristotle and a creator of low characters. But he also has a deeply individualistic side which recognized the world of the estates and habits as something inalterably given. But since it was also Dogberry's and Verges' "nature," he only attributed a *relative rationality* to it. He sought, and indeed found, a new and higher principle of rationality: the value-rationality created by legislative conscience. (Conscience becomes the only source of moral legislation since mores are either stupid or inhumane and, as such, only relatively rational). This is one of the reasons for Shakespeare's inimitable ability to embody tragedies and comedies in one person. Since customary rationality applies only to the masses of the stupid, the blind and the hopelessly obsolete, it is not binding for higher individuals, the most resolute of whom go beyond it and become tragic heroes. Many of them laugh at the world and at their own weaknesses, thus creating order and rationality in their souls and lives. Consequently, the best of Shakespeare's comic heroes ridicule Dogberry's logic. In this sense, he is a non-Aristotelian creator of comic and at the same time intellectually and emotionally superior characters. Shakespeare's sublime comic figures are the most faultless characters in his works. Precisely because of this, however, they create a new type of value rationality through legislative conscience. Their laughter undoubtedly limits their vision. This is an important restriction. Should they go further towards heated passion, they would turn into tragic heroes rather than comic figures. Their special legislative source of rationality provides them with three types of laughter: at Dogberry's level of rational legislation, at the world's absent or inadequate rational legislation, and at their own inability to legislate. In Shakespeare, those in the last level are the highest comic types, e.g., Beatrice and Benedick. Typically, this is the level where women are most represented.

Molière operates somewhat differently. As Lowenthal put it: "With the exception of the *Misanthrope*, there is not a single person in Molière's plays who claims the right and

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the responsibility to create the world in the image of *his reason* as did the figures of Shakespeare and Cervantes."[1] Molière accepts the world of estates as an ethical world of pre-given rationality providing a safe guide for moral conduct. Of course, Molière does not uncritically affirm this world. Unlike Shakespeare, who at the peak of the Renaissance could not use Aristotle, Molière, as Lowenthal pointed out, returns to the Stagirite through Gassendi. The rationale for his "conformism" is Gassendi's principle: "Experience teaches me." Thus, this is not a "natural" world: it is a world of learning. Anyone without prior experience or who has not learned from experience will act foolishly. Anyone who advocates acting *against* experience and on the basis of authority alone, as Tartuffe does, is dangerous and deserves ridicule. Lowenthal has emphasized Gassendi's pluralism and tolerance towards diversity of opinions — more than one of which can be true, rational and desirable. This is the Aristotelian "golden mean" and explains why Molière creates only comic characters, and only once, in the *Misanthrope*, comes close to articulating a passion sufficiently strong to sustain a tragedy. Whereas with Shakespeare love either ignores or opposes money, power and the like, in Molière's world it is "normal," "rational" and "humane" to seek them since this is what experience teaches us. Here the source of rational authority is overwhelmingly external, and conscience can only be corrective. Three problems arise at this point concerning the relation between comedy and rationality.

The first is the "secret anthropology" of modern comedy which can be located in modern comedies, from Shakespeare on. There are certain 'borderline' anthropological positions in the world of the Shakespearean and post-Shakespearean comedy which inevitably deserve to be ridiculed. One is *misanthropy:* in Molière and others, laughter, even if understanding and not too harsh, involves hating man. (Jaques in *As You Like It,* Tellheim in Lessing's *Minna von Barnhelm,* and Captain Brassbound in Shaw's play are laughingly criticized for it.) Another is the total and uncritical conformity to the rules of conduct provided by *any* given external authority. Both of these are related to the principle of rationality in comedy and point towards that "utopian message" inherent in the genre which led Lessing to prefer it to tragedy. The "utopian message" can be formulated as follows: "Act in a way so that you will not become excommunicated from the community either by rising above it — which is dangerous or ridiculous — or through a self-annihilating attitude — which is counterproductive and irrational. At the same time, avoid becoming a slave of convention and preserve your *critical* faculties."

The second problem applies primarily to Molière. Hobbes provided an interesting definition of the comic, typical of his age: "Laughter *without offense* must be at absurdities and infirmities *abstracted* from persons."[2] This is the classic formulation of what Sartre called the alienation of analytical reason which dissolves the totality of an individual into separate qualities in order to subsequently recombine them in the alienated concept of Man. Molière clearly does this. His protagonists are expressions of certain qualities rather than full-fledged personalities. The intention is humanitarian, but the result is the mutilation of the wholeness of human characters. Shakespeare is both more and less cruel. His laughing critique hits the person as a whole, e.g., Malvolio, but he always stops at the unbreakable unity of human personality. Thus, he represents a stage of rationalism prior to the development of analytical reason.

1. Leo Lowenthal, *Literature and the Image of Man: Studies of the European Drama and Novel, 1000-1900* (Boston, 1966), p. 125.
2. Quoted in James Feibleman, *In Praise of Comedy* (New York, 1939), p. 97.

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The third problem has to do with testing one's "genuine" nature. This is an integral part of the relation between rationality and comedy — a recurring situation involving the progression from the unknown to full knowledge. Tests are typical situations in drama, including tragedy, e.g., *Hamlet*. But there is a particular type of testing of people with educational inclinations which is very close to comedy. Typical of this is the Prospero-Sarastro attitude: a kind of "pedagogical despotism" seeking the enlightenment of the unenlightened and resulting in comic effects. But it is comedy's great contribution to turn testing from pedagogical tyranny into democratic self-education. This is not a function of the particular writer, but of the genre itself. It happens in each of the chosen representative writers. With Shakespeare, testing character involves seeking out the comic figure's hidden virtues and is nearly always educational, while only rarely ruthless, as, perhaps, in Falstaff's case. In Molière, this is a practical postulate of experience: "see with your own eyes!" In Shaw, it is often the sudden recognition of one's "secret" nature which usually turns out to be the exact opposite of the apparent one, thus providing the justification and conclusion of the testing process. But in all cases, comedy as a genre is democratic and rational in that it does not accept any superior authority to test others: only reciprocal influences and self-improvement.

The agents of rationality in comedies typifying the Enlightenment's rebellious reason are anticipated by Molière's famous maidservants. As plebeian exemplars of Hegel's master-slave dialectic, they are the agents of world-historical progress. Even if one rejects any teleologically predestined idea of progress, the connection between these stages cannot be denied. What is involved here is value rationality, and it appears on the level of political enthusiasm — even if the particular subject matter is not directly political. It is a noble type of reason, but not without dangers for artistic qualities. Its utmost scorn for instrumental rationality as partly expressed by some protagonists, e.g., Tellheim, or the artwork itself can degenerate into political propaganda and a cheap didactic attitude. Its source of rationality is entirely internal: its own rebellious conscience which, however, intends to provide general external legislation in the form of a new collective authority.

As the only legitimate heir to Shakespeare and Molière, Shaw creates a complex new situation. Of course, he does not accept as valid any external authority. He considers convention, the traditional repository of moral rationality, as worthy only of scorn. Instrumental rationality does not fare any better: only its analysis turns out to be more complex. It has a relative rationality, i.e., that of crude material interests. Yet, because of its absolutely hostile, derisive and scornful attitude to any form of value rationality, or because of the hypocritical forms of pseudo value-rationality, on a higher level the whole situation turns out to be irrational — even from the hero's viewpoint. But to make the situation even more intricate, an exaggerated challenge to traditions and the world in general by Tanner, Captain Brassbound, and Mrs. Clandon also lapses into the comic. The reason is not Shaw's "reconciliation with reality," as many critics claim, but his socialist spirit. The challenge to the whole world is an important *moral* gesture even if exaggerated and, therefore, comic. But the world cannot be redeemed by moral gestures. This recognition leads him to a sceptical rationality which extends to the stage and creates unparalleled comic situations.

II

Regarding the role of the public in creating rationality in comedy, what needs to be asked concerns what the public knows and at whom it laughs. In Shakespeare, the

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audience knows practically everything. Characters, however, are somewhat more mysterious, but not totally enigmatic. Some mystery regarding characters is inevitable since Shakespeare deals with the full complexity of a human totality. At the beginning one senses whether they are "rather good" or "rather bad," and this is important from Shakespeare's viewpoint. Since external authority is "nature" and not a moral instance, we *create* our rationality and morality through legislative conscience. We are not good or bad for eternity, but only in particular situations. Of course, the public progresses from the vagueness of the initial situation to a much more determinate understanding of the comedies when, at the end, some protagonists end up approved and others disapproved. But this is not a final truth for Shakespeare. He wrote well-rounded but open comedies.

As for the target of the audience's laughter in Shakespeare, the answer is that it can laugh at everyone, and accordingly, only those who can be in principle laughed at are appropriate protagonists in comedies. Despite the fact that comic figures and scenes also appear in Shakespeare's tragedies, it is clear that neither Claudius not Hamlet can be ridiculed. It would be blasphemous to ridicule the first because of the gravity of his crimes, and it would be equally blasphemous to ridicule the second because of his greatness and readiness to sacrifice. Of course, characters in Shakespeare's comedies can be laughed at in various ways and on different levels. If equally respectable people misunderstand each other and become entangled in pointless quarrels, the audience's laughter is general, since their behavior is not rational. Such laughter expresses a deep confidence that "normal," rational relations will eventually be re-established. This is what happens between Beatrice and Benedick in *Much Ado About Nothing*. If on the other hand, someone is so stupid and hypocritical that nearly everyone — even on stage — realizes this, laughter will again be general. But this laughter is one of resignation: no one can hope to restore order and rationality in Dogberry's head. In Molière's case, the public is constituted by common sense people. The audience's reason determines expectations regarding knowledge of events and characters. Men of experience want to know everything: they do not tolerate vagueness, but believe they have a simple and irrefutable criterion of truth: experience evaluated by common sense. Molière lives up to these expectations and produces comedies in which everything is clear from the very beginning, both for the protagonists, as well as for the audience. As Lowenthal writes: "We, the audience have the answers the people on the stage would have if they knew as much as we, or if they looked at what was happening as realistically as we do. Molière gives *us* the reality, and whenever the protagonists appear ridiculous it is because they do not or cannot see it."[3] Even names reveal personal characteristics and comic figures consist primarily of one character trait. This gives Molière's comedies that lucid rationality which led Goethe to characterize *Tartuffe* as the inimitable masterpiece of transparently clear artistic construction. Today, the "adult" audience regards much of Molière's production "juvenile": a peculiar punishment for a rationalism too confident of itself. One of Molière's typical features contributes to this obsolescence. An important type in his comedies spells out the "theoretical lessons" as the author's mouthpiece: the *raisonneur*. His presence, as well as the fact that one is not allowed to laugh at him, creates an air of pomposity alien to the comedy. in general, comedies cannot sustain an abundance of fixed principles; the more in it, the less open the artwork. Shakespeare's greatness as a writer of comedies lies, among other things, in the fact that he had few doctrines in his comic plays.

3. Lowenthal, *op.cit.*, p. 129.

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In the comedy of the rebellious reason of the politicized Enlightenment, the writer and his selected protagonists (Minna in Lessing, Figaro and Susanne in Beaumarchais) are the educators, whereas the audience is the educated. At the same time, this provides an answer to the question of how much the audience knows and what it laughs at. Even if not all Enlightenment comedies assume no knowledge on the part of the audience, they all take for granted that this knowledge is inadequate and the ignorant need education through ridicule. One need only recall some of Molière's titles such as *The School for Husbands* or *The School for Wives*. But Molière's audience is well-equipped with the necessary amount of savvy: there are only some exceptions in need of education. We laugh at these comedies not because we discover such blunderers in ourselves. On the contrary, we laugh because the feeling of being the rule and seeing the exception as something other is entertaining. In contrast to this, "*cosi fan tutte*" is the maxim of Enlightenment comedy. We are all blunderers: we need the comic education of those very few who have already emancipated themselves from the detrimental effects of ignorance, prejudice and obsolete conventions. This education can be aggressive, useful, sane and narrow-minded, as with Figaro, but it can also be cathartic and emotionally magnanimous, as with Susanne and Minna von Barnhelm. This pedagogical attitude runs the danger of falling into didactic dryness and pomposity, so often seen as the main disease of all Enlightenment attitudes. The inner danger of "pedagogical tyranny" in Enlightenment comedy is largely eliminated by the reappearance of a Shakespearean feature: the presence of many noble and morally developed characters who balance each other and prevent any particular one from becoming a "general educator."

In Shaw, *everyone* can, in principle, be ridiculed: all protagonists, the public and even the writer himself. Shaw's famous grimaces reveal an undisciplinable self-irony. For Shaw, knowledge was not something "natural." Thus, the dilemma of sufficient or insufficient knowledge of his public cannot be simply solved by "education." At some level, *all* of Shaw's protagonists act rationally. Since, however, each person represents a unique type of rationality, each of them is irrational for others. It is this constant relativization of reason that educates the audience and provides the most powerful source of humor in Shaw's plays. The constant transformation of the rational into the irrational has three consequences. The first is that one type of rationalism constantly absorbs and subjugates the other. This informs the audience that we are living in a fluid and dialectical age. The second is that the plays can in principle be continued. Thus, at the end of *Pygmalion* he spells out, at least for the reader, what the predictable outcome of the Eliza-Higgins relation is. This leads to the third consequence, i.e., the constant interplay of the rational and the irrational generating the reader as a new audience for Shaw's comedies. Of course, Shaw is fully aware that plays have to "stand on their own" on stage. But his long drawn out prefaces and his bracketed remarks in the play or subsequent to its conclusion on stage require private reading in addition to simply attending theatrical performances. Of course, this stretches a genre beyond the limits set by conventional wisdom. It is reminiscent of Tolstoy's or Victor Hugo's long theoretical descriptions of Napoleonic warfare. Even the reasons for these insertions are similar. Traditional rationalism only needed a scene on the stage or an episode in a book to make its point which rested on the obviousness of its own rationality. In all of these cases, however, this procedure became highly questionable — with Shaw, even more than with Hugo and Tolstoy. The reason is clear: in this battlefield full of many variations of instrumental and value rationality there is not one god but many. It is Max Weber's polytheistic world.

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Consider the following exchange between Stephen and Undershaft in *Major Barbara:* STEPHEN (coldly — almost sullenly): "You speak as if there were half a dozen moralities and religions to choose from, instead of one true morality and one true religion." UNDERSHAFT: "For me there is only one true morality; but it might not fit you, as you do not manufacture aerial battleships. There is only one true morality for every man; but every man has not the same morality."

III

Modern comedy has four basic subject matters: love, fixed ideas, money, convention, and their most intricate combinations. The choice of the subject matter depends on the type of rationality prevailing in the given comedy. They also are a function of whether rational authority is internal or external. A crucial feature of this genre is that practically all other subject matters are ruled out. Thus, should power filter into comic situations, rather than serve only as their background, they would immediately cease to be comic — even in stories with "educational aims" such as the previously mentioned ones.

In Shakespeare, comic strategems dealing with money play practically no role in his comedies. Money is an *appendage* to the character's status or strivings. It is a *conditio sine qua non* rather than a conscious goal. Full-fledged instrumental rationality is characteristic of Shakespeare's majestic monsters, or even the minor scheming scoundrels, rather than of his comic heroes. Thus Falstaff in *The Merry Wives of Windsor,* who in the entourage of Prince Henry is money-hungry, in the comedy is almost exclusively lecherous. Similarly, Petruchio, in *The Taming of the Shrew,* makes no bones about his intention to acquire a substantial dowry. Yet, the comic plot revolves around the "taming of the shrew" and, on stage, passions in motion rather than the words attached to them are what count. Ridiculing conventions is not one of Shakespeare's themes. He accepts their existence but does not see them as something that could impair one's rationality. Fixed ideas have a subordinate role in Shakespeare's world and there is one common trait in Shakespeare and Molière: both regard credulity as irrational, and therefore comic, and confidence as rational. Thus, irrational and ridiculous credulity which exposes the protagonist to laughter comes about either as a result of a belief in one's all-pervasive wisdom or irresistibility.

The real substance of comic situations in Shakespeare is love. As Lowenthal put it, "While it may be initially irrational, love creates its own situation, which, from the seemingly absurd moment of its acknowledgment, becomes a productive basis for a new rationality."[4] At the same time, this explains the unequalled freshness of Shakespeare's comedies. By placing an emotion *par excellence* at the center of his comic plots, Shakespeare turns it into a well-gardened oasis which knows no droughts and which is rejuvenated in every new era of rationality. What is this "new rationality" that Lowenthal sees stemming from love? It is "living up to love's promise" — an attitude of value rationality *sui generis:* a microcosm that can become the model of one's whole macrocosm.

In one respect, Molière is undoubtedly the greatest of the great: he is the most universalist writer of comedies, in that all four of the genre's representative subject matters appear in his plays in various but unmistakable combinations. Love is an important but not an exclusive topic in his comedies — not even a dominant one. In terms of rationality it does *not create* it, but it is *created by* it. It is human, and thus rational, to marry on the basis of love — this is the value rational aspect. Yet, love

4. *Ibid.,* p. 86.

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should not be "blind," which means that a Juliet who sacrifices everything for love, is unimaginable in Molière's world, as would be even Rosalind with her "unusual" behavior in *As You Like It*. Similarly, it is reasonable to observe conventions in these matters. For instance, it is strongly suggested through ridicule not to have a considerable age difference between the spouses. Finally, there is an instrumental nuance in love's rationality: it is good to love and be loved, but all this should happen between people who have the "means" for a happy married life, most of all, financial means.

Fixed ideas are an inexhaustible source of humor in Molière. This is because he is a man of common sense. His ideal is the Aristotelian golden mean and every excess of passion becomes irrational and, as such, comic. But there is another reason for treating fixed ideas comically: in his cosmos there are passions which are by their very nature irrational and, therefore, comic. These are prudishness, misanthropy, hypochondria and, most of all, jealousy. This is because jealousy is the classic form of excessive irrational incredulity. None of these passions are intrinsically "perverted," unless they become obsessions blocking elementary rational conduct.

Since in Molière's world money is useful and, in that sense, a value, it is rational and therefore not comic as a normal means for the "good life." However, it is irrational, and therefore comic, as *treasure*. In Molière, excessive greed can only apply to *accumulated* and never to *consumed* money. Similarly, convention is a value in itself. The rational, and therefore not comic, relation to it is acceptance, rather than rejection. There is no instance in Molière in which the acceptance of conventions would be irrational and therefore comic. On the other hand, there are at least two instances of their not being observed which are thus necessarily comic. One is the *transgression of the borders between estates*, e.g., Georges Dandin and his comic failure; the other is *trendiness* which exaggerates otherwise accepted modes of behavior and renders them comical, e.g., *The Romantic Ladies*. All of this confirms what has been claimed about the interconnections of value and instrumental rationality, as well as the exclusively external source of authority in Molière.

In the comedy of the *rebellious reason* of the politicized Enlightenment, *fixed ideas* play a unique role in creating comic effects. This type of comedy is obsessed with a specific fixed idea: the invincibility of reason, the moral need to unmask unreason, and the fanatical belief in the coming era of the "triumph of reason." This is Lessing's, Beaumarchais', Goldoni's and others' personal conviction. Although its intensity varies from writer to writer, it is unleashed against opponents of this fixed idea and against those vacillating in their resolution who thus become the main targets of comic bitterness. The compulsion of this fixed idea in Enlightenment comedies is the source of its frequently didactic nature. In light of its aggressively *ideological* character, all other representative themes play a subordinate role. Money is present but either in a secondary role, e.g., in Bartolo's and Marcellina's efforts against Figaro, or as simple symbolic expressions of someone's inadequate rational approach to the world which, as such becomes the source of the comic effect, e.g., Tellheim's pride with regard to Minna's money. Of course, love is also present but, unlike Shakespeare's inexhaustible emotionality, it does not create but only represents rationality. This means that Shakespeare's protagonists become rational in the process of "living up to love's promise" to the extent that they "learn about each other" and manage to "assimilate to each other" while retaining their own individuality. Love is literally a task to be accomplished in our personality and in that of others; it *creates* rationality since there is no ready-made rationality in the world, and it is an end in itself. In Enlightenment comedies there is no ready-made rationality either. In this sense love's

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effort is to bring rationality into this world through the partners' struggle for their right to love each other without interference. Even the character of love as labor is present, e.g., in the relation between Minna and Tellheim. But love's labor is definitely not an end in itself: only a symbol of something higher. It is the symbol of the "cause" of value rationality in general, which does not exist yet, but has to be created as a new external authority. Here, convention appears often, but usually as a complex metaphor for unreason, e.g., the count Almaviva.

In Shaw's fully developed comic universe the fixed idea as a theme has a highly dubious status. Here, what once was framed as a criticism against Shaw has to be turned into a compliment. The young Lukacs, in his early pre-Marxist period, called the great playwright the clown of historical materialism. According to Lukacs, Shaw was a reductionist. He reduced all of his protagonists' high level ideas to their material basis: he translated their sublime words into their dirty financial equivalent. For him, "men of ideas" are suspicious: all fixed ideas are either forthright lies or self-delusions. Shaw actually anticipated a trend now in vogue: it is with him that the intelligentsia as the "manufacturer of ideas" appears in its segregated social role.

Money is undoubtedly one of Shaw's central subjects. Money is behind everything: good and bad, war and peace, meaning and apparent self-dedication. Money can buy the politician, ideas, love, science and literally everything. Paradoxically, the Undershafts of this world unabashedly professing their love for money are treated more tolerantly than those telling sublime lies about their unselfishness. The reason why he regards the lower and upper class Tartuffes as more dangerous than the Undershafts has to do with their self-deception. As long as Vivie (in *Mrs. Warren's Profession*) is not confronted with her mother's ethics, she is inextricably caught in the net of this egoistic world. Although an eminently rational creature, she behaves with false sentimentality. When, however, they come to a showdown and Mrs. Warren's ethics reveal their real nature, Vivie attains her freedom and leaves her mother's world with a triumphant gesture. Of course, this resoluteness is not a necessary outcome, but is at least a strong possibility.

In Shaw, love as a subject matter is the eulogy and the exaltation of a new type of women rather than the occasion to depict reciprocal relations: Shaw is sceptical about marriage, or even functioning love relations. But he revitalizes the latent "feminist streak" of modern comedy as a genre: he carries on the tradition of Beatrice, Rosalind, Molière's maid-servants, Susanne and Minna von Barnhelm. His Candida and Lady Cicely represent the optimal proportions of reason and emotion in this society. The closest thing to "eternal womanhood," which is not a cheap romantic cliché but a rational being, is the positive female protagonist in Shaw's plays.

Finally, not much can be said about convention as a theme in these comedies. It makes its appearance and is discussed in ironical social chitchat. No one takes it too seriously. Providing it unveils itself and does not obstruct the full evolution of one's own rationality by extorting false sentimental gestures from the protagonists, it has lost its negative poetic value and is artistically relegated to the background. Perhaps there is one exception where convention does become valuable comic material. This happens with the protagonist who gets carried away with his "anti-conventional" zeal and becomes ridiculous precisely as a consequence.

IV

We are now living in Ionesco's world: an epoch characterized by the disintegreation of reason where rationality is no longer relativized but has become the target of

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general derision. As a result, what comes out of this constellation, i.e., the absurd drama, is no longer comedy in the ordinary sense of the genre. Our standards do not apply to it, least of all those of a typical subject matter, since its exclusive source of comic inspiration is, in a far-reaching conformity with a problematic philosophical development, semantic self-analysis. Of course, if something is born that has never existed, it is no bastard but a legitimate offspring: it is an enrichment of art rather than a "deviation." Comic art, however, will sooner or later find its way back to the relation of the rational and the comic in whose terms its greatest masterpieces have been created.

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REDUCTIONISM IN MARXIST THEORY

by Nicos Mouzelis

Most Marxists would agree that two of Marxism's lasting contributions to the methodology of the social sciences are (a) its holistic orientation — its unwillingness to examine social phenomena in a compartmentalised fashion; and (b) its portrayal of collective agents in a dialectical relation to their social environment — with economic, political and ideological structures setting limits to collective action, while at the same time collective agents (classes, social movements, etc.) react to these limitations and try to either change or maintain them. In other words, Marxist methodology shows human beings as both the producers and the products of their social world.

On the other hand, Marx's emphasis on the primacy of the economic sphere and his disciples' innumerable attempts to elaborate this primacy has led to various reductionist tendencies which have diluted the holistic character of Marxist thought. Thus, the various mechanistic and a priori attempts to derive cultural and political institutional forms and practices from the structure and functioning of the economic base have repeatedly impaired the usefulness of Marxism as a holistic conceptual framework — by consistently neglecting the specificity and relatively autonomous dynamics of political and cultural phenomena. Furthermore, this approach has been jeopardised by either an ultra-voluntarism which sees social classes as omnipotent and omniscient anthropomorphic entities; or, at the other extreme, by emphasizing systemic-structural constraints to the extent of portraying agents as mere puppets of economic, political, and ideological structures.

One of the chief foci of analysis of Marxist theory over the last decade has been criticism of the economic reductionism of the "orthodox"-dogmatic Marxism of the Stalinist era. Recent debates concerning the Marxist theory of the capitalist state exhibits a preoccupation with forging conceptual tools for going beyond economistic-reductionist explanations of the political sphere. This explains the centrality of concepts such as the relative autonomy of the state, the specificity of the political instance, etc. Despite this, however, little has been done to clearly define the above concepts and to distinguish, for instance, between different types of reductionism or of "relative autonomy."

To argue that the action of political agents can be reduced to the action of economically dominant groups is very different from arguing that those agents' policies can be fully understood in terms of the reproduction requirements of the capitalist mode of production.

The first type of reductionism implies an agent-agent relationship; the second, insofar as the main focus of explanation is not a socio-economic group but the capitalist system's funtional requirements, implies a system-structure-agent relation.[1] Furthermore, the idea that the political system as a whole, or the institutional framework of the state (rather than the policies of its personnel), can be completely

1. This is the distinction behind the Poulantzas-Miliband debate, see E. Laclau's "The Specificity of the Political: The Poulantzas-Miliband Debate" in *Economy and Society*, vo. IV, no. 1, pp. 87-110.

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understood in terms of the "logic" of capital accumulation leads to a third type of reductionism, one implying a relation between two institutional spheres, i.e., a structure-structure relation. This variant in turn must be differentiated from a fourth, which tries to explain political institutions as the direct result of the conspiratorial machinations of economically dominant groups (an agent-structure relation).

The distinction, therefore, between structures and agents — i.e., the distinction between structural-institutional constraints and agents' practices (in non-Marxist sociology: the system-action or the system integration-social integration distinction)[2] — is a useful basis for establishing four different types of relationships: (a) agent-agent, (b) agent-structure, (c) structure-agent, and (d) structure-structure. This typology may be useful for identifying distinct versions of economic reductionism which exist in Marxist theory.

Voluntaristic Types of Reductionism

Since voluntaristic types of reductionism are straightforward and have been common in recent Marxist debates concerning the relation between the economic and the political, they will be discussed only briefly.

Agent-agent Reductionism. This reductionism typifies all those theories claiming that the actions and policies of those directly exercising state power are invariably subjected to the pressures of an omnipotent bourgeoisie constantly pulling the strings behind the backs of politicians or the military. Here the class-state relation is viewed as a relation between economic groups and political groups or agents in a situation where political groups are the passive instruments of economic ones.

The conceptualization of the economic-political relation as a relation of agents involved in a zero-sum power game allows for an either "economistic" or "politicist" reductionism of the agent-agent kind. As Poulantzas puts it, in the former case "the dominant class absorbs the State by emptying it of its own powers, in the latter case the state imposes its will (that of the bureaucracy and political elites) on the divergent and rival interests of civil society."[3] Since the following will be concerned mainly with economistic forms of reductionism, the latter version is what will be disavowed. In this case, a category of state agents is conceived as the passive tool in the service of economically powerful groups.

This "instrumentalist" view of the state is characteristic of "vulgar" Marxism, and can be found in the writings of, e.g., C.W. Mills and of Miliband,[4] although the stand taken in their writings is not reductionist in the strict sense. They do not *a priori* reduce political to economic practices, for the establishment of links between political and economic agents (either in terms of an analysis of the class origins of state personnel, or in terms of linkages between economic, political, and military elites) is based on empirical research. Their analysis would be truly reductionist only if the relation between economic interests and state personnel were established *a*

2. For a discussion of the system-social integration or system-action distinciton cf. D. Lockwood, "Social Integration and System Integration" in G.K. Ollschan and W. Hirsch, editors, *Explorations in Social Change* (London: Routledge, 1964), pp. 244-56; see also N. Mouzelis, "Social and System Integration: Some Reflections on a Fundamental Distinction," *British Journal of Sociology*, XXI(2), 1970, pp. 207-18. For the distinction between structures and practices cf. N. Poulantzas, *Social Power and Social Classes* (New Left Books, London, 1975), p. 85ff. Cf. also M. Castells, *La Question Urbaine* (Maspèro, Paris, 1972).

3. N. Poulantzas, *State, Power, Socialism* (London: New Left Books, 1978), p. 14.

4. C.W. Mills, *The Power Elite,* (New York, 1956) and R. Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1969).

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priori, i.e., by ruling out any possibility of seeing the relation as variable, problematic, and open to empirical investigation. Such exclusion is characteristic of economic reductionism.

On the other hand, Poulantzas has already pointed out that the conceptual framework underlying the writings of Miliband and Mills focuses predominantly on an agent-agent relationship. As such, it evades the study of the structural-institutional context of economic, political and ideological constraints which set severe limits to the practices of both political and economic agents.[5]

It might be useful, therefore, to distinguish between "strong" and "weak" forms of agent-agent reductionist practices. In the strong type, the reduction of political to economic practices tends to be of a mechanistic, a-prioristic character which substitutes ready-made formulae for empirical investigation; the weak type of reductionism results from a conceptual framework focusing exclusively on problems of social rather than system integration, on social conflict rather than structural constraint and systemic contradictions.

In other words, if the "strong" version of reductionism eliminates problem areas through a-prioristic-dogmatic assumptions as to the total lack of autonomy on certain phenomena (e.g., political groups), the "weak" version of reductionism eliminates problem areas by default, by using a conceptual framework which, though it makes no dogmatic reductions, fails to draw attention to such phenomena.

It goes without saying that no reductionist orientation is implied where economic primacy is established (either in the form of the overriding importance of agents, or institutions, or both) not as a *universal* postulate in the conceptual framework itself, but as the result of theorization and empirical investigation of specific cases, or even specific types of social formation. To argue, for instance, that the relation between class location and political practices tends to be more direct in capitalist than in pre-capitalist formations, and that in consequence political struggles based on economic cleavages are more important in the former, does not involve any reductionist connotation.[6] *Agent-Structure Reductionism.* This type of reductionism is another version of instrumental voluntarism, but here the state as an instrument is seen in terms of its institutional structure rather than in terms of its personnel. Here the bourgeoisie does not control and guide the political decision-making process by constant lobbying, but by creating an institutional framework which itself will ensure that the state personnel (irrespective of their social origins or interest-group connections) will generate policies which safeguard and promote bourgeois interests. This type of reductionism too can take more sophisticated forms, as when political institutions are seen as not only the result of bourgeois machinations, but as the intended or unintended long-term outcomes of class struggles.[7]

Of course, the two types of reductionism examined so far can be and often are combined, resulting in the type of ultra-voluntarism which portrays dominant classes as omnipotent and omniscient entities controlling all practices and shaping all institutions within a given social formation. Although discredited, this type of

5. Cf. N. Poulantzas, "The Problem of the Capitalist State" in *New Left Review*, no. 58, Nov.-Dec. 1969. The debate on this issue continued in subsequent numbers of the same journal (Nos. 59, 82, 95). Cf. also E. Laclau, "The Specificity of the Political: Around the Poulantzas-Miliband Debate" in *Economy and Society*, vol. 5, no. 1, Feb. 1975.

6. For an elaboration of this argument cf. N. Mouzelis, "Class and Clientelist Politics: The Case of Greece" in *Sociological Review*, August 1978.

7. Cf. J. Holloway and S. Picciotto, Capital, Crisis and the State" in *Capital and Class*, Summer 1977, pp. 58ff.

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theories still hold a powerful influence as ideological weapons in the political arena. On that level, when it is not the bourgeoisie as a whole which is portrayed as running the day-to-day management of the capitalist world, it is usually such all-powerful agencies as the Pentagon or the CIA which are said to implement its wishes.[8]

It could be argued that the distinction between the above two voluntaristic variants of reductionism is spurious, that there can be no difference between the autonomy or lack of autonomy of agents on the one hand and institutions on the other and that, for instance, autonomy of political groups implies autonomy of political institutions and vice versa. Now, it is perfectly true that in most concrete situations the distinction between the relative autonomy of groups on the one hand, and that of institutions on the other, is quite difficult to draw in any but purely analytical terms. However, where, due to conjunctural circumstances, a politically dominant group exercises an inordinate amount of power without this power having yet been institutionalized into stable "authority" structures, there group autonomy and institutional autonomy do not coincide.[9] This is merely another way of saying that just as systemic or structural contradictions do not necessarily overlap with social conflict,[10] so structural-systemic constraints do not always overlap with group pressures. Claus Offe provides a good example of systemic constraints and group pressures not necessarily overlapping. He argues that in early capitalism, before the advent of universal suffrage, the state was much more an instrument of the dominant classes, i.e., that in its policy-making it was much more compliant to pressures from the dominant classes. Universal suffrage at a later stage of capitalist development brought with it a reduction of "class" domination and the growth of "capitalist system" domination. In Poulantzas' formulation, the state became increasingly preoccupied with the overall reproduction of the capitalist system, i.e., it became much more exposed to systemic "demands."[11]

Structuralist types of reductionism

In the voluntaristic variants of reductionism, the major linkages between the economic and the political instances are in terms of actions, strategies, or practices of groups, or mere categories of agents which, more or less deliberately, shape political insitituions or directly control the political decision-making process. The anthropomorphism and voluntarism of these types of reductionism contrast sharply with the structure-structure, and structure-agent variants.

8. To take an example I am quite familiar with, in Greek political debates the CIA is often presented as an all-powerful deity regulating and controlling everything and everybody on the social and political scene. Even price fluctuations and global economic crises have been regarded as the direct result of sinister CIA machinations. Cf. for instance John Katris, *The Birth of Neo-Fascism* (in Greek), (Geneva, 1971). For a critique of this approach, as far as Greece is concerned, cf. N. Mouzelis, "The Rise and Fall of the Greek Dictatorship" in *New Left Review*, March-April, 1976.

9. The 1967 Greek military coup provides a good example of the non-correspondence of group and institutional autonomy. The coup did give a group of officers the opportunity to exercise an inordinate amount of power for a limited period of time. But because of their failure to legitimize army rule on a long-term basis, *military institutions* in Greece did not acquire the degree of salience and relative autonomy which they have in neighboring Turkey for instance. There, given the crucial role that Kemal Atatürk's army played in founding the republic, military institutions exercise a dominance which persists throughout the various political conjunctures and regime changes.

10. Cf. Lockwood, *op.cit.*

11. Cf. Claus Offe, "Political Authority and Class Structures" in P. Connerton, editor, *Critical Sociology* (Penguin, London, 1976).

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In structuralist reductionist explanations, agents-actors are no longer central to the analysis. Either they disappear altogether, or they play a very peripheral role as the passive products of structural constraints or determinations. As anthropomorphic voluntarism gives way to functionalist linkages between the economic and the political spheres, so "strategy" concepts such as policies, intended-unintended consequences, group pressures and class struggles are replaced by systemic concepts such as functional requirements, structural constraints, tendential laws and contradictions. Another way of putting the difference is to say that, whereas in voluntarism social processes are viewed in terms of the actors, in functionalism the same social processes are seen in terms of the system and the requirements for its persistence-reproduction.

If the voluntaristic types of reductionism have been out of fashion for some time now, the development of Althusserian Marxism has invested the functionalist-structuralist variants with considerable intellectual respectability. It is appropriate, therefore, to examine them closely.

Structure-Structure Reductionism. In this variant, the institutional features of the political system are derived from, or reduced to, economic structural constraints, or to the "laws of motion" of the capitalist mode of production.

The crudest form of structure-structure reductionism conceptualizes the institutional structure of the state or the overall political system as an epiphenomenon, as a mere reflection of the infrastructure. This epiphenomenalist view of the state and the political sphere allows neither voluntaristic mechanisms (group pressures, policies, strategies) nor functionalist ones (systemic constraints, functional requirements) as linkages of the economic and the political; the political sphere simply reflects the economic one and, diachronically, whenever changes occur in the infrastructure, they sooner or later make themselves felt, in more or less automatic fashion, on the superstructural level.

This type of crude epiphenomenalism is also out of fashion, although there are vestiges of it in, for instance, Offe's theory of the state. Offe starts by criticizing both "instrumentalist-influence" and "systemic constraints" theories of the state in Miliband's and Poulantzas' work. In Offe's view, neither theory succeeds in proving the class character of the bourgeois state, since they both focus on external pressures or constraints, rather than on its internal structure, i.e., not on those administrative mechanisms which transform the general interests of capital into public policy.

In fact, for Offe the state is a *capitalist* state rather than a state within capitalism, because its internal structure includes various selective mechanisms which ensure: (a) the elimination of all policies representing non-capitalist or fractionally capitalist interests; (b) that the "proper" decisions (from the point of view of the general interests of capital) are taken for the further accumulation of capital; (c) that the state policies in favor of capital are presented as favoring the general interest of all classes. Now, assuming that such a complicated "filter system" exists which, irrespective of group influences or systemic constraints, ensures that decisions are produced which are right for capital, how does Offe explain its emergence and persistence?

Since he does not choose to show historically how such a filter system comes about, he has two options left: *either* to demonstrate by teleological means that these three selective mechanisms exist as the result of certain systemic constraints in the economy; *or* to show that these mechanisms "reflect" on the level of the state's internal structure the *complementarity* between the structure of the economy and

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the structure of the polity — a complementarity which ensures that the requirements of the one system must correspond to the requirements of the other and vice versa.

In fact, as Offe avoids dealing systematically with group influences and systemic constraints external to the state, he comes very closely to the second line of reasoning. Sardei-Diermann et.al. have argued that "Offe's reasons for focusing on the state alone are based on the assumption that the relationship state-economy is *reflected* in the internal structures of the political system. While there is no doubt that the analysis of the structures of the state is important and a widely neglected field, their genetic development has to be examined in a socio-historic context. A priori a full correspondence between the structures of the relationship state-economy and the internal structures of the state cannot be assumed. Even if such a correspondence does exist at one stage of the development, this very fact might impede the development of such a correspondence at a later stage." [12]

Most variants of structure-structure reductionism avoid the reflectionist conceptualization by establishing functionalist linkages between the economic and the political instances. So Brunhoff's study of state-capital relations [13] elaborates a theme which has become widely accepted. This is, that contrary to laissez-faire liberal ideologies about the bourgeois state, intervention of the state in the capitalist economy (even during its competitive stage) is not the "external" intervention of an autonomous subject in an already constituted, self-regulating economic system; rather, as well as being external (given the differentiation between the economic and the political spheres in capitalism and the relative autonomy of the latter), it is also innate to the economy. State intervention is seen as playing a *constitutive* role in the reproduction of the money-commodities-money circuit.

Brunhoff tries to establish this by examining the circuit of two specific commodities in capitalism: labor and money. She argues, for instance, that without state intervention the circuit cannot, on a purely capitalist basis, ensure the long-term reproduction of labor power. For, in as far as the price of labor power tends to cover only the cost of its day-to-day reproduction, the costs necessary for its long-term reproduction (which would involve such things as coverage against illness, unemployment, accidents at work, etc.) must be met in a non-capitalist manner, i.e., by state intervention. With respect to labor power, therefore, the circuit is not conceivable in the long run without state intervention; hence state intervention does not play a merely corrective role vis-à-vis capitalism, but is present in its very constitution.

Brunhoff allows that in economies where the capitalist mode of production has not expanded very widely, the long-term reproduction of labor power can be ensured by the large non-capitalist sectors with minimum state intervention. But as capitalism expands, state intervention too has to become more extensive — hence the shift from mere state "assistance" to the full-blown "social security" welfare institutions of advanced capitalism. This shift from minimal to large-scale state intervention in labor legislation is due not so much to class struggles or the development of class consciousness and class organization among the workers, as much more so to the long-term reproduction requirements of monopoly capitalism. In other words, this type of reductionism conceives the increasingly welfaristic character of the contem-

12. Cf. S. Sardei-Dierman *et.al.*, "Class Domination and the Political System: A Critical Interpretation of a Recent Contribution by Claus Offe" in *Kapitalistate*, February, 1973, p. 68 (italics mine).

13. *Etat et Capital* (Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, 1978).

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porary capitalist state as primarily a necessary condition for the existence of advanced capitalism.

It is not, of course, only labor which cannot reproduce itself through purely capitalist means. The reproduction of capital encounters similar problems. Thus, according to the German "logic of capital" school of the state,[14] the interest differences between fractions of capital would, if left to their own devices, tend to create an anarchic state of affairs where fierce competition, cut-throat inter-capital fights and the ensuing over-exploitation of labor would actually jeopardize the very reproduction of the capitalist mode of production. It is this which necessitates state intervention to safeguard the interests of capital as a whole by regulating competition, controlling labor-capital conflicts, and generally providing the bourgeois legal framework which is a fundamental prerequisite for the reproduction of capitalism. So here too the basic institutional features of the contemporary capitalist state are derived from the "logic of capital," i.e., the reproduction requirements of the capitalist mode of production.

This type of reasoning is not, of course, used only in the context of the study of the capitalist state. Godelier, for instance, employs it to explain the political institutions of the Mbuti pygmies, a society of hunters and food-gatherers in equatorial Congo. Their system of production (mainly hunting in bands, with the women and children driving the game into nets held by the men) generates three fundamental constraints which express the "social conditions for the reproduction of the productive process: (a) the *dispersion constraint*, which refers to the fact that for the system to operate effectively, the band members cannot be above or below a certain number; (b) the *cooperation constraint*, which emphasizes the need for collaboration of all members in the productive process according to sex and age; and (c) the *fluidity* or *non-closure constraint*, which is the band's need to be in "permanent flux," i.e., in frequent movement of members from one band to another.

These three constraints form a system which "is the origin of a certain number of *simultaneous* structural effects on *all* other instances of the Mbuti's social organization."[15] For example, on the political level, Mbuti society is characterized by relative equality among band members, and by a remarkable lack of aggression among bands.Why is band warfare rare in Mbuti society? According to Godelier, because it "is incompatible with the mode-of-production constraints (a), (b) and (c) taken separately and in their reciprocal relations." How can one explain the role of the "fool" within the band? By the fact that the fool, by means of certain institutionalized practices, defuses conflict between tribal members and thus enhances the cooperation which is a prerequisite for the reproduction of the system. Thus, there are similar norms of cooperation in all instances of the Mbuti social formation; and this *isomorphism* between instances is "generated by the fact that they are all different aspects of the *same cause* (i.e., the system of the three constraints) which acts simultaneously on all societal levels."[16] In other words, Godelier sees political structures as directly derived from economic ones, or rather political institutional forms as the direct result of the economic system's reproduction requirements.

Hirsch's work, although in many ways similar to the above-mentioned approaches,

14. An exposition and presentation of some representative articles in this intellectual tradition is to be found in J. Holloway and S. Picciotto, *State and Capital: A Marxist Debate* (Edward Arnold, London, 1978).

15. *Horizons, Trajets Marxists en Anthropologie* (Maspèro, Paris, 1973), p. 68.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 72 (translation and emphasis mine).

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presents two interesting features which set it apart. More so than any other member of the German school, Hirsch is very critical of theorists like Poulantzas who, starting from the idea of the relative autonomy of the political instance, either study political structures in isolation from the underlying economic ones; or examine the state-economy relation by limiting their analytical focus to the epiphenomenal forms of economic and political structures. In so doing they, like bourgeois social scientists, take the given institutional forms of the state and the economy at face value, and neglect a deeper study of the hidden laws of motion of capital which, in the final analysis, provide the explanation of both economic and political institutional forms.

Hirsch argues that it is not by the establishment of direct superficial links between economic and political institutions, but only by means of these capitalist laws as formulated by Marx and elaborated by his successors (labor theory of value, tendency for the rate of profit to fall, etc.), that a solid basis can be laid for the proper understanding of not merely the structure of the capitalist state, but also of the institutional structure of present-day capitalist economies. Thus for him "it is with respect to the still major contradiction of the capitalist mode of production as expressed by the tendential law of the falling rate of profit that one can understand the increasingly interventionist character of the contemporary capitalist state — such intervention being necessary in order to counteract the falling profit rate by a radical restructuring of the economy." [17]

The distinction Hirsch draws between depth and surface analysis does not make his approach any the less reductionist, however. It simply replaces a surface structure-structure reductionism with a more complicated reductionism. It is not the functional requirements of the epiphenomenal economic institutions which shape the institutional structure of the state, but instead both these surface structures can be derived from the "hidden" laws of motion of capital.

Another distinctive feature of Hirsch's work, which at first sight attenuates his structure-structure reductionism, is his insistence that the type of a-historical structuralist and purely logical analysis which characterizes the German school must be complemented by historical analysis of the class struggles which at any specific moment can explain the concrete forms taken by state intervention. He contends that since the laws of motion of capital are not iron laws but structural tendencies, often neutralized or weakened by counter-tendencies, it is the outcome of specific class struggles which will determine their structural efficacy. For instance, a trade-union victory over wages can reinforce the tendency of the profit rate to fall, whereas a defeat would reinforce counter-tendencies and attenuate capitalist crises.

In other words, Hirsch makes the general point that the type of logico-deductive structural analysis developed by the German school (identifying the necessary conditions for the existence and reproduction of monopoly capitalism) should not take the place of, but rather go hand in hand with a historical analysis of specific class struggles in the light of the more abstract propositions about the tendential laws of the capitalist mode of production. [18]

Unfortunately, despite these programmatic utterances, Hirsch's work contains no serious historical analysis of class struggles, neither is there a serious theoretical attempt at integrating the structural analysis of tendential laws and contradicitons with a historical analysis of class struggles. In fact, the concept of class struggles,

17. T. Hirsch, "The State Apparatus and Social Reproduction: Elements of a Theory of the Bourgeois State" in J. Holloway and S. Picciotto, *op.cit.*, pp. 57-167.

18. *Ibid.*, pp. 81ff.

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although repeatedly brought up both in his own writings and in those of other members of the German school, plays a purely decorative role. It is used as a *deus ex machina* to save the analysis from the circular formalism and teleological tendencies necessarily entailed in structure-structure reductionism.

It has frequently been pointed out that to list the functional requirements for the maintenance and reproduction of an economic system, and then to say that certain institutional features of the state seem to fulfill these requirements, does not suffice as an explanation of the specific form taken by these institutional features or of how they came about. The attempt of many structuralist theorists to do so by using terms such as structural determination, over-determination, determination in the last instance, etc., is simply to illegitimately transform functional consequences or functional requirements into causes — a teleological type of explanation which both non-Marxists and more recently also Marxist theorists have criticized and rejected.[19]

Given the deeply ingrained teleological bias of all structure-structure reductionist explanations, paying lip service to the concept of class struggles can by no means redress the balance between structuralist and historical analysis. Drawing up, as Hirsch does, long lists of structural tendencies and counter-tendencies, and then at the very end invoking class struggle as the ultimate arbiter in the balance of the two, is hardly the way to integrate the logico-deductive-structuralist with the historical-class-struggle approach. It is simply an *ad hoc* use of concepts of the latter as a smokescreen for the theoretical impasses which are an unavoidable consequence of the former.

Structure-Agent Reductionism. If the structure-structure type of reductionism derives the main features of political institutions from the functional requirements of constraints imposed on it by the economy, structure-agent reductionism uses similar terms to try to explain political *practices*. An area where this type of reductionism emerges very clearly is in the recent debates on the structural determination of classes in capitalist societies.

A useful starting point would be Poulantzas' distinction between class "places" and class "positions." The first refers to the "objective" location of agents in the technical and social division of labor; the second refers to such things as the political organizations or agencies representing a class, the strategies (positions) and policies it formulates in a concrete conjuncture, etc. "What one means by class consciousness proper and by autonomous political organization, i.e., from the point of view of the working class, a revolutionary proletarian ideology and an autonomous party, refer to *class positions and to the conjuncture*, they constitute the conditions for the intervention of classes as *social forces*.[20] (Since in English the term "position" often refers to what Poulantzas calls "places," I shall be using the term "practices" or "strategies" here instead of "positions.") Once Poulantzas' distinction is accepted, the question

19. Cf. for instance R.K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Social Press, Gelncoe, 1963), pp. 60-64; R. Dore, "Function and Cause" in *American Sociological Review*, 1961. Criticism very similar to that used by the above sociologists against teleogical functionalist explanations has recently been rediscovered by Marxist theorists who, with great panache, employ similar arguments though dressed up in a different terminology. (The term "functional requirements" is replaced by "necessary condition of existence" — the argument being that it is one thing to logically identify the necessary conditions of existence of an institutional system, and quite another to explain the specific forms these conditions take in a concrete social situation. Df. A. Cutler, B. Hindess, P. Hirst and A. Hussain, *Marx's Capital and Capitalism Today*, vol. 1 (Routledge, London, 1977).

20. *Les Classes Sociales dans le Capitalisme d'Aujord'hui* (Seuil, Paris, 1974), p. 10.

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arises what linkages there are between class places and class practices.

A straightforward reductionist explanation would involve the establishment of direct one-way linkages between the two: class practices and strategies on the political level are derived and understood in terms of objective class structures, i.e., in terms of the objective places allotted to agents by the capitalist division of labor on the level of the economy.

Now given that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to establish *direct* links between objective class places and political practices, two distinct strategies can be used to cope with the problems created by a structure-agent type of reductionism.

The first strategy is to argue that, whenever political conflicts are not directly focused on class cleavages but on regional, ethnic, racial, religious or clientelistic ones, then the latter are *epiphenomenal*, and going beyond appearances will soon make it evident that it is in fact class divisions which are at the root of such conflicts.

To take a concrete example: Luciano Li Causi has criticized anthropoligists who study Mediterranean politics purely in terms of patronage, and who consequently tend to neglect the class structures underlying clientelistic practices.[21] Although he is right in insisting that clientelistic practices should be linked with the class structure, he slips into a structure-agent type of reductionism when he argues that clientelism is an epiphenomenon, a mere ideology useful for concealing the underlying structures of exploitation. According to him, in the rural areas of Italy there are always exploiting landlords behind the patrons, and exploited peasants behind the clients. From a theoretical point of view, therefore, the problem of patronage ceases to exist.

By dismissing clientelism in this cavalier fashion, Li Causi eliminates a crucial problem in Mediterranean politics: the examination of the intricate shifting relations between clientelistic and class-political organizations during the process of capital accumulation. His reduction of clientelistic practices to class locations does not allow for the study of those conditions where the dominant political cleavages are closely connected with objective class divisions (i.e., where they take the form of exploiters versus exploited), and those conditions where they are not (i.e., where major conflicts take the form of one clientelist or regionally-based exploiter-exploited alliance against another).

Moreover, Li Cause's reductionist position totally misses the fundamental point that political conflicts along clientelist "vertical" lines often cut across and inhibit the political organization of the exploited classes along "horizontal" class lines[22] as well as the fact that in many peripheral capitalist formations a variety of vertical and horizontal political organizations coexist simultaneously and alternate in importance according to the political conjuncture.[23]

21. "Anthropology and Ideology: The Case of Patronage in Mediterranean Societies" in *Radical Science Journal*, no. 1, 1975; for a similar approach cf. M. Gilsenan, "Against Patron-Client Relaitons" in E. Gellner and J. Waterbury, editors, *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies* (Duckworth, London, 1977). For a reduction of the caste system to the class structure, cf. C. Meillassoux, "Are There Castes in India?" in *Economy and Society*, February 1973; concerning class reducitonism vis-à-vis racial conflict, see G. Ben-Tovim, "The Struggle Against Racism: Theoretical and Strategic Perspectives" in *Marxism Today*, July, 1978; cf. also J. Gabriel and G. Ben-Tovim, "Marxism and the Concept of Racism" in *Economy and Society*, May 1978.

22. For concepts of "horizontal" and "vertical" organizations cf. E. Wolf, *Peasants* (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.Y., 1966), pp. 81-86.

23. For an elaboration of these points cf. Mouzelis, "Class and Clientelist Politics: The Case of Greece," *op.cit.*, and also "Ideology and Class Politics" in *New Left Review*, November-December 1978.

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The structure-agent reductionism examined above either sees political practices as the direct effects of class locations, or whenever this does not seem to be so, i.e., whenever political practices do not appear to be founded on class divisions, the importance of class locations is reasserted by dismissing as epiphenomenal the clientelistic, ethnic, regional basis of such practices. In other words, there is a refusal to accept that institutional structures other than economic ones (regional, ethnic) may have an important impact on political practices.

A more sophisticated form of structure-agent reductionism, such as Poulantzas' for example, would accept the obvious fact that political practices cannot be entirely understood or explained by focusing on economic structures alone. Poulantzas begins by admitting that it is not possible to establish a one-to-one relation between class places and practices. For instance, he argues that in terms of class places, the "labor aristocracy" belongs to the proletariat, although this category of workers often adopts bourgeois strategies which are incongruent with its objective interests. [24]

How then can this incongruency be explained? According to Poulantzas, by the fact that class practices are not determined simply by the economic instance, but by the overall structuralist matrix which consists of a complex articulation of economic, political and ideological structures. It is precisely because political and ideological structures, in addition to the economic ones, have pertinent effects on class practices, that there can be no one-to-one correspondence between class places and practices.

This, of course, avoids the crude class reductionism of a direct place-practice correspondence, but merely replaces it with a more general structural determinism which portrays political agents and their practices as the passive product of a complex articulation of institutional structures at the level of the overall social formation. Of course, like Hirsch, Poulantzas constantly talks about class struggles which, he says, constitute the primary motive force for reproducing the relations of production and the whole matrix of structures. But, again like Hirsch, his analysis uses the concept of class struggles as an *ad hoc* formula which has no serious theoretical connections with the rest of his conceptual framework — a framework which in any case does not allow for any real effectiveness of class struggles. [25] Poulantzas defines the concept of social classes as "a concept which indicates the effects of all the structures of a mode-of-production matrix or of a social formation on the agents who constitute the supports: this concept indicates therefore the effects of the global structure in the sphere of social relations." [26]

So classes are seen here as the "effects" rather than the "causes" of structures, and agents are simply "supports" of structures. In fact, Poulantzas' determining relations always develop from the structure to the agents, rather than the other way round. We are constantly told how complex structural determinations shape the agents' practices; we are never shown how the latter, especially in the form of such collective

24. *Les Classes Sociales....*, *op.cit.*, p. 17.

25. For such a critique of Poulantzas' use of the class-struggle concept cf. Terry Johnson, "What is to be Done? The Structural Determination of Social Class" in *Economy and Society*, vol. VI, no. 2, May 1977.

26. Cf. his *Pourvoir Politique et Classes Sociales* (Maspèro, Paris, 1968), p. 66. Furthermore, referring to the distinction between places and agents, Poulantzas expressly states that "the analysis made here of the relations of production according to the phases of present-day monopoly capitalism, concerns the *place* of capital and its functions. Another is the problem of *agents* who exercise its powers, i.e., those who occupy this place or who depend on it directly....in the last analysis they (the agents) are simply an effect of the modification of the relations of production." *Les Classes Sociales, op.cit.*, p. 32.

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agencies as political movements, parties, etc., can in their turn have an impact, can maintain or transform the overall structural configurations. In this way the agent-structure relation remains as mysterious and as unexplained as Durkheim's "conscience collective."

Given this particular conceptualization of classes and of the place-agent relation, it is obvious why the concept of class struggles does not fit at all into Poulantzas' structuralism. For, if classes are the effects of the overall matrix of structures, then struggles between "bearers of structures" are just as much the effects of structural determinations as everything else.

In conclusion, the serious integration of the concept of class struggle into Poulantzas' overall theory would have necessitated a drastic alteration of the author's rigid structure-agent reductionism. It would have necessitated the conceptualization of classes and class struggles not merely as "effects" of structural determinations, but as relatively autonomous collective agencies, as social forces which are not simply the products of structural constraints, but which at the same time continuously produce, reproduce, and transform institutional structures. Since this is not done, the ritualistic incantation of the class struggle cannot in any way mitigate Poulantzas' structure-agent reductionism.

So finally Poulantzas, notwithstanding his useful distinction between class places and practices, and despite his other efforts to differentiate his class theory from Althusser's, does not manage to break away from the latter's obsessive structural reductionism which argues that "the real subject of all partial history is the *combination* under the dependence of which are the elements and their relations, that is to say, something which is *not a subject*. So it could be said that the chief problem of a scientific history, a theoretical history, is identifying the combination on which depend the elements that are to be analyzed. [27]

It is in this way that Althusserians, in violent reaction to the crude voluntaristic reductionism found both in the Marxist and the non-Marxist traditions, ended up at the other extreme: with a structure-agent reductionism which denies all possibility of any autonomous collective action — an ultra-structuralism which reduces all social analysis to the a-historical identification of a number of invariant elements and the study of their intricate articulation and combination.

Conclusion

The four types of reductionism that have been examined, either separately or in various combinations, all neutralize the most fruitful aspects of the Marxist framework: its holistic character. Insofar as they suggest that it is possible to systematically derive political practices and institutional structures from the "laws" or functional requirements of the capitalist mode of production or the machinations of an all-powerful bourgeoisie, they discourage serious study of the complicated and more or less indirect linkages between the economic and the political instances. Moreover, in as far as they portray collective agents as omnipotent, anthropomorphic entities or, at the other extreme, as mere "effects" of structural determinations, they lead either to an ultra-voluntarism or to a structural determinism — both extremes emasculating Marxism's dialectical character, i.e., its portrayal of collective agents in a constantly changing relation with a social environment which both constructs actors and presents them with a more or less large number of alternatives.

Is it possible, then, given this state of affairs, to theorize the relation between the economic and the non-economic spheres, or between institutional structures and

27. *Lire le Capital*, vol. II, p. 146.

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agents' practices without falling into any of the reductionist traps mentioned above? Of course it is beyond the present task to answer this complex question. One thing is clear, however. The problem of reductionism cannot be solved by merely proclaiming the "specificity" or "relative autonomy" of the non-economic sphere. For, if the idea of "relative autonomy" is going to be something more than an empty phrase, one has to construct conceptual tools which can actually lead to the relatively autonomous study of political and cultural phenomena. For the moment such tools do not exist in Marxist theory. Whether one looks at the way in which Marxists analyze the non-economic spheres (political parties, religious organizations, kinship or educational institutions, etc.) they do so in terms of concepts derived from the economy, i.e., in terms of class or the reproductive requirements of modes of production. Of course, there is nothing wrong in examining the intricate interrelations between economic and non-economic spheres or more precisely, the contributions of the latter to the reproduction of the former. But to argue, as many Marxists do, that political or cultural institutions are "nothing but" the conditions of existence of the economy or the dominant mode of production, tells us less about such institutions and more about the conceptual inadequacy of present day Marxist theory.

The point is thus for the moment, despite ritualistic statements about the relative autonomy or specificity of the "political" or the "ideological," Marxism does not provide concepts which can help the student to take seriously into account the specific dynamic and "history" of non-economic spheres. Or, to put it in another way, there are no "regional" theories of politics and culture which are both Marxist and non-reductionist. Therefore, the choice is either reductionism or an *ad hoc*, empiricist treatment of such areas of study as law, education, the family, etc.

Exactly the same argument applies if one tries to overcome the type of reductionism which portrays actors and their practices as mere "effects" of structural determinations (whether on the economic, political or cultural level). It is not enough to proclaim in a highly abstract manner that it is misleading to conceptualize agents or classes as the "bearers of structures." One has to construct specific concepts which can provide systematic guidance as to how structural-systemic constraints articulate with collective agents' strategies and struggles, or how a "logico-deductive" structuralist approach can be integrated with a "historical-genetic" class analysis.

The present crisis of Marxism is to a great extent linked with its failure to provide adequate theoretical tools to the two areas mentioned above. It remains to be seen to what extent theorists within the Marxist tradition will be able to fill these two "gaps" in theory and to overcome the previously discussed varieties of reductionism without diluting the specificity of the Marxian paradigm.

PLANNING FOR A NON-SEXIST SOCIETY

by Lynne Layton and Mary Papke

On March 20-22, the McGill Committee for Teaching and Research on Women sponsored a conference on planning for a non-sexist society. At registration, participants received a round white button with nothing written on it; participants were to create their own vision of a non-sexist society — or perhaps to "white out" the present sexist one. In fact, the papers presented and films shown reflected all

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points of view and were presented by academics from all disciplines, clergy, social workers, psychologists, architects, union representatives, and artists.

The keynote speaker, Margrit Eichler, focused on the visional vacuum of feminism. She observed that feminism and feminist literature has been necessarily issue-oriented and that such reformism is insufficiently radical in that it lacks focus. Eichler claimed that this goal will not be attained in our lifetime, but that a long-range vision is indispensible. Her concept of a non-sexist society is based on two criteria: the eradication of sexual hierarchies in both private and public spheres and the possibility of positive futures for each person both as individual and social citizen. Since Eichler does not consider herself to be a complete visionary, she turned to literature, specifically science fiction, for detailed dreams of non-sexist worlds. She spoke of three of these at length: Edward Bellamy's *Looking Backward*, Dorothy Bryant's *The Kin of Ata are Waiting for You*, and Ursula K. LeGuin's *The Dispossessed*. Concluding, Eichler proposed that an egalitarian society could only come about with a merging of "ecological, feminist and libertarian movements." The probable future is grim, the desirable future is utopian and unattainable, yet the desirable-possible future is to be worked for and is attainable, if not for the present, then for future generations. The future of the basic visions discussed will be born of reform movements guided by visions of an emancipatory whole -- visions formed by knowledge of what is going on in all the various academic disciplines, in the workplace, in leisure, and in the home.

Eichler did not discuss, however, currently active feminist groups, radical and reformist, which obviously have clear visions of a non-sexist society. She did not speak of today's feminist communities, presses, art houses, etc. It was somewhat perplexing to have attention focused, from the conference's outset, upon science fiction feminism to the exclusion of desirable, possible, *actual* visions and practices. The speeches of the next two days would do much to bridge the gap between vision and reality.

On the following morning, there was a session on 19th century British, Irish, and North American feminism. Dana Hearne spoke about radical, liberal, and religious ideology in 19th century Ireland. Her goal was to accent the discrepancy between Church ideology of woman's role and the everyday reality of Irish peasant women. She explained that these women toiled side by side with men, yet submitted to Church ideology because they feared and loved the village priest, who functioned as an organic intellectual around mid-century. Thus women were in a contradictory position in which they both maintained and challenged existing authority relations, for the ideology that the village priest represented in no way sanctioned the somewhat egalitarian work situation.

Jean L'Espérance then presented a paper on "A wise maternalism? The ideology of feminism in 19th century Britain and North America." She argued that after 1870, mainstream feminism chose no longer radically to threaten the social order. Feminists added a "cult of true womanhood" component to their program, thus defusing their previous radicalism and adapting themselves only too well to existing male-led reform programs and ideologies. A period of reformism set in and lasted until the 1960s.

Lorenne Clark gave what was perhaps the most disturbing speech of the conference. Her feminism, which involves a further rationalization of society, i.e., more administration in the private sphere, is clearly that brand of feminism which has the greatest chance of achieving its goals since it does not at all threaten "things

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as they are."

Clark began her critique of family "naturalism" by discussing the origins of the devaluation of women's reproductive labor. She tied this devaluation rather specifically to the history of emerging capitalism with its relegation of women to the private sphere. Although it seemed clear at first that she believed that capitalism is one cause of women's oppression, the critique of capitalism was forgotten in her consideration of the contemporary situation and was replaced by a faith in the legal system, which she seemed to consider wholly separate from the existing economic system. She seemed confident that women will be freed by legislation and state intervention in the private sphere. Significantly, when a questioner asked what she thought the effects of state day care centers or alternative family situations were on children, she replied that this was not her "field." Clark dangerously omitted to distinguish among aristocratic, bourgeois, and lower-class family situations in her historical resumé (thus taking the bourgeois family as *the* family), and, in her discussion of the views of male philosophers and writers, she confused various planes of discourse by conflating "the family" of everyday life and "the family" (as model) of texts. (In literature the family was just as often used to justify visions of liberation as it was used to justify male privilege, a fact which Clark's analysis ignored.)

In a session on women in academia, Deirdre Meintel Machado presented her current research on why so many women Ph.D. candidates drop out of graduate school. She believes that academic women are caught in a no-win situation: If "feminine," a woman is labeled "coy"; if "masculine" (i.e., wants to be treated as an equal), she'll be labeled "ball-breaker." Machado, who did her field work in Portugal, pointed out that in a country where sexism is blatant, it is much easier to deal with; in North America, and especially in academia, the egalitarian facade makes sexism much harder to identify. One of the most interesting facts reported by Machado is that we are just now beginning to equal the number of female Ph.D.'s in the twenties. The facts are similar in faculty employment of women.

Céline Guilbert spoke on "Career Profiles of Female Professors at McGill and l'Université de Montréal." Essentially, she described characteristics of academic women who "make it" today. Not surprisingly, this woman is likely to be the person most like a male counterpart. She works continuously, sacrifices her private life, has no family or steady partner, is of a privileged socio-economic class and ethnic group, never took time off between educational levels and is hostile to feminism and even to other academic women. Later in her career, she often begins to have more of a sense of herself as a woman, especially if she wants to have a family; at this point, she is likely to become more sympathetic to other women and-or feminist concerns.

The following session was entitled "Sexism: Public and Private." Hilary Day, a social worker, spoke on battered wives and made clear the potentially positive side of some state intervention in the private sphere. Present public policies of non-intervention silently or vocally support sexism and violence against women. Day's presentation was marred by an uncritical appropriation of social work jargon which was all too "patriarchal." For instance, people and families were once referred to as "viable social units," and solutions to the violence problem were described as "alternate problem-solving techniques." Such anti-human jargon curtails an emotional response to the problem, encouraging apathy instead. Day's presentation made it clear that women must begin to trust their own voices more than they trust "the literature."

A retired male Unitarian minister spoke next on sexism and religious perspectives. Both entertaining and provocative, he so convincingly argued that most religions

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(not his) are full of sexist practices that, to one audience member at least, it became clear that (a) religions are predicated on strictly-defined sexist sex roles, and (b) there is not much left of most religions when you edit the sexism out (as have, according to the Reverend, the Unitarians).

A McGill English instructor next dramatically convinced the audience that the pen is mightier than the sword — unless a woman is holding the pen. In her speech on the various methods of excluding women writers from the literary canon, she at the same time made it clear that exclusion is only half the problem. The specificity of individual women writers is, in typical patriarchal fashion, destroyed by categorization: *Women's Literature* (special course; only women sign up), *Regional Women Writers, The Female Henry James* are just a few examples of how women *enter* the canon if they do at all.

Another workshop was on chemical dependence and women. Louise Nadeau gave the results of a fascinating study which showed that doctors prescribe Valium for women much more often and readily than for men who describe their symptoms in the very same way. However, after a man reaches sixty, he will be prescribed drugs as frequently as is a woman. Clearly, a sixty year old man is considered unproductive, i.e., a woman. Men on welfare also receive medical treatment on the model of female patients. Rhona Steinberg then lambasted the "medical model" of mental health problems. She explained why and how women contribute to their own oppression by accepting a model which says that if they are depressed then they are ill (rather than perceiving depression as a rational but passive response to an intolerable situation). If a male doctor tells a woman she is sick, she can yield all control over her life to him; it is an excellent way to avoid making decisions and avoid challenging the roots of the problem. Doctors prefer this model for they get a great amount of power from it. Women thus become society's scapegoats; they passively register all of society's ills, and society treats these ills with heavy doses of tranquilizing agents.

During the discussion, an employee of a big drug company, who was in the audience, protested that the companies are in fact reducing production of tranquilizing drugs because, she said, people do not want them anymore. The rest of the audience was generally suspicious of this comment: addiction to alcohol or drugs is alleged to be the norm for women in North American society.

At the final plenary session, conference co-ordinator Barbara Scales recapitulated Eichler's categories of the possible, probable, and desirable futures, abstracting from and attempting to connect all the papers heard at the conference. Unfortunately, the conference ended on an odd note. This closing session, it seems, was not intended to be an open discussion; there was neither a critique nor open critical debate about what had happened in the two days. However, a man in the audience raised his hand and asked what we all intended to do next; he suggested we help our striking workers (mostly women) at the Place des Arts (one of Montreal's cultural centers). Scales insisted that we were not a constituted group and that each person must do what he or she felt necessary. The conference was then hastily adjourned for a wine and cheese party across the road. Were she and others so abrupt because the suggestion came from a male? Or was it "merely" the reemergence of the old theory-praxis split? Yet, even this dubious end took little from the high quality of most of the papers and discussion or from the experience of participating in a visionary and humane conference.

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Book Reviews:

Alvin Gouldner. *The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class.* New York: Seabury Press, 1979.

Although this book is the shortest volume in Gouldner's trilogy on what he calls "The Dark Side of the Dialectic," in many respects it is the most crucial volume. The whole project is an attempt to move toward a post-Marxist critical theory. What Gouldner tries to achieve is not anti-Marx, rather, it is "after Marx." Gouldner calls his approach left-Hegelian sociology, and in many ways it is inspired by Hegel. But whether Gouldner's Hegel is Hegel can only be determined after going through Marx and the Marxian critique of Hegel. This is why Gouldner's "Hegelian sociology" can be more left-wing than pre-Marxist Hegelians could ever be. Gouldner's new Hegelian sociology has learned the lesson of Marxism and the historical lesson of those successful revolutions inspired by the Marxist project of socialism and which implemented a new socio-economic system. Thus, *The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class*, although shorter, less coherently argued and more controversial than the other two volumes in the triology (*The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology*, published in 1976, and *The Two Marxisms,* 1980), is probably the most important building block toward a new, left-wing, post-Marxist critical theory.

This volume subjects the central agent, the intellectual, the ideologue, to the type of critical analysis that the Marxist sociology of knowledge taught us to always apply in "unmasking" the ideological, apologetical components of all theories. As Gouldner correctly notes, Marxists themselves never applied this method with any rigor to their own doctrine and to themselves. "The Marxist scenario of class struggle was never able to account for itself. . . for Marx and Engels themselves" (p. 9). Now, Gouldner does it for them. "Where does the cameraman fit in?" he asks. Are we intellectuals simply expressing the interest of "the other classes," the "good guys" among us, as the "organic intellectuals" of the oppressed, or should we not suspect that intellectuals might only pretend to be the tools of other social forces while having their own structural interests? Is it not conceivable that intellectuals might increasingly stand for their own class interest and might become a class, potentially a dominant one, themselves? These questions are central in Gouldner's book, and his answer is in the affirmative: yes, the suspicion is warranted. Intellectuals, while pretending to be only the "neutral tools," the "ideologues of one class or the other," or technocrats "only executing efficiently tasks which are set by others," are actually serving their own interests and are becoming a new class. According to Gouldner, they are almost already a dominant class in societies that have undergone a "second revolution," the so-called "proletarian revolution," and they are moving now toward class power in the West, too, although a bit more slowly. In the West it might take them another couple of hundred years before they unseat the moneyed bourgeoisie.

There were already quite a few attempts, both from the left and the right, to define intellectuals or the technocrats as a new class. Gouldner does not repeat any of the former theories, however, and his concept of the new intellectual class is a genuinely original one. The right-wing sociologists, who identified in intellectuals the "evil" new class, usually look at the left-wing ideologue as the main figure of the new class of oppressors. Gouldner convincingly shows the lunacy of this approach, how it is impossible to define the new class as the bunch of usually hopelessly powerless left-wing intellectual "professional revolutionaries" in the contemporary West. And, further disagreeing with that approach, he disputes the "evil" ascribed to technocracy: after all, technocrats are "useful," and it is impossible to imagine

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societies without competent managers. The usual left-wing new class theories follow the opposite line of argument. For them the technocrat, or the techno-bureaucrat, is the new oppressive class, but the ideologue, the "social critique," the "genuine" intellectual is excluded from that category, and instead comes to represent for most left-wing new class theorists the hope and most important force of progress. Gouldner operates with a broader concept of "intellectuals" than do most previous left-wing or right-wing new class theorists. His new intellectual class includes both the ideologues and the techno-bureaucrats, his concept of intellectuals includes all those who pretend that as "managers" or as "theorists" — the distinction does not matter all that much in Gouldner's account — they stand for the universal good on the grounds of some genuinely universal principle. Intellectuals are all those who have the monopoly on what Gouldner calls the "culture of critical discourse," something that both "theorist ideologues" and "technocrats" share and which is a kind of new "grammar," "speech community" that undermines all authority except that of the intellectuals. In this respect, Gouldner offers a synthesis of theories of the intellectual new class, unlike the other left- or right-wing theorists who exclude the ideologues or the technocrats. He emphasizes that both are coming together in a new class, a kind of "universal class."

But this synthesis is not an eclectic mixture of a bit of radicalism with a degree of conservatism. Basically — though not without problems and internal contradictions — Gouldner can produce a genuinely left-wing critique of the new class. He does not fall into the trap of the aging Hegel. He does not become an apologist for the new intellectual class, above all for class conflicts. Gouldner's great theoretical contribution is his description of the new intellectual class as a "flawed universal class." This is indeed the rediscovery of Hegel after Marx. Gouldner learned the lesson from Marx that Hegel was wrong: the state does not express universal interests against the particularism of civil society. It is wrong to assume that the state bureaucracy can be conceived as a universal class standing above society. And Gouldner learned the Marxist lesson in the sociology of knowledge: no social force is above society, all universalism is only a universalized expression of some particularism. He "unmasks" the ideological character of Marxism and the class consequences of social transformations that occurred under Marxist-inspired revolutions. He convincingly argues that with these revolutions it was not the proletariat that Marx defined as the genuine universal class that came to power, but the intellectuals, who were only pretending to represent the proletariat, and who were only apparently universal. Since it has failed in achieving the general emancipation of humankind and has instead introduced a new and more sophisticated sort of class oppression, the new class comes to be viewed as a "badly flawed universal class," therefore.

This is a powerful analysis — the best possible reasoning one can expect from a "left-Hegelian sociology" and, in light of what we know of Chinese and Soviet societies, also a very convincing one empirically. The power, theoretical clarity and empirical validity of Gouldner's analysis become clear when confronted with these societies: they indeed appear to be ruled by such a "flawed universal class" of intellectuals. The major problem arises when he tries to project these developments and theoretical premises onto contemporary Western societies. Although the West will not follow necessarily the Russian or Chinese patterns (he avoids falling into the trap of a naive, pro-Soviet version of the "convergence theory") he does not see any qualitative difference in the position of intellectuals under contemporary state socialism and Western capitalism. He claims he has a general theory of a new class, which applies to both systems. But here, Gouldner's imaginative concept of the flawed universal class falls into the trap of a "flawed universal theory of the new class."

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In developing this theory, Gouldner also cheats a bit. The concept of the flawed universal class obviously can be traced back to the Hegel-Marx debate. The empirical evidence that after the revolution the emerging new class will be flawed was, on the other hand, always linked with Leninist vanguardism and based on the empirical knowledge we have that Marx was wrong. To put it simply: the notion of flawed universal class is convincing because we know how ridiculous are the claims of Ulbricht or Stalin to represent along with their "professional revolutionary vanguard" the proletariat's historical task while at the same time murdering Russian and Eastern European peasants *en masse*. But at this point Gouldner shifts the meaning of "universal" into another dimension in order to apply his concept to Western capitalism. He claims to have developed a universal or "generic" theory of capital. According to Gouldner, there are two forms of capital: "moneyed capital" and "cultural capital." While the old class dealt with money, the new class deals with culture. The old class declines with the significance of money capital and the rise of cultural capital. The emerging new class is composed of the owners of cultural capital: it is a new, cultural bourgeoisie.

At this point Gouldner loses me. I don't know what the essence is of the "universalism" of the intellectual class: is it the "revolutionary vanguardism" of intellectuals in and after successful Marxist revolutions; the challenge posed by the managerial bureaucracy to the capitalist as the expert takes over control from legal owners; or, finally, the increasing power of those intellectuals who develop and transmit culture, a kind of "cultural bourgeoisie," which, in a metaphorical sense, accumulates Gouldner's cultural capital? These are three completely different perspectives, referring to three different intellectual traditions and empirical realities. Gouldner seems to mix them together. But I just don't see any hope in having one general theory of this kind. I don't see how one can place into the same class Ulbricht (a member of the "flawed universal class" because of his claims to exercise the dictatorship of the proletariat while exercising the dictatorship of an intellectual class), the general manager of Ford Motor Co. (also a member of the same class by virtue of his pretending to execute the orders of the company's board of directors while in fact actually making the real decisions himself), and the academic (who qualifies for membership in the class because, while pretending to have knowledge that respects no authority but reason, he simultaneously defines "reason" as the sole possession of academics).

Gouldner senses the trouble and would like to get out of it in developing a generic concept of capital. But while his notion of flawed universal class in reference to the Hegel-Marx debate and revolutionary vanguardism is admirable and successful, the attempt to develop a generic concept of capital (comprising money and cultural capital) is a total disaster. Gouldner defines capital in a generic sense as income-earning capacity. Any author can define his concepts any way he pleases. But clearly a notion of capital as "income-earning capacity" is completely *useless* in defining class relations. Different access to income-earning capacities explains income inequalities, but no one dealing with class analysis — whether Marxist or Weberian or anything else — can ever explain class dynamics in terms of income differentials. The situation gets worse when Gouldner claims that his concept of class is very close to the Marxist one. In light of his notion of generic capital, this only adds to the theoretical confusion. With such a concept of capital the little sense that his term "cultural capital had (i.e., the self-interest of those who have culture in keeping it to themselves) is also lost. If "cultural capital" in Gouldner's sense is knowledge as income-earning capacity, then obviously — and Gouldner acknowledges this to be the case — everyone who can

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sell his or her labor power on the market will have at least a little of this so-called "cultural capital." It is impossible to base a concept of class on this.

This is most unfortunate, since in substance Gouldner could be right: intellectuals in Western capitalist society may indeed seek class power and in doing so avoid following the path taken by the Russian and Chinese revolutions. In the West, intellectuals are unlikely to be able to use Marxism and revolutionary vanguardism in moving toward a society in which private capitalists are unseated. But the means by which they can achieve this is more likely to be the state apparatus rather than another form of capital. Gouldner should have remained more faithful to his stated task of developing a "left-Hegelian sociology," because then he would have realized that what he needs in order to have a more valid general theory of the flawed universal class of intellectuals is not a more generic notion of capital, but a more generic concept of the state. Under Marxism-inspired revolutions, it was not by means of a new form of capital that intellectuals came very close to a dominant class position, but by the use of a new state apparatus. The chance in the West for intellectuals to achieve class power is also linked to their ability to transform the state and to make sure that it will not remain the expression of the hegemony of the dominant capitalist class. In order to deal with this, a new and more generic theory of the state is probably needed. As with the notion of the universal class, where Gouldner returned to Hegel after having learned the lesson of Marx's critique, he ought to do the same with the theory of the state.

Gouldner missed a great theoretical opportunity, but the task remains. Understanding how the relative autonomy of the political state toward civil society might change is, of course, not just a purely theoretical interest, but also has great political importance. The Western world is now undergoing a phase of neo-conservative anti-statism, and it is vital for the Left to have a clear understanding of the potentials and dangers of state intervention and government control. Theoretical insights are needed to fight back this anti-statism, to stop the dismantling of the Welfare State, to find ways out of the present stag-flationary crisis and the fiscal crisis of the state without giving up the post-World War II welfare achievements, and at the same time to make sure that, with further expansion of government controls on the private economy, a new intellectual class does not rise into a dominant class position as a sort of "evangelical planning bureaucracy," the Western version of the flawed universal class.

These political struggles are far from resolved. The future of the contemporary Western world is an open one. The new critical social theory can help us be more aware of these possible alternative futures. The New Right may succeed in its anti-statist drive to dismantle the Welfare State. On the other hand, the labor movement may join forces with the government bureaucracies and force the New Right and big capital into a new New Deal. But while the possibility of more government controls may mean more constraint on capital and a better deal for the forces of a democratic socialism, if the labor movement is not cautious enough and does not learn the lessons of a post-Marxian new critical theory and the dangers of authoritarian state socialism, what may result is the so-called "evangelical planning bureaucracies" moving toward authoritarianism rather than increased democracy.

These are alternative possibilities for the West, and which one will succeed depends on social struggles in which the new critical theory of the state and intellectuals could play a role. In such a situation, Gouldner's book is a valuable contribution.

Ivan Szelenyi

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Frederic Jameson. *Fables of Aggression. Wyndham Lewis, the Modernist as Fascist*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1979. 190 pages.

Since 1945 literary scholarship in the West has rarely turned its attention to the problem of fascist literature.[1] This disinterest was due less to the historical turning point of the end of the Second World War than to an apparent depoliticization of the critical discussion which could no longer thematize significant relations between literary works and a socio-political context. Thus, the reaction of New Criticism against an earlier, historically oriented treatment of literature — in particular, the expressly political phase of the Thirties — in fact began to gain momentum before the defeat of National Socialist Germany, and under the aegis of figures like T.S. Eliot and Allen Tate [2] the groundwork was prepared for a critical discourse which would flaunt its own disregard for the allegedly extrinsic moments in literary production. This programmatic isolation of the literary work from its specific historical context induced a parallel dichotomy in the treatment of authors whose personal ties to fascism were undeniable, yet whose works were to be rescued for the modernist canon. For example, Pound escaped a trial for treason because of his broadcasts on Italian radio during the war only thanks to his being declared insane, i.e., his political engagement was judged irresponsible and hence irrelevant to his literary admirers. Consequently, he could simultaneously receive prestigious literary prizes, and typically, in the controversy surrounding his being awarded the Bollingen Prize in Poetry for 1948, even his opponents were forced to claim that it was inappropriate to use political categories in a literary discussion.[3] Similarly Knut Hamsun's collaboration with the Quisling regime was, soon after 1945, chalked up to senility — an accusation against which the author could vigorously protest [4] — saving the post-war critics from an investigation of political connotations in his mature novels.[5] A final example: Louis-Ferdinand Céline, whose *Voyage to the Edge of Night* and *Death on the Installment Plan* had been phenomenally successful during the Thirties (including both wide distribution in the Soviet Union and a rave review by Leon Trotsky), [6] was also a fascist propagandist who, in a series of pamphlets, harangued his readers with rabid anti-Semitism, inveterate anti-republicanism and — after the defeat of France — exhortations to support the German occupation.[7] His post-war

1. Some exceptions: John R. Harrison, *The Reactionaries* (New York, 1967) and Fritz Stern, *The Politics of Cultural Despair* (Berkeley, 1961).

2. Of course Eliot's whole project of a critique of romanticism implied a break with historicism and a return to a rigid tradition, a set of orthodox tenets which, he argued, should not be tampered with by a liberal relativism. Culture was not the product of a historical moment. Rather it flourished in the context of a stability dependent on racial (homogeneous) and economic (agrarian) prerequisites. Cf. T.S. Eliot, *After Strange Gods* (New york, 1934), pp. 17-20; Ernst Beer, *Thomas Stearns Eliot und der Antiliberalismus des XX. Jahrhunderts* (Vienna, 1953); Allen Tate, *Reactionary Essays on Poetry and Ideas* (New York, 1936).

3. The bone of contention is reprinted in *"Ezra Pound Speaking:" Radio Speeches of World War II* (Westport, 1978). Cf. William Van O'Connor and Edward Stone, *A Casebook on Ezra Pound* (New York, 1959).

4. Cf. Knut Hamsun, *On Over-grown Paths* (New York, 1967).

5. Leo Lowenthal had earlier investigated the interface of literature and fascist politics in "Knut Hamsun. Zur Vorgeschichte der autoritären Ideologie" in *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* VI, 1937, pp. 295-345.

6. Leon Trotsky, "Novelist and Politician," in *Atlantic Monthly* 156 (October, 1935), pp. 413-420.

7. Louis-Ferdinand Céline, *Bagatelles pour un massacre* (Paris, 1937), *L'école des Cadavres*

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publisher Balland however excluded the political writings from the official edition of his complete works. Thus, the intolerant separation of literature and politics meant either the incarceration of the political author in psychiatric or geriatric institutions (Pound and Hamsun) or a truncation of the oeuvre not far from censorship (Céline).

The choice of these three examples, all important modern authors associated with fascism, suggests how an investigation of this point of intersection of politics and art might contribute significantly to the understanding of major aspects of twentieth century literary life. This hypothetical centrality of the problem of fascist literature contrasts with the approach which has developed in West Germany since the late Sixties, where leftist critics have gradually begun to explore the literature of the reactionary *völkisch* subculture and its relation to National Socialism.[8] The rediscovery of this literature, which had been thoroughly ignored during the years of conservative hegemony, was intimately tied to the wider problematic of a "confrontation with the past," which, in Mitscherlich's now classic account, constituted a prerequisite to a vibrant, democratic culture.[9] Whatever one may think of this psycho-diagnosis of the Federal Republic, the literary critical corollary has often fallen into the trap of marginalizing the issue of fascist literature. Once the problem is restricted to the far right lunatic fringe close to the Nazis, the issue loses any relevance to contemporary literary life (unless the Neo-Nazis have upheld some continuity with the pre-1945 literary canon, which is highly unlikely). One recalls Adorno's remark that the continuity of the anti-democratic opposition was less threatening than the continuity of anti-democratic tendencies within the established institutions themselves.[10] Are there fascist tendencies within the institution of literature? Can one speak of a fascist program in literature and within the aesthetic structure itself, regardless of the author's proximity to the reactionary subculture and its parties? Criticism of fascist literature would then describe the constitution of the artwork instead of highlighting the overt ideology of the work in order to denounce it.

Instead of an ideology criticism which focuses simply on the "message" of literature, central texts of critical theory suggest an alternative starting point. Benjamin's thesis of an "aestheticization of politics" and the closely related concept of "expression" provide an explanation of a specific literary strategy:[11] the incorporation into the work of new experiential material, which is however frozen into the forms which express it and thus denied any reflective mediation. This is most obvious perhaps in Ernst Jünger's prose during the twenties and thirties, in reference to which Benjamin developed his own approach to fascism. Yet, the Frankfurt School's broader account of fascism, and the specifically literary essays, also suggest a potential analysis of fascist literature. Fascism represents one specific version of the transition from the nineteenth century liberal

(Paris, 1938), *Les Beaux Draps* (Paris, 1941). Documentations on Céline's fascist engagement is provided in Maurice Vanino's, *L'école d'un Cadavre. L'affaire Celine* (Paris, 1952).

8. For example: Uwe-Karsten Ketelsen, *Völkisch-nationale und nationalsozialistische Literatur in Deutschland, 1890-1945* (Stuttgart, 1970), and Alexander von Bormann, "Vom Traum zur Tat. Uber völkische Literatur," *Die deutsche Literatur in der Weimarer Republik*, Wolfgang Rothe, ed. (Stuttgart, 1974), pp. 304-333.

9. Alexander Mitscherlich, *The Inability to Mourn* (New York, 1975).

10. Theodor W. Adorno, *Erziehung zur Mündigkeit,* Gerd Kadelbach, ed. (Frankfurt, 1970), pp. 10-11.

11. Both terms are of course developed in "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," in *Illuminations* (New York, 1969), esp. pp. 241ff.

12. Cf. Walter Benjamin, "Theorien des deutschen Faschismus," in *Gesammelte Schriften III*, Hella Tiedemann-Bartels, ed. (Frankfurt, 1972), pp. 238-250.

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world of laissez-faire capitalism and the bourgeois individual to the totally administered society of the modern interventionist states.[13] The aesthetic question then involves the status of literature first in the expressly fascist world and, secondly, in the post-liberal world in general. For Horkheimer and Adorno, the answer is twofold: on the one hand, the avant-garde work of art represents an enclave of autonomy and hence a figure of resistance against domination, while the products of the culture industry enforce a homogenization of society with greater success than could a policy of direct violence. [14] Benjamin (and Brecht) of course envisioned a convergence of the avant-garde (montage) and popular forms in order to fashion a new reception situation which would foster the rational independence of the audience. Despite the profound differences between these two models, they ultimately share a basic distinction between the emancipatory artwork which preserves the autonomy of the subject and its illegitimate counterpart (culture industry, the object of contemplation, the theater of illusion) which corresponds to the integration of the recipient into the logic of capitalist domination. This distinction, furthermore, can be explained in the light of the Hegelian neo-Marxism of early twentieth century Germany, colored by the terms of an aesthetic discussion traceable back to Neitzsche's treatment of Wagner.[15] Within this discussion, fascist literature might be treated both as an expression of historical forces as well as a matter of a specific literary program with definite consequences within the work itself.

In Frederic Jameson's investigation of Wyndham Lewis' writings, attention is focused on the inner-literary structures. Indeed the author assures us that his approach is fully "immanent" (184), and he is certainly at his best when he demonstrates the internal dynamics of Lewis' style. Yet this attempt to describe "the affinities between proto-fascism and Western modernism" (5) marginalizes the problem of fascism, albeit in a different manner than that of the West German ideology critics. This marginalization, however, has a good deal to do with Jameson's notion of ideology. he rejects the approach "that ideology is essentially a matter of conceptual positions, opinions, attitudes and values" because "then ideological analysis reduces itself to a typologizing and classificatory affair, a labelling operation, in which we are called on to 'decide' whether it is fair to assign Lewis' work to the category marked 'fascist'" (12). At this pont Jameson, freed from the exigencies of a denunciatory ideology-criticism, might have posed the question of a specifically fascist literary program — for example, a possible convergence in the narrative strategies of Lewis and Céline, or related aesthetic categories in Pound or Eliot — and its difference from other varieties of modern literature. Instead Jameson reaches for an Althusserian concept of ideology which will eventually shift attention away from the fascist problem: the attempt to explain ("represent") the relation between the individual and the existential context ("the Real"). The context, however, is outside the reach of knowledge: "It is rather an asyptotic phenomenon, an outer limit, which the subject approaches in the anxiety of the moment of truth — moments of personal truth and of the agonizing political polarization of revolutionary situations; and from

13. Max Horkheimer, "The Authoritarian State," in *Telos* 15 (Spring, 1973), pp. 4-20.
14. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *The Dialectic of Enlightenment* (New York, 1972), pp. 120-167.
15. Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Richard Wagner in Bayreuth* in *The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche*, Oscar Levy, ed. (Edinburgh and London, 1911), Vol. IV, and *The Case of Wagner, Ibid.*, Vol. VIII.

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such an approach to the Real the subject then tends to retreat again, at best in possession of abstract or purely intellectual schemata when not of personally charged narrative representations. The narrative apparatus which informs ideological representation is thus no mere 'false consciousness,' but an authentic way of grappling with a Real that must always transcend it, a Real into which the subject seeks to insert itself through praxis, all the while painfully learning the lesson of its own ideological closure and of history's resistance of the fantasy-structures in which it is itself locked" (12-13). Jameson's rejection of the "false consciousness" approach separates ideology from the problem of truth as the historical and social development of consciousness. Instead ideology becomes an arbitrary (even if "authentic") result of an individual colliding with experience, and the critic's attention shifts toward the collision itself and away from the ideational outcome, the "conceptual positions, opinions, attitudes and values."

This shift explains Jameson's treatment of Lewis; Lewis becomes so to speak only secondarily a fascist. In the wake of the First World War — so argues Jameson — the established system of national structures and diplomatic relations which motivated Lewis' early works gave way to an international conflict between fascism and communism which leads to a revision of the narrative strategy and a tendentious identification with the fascist wing. This identification was not due primarily to logical choice but to the transformation of the ideological representations which Lewis had set up as a reaction against the process of capitalist reification. Two comments now become necessary. First, underneath the constructs and technical terminology of French post-structuralism, to which Jameson is deeply attracted, one finds the outline of a substantial intellectual biography which might have profited from a more conventional approach. Yet, because the subject's intellect and consciousness are replaced in post-structuralism by non-individual categories, Jameson discusses Lewis' "libidinal apparatus" (94-95) instead of the development of his thought. Secondly, we find Lewis cast as a critic of bourgeois society whom Jameson rescues from certain ideological detours. His fascism was in actuality merely anti-Marxism, which in turn had nothing to do with historical Marxism but rather represented one moment in Lewis' overall attack on capitalism. Thus the account has less to do with the relation between modernist literary strategies and fascism than with the anti-bourgeois character of one modernist's texts.

The central element in Lewis which Jameson admires is the recognition of the disappearance of the subject; Jameson traces this moment through various formal elements in Lewis' prose and defends it with a mixture of Lacan and Lukacsian reification theory. In terms of literary history he differentiates between the "classical modernism" of Joyce and Proust, which is treated as a hypersubjectivity and thus linked (pejoratively) to the traditional illusions of bourgeois autonomy, and Lewis' own programmatic denunciation of the language of that autonomy; in fact that denunciation of traditional literature is the basic motor behind the various figures in Lewis' prose. Jameson comments: "The instinctive greatness of Lewis was, I think, to have understood that even where the real is ultimately inaccessible we are not for all that reduced to silence. The impressionistic way kept faith with the illusions of subjectivity and sought lovingly to reproduce them in the detail of their appearance. Lewis' expressionism on the contrary marks those illusions with the stamp of their own spuriousness, keeping the place of the Real warm by deforming its caricatural substitutes in the realm of the sheerly phenomenal" (84). On the one hand, Jameson

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underestimates the radicalism of classical modernism,[16] even if, as he complains, that radicalism is no longer immediately evident to the naive eye (3). On the other hand, he eclipses the problem of fascism by pushing Lewis into the proximity of Beckett and the contemporary critics of the subject. In fact, given his differentiation between the two schools (if not generations), Jameson seems to be arguing less about fascist modernism than about fascist post-modernism, which perhaps would have been a more legitimate and more plausible title.

Yet neither fascist authors nor post-modernist critics have a monopoly on the thematicization of the problematic character of the subject in the modern world. It would be a task for the literary historian to describe the range of alternative positions and textual strategies associated with the critique of the subject. Thus, Althusser contrasts the inchoate Real with the always inadequate rigid terms of the subject's ideology, while Jameson himself displays a certain nostalgia for "the shared experience . . . of the *Gemeinschaft*" (a curious term in the context of a discussion of fascism) as the polar opposite of "that great automobile graveyard which is the 'modern mind'" (80). Similarly he treats Lewis as the radical critic of modernity and the advocate of some primal layer of experience which bourgeois subjectivity denies, roles Lewis shared with many other fascist authors. In order, however, to understand the specificity of this fascist position, it would be necessary to compare other critics of traditional bourgeois forms; Thomas Mann's ironic prose with its implicit denunciation of the narrator and the Brechtian erosion of the passive public in epic theater both come to mind as modernists who were not fascists. The issue might be clarified with the help of a typology of twentieth century textual models including at least three basic paradigms: 1) the modernistic immanent dissolution of aesthetic autonomy (Mann), 2) the Brechtian montage technique linked to the emancipation of the recipient, and 3) the fascist rejection of autonomy from the standpoint of an allegedly authentic non-social dimension of existence. Fascist category corresponds ultimately to phenomena as varied as Pound's imagism, Céline's narrative structures and Benn's anti-intellectualism. In any case, all three models are "modern" in their break from nineteenth century literary conceptions,[17] and Jameson's careful individual dissections of Lewis' technique could well fit into this scheme.

In order to describe this fascist literary project as an aspect of modern literary and not as a matter of ideology (either as false consciousness or as representation), it must be recognized that literature as a social institution remains a relatively independent sphere. Despite influences by external factors, new developments can be traced within the limits of a separate, irreducible history. The autonomy of this aesthetic realm of course did not go unchanged by the avant-garde revolution of this century; at the same time, literature, or art in general, has not disappeared as an identifiable institutional structure, and it is the history of that structure which should concern literary historians. A discussion of fascist literature takes on significance only in this specific context where art and politics converge. Ideological approaches, on the other hand, either downplay the aesthetics in order to denounce the politics or peripheralize political positions in order to rescue the literature.

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16. Cf. Theodor W. Adorno, "Standort des Erzählers im zeitgenössischen Roman," in *Noten zur Literatur I* (Frankfurt, 1958), pp. 61-72.

17. This account extrapolates from the argument in Peter Bürger, *Theorie der Avantgarde* (Frankfurt, 1974).

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Jean Baudrillard. *De la Séduction*. Paris: Edition Galilée, 1980. 249 pages.

Positive meanings, the infrastructure, and other mainstays of the modern intellect, cannot be subverted by interpretation or by historical laws. They can be challenged only at the level of appearances: from the outside without looking in. This is what Baudrillard means by seduction: it refuses to be co-opted by the illusion that power has depth, that it is supported by a *Hinterwelt* of meaning and nomological forces. Seduction deals with power superficially, precisely where it is most vulnerable: "To seduce signs is more important than the emergence of no matter what truth" (p. 78).

Such is the general drift of *De la Séduction*, Baudrillard's tenth book, and his most substantial since *L'Echange Symbolique et la Mort* (1976).[1] It is a difficult book to size up. It might, for example, be a kind of modern *In Praise of Folly*: an ironic jab at the strange beliefs of the New French Academy, which forbids talk of subjectivity, equates mediation with alienation and opposes it to "presence," delights in reversing binary hierarchies, real or imagined, conceives desire cognitively, or imagines that desire "has no need of mediation,"[2] (thus it is a cure for alienation), and so on, right down to the notion that texts are self-producing and that everything else is just fornication.

It is no news to anybody, of course, that Gilles Deleuze (doing double duty standing in for the likes of Lacan the later Foucault, and Lyotard) pisses Baudrillard off. Indeed, Baudrillard once promised to write a *Mirror of Desire*, for which this book is probably a substitute. But he might also be contriving some answer to Derrida, whom he never mentions. There are circumstantial reasons for trying to approach *De la Séduction* from this angle. Baudrillard proposes, for example, a theory of hyper-realism — a sort of cultural analogue of quadrophonic sound, an obsession with simulated proximity which attempts to eliminate all the mediations of actual presence. And his ongoing critique of digitalism adds up to a more credible diagnosis of what Derrida labels "logocentrism." But Baudrillard, like so many brilliant French intellectuals, is too flighty to make explicit the connections with others' work. He has come as close as one could to writing a virtually unquotable anti-text, and the long-suffering reader is naturally tempted to search for profound reasons why. Such an approach would allow a more generous view of the sketch-book arguments, trial balloons, and now total contempt for documentation which characterize Baudrillard's current style. Unfortunately, it would also be contrary to the spirit of the book, which is resolutely superficial. So the reader is eventually forced to conclude that *De la Séduction* is, at least on the surface, a bad book, and since reasons beyond that are not usually deeper meanings but rationales, a bad book it shall remain, no matter how deep we think we can dig.

Nevertheless, it may safely be assumed that seduction is Baudrillard's latest code

1. Apart from many articles, some of them rehashed in this book (including, for example, an eccentric meditation on the cloning craze of a few years back), and his co-editorship of the journal *Traverses*, which has recently put out two numbers on the subject of seduction, Baudrillard has published *Le Système des objets* (Gallimard, 1968), *La Société de consommation* (Denoël, 1970), *Pour une critique de l'économie politique du signe* (Gallimard, 1972), *Le Miroir de la Production* (Casterman, 1973), *L'échange symbolique et la mort* (Gallimard, 1976), *Oublier Foucault* (Galilée, 1977), *L'Effet Beaubourg* (Galilée, 1977), *A l'ombre des majorités silencieuses* (Cahiers d'Utopie, 1978), *Le P.C. ou les paradis artificiels du politique* (Cahiers d'Utopie, 1978). The first five are sometimes brilliant. (Telos Press has translated two of these: *The Mirror of Production* (1975) and *Notes for a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign* (1980). Since then, he has been in a protracted slump.

2. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Capitalisme et Schizophrenie: L'Anti-Oedipe* (Paris, 1972), p. 36.

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word for everything that is inimical to production, political economy, the media, and more especially, anything that takes the form of a rationalized means to a rationalistic end — not just "labor power," but the preoccupation with the "revealed truth of sexuality," with orgasms and all their imagined extension throughout social existence. The idea of seduction (at least as Baudrillard reads our "Western" culture) gathers within itself everything that is considered evanescent, frivolous, and contemptible — seduction is, after all, just a bag of tricks: it is entirely insubstantial. Better still, as far as Baudrillard is concerned, seduction is libido in a state of heteronomy, if not precisely its negation. It breaks up everything. To praise seduction is to mock the pretentious profundity of the real, to tweak desire's nose.

Baudrillard begins the book with a discussion of feminism, thus showing early on that he is as capable as the next man of the appropriate gesture, and promptly lands himself in hot water. Armed with the crusty Hegelian epithet "Woman — eternal irony of the community,"[3] he blunders through a parody of all the time-worn male protests against any sustained inquiry by women into their own situation. He confuses feminist discourse about sexuality with the "sexual revolution" he is out to debunk; he also seems to share that side-spread, if hushed up assumption by Left male intellectuals that feminism is a flash in the pan — or at least, that it has no history thus far, and what is best in it is destined to be incorporated into the Grand Theory of Human Liberation.

Actually, this is not quite fair to Baudrillard, who has never been partial to bloated theoretical constructs and thinks he finds the avatar of one gestating in the feminist womb. He even manages to score a few points by showing that some feminists, in their zeal to develop a theory of women's desire, stumble into purple passages about what sounds like an intrinsically female orgasm (which is supposed to be more fun, and morally superior) -- to which Baudrillard replies that he thought feminists disagreed with the idea that biology was destiny. One of the few examples he provides of this occasional sloppiness is a passage from Luce Irigaray, an ex-Lacanian psychoanalyst. Of course, everybody knows what clotted gibberish Lacanism is, and that his influence is rampant among French feminists. But if Baudrillard thinks he has thereby made a case, he is dead wrong. All he has succeeded in accomplishing is an unfortunate display of bad faith, for he, like the feminists themselves, is trying to break new ground, groping for a renewal of the radical impulse; and there are excellent historical reasons why feminists should be seizing for themselves a certain license. But Baudrillard will not allow them the latitude to explore what he fully expects to receive himself.Consequently, his reading of contemporary feminism is obtusely literal and decontextualized.

What he really wants to say is that *seduction* — not woman — is "the everlasting irony in the life of the community," and that insofar as women have been identified with its capacity to "lead astray" by the church and its modern statist and academic heirs, feminists should not be so quick to dismiss its myths out of hand, for when power protests too much, something radical is afoot.

Schroyer once wrote that "A critical theory of society derives from the philosophical tradition of the critique of appearances."[4] This self-understanding is really the main problematic of *De la Séduction*. Why do we persist in believing that the problems of this bleak age, not to mention the promise of its future, are to be discovered in some

3. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, translated by J.B. Baillie (New York, 1967), p. 496.

4. "A Reconceptualization of Critical Theory," in J. David Colfax and Jack L. Roach, editors, *Radical Sociology* (New York, 1971), p. 132.

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deep structure? Isn't this just giving aid and comfort to the enemy, not only by lending credence to the notion that our culture is profound, but by implying that its inhumanity is at least concealed? "Porno...is not like an ideology," declares Baudrillard. "That is to say, it does not hide some truth; it is a simulation, in other words, a truth effect which hides the fact that the true sex it caricatures does not really exist" (p. 56). Our civilization, he is arguing, is not a distortion of something else — it is a total mistake. In this respect, he agrees with Pierre Clastre and Stanley Diamond that primitive ways of life embody a difference which cannot be subsumed dialectically to the ones that have destroyed them.[5] This is not necessarily a denial of history or of action. But just as he cannot believe in the certainty of a better future, Baudrillard refuses to affirm the inevitability of the choices and exclusions of the past. The lesson he appears to have culled from the synchronic view of some anthropologists is that human truth does not necessarily lie in the manic historicism of an irreversible time (authenticity), which easily lends itself anyway to the trammelings of the fascist ethic.

But what of the impulse to disavow the order of the present? Does it justify itself by constructing a metaphysics of absence? Is it just another form of Gnosticism? Baudrillard's only answer to the conundrum he has posed is to redefine the issue: the problem is not to choose between appearances and reality, but to undermine their philosophical and practical opposition. When the anthropologist asks the savage why his people wear no clothes, Baudrillard has the Indian replying, brilliantly: "Chez moi, tout visage." A society that cannot trust appearances is a society with something to hide, and a bad conscience to boot.

So, to argue that what is given to us in the present is false is to evade the fact that it is complicated and multiple. On this point, Baudrillard has always been very persuasive, and it seems about time for critical theory to adjust. Simulation is not analyzed as easily as alienation and has little to do with simple ideological fakery. The time when energy was widely believed to have an essential identity which could be defined and recovered is rapidly passing. We still pay homage to this energy, but we know that it cannot be harnessed. It *is* the harness. Energy is the *dissolution* of subjectivity *and* its problems. Ideologies of desire, or production, are only the convenient myth that this catastrophic loss can be reversed by being followed through to the bitter end, in revolution or the "schizophrenic" destruction of the social. Production, desire, "communication," Baudrillard continues, are all irreversible processes; cybernetics can allow them to circulate (indeed it is their principle of organization), but they are incapable of reciprocity, of the laughter of being overturned, they are not the least bit seductive, they are just overpowering. Simulation, in other words, is quite real...the question is whether the "real" itself is real. Does labor power or desire sit closer to the power base of reality than simulation? Baudrillard's answer appears to be that the "real" itself (a "Western" category anyway) is always a simulation. To try to "penetrate" it is only to submit to its tyrannical mirage of truth, whose eschatological ideal must be abandoned, whether it is cast in sexual, social, historical or discursive terms, for it will never, of its own accord, lead us away from itself. It lacks the charm.

Seduction, of course, escapes and even undermines the terrible "logic" described above. By arguing that it is an ironic reversal of the oppressive dialectics of desire,

5. Cf. Pierre Clastres, *La Société contre l'état* (Paris, 1974) and Stanley Diamond, *In Search of the Primitive: A Critique of Civilization* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1974). Baudrillard also suscribes to Marshall Sahlins' theory that the so-called neolithic revolution was an historical disaster. See, for example, his "The Original Affluent Society," in *Stone Age Economics* (Chicago, 1972). Sahlins' *Culture and Practical Reason* (Chicago, 1976) contains an interesting elaboration of Baudrillard's ideas.

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Baudrillard implicitly discards the deception model of seduction (Eve, the Communist conspiracy, the mass media, etc.) and opts for something like Scheherzade and the creative disarming of power. According to him, seduction never raises the issues of reality or truth except indirectly in the minds of its detractors, who are usually insufferable moralists. It does not ossify into concretions of libido or information; it oscillates collapsibly in a playfully reversible medium which may be rule-governed, but is never structured by laws. Seduction is the ultimate triumph of the artificial over the "natural." It renounces the strategy of fixing the truth by finding an imaginary center to appearances which will allegedly dissolve them in favor of a higher "reality."

Indeed, for Baudrillard, seduction is a metaphor for what human beings are or do. It is a wedge between the great divide (in France) of nature and culture, eeking out space for "presence," style, the particular — a celebration of the arbitrary but also of the dysfunctional. If sexuality was ever naive, he seems to be saying, it has now been revolutionized (a patented process) into pure sentimentality. Political revolutions have led to the finality of the state, harnessing the political "will" of the people (as Kant put it: "Nature drives man...[to] the achievement of a universal civic society which administers law among men")[6] Economic revolutions have unleashed the "natural" interests, but also an "unbridled romanticism of productivity."[7] The sexual revolution looks like the epitome of this always ambiguous domination-liberation of nature, but there is yet another great tide of domestication washing over us: the "communications revolution." It crops up everywhere. Even sociobiologists, who sometimes call themselves "biogrammarians," fiddle with it. The human race is a "data bank" and individuals are so many "channels" for the "transmission" of genetic "information." (Baudrillard's famous "terrorism of the code.") The end is the species, in some vague, inexperienceable but thoroughly utilitarian sense.

All of these explanatory frameworks are bankrupt, Baudrillard insists — so bankrupt that the ideals in whose name they are still invoked are becoming literally unspeakable. Socialism, anyone? What do "we" call ourselves these days? The Left? Of course, Baudrillard is not recommending that the oppressed and disaffected plot some kind of world seduction, or fight local wars of passion. And if only to underscore that he is making no practical claims, he fails utterly to explain anything by means of his new category. What is more perplexing, however, is an apparent unwillingness to explore the vast literature on this exalted, ritual form of relationship. His only sustained reference is to Kierkegaard's *Diary of a Seducer*, a text which exemplifies the precise opposite of the reciprocity in symbolic exchange which Baudrillard wishes to convey. If ever there was literary proof that one "caste" can actually believe that the members of the other are devoid of subjectivity, suffused only with its own, it is this paranoid, self-conscious document of misogyny. One grows uncertain whether to be relieved or furious that Baudrillard so willfully ignores its intent. To illustrate his thesis, he would have been much better off citing another, more entertaining section of the *Either*, entitled "The Rotation Method," though it never mentions seduction. Nevertheless, his point is Kierkegaardian: between the ethical and the aesthetic, there is really no choice — which is to say, as individuals, we will always be limited to the ethical, and then together create an abominable and brittle social order out of the sum. The aesthetic life is our salvation, but it requires some form of human contact. It is not something we can plan as a goal. What Baudrillard keeps coming back to, while thinking all these revolving thoughts, are two words which, combined, once

6. Immanuel Kant, *On History*, Lewis White Beck, editor (New York, 1963), p. 16.
7. Jean Baudrillard, *The Mirror of Production*, translated by Mark Poster (St. Louis: Telos Press, 1975), p. 17.

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summarized what Sartre thought human: a "useless passion." If only we could be what we are, and not be what we are not.

Charles Levin

Stephen Eric Bronner, ed. *The Letters of Rosa Luxemburg*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978.

Probably more than any other Marxist of her time, Rosa Luxemburg was devoted in her work and politics to the goal of democracy in its most comprehensive meaning — a goal that drove her to the most single-minded heights of revolutionary commitment and optimism and for which, in the crisis and turbulence of Berlin in 1919, she sacrificed her life. Luxemburg's democratic sensibilities went far beyond the abstract formulations of German Social Democracy and the rhetoric of Bolshevism. Democratization for her meant more than a plank in a party program, efforts to "broaden" liberal institutions, or promises of democratic forms to be introduced by benevolent, tutelary leaders at some future revolutionary "stage". She envisaged it as the expression of a deeper historical *process* of social transformation rooted in the struggle for self-emancipation by the masses. It was a vision that inspired and shaped virtually every constituent element of her theory — the self-activity of the proletariat, the mass strike, the merging of revolutionary objectives with strategic methods, the critique of social democracy and Leninism, and so forth. And of course it was at the core of her celebrated "faith in the masses", an outlook that always reflected *Geist* than actual theory. If this thematic permeates Luxemburg's most important theoretical contributions as one of the major figures in European "left" communism before 1920, it is also quite prominent in this volume of her letters, which Bronner has skillfully assembled and situated historically with his excellent introduction and ongoing editorial commentary.[1]

Neither prison nor great political setback appeared to erode Luxemburg's perpetual and boundless triumphalism; history would ultimately be on the side of the heroic masses. In one of her prison letters to Sonja Liebknecht, she wrote: "The psyche of the masses, like the eternal sea, carries all the latent possibilities: the deathly calm and the roaring storm, the lowest cowardice and the wildest heroism. The mass is always that which it *must* be according to the circumstances of the time, and the mass is always at the point of becoming something different than what it appears to be." (p. 37) As Bronner makes clear in his introduction, this lyrical exhuberance was in great part her attempt to recapture the spirit of revolutionary momentum that had been lost with the paralysis of social democracy following World War I. Yet it revealed more than that, as Bronner suggests, for already in her earlier political activity and writing — and emphatically by the time of the 1905

1. Bronner has selected roughly 200 pages of letters from what he estimates would fill out nearly six volumes of correspondence. In deciding what letters to finally include in this work, he was motivated by the aim of linking the political and personal dimensions of Luxemburg's exchanges with friends and comrades — and, mercifully, by the desire to avoid endless repetition of uninteresting trivia. It turns out that only a rather small circle of intimates were on the receiving end of Luxemburg's correspondence during the period 1894-1919: Leo Jogiches, Karl and Luise Kautsky, Henriette Roland-Holst, Hans Diefenbach, Marta Rosenbaum, Sonja Liebknecht, and a few others.

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Russian upheaval — Luxemburg's commitment to mass activity was associated with efforts to create (however incoherent they were) a non-authoritarian strategic course that would give full meaning to the *democratic* socialist ideal that theorists such as Bernstein, Adler and Kautsky had only obscured.

Although Luxemburg's philosophical orientation was hardly elaborated even within her most important writings, a strong Hegelian influence can be detected in her letters, as elsewhere — an influence that is no doubt bound up with her popular, democratic impulses. Thus, in a letter to Leo Jogiches (May, 1899), she argued that the presence of "idealists" within the working-class movement had contributed significantly to its development, adding that "I am and will remain an idealist in the German as well as the Polish movement." (pp. 77-78) Later (in October, 1905), she wrote to Jogiches that the Mensheviks were behaving like children attempting to imitate grown-ups in their mechanical appropriation of Marx's "science" of historical development. "We are a party of class struggle," she insisted, "and not of 'historical laws' " (p. 104). And despite her friendship with Karl and Luise Kautsky, Luxemburg found Karl's bland, objectivist Marxism distasteful, even pernicious, in its implicit denial of the subjective activity of the proletariat. Writing to the Kautskys (in July, 1900), she compared the "immutable loftily indifferent sea" and the "unceasing roar" of the Rhine Falls in Switzerland with the annihilating, crushing impact of social laws; in both cases, the spirit of change is crushed and the "heart feels strangled". She went on: "...there is a similar effect in philosophy which...says of everything that happens — '*It has always been that way*', 'Things will turn out all right by themselves', etc.; man with all of his ability, his will, his knowledge seems too superfluous...that is why I hate that sort of philosophy, my dear Charlemagne, and insist that we should rather throw ourselves into the Rhine Falls and go down in them like a nutshell than sagely nod our heads and let them go rushing the way they have rushed in our forefathers' time and will go on rushing after our time." (p. 83)

By the time of World War I, after German Social Democracy voted to support the national war effort and thereby compromised the last remaining shreds of its socialist identity, Luxemburg's differences with Kautsky grew more bitter. In a letter to Marta Rosenbaum (April, 1917), she attacked Kautsky's attempt to demonstrate that social conditions in Russia negated the possibility of revolution and characterized the mass upsurge as a "punch in the face of the local Social Democrats and the entire slumbering international." Kautsky had forgotten "that 'statistically' France in 1789 and even in 1793 was even less ripe for the rule of the bourgeoisie.... Luckily, history has long since stopped following Kautsky's theoretical prescriptions." (p. 194)

Though a powerful figure within German Social Democracy, Luxemburg never played more than a marginal role in the party — a marginality that was reinforced by her association with the European radical "left"; and while extremely reluctant to leave the party, she never concealed her disdain for its often narrowly instrumental electoral strategy. Unlike many of her contemporaries, she seemed constantly on the lookout for new opportunities, new avenues of struggle, new forms of popular initiative. Above all, she wanted to avoid the extremes of parliamentarism and electoralism, as her correspondence with the leftist Henriette Roland-Holst (December, 1904) clearly indicated: "Some exhaust themselves in guerrilla warfare against the opportunists; others believe that if (in elections and in their organizations) their number grows mechanically and automatically, that this in itself is progress. They forget that quanitity has to transform itself into quality, that a party of three million cannot content itself with automatically repeating the gestures of a half-million

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member party. I don't have to tell you, of all people, that I envisage neither a 'sudden descent into the street' nor some haphazard adventure." (p. 95) Three years later, in a letter to Clara Zetkin (March, 1907), Luxemburg lashed out at those SPD leaders who had swung over to parliamentarism without so much as a pause and who quickly became lost once events took a turn that went beyond the limits of parliament, hoping to lead mass enthusiasm back into parliamentary channels. Her prediction — incorrect as it turned out — was that "the masses, and still more the masses of comrades, in the bottom of their hearts have had enough of this kind of parliamentarism." (p. 121) Had the SPD comrades and masses in fact "had enough" of this strategy, no doubt Rosa Luxemburg's own fate would have been entirely different.

Interestingly enough, the letters tell us very little about Luxemburg's responses to Lenin, the Bolsheviks, or the Russian Revolution; virtually nothing of her well-known critique of Leninist centralism has found its way into the correspondence that is assembled here, much of which can be explained by the vary paucity of letters after 1917. What indeed appears remarkable about this volume of communications as a whole is the dearth of political references of *any* sort. Politics emerges as an opaque element, most often giving way to running commentary about aspects of her everyday life, personalities, culture, the ordeal of prison. No doubt the letters served as an emotional release from the political traumas and struggles that filled her life. Then, too, she expressed a certain discomfort about the harsh demands of political involvement — especially its organizational side — which took her away from the simple pleasures that she valued so greatly. Writing to Sonja Liebknecht (in May, 1917), she said that "sometimes, it seems to me that I am not a human being at all, but rather a bird or beast in human form. Inwardly, I feel so much more at home in a plot of garden like the one here [in prison], and still more in the meadows when the grass is humming with bees, than at one of our party congresses." (p. 203)

Nor did Luxemburg reveal much concerning her attitudes towards her own theoretical work. Aside from the several references to her classic, *The Accumulation of Capital*, there is scarcely a mention of her major works (e.g., *Mass Strike, Social Reform or Revolution,* the *Junius Pamphlet*) much less the kinds of factors that shaped the arguments contained in them. Hence while we learn a great deal about Luxemburg the person, we discover very little about Luxemburg the *theorist*. She did mention that the *Accumulation* volume was written hastily but very conscientiously, motivated as it was by the heated debates on the questions of nationalism and imperialism taking place in the Second International. In a letter to Hans Diefenbach (May, 1917), she wrote: "The period in which I wrote the *Accumulation* belongs to the happiest of my life. I lived in a veritable trance. Day and night I neither saw nor heard anything as that one problem developed so beautifully before my eyes.... Do you know that I wrote the whole 900 pages in 4 months at one sitting? An unheard-of thing! Without checking the rough copy even once, I had it printed." (p. 204) The critics of Luxemburg's *Accumulation*, which was generally considered her opus, were many — including Otto Bauer. In response she wrote what is today her much lesser-known *Anti-Critique*, a work she believed was "much more mature than the *Accumulation* itself: its form is extremely simple, without any accessories, without coquetry or optical illusions, straightforward and reduced to the barest essentials; I would even say 'naked,' like a block of marble." (Letter to Diefenbach, March, 1917, p. 185.) This passage expressed the tremendous value Luxemburg placed in direct, uncomplicated writing style, which presumably would render even rather advanced theoretical arguments intelligible to a broad public.

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She went on: "In theoretical work as in art, I value only the simple, the tranquil and the bold. This is why, for example, the famous first volume of Marx's *Kapital*, with its profuse rococo ornamentation in the Hegelian style, now seems an abomination to me (for which, from the Party standpoint, I must get 5 years' hard labor and 10 years' loss of civil rights)." But then she added, in amusement, that "of course, in order to intelligently appreciate it, the reader of my *Anti-Critique* must thoroughly master political economy in general and Marxian economics in particular. And how many such mortals are there today? Not half a dozen. From this standpoint, my works really are luxury items and could be printed in handmade paper." (p. 185)

Alongside Luxemburg's constant faith in the democratic outpouring of the masses was a dauntless personal optimism that sometimes bordered on a blind messianism. Even prison did not destroy this spirit, as it had in the case of many other revolutionaries. "After all," she wrote to Comrade Westphal (February, 1916), "a prison is a natural extension of our calling as fighters for freedom of the proletariat and, from Russia, I have become accustomed to considering the entry and exit from these walls as the purest circumstance." (p. 166) In a prison letter to Marta Rosenbaum (undated), she referred to the physical and mental strength that she was able to sustain while incarcerated and looked to the "hidden coiled springs of history" for deliverance from the political and personal depression of the moment. At such times, Luxemburg indulged herself in the luxury of a scientific Marxism that might rescue the masses from their own confusion and inactivity. Thus: "And I know from historical experience, as well as from personal experience in Russia, that precisely when on the surface everything seems hopeless and miserable, a complete change is getting ready, which to be sure will be all the more violent. Above all, never forget: we are tied to historical laws of development and these *never* break down, even when they do not exactly follow the plans we have laid." (pp. 168-69) Yet this optimism and strength resided in her own character as well as in history. From prison, she wrote to Sonja Liebknecht (April, 1918) that, horrible as things might be, "one must view *everything* as beautiful and good" since "I instinctively feel that this is the only right way to take life and that's why I feel truly happy in every situation." (p. 251) In an earlier correspondence — also to Liebknecht — Luxemburg spoke of the "manifold black scarves of darkness, boredom, confinement, and winter" which mysteriously give rise to "an incomprehensible, unkown inner happiness, as if I were walking over a blooming field in radiant sunshine." (p. 239)

Very few of the letters contained in this volume explore in any real depth the theoretical and political issues that consumed Marxism and the Second International between 1895 and 1919 (roughly the span of the correspondence) and to which Luxemburg contributed so much. The letters on the whole were quite brief; and even within the lengthier ones, rarely did she carry out the kind of sustained, logical argumentation for which she was famous. Nor did this really matter. What the letters do provide is something entirely different: new insights into the personality and everyday life of one of the most creative and influential Marxist theorists in the twentieth century. Of particular interest here is Luxemburg's generally candid assessment of prominent individuals in her world — both political and non-political, past and present — many samples of which are included in these letters.

On Karl Kautsky: "It is with one eye laughing, and one weeping, that I follow the inexhaustible stream which flows from Kautsky's untiring pen and which, calmly, spins one 'theme' after the other with the patience of a spider. Everything is properly laid out. . . [and] begins with the foggy origins of the world and proceeds to the present day. Only in the essentials does he, unfortunately, not know what he thinks he

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knows." (To Franz Mehring, September, 1917, p. 231.)

On Trotsky: "Our friend Trotsky is revealing himself more and more as a rotten customer." (To Luise Kautsky, 1911, p. 143.)

On Karl Liebknecht: "[His] stance is always like a jump to the right, a jump to the left. In the Prussian *Landtag*, he announced the mass strike. In the [Berlin] City Council he was against our proposal." (To Leo Jogiches, undated, p. 129.)

On Romain-Rolland: "He is one of the rare birds — here and abroad — who have not joined the relapse into the psychology of Neanderthal times on account of the war. Of his works, I have read *Jean-Christophe in Paris* in German translation.... I found the book very nice and sympatico, but it is more of a pamphlet than a novel." (To Diefenbach, August, 1917, p. 228.)

On Goethe: "I don't know myself why it is that a beautiful poem, especially by Goethe, so deeply affects me at every moment of strong excitement or emotion. The effect is almost physical. It's as if with parched lips I were sipping a delicious drink that cools my spirit and heals me, body and soul." (To Sonja Liebknecht, July, 1917.)

On Camille Huysmanns: "For ten years, the two of us both belonged to the International Bureau and for ten years we hated each other — as far as such a feeling is possible for my 'dove's heart'.... Why? It's difficult to say. I believe that he cannot stand politically active women. For my part, I suppose this impertinent fact got on my nerves." (To Diefenbach, June, 1917, p. 213.)

Bronner's superbly-written introduction covers the main areas of Luxemburg's thought — her views on the mass strike, nationalism and imperialism, parliamentarianism, etc. — and arguably offers one of the best general summations of her work in English. For Bronner, as for other interpreters of Luxemburg, the notion of the "self-administration" of the masses leading to revolutionary democracy occupies the core of her theoretical contribution. (p. 48) Hers was the persistent fight against elitism, bureaucracy, and authoritarian manipulation that was all too often justified by appeals to a "scientific" ideology. If democracy was seen as an integral part of the revolutionary process, the precise form of this democracy was expected to be the dramatic mass strike based upon the 1905 Russian model. Bronner argues that, despite an unwavering belief in the integrity (and political efficacy) of this tool and of mass activity in general, Luxemburg in fact presented a rather coherent and structured strategic framework; he concludes that she was hardly the "spontaneist" that most commentators make of her. What he sees is a dynamic Luxemburgian legacy, closely tied to the council movements, the workers' opposition in Russia, and the Spanish insurgency of the 1930s, which has given birth to a new tradition "outside the mainstream of Marxism." (p. 3)

There is surely an element of validity to this. Yet Bronner also notes that revolutionary movements which might have incorporated Luxemburg's prescriptions are dead and that, furthermore, both Marxist and bourgeois writers have tended to dismiss her approach because it has never really led to "success." (p. 45) What I believe this suggests, and what Bronner might have explored more fully, is the essentially ambiguous and contradictory nature of Luxemburg's thought — and hence the very obscure fate of her legacy. One of the noteworthy things about this legacy, as Russell Jacoby has recently stressed, is that it has been claimed equally by Leninists and non-Leninists in the years since her death.[2] She emerged simultaneously as a theorist of the mass strike and of the hierarchical party; of popular self-activity and

2. Russell Jacoby, "The Inception of Western Marxism: Karl Korsch and the Politics of Philosophy," *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory*, vol. 3, no. 3, p. 13.

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of centralized leadership; of "democracy" and of the dictatorship of the proletariat — a theorist and political activist fully absorbed within two rather distinct worlds, and who was never able to reconcile her real theoretical preferences and instincts with her deep organizational attachments bred of long years of practical party work. As in the case of Lukacs, she winds up with an unmediated spontaneism that is counterposed to the always omnipresent reality of the guiding party. (It is precisely in this sense that it is not accurate to label her a "spontaneist" pure and simple.)

The crucial problem is that, in contrast to theorists like Bernstein, Kautsky, Lenin, and even the council communists, Luxemburg never actually developed in her work an integrated political theory and strategy that could produce concrete tendencies within the mass struggles of the time — or later. No doubt, in her rejection of the SPD's narrow reformism and the most extreme forms of vanguardism she found refuge in the "masses" and struggled to counter the powerful anti-democratic currents at work within Marxism; yet her vision of the mass strike — and her call for a "dialectic" between leaders and followers — provided no tangible solution to the problem of building a sustained democratic socialist movement. Bronner fails to note in this regard that Luxemburg's theoretical framework, whatever new insights it might have generated, was largely devoid of new and original *concepts*. Her great faith in the mass strike resembled more than anything else a Sorelian myth that enabled her to sidestep the intricate questions of consciousness and organization. It also allowed her to avoid taking up the issue of democracy in its *concreteness,* as part of the struggle to create alternative, popular, non-bureaucratic structures of authority. (An interesting point here: Luxemburg, despite her long affiliation with the German radical left, firmly distanced herself from the council perspective that was so vital to this tradition.) The heritage of "Luxemburgism" thus remains extremely diffuse, the embodiment of ideals expressed in the life and work of a heroic fighter for social transformation.

Carl Boggs

Andrew Jaszi. *Erkenntnis und Wirklichkeit. Grundlagenkritische Voruntersuchungen.* Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1974. 127 pages.

"What kind of philosophy one chooses depends upon what kind of a man one is." Fichte's statement in the (First) Introduction to his *Doctrine of Knowledge* captures the spirit of Jaszi's contribution to philosophical inquiry: mediative thinking. The experience of almost three decades of human life and thought is sedimented in *Erkenntnis und Wirklichkeit* (Knowledge and Reality). Four bookshelves of manuscripts are condensed into a little booklet of barely 127 pages. Thus it is not a work that one can read in three hours' sitting, nor digest in three months' time, but the philosophy of a lifetime, the reading and comprehension of which require the same effort of thought on the part of the reader as the author exerted in its conceptualization.

Jaszi's thinking embodies a quiet radicalism, a determination to get at the radix; there is no pathos conjuring up hope or utopia, nor even the evocation of determinate negation, just a silent stubbornness to follow thinking where it may lead. And it leads to the deconceptualization of categories of thought and existence, without, however,

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finding a bedrock principle, be it that of negativity itself, upon which to rest. Jaszi's thinking is no longer even the "melancholy science" of Adorno, for even melancholia offers a kind of familiar refuge for the isolated but heteronomous individual. Rather, it is just a lonely discourse — perhaps all that remains to thinking now. Jaszi does not use philosophical constructs to guide his thinking, but allows thought to take its own course to the point where it hits the bottom line and founders on its own inadequacies. Consequently, he shows in the deepest possible way the real shortcomings and contradictions of existence itself. That Jaszi's inquiry reaches a limit reveals a rare intellectual honesty, for one's thought, no matter how "radical," is bound to one's historical determinancy; it cannot leap over its own shadow, which is the pall cast by social existence. Thought can go no further than what the set boundaries of given reality and the concrete possibilities of imagination allow (hence the images and metaphors that Jaszi draws from the charmed circle of aesthetics, and only a few at that). Even an extension of thought into madness, be it but a brief foray, slams against the brick wall of specific historical existence.

Jaszi finds himself forced to make contradiction itself into a method; contradiction rending the guts of contemporary human existence. If suffering (i.e., an ontological need) is the soul of genuine thought, those who seek to appropriate the letter of advanced critical thinking miss the spirit. And as Jaszi once remarked to some students, you only reach someone through their suffering — not, however, a raw mass of pain, but a pain reflected upon and thus activated as the basis, call it the humus, of productive thinking.

Without attempting to lay out Jaszi's philosophical questioning, it may be fruitful to mention a few critical thoughts. The whole inquiry is driven by the search for shared human identity — an identity only evident as a lack. But an interhuman identity seems to hinge upon a shared thingly identity, also non-existent in reified reality and, just as shared human identity, non-existent to reified thinking. Merely to begin to approach some kind of shared identity, even its absent conception, conventional categories of time, space and consciousness, the ultimate containers of lived experience (as opposed to integrated experience) have to be deconstructed, or shown to be but the reified semblance of a dynamic state that eludes definition. In the filled dynamism of dissolved categories of time, space and consciousness, cognitive acts emerge from non-being and *momentarily* vouchsafe a true or shared identity (viz. between human beings and between human beings and things), but only as these beings and things abandon their reified existence or false identity in true process of differentiation: "momentarily" in a sense outside of linear time. Being then no longer is private property as the being, existence, or identity of someone or something, but resides in the polar tension between shared identity and differentiation. And each pole *is* because it is *not* the other.

It is as if Jaszi's investigations stand in a no-man's-land between the either-or that undergirds traditional thought and conventional reality, between hope and hopelessness, where the infinite distance of these investigations from their unnamed goal, no, end, first allows that end to guide thought. It is not that truth resides in the subjectively mediated, if objectively adequate, force field between perceived and existent polarities (a field that, for example, Adorno produces or reproduces out of dialectical mediation as a kind of bridge between subject and object, a bridge that must be reconstructed since the genuine bridges have long since been destroyed and their remnants forgotten), it is rather that there is some "third point" or dimension that first potentiates these polarities, from a point somewhere outside their mutual tension. It is as if there were a true outer in the usually internally constituted (and

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resolved) dialectic of inner and outer; an outer that sets hard and fast polarities into reciprocal motion, not directly — for like a sun its infinite heat and light would dissolve philosophical inquiry into blind mysticism (and its proximate existence could only be seen in the existent world as utter abstract negation: world annihilation) — but through the force of its gravitational field; a gravitational field first given philosophical articulation in Jaszi's mediative thinking, though perhaps first aesthetically brought to light in Goethe's poetry.

To put it differently, what would be closest at hand and what is farthest away are inextricably interconnected. One could only experience the cosmos (the unspoken "third point") through community (a genuine shared identity), one can only sense a joyous community through the gravity of the cosmos. Perhaps Jaszi's investigations can he considered the philosophical mediation of Walter Benjamin's opaque-luminescent images and the conceptual validation of his materialist-Messianic vision; in fact, perhaps Jaszi's investigations first bridge, or rather, make comprehensible, the gap between Benjamin's concrete specificity and his visionary impulse, which are contained in their apparent disparateness and actual discontinuity within the body of his writings.[1] Jaszi's labors on the decomposition of the constructs of reified thought, which are the catgories of reified existence, unintentionally coincide with Benjamin's efforts toward the reconstitution (remembrance) of the configurations of a mute and fragmented thing-world, which are the ciphers of human redemption. For Jaszi's mediative reflections converge with the sensuous illuminations of Benjamin in a "mysterious-manifest" (Goethe), absent-present truth content, a negative truth content that is in the reified and estranged world but not of it. If Jaszi has made the authentic paradox the hinge of coming-into-being of cognitive acts, then we first begin to perceive the profound depth at which Benjamin's redemptive micrological vision strains toward genuine knowledge, for it turns on the definitive paradox: what Adorno in his "Portrait of Walter Benjamin" terms the "paradox of the impossible possibility."[2] And this paradox surely also characterizes Jaszi's inquiry: or to borrow his own crucial conception, what we might term the "presence of absence."[3]

But mediative thinking is not grasped in the concepts and categories with which Jaszi sets the reified notions of conventional knowledge and conventionalized reality in motion, nor even in the interpretation ventured above; such an act of appropriation only reifies everything once again. Mediative thinking, rather, takes place in the

1. To begin with, consider Benjamin's observation, entitled "To the Planetarium," in "One-Way Street," for in this little observation the cosmos-community relationship is intimated. Then see the rest of "One-Way Street" and also "Berlin Chronicle" on the one hand, and "Theologico-Political Fragments" and "Theses on the Philosophy of History" on the other. Read the former two pieces — assembled 1924-28 and sketched in 1932 respectively — in conjunction with a restudying of Jaszi's centerpiece, "The Thing in Time and Space," chapter 3, and read the latter two writings — composed 1920-21 and completed in 1940 respectively — in conjunction with a re-reading of Jaszi's concluding "Further Considerations," chapter 5, together with his brief comments in the Preface, which is the part of the book written last. The first three writings (selections only of "One-Way Street") can be found in Walter Benjamin, *Reflections. Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings,* edited and introduction by Peter Demetz, translated by Edmund Jephcott (New York and London: A Harvest-HBJ Book, 1979); "To the Planetarium" is on pp. 92-94. The "Theses" can be found in Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations,* edited and introduction by Hannah Arendt, translated by Harry Zorn (New York: Schocken Books, 1973), pp. 253-64.

2. Cf. Theodor W. Adorno, *Prisms,* translated by Samuel and Shierry Weber (London: Neville Spearman, 1967), p. 241.

3. Also see the follow-up essay by Jaszi, "Ueber das Vergehen" ("On Passing"), in *Literaturwissenschaft und Geschichtsphilosophie. Festschrift für Wilhelm Emrich,* edited by Helmut Arntzen *et.al.* (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1975), pp. 83-95.

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process of its own movement. And to follow this movement, to participate in its dance, a dance in which the dancer, "by moving himself, detaches himself perpetually from every surrounding" (p. 22), we must hearken to its tune. And we then leave behind the prose of disheartened everyday life for the poetry of the undaunted human spirit. For it is on the level of imagination, immediately and sensuously before the reader, not as a product of immediacy but as part and parcel of stringent conceptual thinking, that the deeper and sustaining currents of mediating thinking move and carry one to genuine insights. What emerges from the language is the image of the subject, the last point of resistance against insurmountable odds, struggling to crack the necessary semblance of reified thinking-existence (and first constitute itself, which it cannot even negatively do without constituting an object in the true sense), while precariously balanced on the brink of the abyss that yaws before it. The language of *Erkenntnis und Wirklichkeit* conveys a dogged stubbornness, the refusal to close one's eyes and rest, if only for a moment, because one literally shudders within the terrible knowledge that once closed the eyes will never open again — or forever they will stare lidless into unspeakable horror.

The most advanced theory prior to Jaszi's contribution to philosophical inquiry has been Critical Theory. But its spirit has not animated individuals in their own critical endeavors, rather its letter has been parroted in Journals, classified and neutralized in the academy: as Adorno himself pointed out, even critical theory does not escape the marketplace. Moreover, as one insider put it, critical theory has seen its "rise" in the turbulent 60s and its necessary "decline" in the satisfied (read: scared, petrified) 70s. But I doubt whether Jaszi's mediative thinking will be so readily consumed as Critical Theory once was among the cognoscenti; although Adorno's "negative dialectics" was never easily digestible because of its fragmentary, determinately negative approach to reality and knowledge. Likewise, Jaszi's mediative thinking will prove difficult to appropriate as a system. And in plumbing the depths of thought, Jaszi's investigations may prove more fruitful as a substantive model for philosophical exploration (cultural criticism, textual interpretation) than Adorno's mode of thought. For Jaszi goes a level deeper than Adorno. Rather than negatively *constituting* a dialectics through the tension of the internal contradictions of various models of thought and reality, as Adorno does in *Negative Dialectics*, Jaszi drives his mediations to the no-man's-land where, having internally undermined the reified categories of thought and the world — Existence and Appearance, Self-Identity and Thing, Time and Space and Consciousness — thinking experiences its own insufficiency in view of something beyond that eludes definition. Through its remoteness from knowledge and reality, this elusive something imbues Jaszi's mediative thinking — a form of thought that can sense the undefinable "something" but can neither think it nor know it — with the horizon of a world that would be different and thus recalls the "age-old dream of unity, the beginning and end of all things" (p. vii). By deriving the strength of theory solely from turning the power of reified thought and things against these very thoughts and things in a stance of resistance, negative dialectics — unlike mediative thinking — perpetuates a vicious circle wherein hardness meets hardness and coldness coldness, a closed circle that can exclude the reason for thinking at all, the point of the whole damned business: redemption.

Larry Vaughan

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Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron. *New French Feminisms: An Anthology.* Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1980. 279 pages.

Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron attempt with *New French Feminisms* to fill an obvious void. Aside from works by Simone de Beauvoir, Monique Wittig, or Julia Kristeva, plus a few essays by Hélène Cixous, very little of the writings of recent French feminists has appeared in English.[1] Quoting Cixous' complaint in the preface: "We translate what the American women write, they never translate our texts," the editors describe the book as "the beginning of an exchange" (p. ix).

Readers who seek in the anthology anything beyond this beginning will be disappointed, for Marks and Courtivron have chosen to represent a fairly wide range of writers with short excerpts by each one — a kind of feminist *Reader's Digest.* A first reading provides a confusing cacophony from which only a few especially high-pitched sounds emerge. The reader comes away impressed with some inspired rhetoric and a few predominating themes, rather than a clear sense of the range of ideas among women in France.

The arrangement of the texts clarifies neither the pieces themselves nor the relationships of their writers. The selections begin with the Introduction to *The Second Sex,* the only text present published before 1968. Justification for this inclusion of a work long available in English is supposed to be the "dialectical" ordering of the excerpts, which embodies evident assumptions: "We have arranged them in a dialectical order: their *beginnings* in Simone de Beauvoir's *The Second Sex*; the *demystifications* of official male models and categories; the *warnings* about the dangers of marginality and provincialism inherent in the assumption that there is an exact correlation between sexual and linguistic specificity; the *creations,* in spite of the warnings, of women writing, not *about* women or feminism but writing woman, writing feminist; the *manifestoes-actions* that accompany the launching of journals or groups and which translate the presence of feminisms in France today; the *utopias* toward which all feminisms tend" (p. xiii).

A three-part introduction (to which it is useful to return to correlate texts with political groups and activities)[2] provides some information about the historical and political context of the "woman question" in France, tracing it back to the medieval *Querelle des femmes* and claiming that pre-World War II feminists "were always on the defensive, always pleading and, even if they affirmed the equality or superiority of women, never initiating the debate" (p. 6). Then Simone de Beauvoir shifted the ground of the discussion in 1949 by raising the question: "How does a female baby become or not become a 'feminine' woman?" *New* feminism emerges from the concatenation of forces that culminates in May '68; de Beauvoir's own evolution toward a position of feminist militancy occurs in the context of this subsequent upsurge of women's groups.

As in the United States, there has been a rough division of French women's groups in the 1970s into reformist and radical. The reformist position is best exemplified in France by "Choisir," a group analogous to NOW, which was organized in 1971 under the leadership of Gisèle Halimi. In 1978 this group published *Le Programme*

1. Exceptions include: Hélene Cixous interviewed by Christine Makward, *Sub-stance,* no. 13 (1976), pp. 19-37; Marguerite Duras, "An Interview with Marguerite Duras" by Susan Husserl-Kapit, in *Signs* 1, no. 2 (Winter, 1975), pp. 423-34; Julia Kristeva interviewed by Josette Féral, translated by Jane Kritzman, in *Sub-Stance,* no. 13 (1976), pp. 9-18.

2. Carolyn Greenstein Burke also discusses the French feminist movement in her article, "Report from Paris: Women's Writing and the Women's Movement," in *Signs* 3, no. 4 (Summer, 1978), pp. 843-855.

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Commun des Femmes, which suggests specific legislation to meet women's demands and urges all women to vote for candidates who support the common program. "Choisir" identifies itself as "a work group and a pressure group" (p. 209), and seeks rather than fears cooptation of its ideas by political parties of both the right and left.

Groups and individuals that reject the reformist strategy are more difficult to classify. Avoiding parliamentary politics, they depend more heavily on writing *per se* and on making spectacular symbolic gestures. The "Mouvement de Liberation des Femmes" (MLF) represents a loose coalition of diverse groups, which came into existence when it was named by the press in 1970. In popular consciousness, the MLF is perhaps epitomized by the women who placed on the tomb of the unknown soldier in Paris a wreath inscribed, "to the unknown wife of the soldier." This piece of theater received as much publicity as did that of their American counterparts who burned cosmetics, bras, and other accouterments of femininity at the celebrated anti-Miss America pageant demonstration.

The MLF has undergone frequent splits and internal divisions through which "the myth of a single, united women's movement has been shattered."[3] One of the most aggressive and vocal groups within the MLF has been "Politique et psychanalyse," whose members insist that "Women's struggle must of necessity deal with the dialectical relationship between historical materialism and psychoanalysis" (p. 118). In order to give women writers an opportunity to publish their works, members of "Po et psych" established an editorial collective known as "Editions des femmes." (They deliberately named themselves using lower case letters to refuse the implications in "La Femme.") However, controversy erupted around "des femmes" when the collective rejected the term "feminism" as irredeemably tainted by the bourgeois political tradition.[4] This also meant, of course, rejecting all those women who identified themselves as feminists.[5] Their position is summarized by Antoinette Fouque: "Feminists are a bourgeois avant-garde that maintains, in an inverted form, the dominant values.... Bourgeois order, capitalism, phallocentrism are ready to integrate as many feminists as will be necessary. Since these women are becoming men, in the end it will only mean a few more men. The difference between the sexes is not whether one does or doesn't have a penis, it is whether or not one is an integral part of a phallic masculine economy" (p. 117).

In opposition to "Po et Psych," the "Féministes révolutionnaires" were organized in 1970. They adopted the American feminists' model of consciousness-raising groups, which sought to change the ways women saw themselves and related to one another. For a time, the association's most famous public spokeswoman was Monique Wittig, and "Féministes révolutionnaires" attracted many Lesbians and Lesbian separatists. However, conflicts between Lesbians and heterosexual women arose, as they did in so many American groups, and, along with the debates over the use of the word "feminism," undermined the association's unity.

Another area of conflict has been the relation between traditional Marxism and feminism. Both the limitations of Marxist theory and the behavior of some left-wing men have driven many women away from Marxism, while others have remained faithful to it and to one or the other of the Marxist parties. These women continue to

3. Burke, *op.cit.*, p. 855.

4. This view was also adopted by Hélene Cixous and Julia Kristeva. According to Kristeva, "Feminism can be but one of capitlism's more advanced needs to rationalize" (p. 141).

5. The refusal of "des femmes" members to publish works by women with whom they disagreed also generated bad feeling in the movement. Women who thought they were being offered a chance to publish saw the opportunity snatched away from them again.

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place the class struggle ahead of women's struggles and to insist that women should work with men in political movements, rather than establish their own organizations. As Arlette Laguiller puts it: "Women must fight within the existing organizations.... Women in the feminist movements are not politicized: for them there are women's problems and then there are the larger problems of humanity that are to be settled by men.... Feminism, except on very limited issues (abortion) cannot bring together all women in a common struggle. Class oppression is stronger" (p. 123).

The dissension and debates in and among all these groups demonstrate not only the unfortunate tendency to fragmentation familiar on the left, but also an encouraging energy and vitality. As Simone de Beauvoir remarked: "Feminist thought is not monolithic" (p. 191) and for that we can only be grateful. All the groups and individuals that reject the reformist strategy of merely inserting women into positions of power and changing some laws are united only by their unwillingness to accept the existing male-dominated order and have women take their places within it. Claudine Hermann puts this refusal as follows: "It means nothing to allow women to participate in society if it robs them of everything that makes them different. But men cannot conceive without scorn anything that is not exactly like them" (p. 98).

This assertion of feminine difference allows women to define and identify with life-affirming, non-hierarchical values in opposition to those of the dominant culture, but it also raises some problems. Rejection of the essentialist position (basic to any separatist tendency in feminism (— that women, *as women*, are fundamentally different from men, have a different language, a different mode of experiencing the world — has been expressed by "Po et Psych," by Kristeva: "Woman as such does not exist,"[6] and by de Beauvoir: "It would be an error...to think that the feminine body gives you a new vision of the world" (p. 153). *Questions Féministes*, a journal launched in 1977 under de Beauvoir's editorship, characterized this perspective in its opening editorial as a moment in women's struggle that they called "feminitude" (resembling negritude) or "cultural feminism."[7]

The best representatives of this viewpoint included in the volume are perhaps Chantal Chawaf, Claudine Hermann, and Marguerite Duras, all of whom assert that women's language, writing, sense of time and space are *different*, and that women must articulate this specifically feminine experience. According to Duras: " 'Feminine literature' is an organic, translated writing...translated from blackness, from darkness. Women have been in darkness for centuries. They don't known themselves. Or only poorly. And when they write, they translate the darkness.... Men don't translate. They begin from a theoretical platform that is already in place, already elaborated. The writing of women is really translated from the unknown, like a new way of communicating rather than an already formed language" (p. 174). For them, women's writing ought to be direct, rooted in women's physical experience. As Chantal Chawaf puts it: "If a music of femininity is arising out of its own oppression, it materializes through the rediscovered body. I feel that feminine writing is social, vital. I feel the political fecundity of mucus, milk, sperm, secretions which gush out to liberate energies and give them back to the world" (p. 178). They tend to distrust theory and insist that "we must disintellectualize writing" (p. 177).

More complex is the position that Hélène Cixous articulates in her essay, "The Laugh of the Medusa."[8] She also emphasizes women's creativity, women's writing: "I

6. Julia Kristeva, *About Chinese Women*, translated by Anita Barrows (New York: Urizen Books, 1977), p. 16.

7. In 1978 Monique Wittig also began to publish in *Questions Féministes*.

8. A translation of "The Laugh of the Medusa" done by Keigh and Paula Cohen was

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write woman: woman must write woman" (p. 247), but insists that "There is, at this time, no general woman, no one typical woman" (p. 245). Instead, she will note "what they have in common."

What makes women *different* from me is, of course, never seen solely as a matter of biology; the experience of *becoming* feminine, of living as a woman in a male-dominated and determined society is crucial. Certainly no respectable feminist would argue that "Anatomy is destiny." However, the insistence on the difference in, even superiority of, women's sexual pleasure, women's language, women's writing brings with it some of the very dangers feminists have been combatting for centuries. These are embodied in Sacha Guitry's remark, quoted in the *Questions Féministes* editorial: "I would gladly agree that women are superior if it would discourage them from becoming equals" (p. 222).

An emphasis in feminist discourse on women's discovering their suppressed creativity will not be unfamiliar to American feminists familiar with Tillie Olsen's *Silences* or with some of Adrienne Rich's essays,[9] nor will the essentialist notion that all women possess a fundamental creativity stifled by patriarchy seem unusual to readers of Mary Daly or Andrea Dworkin.[10] Like their American counterparts, French feminists denounce stereotypically male stances, styles, and attitudes toward sexuality. They locate the undeniable strain of misogyny in Western culture and analyze a number of its specific manifestations.

Along with these elements familiar to American feminists, there are also some differences. In the area of sexuality, Americans tend to look to Masters and Johnson's empirical research to tell them where and how to have orgasm, while the French refer to a *jouissance* that could never be measured in the laboratory, but which is specific to women: "It is a kind of potlatch in the world of orgasms, a giving, expending, dispensing of pleasure without concern for ends or closure" (pp. 36-37). In the area of cultural criticism, there is also a notable difference of focus. Rather than looking for neglected or suppressed examples of women's presence in history and culture, as do many British and American feminists, the French focus on the very absence of women from phallocentric, phallocratic Western civilization. They write as if there were absolutely no tradition of feminist discourse at all, and they were starting from *point zéro*.[11] In addition, the emphasis on writing as *the* creative expression for women strikes the American reader as peculiar to the French intellectual milieu. As Carolyn Burke puts it: "It is possible to write oneself into existence in Paris."[12]

A more sophisticated analysis of contemporary French feminism than the editors provide might have explained some of the relations between the writers in the volume and the Great Fathers of the French intellectual milieu — Lévi-Strauss, Lacan, Derrida, for example. They remark in their introduction that radical feminism "has stolen the intellectual tools of patriarchy and, in many cases, has turned them against

published in *Signs* 1, no. 4 (Summer, 1976), pp. 875-893.

9. Tillie Olsen, *Silences* (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1978); Adrienne Rich, *On Lies, Secrets, and Silences: Selected Prose, 1966-1978* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1979).

10. Mary Daly, *Gyn-Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978); Andrea Dworkin, *Woman Hating* (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1974).

11. In her "Foreward" to *Lies, Secrets, and Silences,* Adrienne Rich notes the dangers of ignoring this tradition: "The entire history of women's struggle for self-determination has been muffled in silence over and over. One serious cultural obstacle encountered by any feminist writer is that each feminist work has tended to be received as if it emerged from nowhere; as if each of us had lived, thought, and worked without any historical past or contextual present. This is one of the ways in which women's work and women's thinking has been made to seem sporadic, errant, orphaned of any tradition of its own" (Rich, p. 11).

12. Burke p. 844.

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their inventors" (p. 35). In how many cases, however, have these intellectual tools turned into double-edged swords to undercut the very arguments on which they are based? The editors' introduction provides little guidance here, nor do the texts themselves, truncated as they are, always give the reader a clear indication of their writers' references and assumptions. Nonetheless, the efforts of many of these writers to break with a tradition of theoretical discourse, the limits of which are obvious not only to feminists, are impressive.

Eileen Manion

Harold Entwistle. *Antonio Gramsci: Conservative Schooling For Radical Politics*. Boston and London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979. 207 pages.

Within the last decade a considerable amount of literature in the tradition of the "new sociology of education"[1] has challenged reductionist accounts of schooling by conservative as well as radical critics. On the one hand, the "new sociologists of education" have repudiated the conservative position that schools are neutral, meritocratic institutions designed to promote economic growth and social mobility. On the other hand, they have argued against "radical" positions which claim that schools are simply agencies of cultural and economic reproduction functioning smoothly, transmitting the imperatives of capitalist production and dominant social relations.

In opposition to those who see schools merely as "black boxes," critics such as Young, Bernstein, Bourdieu, Whitty and others have focused on the forces that wedded pedagogy to existing forms of economic and cultural power. In doing so, these critics

1. This refers to an eclectic range of writers in both the United States and Europe who have drawn upon a variety of forms of social inquiry in reconstructing educational theory and practice. While phenomenological and neo-Marxist influences dominate this tradition, the latter appears to have taken the upper hand in the last three years. The essential feature of the field's common bond is its rejection of the positivism and empiricism characteristic of the traditional sociology of education and mainstream educational theory and research. Some of the notable representatives of this tradition outside of the United States include: Michael F.D. Young, ed., *Knowledge and Control: New Directions for the Sociology of Education* (London, 1971); Richard Brown, ed., *Knowledge, Education and Cultural Change* (London, 1973); Michael Flude and John Ahier, eds., *Educability, Schools and Ideology* (London, 1974); Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson, eds., *Resistance Through Rituals: Youth Subcultures in Post War Britain* (London, 1975); Rachel Sharp and Anthony Green, *Education and Social Control* (London, 1975); Geoff Whitty and Michael F.D. Young, eds., *Explorations in the Politics of School Knowledge* (Driffield, 1976); Basil Bernstein, *Class, Codes and Control*, Volume 3 (London, 1977); Pierre Bourdrieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture* (London, 1977); Madeleine MacDonald, *The Curriculum and Cultural Reproduction* (Milton Keynes, 1977); Michael Young and Geoff Whitty, eds., *Society, State and Schooling* (Sussex, 1977); Geoff Whitty, *School Knowledge and Social Control* (Milton Keynes, 1977); Denis Gleeson, ed., *Identity and Structure: Issues in the Sociology of Education* (Driffield, 1977); Ulf Lundgren, *Code, Context and Curriculum Process* (Stockholm, 1979); Madan Sarup, *Marxism and Education* (London, 1978); Paul Willis, *Learning to Labor: How Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs* (Westmead, 1977). In the United States, the few books that have had a significant impact include: Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, *Schooling in Capitalist America* (New York, 1976); William Pinar, *Curriculum Theorizing* (Berkeley, 1975); Stanley Aronowitz, *False Promises* (New York, 1973); Jerome Karabel and A.H. Halsey, eds., *Power and Ideology in Education* (New York, 1977); Maxine Greene, *Landscapes of Learning* (New York, 1978); Martin Carnoy, *Schooling in a Corporate Society* (New York, 1975); Michael W. Apple, *Ideology and Curriculum* (Boston and London, 1979). I am excluding the work of American revisionist historians, but their work, I believe, shares part of this tradition.

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have stripped schools of their political innocence and illuminated the complex and often contradictory ideological principles underlying the organization of curriculum knowledge, the form of its transmission, and the ways it is evaluated. In these views, schools are seen neither as all-encompassing footholds of domination nor as the locus of revolution. Rejecting a version of the correspondence theory,[2] these critics portrayed schools as relatively autonomous institutions characterized by a particular relation to the needs of the capitalist state. This relation is more complex than the way vulgar functionalist accounts portray it, according to "which the whole sphere of the cultural ideological. . .[is] subsumed within a single function, the reproduction of the conditions of capitalist production."[3]

Drawing on Gramsci's writings, many of these critics recognized that while his theoretical analyses of politics, education and culture were limited by a historical specificity of Italy's problems in the 1920s, many of his ideas can be used in the reconstruction of a radical theory of advanced industrial societies today. From the beginning, these issues have been marked by intense debate, primarily among those sharing its most important assumptions, i.e., its rejection of positivist notions of schooling.[4] Only recently have "liberal" ideologues entered the debate with arguments to support a conservative pedagogy emphasizing standards and techniques.[5] Entwistle's book is representative of this genre. It is an attempt to discredit the radical potential in Gramsci's writings on the important relations between hegemony, pedagogy, and radical practice.

The result is a mechanical reading of Gramsci which, whatever Entwistle's intentions, points toward a new-conservative pedagogy. It is neither a fruitful critique of the "new sociologists" nor a commentary on Gramsci's pedagogical writings. In it students and teachers appear as cultural dopes and passive bearers of ideology, while Gramsci's notion of hegemony becomes a poor version of a Leninist theory of radical pedagogy; the task of revolutionary education is assigned to a vanguard of elite pedagogues who systematically ignore the sutdents they are meant to "save." Such a reading has little to do with Gramsci's views.[6]

Gramsci's ideas regarding education, of course, are marred by both coded language as well as incomplete and shifting perspectives. For example, a large part of Gramsci's prison notes on curricular change and pedagogy were written in response to Gentile's proposed school reforms of 1923 and can only be understood within Gramsci's overall

2. Bowles and Gintis, Bourdieu and Passeron, and Althusser have come under rather heavy criticism on this issue. See David Hogan, "Capitalism, Liberalism and Schooling," *Theory and Society*, 1:3 (1979), pp. 387-1413; Michael Erben and Dennis Gleeson, "Education as Reproduction: A Critical Aspect of the Work of Louis Althusser," in *Society, State and Schooling*, eds. Michael Young and Geoff Whitty, *op.cit.*, pp. 73-92; Eric Bredo and Walter Feinberg, 'Meaning, Power and Pedagogy," *Journal of Curriculum Studies*, 11:4 (1979), pp. 315-332; Henry A. Giroux, "Beyond the Correspondence Theory: Notes on the Dynamics of Educational Reproduction and Transformation," *Curriculum Inquiry*, 10:3 (forthcoming).

3. Richard Johnson, "Histories of Culture-Theories of Ideology: Notes on an Impasse," in *Ideology and Cultural Production*, eds. Michele Barrett, Philip Corrigan, Annette Kuhn and Janet Wolff (New York, 1979), p. 69.

4. A good summary of this debate can be found in Richard Bates, "New Developments in the New Sociology of Education," *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, 1:2 (1980), pp. 67-79; James Donald, "Green Paper: Noise of Crisis," *Screen Education*, No. 30 (Spring 1979), pp. 13-49.

5. In the United States this is exemplified in the work of Diane Ravitch, such as *The Revisionists Revised: A Critique of the Radical Attack on the Schools* (New York, 1977).

6. Cf. Paul Piccone, "Gramsci's Marxism: Beyond Lenin and Togliatti," *Theory and Society*, 3:4 (Winter 1976).

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outlook. Otherwise, one runs the risk of falling into a simplistic reading of Gramsci as a supporter of conservative schooling. This would be particularly misleading since what was labeled "progressive educational policy" in Italy in the 1920s might be considered "conservative" by "radical" educators in the 1980s. Thus, the starting point for evaluating Gramsci's educational writings is whether his questions and suggestions provide the conceptual building blocks for a radical pedagogy.

Entwistle's book is one of the first full-fledged neo-conservative efforts to explore the relevance of Gramsci's writings for radical education. Entwistle approaches this task by examining Gramsci's writings on Schooling, and then comparing his own analysis of these writings against the way Gramsci's work has been interpreted by "new sociologists of education" and others. After resurrecting the "real" Gramsci, Entwistle readily dismisses those radical critics who have allegedly misinterpreted Gramsci's work. The last section takes up over half of the book, and is the most important and original part. He closes by providing a loose section on the relevance of Gramsci's writing for adult education. The book ends with the conclusion that the lesson to be learned from Gramsci's work is that schools do not provide the setting for "a radical, counter-hegemonic education" (177).

Thus, radical pedagogy makes sense only for institutions designed for adult education, i.e., work-places, trade unions, etc. This results in a dualism: on the one hand, schooling for children is seen as an exercise in imposing discipline, drudgery, and "objective" facts; i.e., it becomes a place where teachers mechanically instill the tools and "virtues" of "traditional" culture. On the other hand, education for adults is characterized by self-reflection, critical thinking, and teacher-student relations in which both parties are actively engaged as learners in the pursuit of truth and social change. The book is organized along these lines. It does not begin with a problem, but with a messianic fervor, the purpose of which is to impose a positivist reading of Gramsci as a crude apologist for the most reactionary pedagogy. Entwistle's aim is to exorcise the evil influence of the "new sociologists of education" and neo-Marxist radical educators. In both cases, his account is inadequate.

According to Entwistle, Gramsci turns out to be a stern taskmaster whose views on discipline, knowledge, and hegemony are more consistent with Popper and Barzun (both of whom are favorably quoted) than Marx, Freire, or even Dewey. For instance, Entwistle's version of Gramsci as a model for socialist education is based on the claim that Gramsci held human knowledge to be objective in Popper's sense: i.e., knowledge as "independent of anybody's claim to know, and that there exist objective, intractable laws to which man must adapt if he is to master them in his turn" (46-47). But Popper's "knowledge without a subject" and his notion of logic independently of human volitions bear little resemblance to Gramsci's thought. Moreover, Gramsci's position does not support the relativism of the early proponents of the new sociology of education which is rightly criticized by Entwistle.[7] Nor does it support Popper's view of knowledge with its underlying endorsement of technocratic organizational forms designed "so that objective, ahistorical and abstract knowledge may be employed in controlling historical events."[8] Gramsci was very clear about subjecting human action to projections based on statistical laws. He argued that such a view reinforced passivity among the masses and supported the notion that the future could be predicted through a mechanical reading of the past.[9] Entwistle's objectivism thus bleaches

7. This refers particularly to Young, *Knowledge and Control, op.cit.*

8. John Friedman, "The Epistemology of Social Practice: A Critique of Objective Knowledge," *Theory and Society*, 6:1 (July 1978), p. 80.

9. Antonio Gramsci, *The Modern Prince and Other Writings* (New York, 1967).

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Gramsci's epistemology of its subjectivity, history, and humanism. Gramsci's concern with "facts" and intellectual rigor make sense only as a critique of those forms of pedagogy that separated facts from values, learning from understanding, and emotion from the intellect.

To Gramsci, the pedagogy of the Gentile reforms, which stressed "feeling," "emotion," and the most "immediate needs of the child" to the exclusion of content and modes of critical reasoning, was a form of domination camouflaged as libertarian educational theory. Gramsci's pedagogy focused on a critique of vocational schooling, the linking of scholarship with self-discipline and a rejection of the "immediate." His epistemology rejected a positivist account of social reality and human nature based on a self-subsistent world of facts. Entwistle's reading of Gramsci substitutes a one-sided celebration of the immediacy of needs with an equally one-sided celebration of the immediacy of "facts."

Gramsci rejected mere factuality and demanded that schooling be "formative while being 'instructive.'" The pedagogical task entailed, in part, "mitigating and rendering more fertile the dogmatic approach which must inevitably characterize these first few years."[10] Underlying Gramsci's pedagogy is an educational principle in which a comfortable humanism is replaced by a hardheaded radicalism that integrates necessity and spontaneity, learning important basic skills and imagination."[11] In contrast, Entwistle interprets Gramsci's view of schooling as reducing pedagogy to dull routine, and implies that such a pedagogy can and should be maintained. There is no question that drill, drudgery, and discipline are part of Gramsci's pedagogy. but as Simpson points out, "the necessary drudgery is not the principle he finds in work, so much as its transforming power."[12] The connections between discipline and critical thinking in Gramsci's view of schooling only lend support to a conservative notion of pedagogy if the concept of physical discipline and self-control is abstracted from his emphasis on developing a counter-hegemony.[13] Gramsci claims that "...it will always be an effort to learn physical self-discipline and self-control, the pupil, has in effect to undergo psycho-physical training."[14] But this is distorted unless understood in the context of his other remarks on the subject. For instance, in 1916 he wrote: "We must break the habit of thinking that culture is encyclopedic knowledge whereby man is viewed as a mere container in which to pour and conserve empirical data of brute disconnected facts which he will have to subsequently pigeonhole in his brain as in the columns of a dictionary so as to be able to eventually respond to the varied stimuli of the external world. This form of culture is truly harmful, especially to the proletariat. It only serves to create misfits, people who believe themselves superior to the rest of humanity because they have accumulated in their memory a certain quantity of facts and dates that they cough up at every opportunity to almost raise a barrier between

10. Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. and trans. by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Smith (New York, 1971), p. 30.

11. Cf. Marx Wartofsky, "Art and Technology: Conflicting Models of Education? The Use of a Cultural Myth" in *Work, Technology and Education*, eds. Walter Feinberg and Henry Rosemon Jr. (Urbana, 1975), pp. 166-185; Henry A. Giroux, "Beyond the Limits of Radical Educational Reform: Toward a Critical Theory of Education," *Journal of Curriculum Theorizing*, 2:1 (Winter 1980), pp. 20-46; Jean Bethke Elshtain, "The Social Relations of the Classroom: A Moral and Political Perspective," *Telos*, No. 27 (Spring 1976), pp. 97-110.

12. Philip Simpson, "The Whalebone in the Corset: Gramsci on Education, Culture and Change," *Screen Education*, No. 28 (Autumn 1978), p. 20.

13. Jerome Karabel, "Revolutionary Contradictions: Antonio Gramsci and the Problem of Intellectuals," *Politics and Society*, 6:2 (1976), p. 172.

14. Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks, op.cit.*, p. 42.

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themselves and others."[15] Entwistle argues that this can be dismissed as a youthful aberration, but Gramsci stressed this view just as forcefully in the *Notebooks*.[16]

Entwistle's reading of Gramsci turns into a critique of both phenomenological and neo-Marxist brands of radical pedagogy. In part, Entwistle corrects a number of earlier "radical" interpretations of Gramsci's writings. For example, he rightly criticizes the relativism, the failure to situate classroom knowledge historically, and the linear reading of hegemony as an imposition of meaning as serious flaws in both their interpretation and use of Gramsci's educational principles. But in the attempt to buttress his position that Gramsci argued against a radical pedagogy in which schools are sites for counter-hegemonic struggles, Entwistle develops a critique of radical schooling that is shallow and misleading.

His first line of attack is that Gramsci's notion of the hegemonic function of the school "lies in its organization rather than in its curriculum, or in the 'hidden curriculum' implicit in teaching method" (92). That is, the hegemonic function of the school has nothing to do with how or what it teaches, but rather with how it prevents working class students from gaining access to traditional humanistic education (93). Thus, questions concerning how schools function within the larger system of power relations in order to maintain the dominance of ruling groups are readily dismissed as either inconsequential or misleading. By ignoring the issue of how the imposition of meanings and values distributed in schools are related to the mechanisms of economic and political control in the dominant society, Entwistle depoliticizes the role that schools play in defining what is legitimate knowledge and social practice. Consequently, his own analysis ends up as a form of management ideology that substitutes questions concerning the relation between knowledge and power for questions limited to how a *given* body of knowledge is to be taught and learned.

How does Entwistle justify his position? In a flash of insight, he concludes that schools are not agencies that reproduce class relations in advanced industrial societies. Nor are radical critics correct in claiming that schools discriminate against students along class, gender, and racial lines. The sexism, racism, distorted history and other forms of knowledge which in ideological form represents the "material configurations of interaction and opportunity that characterize the social order"[17] vanish into metaphysical smoke.

The working class will be pleased to hear that schools are not all that bad — certainly not as bad as the radicals claim. Entwistle buttresses this with the uninspired remark that, after all, "the founders of Marxism were products of conventional school systems" (89). He is equally weak regarding the nature of resistance and alienation in schools: "In a weak sense, no doubt, students are often alienated from schooling in the sense of being bored, resenting the hard work it necessarily entails, or finding an imposed curriculum irrelevant much like the student who once confided to me that he had bitterly resented, as an undergraduate reading philosophy, being made to study Kant, but who had now concluded that is was the most significant educational experience in his life" (91). That student resistance may be caused by something other than the refusal to study Kant, or may be a critique of capitalism, is simply ignored.[18]

15. Antonio Gramsci, "Socialism and Culture," in *History, Philosophy and Culture in the Young Gramsci*, eds. Paul Piccone and Pedro Cavalcanti (St. Louis, 1975), pp. 20-21.

16. Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks, op.cit.*, p. 42.

17. Jean Anyon, "Education, Social Structure and the Power of Individuals," *Theory and Research in Social Education*, 7:1 (Spring 1979), p. 50.

18. Cf. Paul Willis, *Learning to Labor, op.cit*; Peter Woods, *The Divided School* (Boston, 1979); Jean Anyon, "Social Class and the Hidden Curriculum of Work," *Journal of Education*, 162:1 (Winter 1980), pp. 67-92.

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In his eagerness to pit Gramsci against existing modes of radical pedagogy, Entwistle sacrificed a critical reading of the very sources he attacks. For example, he criticizes Marxists such as Sarup for supporting a version of Bowles' and Gintis' correspondence theory, which Sarup has extensively criticized.[19] Entwistle criticizes Young for a 1971 position that he has long since modified. Similarly, Entwistle attributes a realitivistic position on school knowledge to Whitty that, in fact, the latter actually criticizes in the same source that Entwistle failes to footnote (38). Entwistle is particularly adamant in criticizing "radicals" for dignifying "lower class culture." He lowers his theoretical hammer on Young and Whitty, claiming that they wrongly condemned the old sociology for acknowledging "'low' social class...as a source of desirable cultural identity" (103). But even a cursory reading of their work suggests that they stress the importance of distinguishing between the positive and negative features of working class cultural capital. It is difficult to understand how Entwistle could have seen in the suggestion that working class cultural capital may be a source of desirable cultural capital, a rationale by Young and Whitty for the equivalency of all cultural forms.

Entwistle claims that Gramsci's notion of hegemony has been badly interpreted and applied by a number of radical educators. By viewing hegemony as simply the imposition of meanings, they have trivialized the concept by defining it merely as a form of inculcation. This is important in understanding how the mechanisms of domination mediate between society and school, particularly in classroom social relations, in the ideological practices of teachers, in the behavior of students, and classroom materials themselves. But Entwistle's own preference for mainstream schooling and pedagogy forces him to abandon Gramsci's complex formulation of hegemony and its heuristic potential for unraveling the mechanisms of domination and resistance in schools. In other words, though Entwistle rejects a simplistic reading of the concept of hegemony, he does not use it in his own analysis. That hegemony requires consent presupposes that people engage actively in reproducing the forces that oppress them. This is an important corrective to the view that hegemony is merely a form of ideological imposition, but it hardly answers the more complex and important question of how consent is both won and sustained in schools. Needless to say, this requires a consideration of how particular forms of subjectivity are legitimated, invalidated, resisted, and partially incorporated by schools, educational workers, and the students themselves. To ignore issues of this sort is tantamount to renouncing any possibility for developing oppositional forms of pedagogy. The result is a notion of schooling that denies both the conscious subject and that hegemony functions not only as a set of ideas but also as practices rooted in the daily routines of students and teachers. Consequently, questions concerning how schools function to produce their ideology fade away in Entwistle's account. Furthermore, as contradictions and resistance disappear, Gramsci's view of schools as sites for counter-hegemony struggle is reduced to an apology for the status quo.

Entwistle's pedagogy for children is based on a number of faulty assumptions. First, he argues that schooling should be neutral; secondly, he supports a transmission model of curriculum in which teacher-student relations are based on one-sided notions of control, habit formation, and the learning of fixed belief systems. Third, he ignores notions of resistance, and thus, succumbs to a view of teacher and student passivity that is as false as it is reactionary, and ignores questions raised by Bourdieu,

19. Madan Sarup, *Marxism and Education* (Boston and London, 1978), especially chapter 11.

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Bernstein, and Lundgren regarding knowledge as a dimension of political theory and a major feature of political power.[20] Entwistle assumes that teachers should emphasize "historical-mainstream culture against that of the home and neighborhood" (71). The fundamental problem with accepting what Entwistle casually calls "humanistic-mainstream culture" is illuminated in Ozolins' analysis of Bourdieu's writings. This is worth citing at length. The "curriculum serves to distinguish the elite and (because they fail to master it) severely restricts and rationalizes the life-chances of the working class pupils. . . . first that the school works in a biased manner by demanding of every child what only some children can give — a certain orientation to the culture of the school and the academic curriculum, a certain 'cultural capital' that reflects the cultural level of the home and provides the children of some families with the essential skills and attitudes ('cultural ethos') that lead to success in school. It is these children who are rewarded in school when their social gifts are interpreted as natural ability and interest. Secondly, the curriculum of the school cannot be treated as a neutral object: some elements particularly the letters, humanities and social sciences, are peculiarly dependent on the child's cultural capital. They are taught by a pedagogy which makes continual, implicit demands on a child's own social and cultural skills — the skills of subtlety, nuance, taste, and manner which some children acquire 'naturally' from their own cultural milieu and which are not capable of an explicit pedagogy."[21]

Entwistle's provides a linear reading of Gramsci's position on culture, and ignores his call to critically engage the dominant culture. Moreover, such a reading misunderstands Gramsci's notion that "every relationship of hegemony was necessarily an educational one." Gramsci's view of ideological struggle was far too critical to suggest that teachers simply transmit mainstream culture. He argued that traditional humanistic culture should be mastered, but in the sense that it had to be understood in order to be criticized and rearticulated according to the needs of a radical working class. Opposition, not transmission, is the theme of Gramsci's pedagogy. This suggests making neither a clean sweep of the existing culture nor "replacing it with a completely new and already formulated one. Rather, it consists of a process of transformation (aimed at producing a new form) and rearticulation of existing ideological elements."[22] Again, the dominant culture had to be understoood critically before it could be transformed. This is a significant issue in Gramsci's notion of education for it has important implications for teacher-student relations in a radical theory of pedagogy -- implications contrary to the views that Entwistle attributes to Gramsci.

Gramsci clearly understood that "revolutionary consciousness was not to be pumped into the working class from without, it must be mobilized from within." This does not imply, as Entwistle claims, that there is no working class culture. Nor does it suggest that radicals should equate working class culture with the dominant culture. Both positions are reductionistic and ignore many complex mediations. Entwistle's rebuke of working class culture suggests that domination in schools is total. This

20. Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture, op.cit.*; Basil Bernstein, *Class, Codes and Control Vol. III, op.cit.*; Ulf Lundgren, *Codes, Context and Curriculum Processes, op.cit.*

21. Uldis Ozolins, "Lawton's 'Refutation' of a Working-Class Curriculum," *Melbourne Working Papers*, 1979, pp. 44-45.

22. Chantel Mouffe, "Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci," in *Gramsci and Marxist Theory*, ed. Chantel Mouffe (Boston and London, 1979).

23. Joseph V. Femia, "The Gramsci Phenomenon: Some Reflections," *Political Studies*, 27:3 (September 1979), p. 478.

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misconstrues both the notion of hegemony and people's ability to resist. For Gramsci, common sense did not suggest simply a mystified consciousness. It referred to the terrain where people acquired consciousness of themselves. Working class culture is not to be equated with passivity and one-dimensionality. It ought to be seen as a practice unable "to break with the given world and transform it." [24] Far from being passive, such a world-view is simply "disjointed and ambivalent." [25] For radical educators, working class culture may serve as a starting point to understand how students give meaning to the world. Students must be able to speak with their own voices before they learn to move beyond their own frames of reference; before they can break with the "common sense" that prevents them from understanding and challenging the socially constructed sources underlying their own self-formative processes. Gramsci's notion that "common sense" contains the seeds of a more rational view of the world reinforces his view that the task of the intellectual is to develop counter-hegemonic struggles by using popular consciousness as a starting point in any pedagogic relation. When Gramsci argues that "every teacher is always a pupil and every pupil a teacher," he is not abandoning the call for disciplined pedagogy, as Entwistle indicates. Gramsci is introducing an educational principle into the teacher-student relation that leaves no room for elitism or sterile pedantry. The notion that the teacher is always a learner places intellectuals in the position of not only helping students appropriate their own histories, but also to look critically at their own relations with students. Gramsci's notion that "the popular element 'feels' but does not always know or understand; the intellectual element 'knows' but does not always understand and in particular does not always feel" emphasizes two important dimensions of hegemony that must be challenged in schools. On the one hand, ideologies must be fought and de-reified, whether in the overt or the hidden curriculum. On the other hand, the hegemonic practices sedimented in classroom social relations, part and parcel of the very texture of our need structure and personalities, must be transformed through concrete social formations that allow critical communication and action.[26] Only within this type of pedagogy will radical educators be able to understand how the seeds of social and cultural reproduction are contained within the very nature of working class resistance, and how they might, for instance, use that insight to transform what is often misdirected cultural resistance into forms of political awareness and social action. Moreover, Entwistle ignores the predicaments of both teachers and students, saying almost nothing about the structural limitations that the latter face daily in public schools. Clearly, any notion of radical pedagogy which ignores these limitations is both utopian and idealistic.

Any notion of radical pedagogy must begin with a dialectical view of hegemony. It must refuse to accept social reproduction theses based on a one-sided notion of domination and despair regarding the possibilities for social change. It is necessary to analyze hegemony not just as the unfolding of capital's material and ideological imperatives, but also as part of the formative process of those it oppresses. In other words, the notion of domination in schools has to be located within the interplay of both submission and resistance. Such a perspective demands examining the

24. Mihaly Vajda, "Antonio Gramsci: Prison Notebooks Review," *Telos*, No. 15 (Spring 1973), p. 151; cf. also Paul Piccone, "Gramsci's Marxism: Beyond Lenin and Togliatti," *op.cit.*, pp. 485-511.

25. Joseph V. Femia, *op.cit.*, p. 481.

26. Maxine Greene, "The Politics of the Concrete," *Social Practice* (Spring 1980); Henry A. Giroux, "Critical Theory and Rationality in Citizenship Education," *Curriculum Inquiry*, 10:4 (in press).

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disjunctions, tensions, and forms of submission that characterize the daily routines of different socio-economic classes of students in schools. It must focus on the forms of negotiation and resistance and attempt to identify how potentially political moments arise, are deflated, or are incorporated within the bounds of hegemonic discourse. The central question for such a pedagogy is to what extent do the determinations, mediations, and practices of schools as embedded in their overt and hidden curricula produce or leave "gaps upon which to ground a contesting theory and practice." [27]

In his study of working class students in an urban high school in England, *Learning to Labour*, Willis provides a number of concrete answers to this question. He begins by distinguishing between the ideology which the school institutionalizes and whether or not it is internalized by the students who confront it. In this case, a group of students called "the lads" refused to accept the schools ongoing assault on their language, style of dress, sensuality, and their celebration of "the group" as an important social formation in directing and interpreting their school experience and worldview. "The lads" would have none of the instrumental order of the school, be it the authority relations that defined legitimate knowledge, or classroom relations that legitimated the "reward system of capitalism — individual payment for individual work." [28] Similarly, "the lads" rejected many of the basic messages of the overt school curriculum. For instance, their own experiences, and those of their friends, parents, and social class, stood in sharp contradiction to the schools' promise that they would receive rewarding jobs in exchange for academic discipline and institutional conformity. The glitter of school credentials and the correlated power of social mobility appeared phony to "the lads" who received such messages with a mixture of cynicism and indifference. Choice as defined in school terms was seen as a form of surrender, not opportunity. "The lads" had learned early from the real world that work, for instance, is defined "by the overwhelming need for instant money, the assumption that all work is unpleasant, and that what really matters is the potential that work situations hold for self and particularly masculine expression, diversions, and 'laffs'" (Willis, p. 100).

Though limited to cultural, and especially incomplete, forms of resistance, the actions of "the lads" represent what Willis has termed "the far from simple reflex of defeat." [29] Resistance, in this case, whether it be in the use of deflationary humor, not going to class, or the exaggerated celebration of physicality, represents an important element of refusal by those who are alleged to be the most oppressed. Powerlessness is very different from passivity and the willingness of many to confuse the two notions misses the point that students such as "the lads" may simply lack any available alternatives by which to change their situation.

By taking stock of the forms of resistance in schools, radical educators can raise some important questions in developing their strategies. First, what specific forms does resistance take and what is its relation to larger social determinants? Second, how do these forms of resistance often end by supporting the very modes of domination they attack? Put another way, how do the students' opposition and efforts to wrest some power from the school bring about "the future that others have mapped for them?" [30]

27. John Corner, "Determination and Processes," *Screen Education*, No. 28 (Autumn 1978), p. 89.

28. Roger Dale, "Education and the Capitalist State: Contributions and Contradictions," in *Cultural and Economic Reproduction in Education*, ed. Michael W. Apple (in press), p. 8.

29. Paul Willis, "The Class Significance of School Counter-Culture," in *The Process of Schooling*, eds. Martyn Hammersley and Peter Woods (London, 1976), p. 188.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 198.

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if not translated into political power, symbolic power simply reinforces dominant social relations. This is due to the self-defeating assumptions underlying "the lads" resistance. For example, while "the lads" adulated physical labor and masculinity, they also rejected mental labor as effeminate. Moreover, their celebration of masculinity was fueled by a deep-rooted sexism. Thus, while these students' collective action represents a realistic response to the lived alienation embedded in the school's daily routine, it also contains elements which reproduce the very division of labor at its source.

For radical educators this means, as Gramsci was well aware, acquiring a critical understanding of the students' language, modes of experiences, and cultural forms. These cultural forms must be historically situated and politically analyzed in connection to wider economic and social determinants. Part of this task has been outlined in Freire's *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* which emphasizes the need to base pedagogical projects on the lived experiences of the students themselves. The task here is to use the spectacle of everyday life as part of the pedagogical process to help students critically account for the nature of those objective and self-formative processes that have made them what they are.

This is not a call for student centered pedagogy, but for a move beyond the false division over questions of control that have plagued both supporters of the free school movement in the U.S. and many phenomenologically inspired educators in Europe. The endemic paradox between freedom and control cannot be resolved through a paralysis of guilt over one's use of authority in the classroom. Elshtain has correctly addressed this issue by calling for a mode of classroom authority that supports persuasion; i.e., control informed by the power of reasoned choices operating in the interests of emancipation replaces forms of control that are either overtly coercive or covertly manipulative.

Radical pedagogy presupposes a critical education in which students are given the opportunity to validate their own experiences. These range from studying their own class-specific histories and interests to an analysis of the popular culture that they use to express themselves. This can be the basis for a more distanced and critically directed pedagogy that provides students with access to the dominant discourse, skills, and academic traditions. Gramsci's position on this issue is exemplified by Aronowitz's claim that "for the emancipation of those who have been historically excluded from the dominant discourses depends on their ability to grasp the issues presented by the past, many of which are inscribed in the humanistic canon, including scientific theory, history and philosophy.... This is not to claim that, in the short run, at least, everyone (or no one) need to be a critical intellectual. On the other hand, a democratic, self-managed society demands the formation of persons whose ties to the subaltern classes is intimate because they originate in those classes, but have succeeded in overcoming the scars imposed by schooling to engage the bourgeois tradition and also create a new one that is of a piece with working class culture." [31]

Radical pedagogy must seize the positive moment amidst the cracks and disjunctions created by oppositional forces within the schools. This is a crucial step in translating political understanding into the kind of political struggle that might challenge not only the school's hegemonic practices, but could trace their source to broader social and political determinants. The very power to think and act critically is vital. Radical pedagogy needs an anthropological grounding that recognizes the force

31. Stanley Aronowitz, "Technocratic Rationality and the Politics of the School," *Social Practice* (Spring 1980), pp. 25-26.

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of structural determinations outside of the actors immediate experiences. The dominant moment in radical pedagogy consists in unravelling the contradictory dynamics of hegemonic ideas so they can become the basis for a cultural politics that dignifies students through the process of empowering them to think critically and act collectively in the struggle for personal and social change.

Entwistle's book simply blurs Gramsci's views on education, and fails to offer any new insights into how to construct a radical pedagogy. While he advocates a more radical program for adult education in the latter part of the book, he says nothing new on the subject and, in one sense, invalidates his position by forgetting that in the transition from childhood to adulthood one's own history is not simply liquidated. There is no continuity between his notion of education for children and his notion of education for adults. One wonders how the students educated under the rubric of Entwistle's pedagogy would be able to escape from their own histories once they assume adulthood. His recommendations for radical schooling are likely to produce right-wingers rather than critical adults.

Henry A. Giroux

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Antonio Labriola,
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Originally written between 1897 and 1899 as a series of long letters to Sorel, this book provides an account of socialism that was studiously ignored by both the Second and Third Internationals. Yet, it is crucial for understanding the development of Gramsci in particular and the whole tradition of Italian Marxism in general.

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Short Journal Reviews*:

BLACK ROSE, 1:3 (Fall 1979)
P.O. Box 1075, Boston, MA 02103. $6 for 4 issues. RUDY PERKINS, *"Breaking with Libertarian Dogma: Lessons from the Anti-Nuclear Struggle."* Reviews a personal, though group, experience with the Boston chapter of the Clamshell Alliance and critically evaluates their attitudes toward mass politics as well as their unqualified support for a number of long-standing libertarian concepts. This re-evaluation was required because the more fundamental libertarian principle of direct democracy was being violated: "to simply oppose anti-mass to mass, consensus to majority rule, local control to global management, decentralism to centralism, the small group to the local organization was not enough." What is attempted here is to abandon these concepts as dogma and incorporate them as part of a new synthesis. VINCENT FERRINI, *"Ars Poetica"* and *"The Sound of My Laughter."* Two poems. CHRIS HABLES GRAY, *"The New Libertarians."* Beginning with a detailed discussion of the Libertarian movement, its groups, publications, and money, the focus is primarily on the Libertarian ideology in general and is concerned with understanding how this ideology can include denunciations of the draft, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, homophobia, and U.S. imperialism, as well as a faith in free enterprise and private property. WILL PETRY, *"Gustav Landauer's* For Socialism." A book review. JOHN WIENERS, *"Children of the Working Class."* A poem. PFM

BLACK ROSE, 1:4 (Winter 1979)
ALAN MANDELL, *"Anti-Psychiatry and the Search for Autonomy."* Summarizes the ideas of Laing and Cooper as efforts to examine the alienation of our experience and our need to recover "the wholeness of being human." Laing's work is seen to represent "a clear and crucial step toward and understanding of freedom and domination on both the individual and social level;" Cooper's work "Sensitively and provocatively deepened the discussion of therapy, self-exploration and personal change to include issues of the family, the limits of community health programs, the power of the state, and corporate capitalism." A brief discussion of Judi Chamberlain's, *On Our Own: Patient Controlled Alternatives to the Mental Health System,* as an account of one individual's experiences as a mental patient, greatly enhances the analysis. NOAM CHOMSKY, *"Restoring the Faith."* Examines two distinct versions of the U.S. role in the world as described by American elite groups. The "State Religion" interpretation presents the U.S. as governed by abstract and moral principles such as self-determination, human rights, and economic welfare; the "Grand Area" interpretation, appearing in internal planning documents and in the business press, proposes a region strategically necessary for world control including the Western Hemisphere, the former British Empire, and the Far East. These conceptions are thoroughly debunked in light of innumerable examples throughout the world testifying to the sham of the current U.S. human rights crusade. PFM

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL THEORY, 3:2 (Spring-Summer 1979)
University of Toronto Press, Journals Dept., 5201 Dufferin Street, Downsview, Ontario M3H 5T8. $10 per year. LIONEL RUVINOFF, *"On Theorising Human Conduct."* Sympathetic discussion of Oakeshott's *On Human Conduct.* Defends Oakeshott's anti-holistic Platonism against technocratic and romantic conceptions of polity, but criticizes his insistence that subjective (as opposed to formal) political goals lie outside the realm of moral engagement and reflection. MICHAEL WEINSTEIN, DEENA WEINSTEIN, *"The Role of Ideas in Freud's Theory of Civilization."* Takes Freud's analysis of civilizational ideals to be both confused and wrong-headed. Against both Freud's own naturalistic reduction of ideals to impulses and the idealist notion that they are real historical emergents, the Weinsteins argue the Kantian view that civilizational ideals are irreducibly rational constructs premissed on the mutual acknowledgement of humans as rationally autonomous beings. PAUL PHILLIPS, *"Clare Pentland and the Labor Process."* Introduction to a section assessing the *oeuvre* of the late Canadian labor historian. H. CLARE PENTLAND, *"The Western Canadian Labor Movement 1897-1919."* Seminal essay, originally part of the Woods Commission Report on industrial relations in Ontario, reprinted as representative of Pentland's unfinished historiographic project. Examines the specificity of the pre-1919 Western Canadian labor movement in relation to developments in the U.S. West and Canadian East. Articles by GREG S. KEALEY, PAUL PERREZ, and W.T. EASTERBROOK explore the significance of Pentland in the Canadian intellectual context. JON ROBERT SCHILLER, *"The Illusion of a*

*This section has been compiled by John Fekete, Department of English Literature, Trent University, Peterborough, Ontario I9J 7B8. The following have contributed reviews: John Fekete, Robert John, Michael Lacy, Pam McCallum, Peter Murphy, Odessa Pierce, Harland Prechel, Robert E. Rucker, Rachel Scharff, Jimmy Lee Shaw, Andrew Wernick.

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Future." An ungenerous Rieffian polemic against Gad Horowitz's *Repression* (University of Toronto Press, 1977). The book's attempt to provide a secure basis in Freud's own theory for the Marcusean distinction between basic and surplus repression is judged a failure, mainly because of Horowitz's heavy reliance on post-Freudian ego psychology. Marxism cannot assimilate Freud, argues Schiller, so long as it resists the stoic anti-illusionism that a properly Freudian perspective entails. KENNETH MINOGUE, *"Abstractions and Political Theory."* Review of C.B. Macpherson's *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy*. Re-examines Macpherson's fourfold schema of liberal-democratic theories (Benthamite, Millian, behavioralist and participatory), and regards the vague and ungroundable fourth model symptomatic of a more general theoretical weakness. Macpherson's failure to distinguish between analytic abstractions and regulative ideals, it is argued, vitiates much radical thought. Minogue sees a parallel confusion in the young Marx's critique of bourgeois political economy. C.B. MACPHERSON, *"By Innis out of Marx."* A short, controversial paper reviewing *The Canadian State* (Leo Panitch, ed., University of Toronto Press, 1977), and situating the current surge of Canadian political economy in the conjunction of post-1960s neo-Marxism with a homegrown Innisian tradition. But how "Marxist" was Innis? LEAH BRADSHAW, *"A Second Look at Savage Fields."* Sympathetic examination of Dennis Lee's *Savage Fields: An Essay in Literature and Cosmology* (Anansi, 1977). Tries to elucidate the dualistic ontology (earth-world) that underlies Lee's account of modernity. For Bradshaw, the antinomies are only reconcilable through praxis. DAVID GODFREY, *"On Savage Fields and the Art of Criticism."* Attacks Lee's reading of Cohen's *Beautiful Losers* and Ondaatje's *Billy the Kid* and sees the critical deficiencies as rooted in Lee's pre-structuralist attitude. DENNIS LEE, *"Reading Savage Fields."* Rounds on his critics, but absorbs their insights as corrections. Bradshaw is charged with identifying ontological duality with antagonism and thereby confusing the historical and existential dimensions of Lee's construction. Godfrey is accused of making a yes-but point that is irrelevant to the argument. In the literary work as well as in history, the structural logos should be grasped alongside and not as a substitute for the logos of development. JOHN KEANE, *"Reviews in Crisis Theory."* Introduces reviews of recent works by Bell, Lefebvre, Poulantzas and Gamble and Walton, and places them in the context of the modern neo-Marxist rejection of traditional crisis theory in the light of the post-Keynesian relation between state, economy and culture. AW

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL THEORY, 3:3 (Fall 1979)

RUSSELL JACOBY, *"The Inception of Western Marxism and the Politics of Philosophy."* In explicit faithfulness to Korsch's own insistence on reading philosophy in terms of its political history, Jacoby places Korsch and the tradition of Western Marxism with which he has been linked in the political context of the post-1917 politics of the European Left. BRIAN SINGER, *"The Early Castoriadis: Socialism, Barbarism and the Bureaucratic Thread."* First part of a two-part essay explicating and assessing the thought of Castoriadis, which takes the narrative of his theoretical development up to the days of May. An illuminating account of how a single-minded pursuit of Trotskyism's anti-bureaucratic critique of Stalinism led Castoriadis to deconstruct the Marxist totalization. H.T. WILSON, *"The Meaning and Significance of 'Empirical Method' for the Critical Theory of Society."* Favorably counterposes critical social *theory* to critical social *science*, Adorno's negative dialectics to Habermas' compromise with scientism, as fulcrum for yet another discussion of the relation between social knowledge and practice. K.D. McCRAE, *"Le Concept de la Société Fragmentaire de Louis Hartz: Son Application à l'Exemple Canadien."* Translation of a 1977 paper that critically surveys various post-1961 attempts to explain the specificity of Canadian political culture in terms of the Hartz thesis. JOHN L. STANLEY, *"Sorel and the Social Uncertainty Principle."* Review of R. Vernon's *Commitment and Change: George Sorel and the Idea of Revolution*, which adds to the voices calling for Sorel's rehabilitation — on the basis of his almost unknown socialist *oeuvre*. Fair enough, but Sorel's (and Italian futurism's) turn to fascism remains a somber mystery. J.G.A. POCOCK, *"Reconstruction of the Traditions: Quentin Skinner's Historian's History of Political Thought."* Magisterial review of Vols. I and II of Skinner's *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, which explicates Skinner's trichotomous (rhetoric-scholasticism-juridicalism) historical framework and explores the methodological implications of his structuralist rupture with the traditional approaches to intellectual history. KEN RESHAUR, *"Consciousness and the World."* Review of Dollmayr and McCarthy's *Understanding Social Inquiry*, which discusses the latest round of reflections on the verstehen-objectivism problem. ALKIS KONTOS, *"Of Leviathan Republics."* Favorably reviews Frank M. Coleman's possibly pathbreaking *Hobbes and America*. F. MECHNER BERNARD, *"Marriage for Socialism: Emotions and Notes*. Reviews Vols. I and II of the Webbs correspondence, as edited by N. Mackenzie. Authoritarianism is shown to be a constant in the

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English couple's historic drift from Glastonian Liberalism via Fabianism to support for the 1930s Soviet Union. Letter by REGINALD WHITTAKER in response to Macpherson's "By Innis out of Marx." He agrees that Veblen influenced Innis. But how "Marxist" was Veblen? AW

DISCOURSE, No. 1 (Fall 1979)

Box 4667, Berkeley, CA 94704. $9 for 3 issues. CHRISTIAN METZ, *"The Cinematic Apparatus as Social Institution. An Interview."* A discussion of the impact on cinema studies by three modes of analysis: the linguistic, the psychoanalytic and the socio-economic. BERTRAND AUGST, *"The Order of Cinematographic Discourse."* A presentation of Foucault's analysis of the production of discourse and its confrontation with the concept of subject-effect in recent film theory. PAUL THOMAS, *"The Language of Real Life: Jürgen Habermas and the Distortion of Karl Marx."* A critical view of Habermas' attempt to incorporate the realm of "communicative interaction" into social analysis in response to Marx's equation of labor with essentially human activity, which, according to Habermas, entails the neglect of communication. LAURA MULVEY, *"Textual Riddles: Woman as Enigma or Site of Social Meanings? An Interview."* An intertextual article dealing with feminine discourse in Laura Mulvey's and Peter Woolen's *Riddles of the Sphinx*. BB

MONTHLY REVIEW, 31:6 (November 1979)

62 West 14th Street, New York, NY 10011. $13 per year (Students $10). $16 foreign. EDITORS, *"Inflation without End?"* The transformation of capitalism from competitive marketing to monopolistic business practices has contributed to the decreased spending power of the general population during the present period of inflation, which, it is said, is bringing about increased awareness of class interests among workers. JEFF HENDERSON, ROBERT COHEN, *"Capital and the Work Ethic."* Argues that in contemporary capitalism the relations of production are reproduced through both exterior conditioning of workers, normally at the point of production, and interior determination via the socializing process. JOSEPH COLLINS, *"Agrarian Reform and Counter-Reform in Chile."* Examines the effects of land reform policies on the Chilean people, and concludes that reform policy has contributed to the enrichment of the wealthy and the immiseration of new or non-landowners. As with past reform, new land reforms have affected the population unequally. Plus book reviews. RS

MONTHLY REVIEW, 31:7 (December 1979)

PAUL M. SWEEZY, *"Whither U.S. Capitalism?"* Discusses some similarities between the 1930s depression years and current problems in the U.S. GABRIEL P. AGUILERA, *"The Massacre at Panzos and Capitalist Development in Guatemala."* Describes acts of violence designed to suppress the proletariat. DAVID SELBOURNE, *"State and Ideology in India."* Examines the role of caste and the development of class consciousness in India. Plus book reviews. RS

MONTHLY REVIEW, 31:8 (January 1980)

PAUL M. SWEEZY, *"Gold Mania: Capitalism's Fever Chart."* Describes the drastic increase in the price of gold as a symptom, a fever indicator, of the deep-seated troubles facing the capitalist world. SAMIR AMIN, *"The Class Structure of the Contemporary Imperialist System."* Describes and analyzes the class structure of the contemporary imperialist system as a necessary accompaniment to the unequal international division of labor. KENNETH NEILL CAMERON, *"The Fallacy of the Superstructure."* Presents data to support the premise that there is no such social entity, or Marxist category, as the "superstructure." Plus book reviews. OP

MONTHLY REVIEW, 31:0 (February 1980)

PAUL M. SWEEZY, *"Japan in Perspective."* Cites facts and figures to illustrate the structural changes and consequent rapid growth of Gross National Product in present-day Japan in relation to the post-World War II global economy. JAMES PETRAS, *"U.S. Foreign Policy: The Revival of Interventionism."* Analyzes the global situation (successes and failures of recent political, military and diplomatic encounters abroad; the degree of internal opposition to, or support for, differing foreign policies; and the kind of backing provided by allies and supporters) and the specific conjuncture out of which the foreign country emerges, as well as U.S. historic interests and policies. ROGER BURBACH, *"Nicaragua: The Course of the Revolution."* Explains the key developments since the victory of the Nicaraguan revolution and discusses how the Sandinista Front and the popular sectors are leading the country forward on a revolutionary socialist trajectory. Plus book reviews. OP

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NEW GERMAN CRITIQUE, No. 18 (Fall 1979)

German Department, Box 413, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI 53201. $10 for three issues. HERBERT MARCUSE, *"The Failure of the New Left."* Marcuse argues that it is wrong to speak of failure; the New Left redefined the concept of revolution, so that new possibilities for freedom and new potentials for socialist development were created, introducing new dimensions of social change. BARRY M. KATZ, *"Praxis and Poesis: Toward an Intellectual Biography of Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979)."* Presents a short sketch of the experiences in Marcuse's life and the activities that helped to shape his thought, from his birth in Berlin to his death. REINHARD LETTAU, *"Herbert Marcuse and the Vulgarity of Death."* Notes Marcuse's rejection of the force of death in all realms from Vietnam to cancer as a disgusting, contemptuous swindle. MARGARET CERULLO, *"Marcuse and Feminism."* This piece appeared also in *Telos*, No. 41 (Fall 1979). JEFFREY HERF, *"The Critical Spirit of Herbert Marcuse."* Contends that the critical spirit of Marcuse embodied in his works confronts us just as powerfully today as some twenty years ago. ERICA SHEROVER MARCUSE, PETER MARCUSE, *"An Open Letter to Friends of Herbert Marcuse."* Expresses the wishes of the family with regard to Marcuse's central issues and concerns. DETLEV HORSTER, WILLEM VAN REIJEN, *"Interview with Jürgen Habermas: Starnberg, March 23, 1979."* The emphasis is on Habermas' early life and how the entire spectrum of social and political events of the 1930s and 1940s shaped his thought, as well as on his synthesis of various social theories and their impact upon his Marxism. JACK MENDELSON, *"The Habermas-Gadamer Debate."* Discusses Habermas' criticism of Gadamer's hermeneutics, grounded in an ontological approach as opposed to Habermas' own epistemological approach. AGNES HELLER, *"Georg Lukacs and Irma Seidler."* This essay is based on Lukacs' diary, in which Irma Seidler was recreated over and over again by Lukacs in his effort to gain her understanding. In the end, he lost her through the process of alienation that developed as he exposed his philosophical categories to explain their relation. DIRK BRUNS, *"Horvath's Revival of the Folk Play and Decline of the Weimar Republic."* Discusses Horvath's basic approach, which follows that of Marxism and the Frankfurt School. JEAN-CLAUDE FRANCOIS, *"Brecht, Horvath and the Popular Theater."* Discusses the attempts of theater critics to set Horvath against Brecht. Argues that their approaches differ distinctly, even though both used similar techniques for a critique of society within a dramatic medium. MARCIA LANDY, *"Politics, Aesthetics, and Patriarchy in the Confessions of Winifred Wagner."* Discusses Wagner's role in politics via the theater and music as she developed her relationship with Hitler. It is in this context that critics noted the use of aesthetics in the politics of emerging fascism. JLS

THE NEW INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, 2:3 (Fall 1979)

P.O. Box 156, Jackson Heights, New York 11372. $12 for two years (8 issues). "A social democratic journal committed to a renaissance of social theory." STUART ELLIOTT, *"On the Brink Again."* Discusses the current economic environment, at the threshold of a generalized recession, facing a return of a militant right wing and the emergence of an austerity consensus. Does not presume to offer solutions. MAX SHACHTMAN-EARL BROWDER. *"Is Russia a Socialist Community?"* A reprint of the 1950 debate between Browder, the former General Secretary of the CPUSA (1930-44) and Schachtman, Chairman of the Independent Socialist League, chaired by C. Wright Mills. With a Preface by NIR editor, Eric Lee, and an introduction by Irving Howe. Plus book reviews. JAF

THE NEW INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, 2:4 (Winter-Spring 1980)

EDITORS, *"Detente Reaffirmed."* Condemns the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, opposes cold war responses, and supports a solid detente as the precondition for internal change in both communist and capitalist societies of minority social rule. TOM MILSTEIN, *"Schachtman-Browder: We Know Who Won, But Who Really Lost that Debate?"* Socialism in preference to the illusions of Marxism, Browderian or Schachtmanite. STUART ELLIOTT, *"Sakharov, Detente and Socialism."* Detente viewed as a key to democratization in the Soviet Union; the Western left has the responsibility to support detente and develop a program for it. Notes the emergence of an independent consciousness among a small section of the Soviet population. DR. ANDREI SAKHAROV, *"Message to the 1979 Sakharov Hearings."* In defense of human rights as a unifying international ideology. ERIC LEE, *"Quebec: For Sovereignty-Association."* Argues that neither nation-state nor self-determination are absolute values or ends in themselves; but in the case of Quebec, both are means to advance the interests of socialism on the grounds that Levesque's "Parti Quebecois is a social democratic party, with a social democratic program" and on the grounds of some other strategic considerations (some of which, one might note, could appear as romantic misreading in the light of radical perspectives from within Quebec). *"The Woman Question: Three Articles from The International Socialist Review, 1908-1909"*; JOHN SPARGO, *"Woman and the Socialist Movement"*; THERESA MALKIEL, *"Where Do We Stand on the Woman*

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Question?" LIDA PARCE, *"The Relation of Socialism to the Woman Question."* Pro human rights and dignity; somewhat sentimental flavor. Plus book reviews. JAF

NEW LEFT REVIEW, No. 117 (September-October 1979)

7 Carlisle Street, London W1V 6NL England. $18 per year (6 issues). ZHORES MEDVEDEV, *"Russia under Brezhnev."* Considering that the author is an exiled ex-prisoner of a Soviet psychiatric ward, this review of the recent performance of the Soviet regime is surprisingly positive. Responding in a question-answer format, Medvedev gives informative shapshot views of Brezhnev's style in party affairs, the rising technical competence of elite members under Brezhnev (with some asides on the ignorance, even illiteracy of Khrushchev and Stalin), recent Soviet agricultural dilemmas, and progress in industry. Medvedev's description of the Soviet prison and camp system shows it as more humane and rational than is usually thought. He also comments on the primitive ideological positions and political ignorance of prominent dissidents. The problem of nationalities is played down. A look to the future suggests that a solution to current Soviet economic problems (labor productivity and the quality of the service industries) would require greater democracy, more participation "from below." ORLANDO PATTERSON, *"On Slavery and Slave Formations."* A refreshingly non-orthodox look at the theoretical problems in this area. Presents the constitutive features of slavery as slaves' utter powerlessness, lack of honor, alienation from kin, and the institution's basis in the life or death choice of the slave. Patterson eschews schematism in studies of slavery, and advocates a middle ground between the abstraction of "misguided Marxian" approaches and the particularism of bourgeois history. Substantively, he argues that the idea of slave status is not based on the notion of private property, but that the historical and causal chain runs in the opposite direction. His culminating theoretical position is to efface the conceptual boundary between capitalist and slave economies. In Patterson's view, slavery is a "quasi-capitalist institution" that may penetrate different social formations. Generally, Patterson's theoretical arguments are convincing and unusual; the article's weak points come in the historical illustrations, where Patterson falls into the particularism he himself criticizes. HARALD JUNG, *"Behind the Nicaraguan Revolution."* A straight, detailed description of the present and recent past of Nicaraguan politics. Focuses on the three main power elements: the Somoza group, whose politics and methods of extraction more resemble the Mafia than ordinary capitalism; the non-Somoza bourgeoisie, whom Somoza continually prevented from conducting business as usual; and the Sandinistas, who are drawn from students, workers, peasants and other leftists. Concludes with only the briefest of comments on the possible future of the popular front government that replaced Somoza. DAVID FORGACS, *"The Aesthetics of Galvano Della Volpe."* An arcane, dull exegesis without critique. It is not accessible to the non-specialized reader, since it deals not so much with general issues in aesthetics as with specific arguments about Della Volpe. ML

NEW LEFT REVIEW, No. 118 (November-December 1979)

HANS-MAGNUS ENZENSBERGER, *"A Determined Effort to Explain to a New York Audience the Secrets of German Democracy."* Enzensberger expounds on the demise of democracy in West Germany. The power holders have reacted to the student movement and signs of economic crisis with a massive resurgence of "right-wing, if not fascist, ideologies." Harassment has taken the form of intimidation by police, censorship of schools, universities and the media. RAIMUND LOWE, *"The Politics of Austro-Marxism."* Loew argues for a renaissance of Austro-Marxism, while exploring the political ideas of Otto Bauer, Max Adler and other Austro-Marxist leaders. He argues that these leaders produced a Marxist political perspective that alarmed the bourgeoisie; but he criticizes their tactics and political strategy for passively adapting to the bourgeois regime and continually dampening and deflecting the militancy of their followers. PINO ARLACCHI, *"From Man to Honor to Entrepreneur: The Evolution of the Mafia."* Arlacchi carefully analyzes the social basis of mafioso traditions. He tries to identify the old-style "man of honor," and shows how this characteristic has fused with modern capitalism in Southern Italy. But the entrepreneurial mafioso must change if he is to survive where "progressive economic and social disintegration... have been brought about by the combination of market competition and horizontal social conflict." Plus book reviews. HP

NEW LEFT REVIEW, No. 119 (January-February 1980)

ALEC NOVE, *"The Soviet Economy: Problem and Prospects."* Nove is critical of the identification of socialism with a highly centralized bureaucratic planned economy, and strongly encourages consideration of market socialism as a viable alternative. FRED HALLIDAY, *"The War and Revolution in Afghanistan."* An account of post-revolutionary developments in Afghanistan from the uprising of April 1978 that marked the toppling of the monarchy and the

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formation of a civilian government dominated by the Afghan Communists, through the problems encountered by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and its inadequacy in coping with land reform, internal disunity, the impact of the Iran revolution and the Sino-Soviet dispute, to the Soviet move to establish stability with force. PETER FULLER, *"The Fine Arts after Modernism."* Fuller proposes that the arts are in a crisis owing to their marginalization in technological media culture. Through their respective control mechanisms, both Soviet and Western societies make artists unable to "act socially." STUART HALL, *"Nicos Poulantzas: State, Power and Socialism."* Argues that Poulantzas' work contributes significantly to a Marxist theory of the state, but that his attempts to transpose Foucault's pluralistic conception of power into his own structuralist framework leave glaring inconsistencies. CAROL JOHNSON, *"The Problem of Reformism and Marx's Theory of Fetishism."* Discusses the gap left by Marx between the forces contributing to a revolutionary working class consciousness and its actual realization. The relation between labor reformism and commodity fetishism is introduced briefly only in the last few pages. HP

NEW LITERARY HISTORY, 10:2(Winter 1980)

John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Md. 21218. $11 for 3 issues. KAZIMIERZ BARTOSZYNSKI, *"The Borderlands of Literary Criticism."* Arguing against the opposition of criticism to creative writing, Bartoszynski maintains that critical texts possess a "poeticality" of language and can never be merely rhetorical. RICHARD OHMANN, *"Politics and Genre in Nonfiction Prose."* An examination of nonfiction prose of "plural authorship" (the actual author allows another voice to speak through him) as a genre which becomes increasingly significant in capitalist society as a means of revealing a concealed voice. FERENC FEHER, *"The Pan-Tragic Vision: The Metaphysics of Tragedy."* An analysis of Lukacs' early works on tragedy which argues that his pan-tragic vision of the desire for authentic life displaces traditional tragic concerns with freedom and equality. A valuable introduction to works not available in English. R. HOWARD BLOCH, *"Wasteland and Round Table: The Historical Significance of Myths of Dearth and Plenty in Old French Romance."* Extratextual explanations of sources often overlook the relations among a whole set of elements from vocabulary to overall design. H.U. GUMBRECHT, *"For a History of Spanish Literature 'Against the Grain.'"* Attempts to reinterpret Benjamin's exhortation to write history 'against the grain' in order to lay bare the misdirections in the writing of Spanish literary history. JAMES H. BUNN, *"The Aesthetics of British Mercantilism."* An examination of the aesthetic values in the mercantilist period, 1688-1793, with a focus on naturalization of foreign objects and cultural exchange imaged as gathering commodities. PETER SZONDI, *"Tableau and Coup de Théâtre: On the Social Psychology of Diderot's Bourgeois Tragedy."* Diderot's *tragedie domestique* brings to the stage the lower ranks of nobility presented as the patriarchal nuclear family of bourgeois life. KARLHEINZ STIERLE, *"Baudelaire and the Tradition of the Tableau de Paris."* Stierle examines the precedents for Baudelaire's and Benjamin's concept of the *tableau* in Mercier's *"Tableau de Paris."* Plus summarizing remarks on the issue by Hayden White. PM

NEW POLITICAL SCIENCE, 1:1 (Spring 1979)

Editorial Collective, Caucus for a New Political Science, Columbia University, 420 West 118th Street, Room 733, New York, NY 10027. $15 for 4 issues. DOUGLAS KELLNER, *"Critical Theory, Democracy and Human Rights."* Introduction to the interview with Marcuse and Habermas, placing it in the context of Marx's vision of a socialist democracy. HERBERT MARCUSE, JUERGEN HABERMAS AND FRIENDS, *"A Discussion on Democracy and Critical Theory."* In this 1978 interview, Marcuse "outlines the role of newly marginalized groups and discusses the need for a second bourgeois revolution." MICHAEL E. BROWN *"The Ollman Case and Academic Freedom."* Examines the University of Maryland's refusal to accept Marxist professor Bertell Ollman as chairman of the Department of Government and Politics, stressing the weaknesses of the civil libertarian defense at a time when the university has ceased to be relatively autonomous. A trade-unionist strategy that recognizes the reality of an administratively transformed university is suggested as a basis for negotiating with the state. WOLF-DIETER NARR, *"Academic Freedom 1979: The West German Case."* A general summary of the International Russell Tribunal's second report on West Germany surveying the catastrophic results of that country's repressive laws. "That generality of definition and enforcement can provide little protection for academic freedom, even by bourgeois standards, is demonstrated." What is seen to be necessary is a concept of academic freedom wide enough to encompass the responsibility of the university to society. ANTHONY ARBLASTER, *"Britain: A Crusade Against Marxism?"* Documents the attack on radicals in the British academy with a focus on the officially commissioned Gould Report. What makes this report unique is that it is not aimed at any specific party affiliation but at Marxism in general. MARK KESSELMAN, *"'No' to Kissinger at Columbia."* A reprint of an article on the anti-Kissinger campaign organized at Columbia during

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the spring of 1977, updated to consider the appointment of McGeorge Bundy to the faculty of New York University. The emphasis is that "united in opposition to an endowed chair in political science for Kissinger, students and faculty were able to mobilize sufficient support to sour the offer by the university administration." *Organizing Notes.* A section including reports on Youngstown, "Blacks Britannica," Taiwanese spies at the University of Hawaii, the status of federal repressive legislation, upcoming conferences, and various requests for papers and collaboration. PFM

OUR GENERATION, 14:1 (Spring 1980)

3981 Boulevard Saint-Laurent, Montreal, Quebec, Canada H2W 1Y5. $7.50 for 4 issues. EDITORIAL, *"A Radical Analysis and its Conclusion."* Analyzes the options raised in the Quebec referendum on sovereignty-association, in the light of a history of national and social struggles in Quebec and the journal's long-standing commitment to self-determination for Quebec. In the framework of a critique of "a fraudulent Canadian federalism,' it challenges the gradual ritualization and bureaucratization of a broad social movement of revolt by the organs and supports of the official political process. Rejects a "non" vote as a support for centuries of domination and a "oui" vote as a support for a militaristic, exploitative state revolution, which would not sufficiently enhance the "capacity for autonomy and radicalism" of a social movement that could advance the project of fundamental change toward an alternative society. Argues that abstention is a militant, non-reformist act, and supports the position of Pierre Valhières against that of Le Centre de Formation Populaire in the texts that follow. PIERRE VALLIERES, *"The Referendum: Why I Shall Abstain."* "The movement for independence was our first and last chance to live differently from American suburbanites. And we blew it." Arguing that materialism is condemning Quebec to annexation, this major figure of Quebec's radicalization calls (in this chapter from his book, *The Impossible Quebec*) for a socialist project to challenge consumerism and invent a new society marked by a grass-roots autonomy. Against both a non vote ("masochistic") and a oui vote ("imbecilic"), he proposes to abstain, "not having a choice." COMMITTEE ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION OF LE CENTRE DE FORMATION POPULAIRE, *"The Political Stakes for the Labor Movement."* Opts for a oui vote on the ground that the best strategy for the labor movement is tactical participation in a "sovereignist" social bloc that might destabilize the institutional system of bourgeois domination in Canada and open a break in the North American capitalist system. This position is criticized in the editorial above for both its social-bloc type class alliance argument and its preoccupation with provoking a crisis per se, with no assurance that it would advance radical social change, particularly in the absence of a self-conscious social movement. NICOLE LAURIN-FRENETTE, *"Quebec and the Theory of the Nation."* A penetrating conceptual analysis of the sterility, circularity and tautological character of various versions of nation-theory, all of which ultimately reinforce and legitimate the power of the state, which is accorded a position as regulator of all social processes. "Believing that the state is Quebec is, in the end, a trap." Argues the importance and vitality of social processes (e.g., feminism) that elude a national framework. Plus book reviews. JAF

OUR GENERATION, 14:2 (Summer-Fall 1980)

DIMITRI ROUSSOPOULOS, *"Root and Branch: The Political Origins of the 1960's New Left and the Future."* Focuses on the intellectual factors that shaped political life in the 1960s, assesses the political currents of the 1970s, and proposes directions for a radical project. PAT FLANAGAN, *"In Memoria: Jean-Paul Sartre: 1905-1980."* Brief intellectual evaluation and tribute, pivoting on the categories of rationalism, radicalism, libertarianism, anarchism. ART KILGOUR, *"Uranium Mining: Who Pays, Who Profits?"* On the environmental pollution and health hazards entailed in uranium mining and its dangers today and to generations to come. MURRAY BOOKCHIN, *"An Open Letter to the Ecology Movement."* Argues that ecology must mean social ecology and aim at transforming the most molecular relationships in society to eliminate the hierarchical domination of human by human as a precondition for ending the domination of nature. Opposes mere environmental engineering, technocratic instrumentalism, political opportunism, as well as people like Brown, Hayden, Commoner, Lovins, Clamshell, and MUSE as betrayers and subverters of ecological sensibility, practices, and forms of organization. WALTER JOHNSON, *"Brave New Technology."* On the struggle of Bell Canada workers against the deskilling of work and the growth of managerial power brought on by technological change. Review essay on *The Phone Book* by Josa Kryek. Reflection on the role of unions. RAY W. KUSZELEWSKI, *"Organizing within the Teamsters for Rank and File Survival."* On the stifling and contemptuous union bureaucracy, and some internal rank and file challenges to it. Plus book reviews of books by Foucault, Horowitz, Ollman, Fleming. JAF

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POLITICAL THEORY, 7:4 (November 1979)

Sage Publications Inc., 275 South Beverly Drive, Beverly Hills, CA 90212. $16.50 per year (4 issues). WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, *"Appearance and Reality in Politics."* A social psychological explanation for the failure of the oppressed to rebel. While he mentions structural constraints, the author proposes a solution that amounts to a mental experiment in which the oppressed compare ideology and reality by concentrating on the impoverished anthropological conception of bourgeois ideology. TERENCE BALL, *"Marx and Darwin: A Reconsideration."* Asserts that any connection between Marx and Darwin is a myth attributable to Engels, Aveling and the Social Darwinists' desire to render Marx's writings into scientistic form. Using Marx's concept of nature, Ball shows that Marx found Darwin "amusing" but fundamentally wrong, and concludes with a devastating attack on Lewis Feuer's assertion that Marx was a materialist determinist. GEORGE A. KELLY, *"The Political Thought of Lamoignon de Malesherbes."* An example of the "constitutionalist" position in French thought at the time of the Revolution, Malesherbes' political thought was both liberal and conservative: critical of the Old Regime but not sufficiently at home with republican virtue. His relation to Rousseau, Turgot and Montesquieu is discussed. PHILIP J. KAIN, *"Estrangement and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat."* Seeks to trace and explain the development of Marx's thought on whether political or economic alienation and estrangement exist during the transitional stage characterized as the dictatorship of the proletariat. Using Stanley Moore's book *Three Tactics,* he maintains that the confusion over Marx's position is the result of Marx conflating "two rather different models for revolution." MARTIN LEVIN, *"On 'Animal Laborans' and 'Homo Politicus' in Hannah Arendt: A Note."* Arendt's harsh view of "animal laborans" is not a criticism of the working class as some have maintained, but a criticism of modern man's relation to the world. Asserts that Arendt denigrated activity in the realm of necessity because the accomplishments were fleeting and therefore futile. Maintains that Arendt's endorsement of political activity was not to be understood as the quest for human autonomy through action in the public sphere so much as an expression of man's metaphysical striving after immortality. Communications and reviews, plus *"A Bibliography of Articles in Political Theory, 1974-1978,"* with sections on Marx and Classical Marxism and Contemporary Marxism. RJ

RADICAL AMERICA, 13:4 (July-August 1979)

38 Union Square, Somerville, MA 02143. $10 for 6 issues. MICHAEL WARD, MARK FREEMAN, *"Defending Gay Rights: The Campaign against the Briggs Initiative in California."* A brief history of the gay movement in California with a stress on the nature of the political opposition to Proposition 6. Many liberals and radicals, gays and straights, ignored such fundamental questions as heterosexism, the oppressive nature of the traditional family, and male supremacy in general, preferring to fight on exclusively civil libertarian grounds. In opposition to this, left gay groups, primarily Lesbian feminist and straight feminist networks, did more grass-roots organizing. As the editors quite accurately point out, however, the analysis suffers from the lack of any discussion of how structural divisions — by class, sex, and race — also affect gay politics. PAM DAVID, LOIS HELMBOLD, *"San Francisco: Courts and Cops vs. Gays."* Describes the ongoing struggle between the right wing (especially the police) and gays, focusing on the riot following the verdict of "voluntary manslaughter" against Dan White, the ex-policeman who assassinated the mayor and Councilman Harvey Milk. That the riot was not just a response to the verdict but also an escalation of police violence is stressed, asl well as the challenge raised to the low-profile, respectable and anti-radical politics of the gay community business leadership. PETER BATES, BILL COSTLEY, ARNOLD TRACHTMAN, *"Lynn Voices."* Excerpts from a collection of poems and pictures about the city and people of Lynn, Massachusetts, by the same title. Conceived as an update of Vincent Ferrini's *No Smoke* (1941), a book of poems about Lynn people. PAUL FALER, *"Lynn in History."* A brief afterword sketching the history of working-class militancy in Lynn and counterposing this to the outlook of "Lynn Voices," which is interpreted as concentrating on decline and decay. MARK NAISON, *"Lefties and Righties: The Communist Party and Sports During the Great Depression."* The party's attempt in the late 1920s and 1930s at organizing community-based sports leagues and their subsequent rejection a few years later as marginal because they only attracted foreign-born workers who were open to the explicitly socialist orientation is analyzed in depth. This activity, as one of the many efforts to Americanize the party, is seen to have ultimately served to help integrate immigrants into the mainstream rather than bringing the mainstream into the party, as was originally intended. It is maintained that "working class receptivity to socialism was less than overwhelming, and that the Communist Party's movement toward liberalism and practical reform may have been the price it had to pay to attract and American-born constituency and acquire a modicum of influence in the mainstream of American life." E.P. THOMPSON, *"C. Wright Mills: The Responsible Craftsman."* Mills' work as one of the first critics on the left to analyze the bureaucratization of the CIO unions (*The New Men*

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of Power), his non-Marxist class analysis (*White Collar*), and his elite analysis (*The Power Elite*) are reviewed at length; as are his attacks on U.S. militarism and imperialism (*The Causes of World War III* and *Listen, Yankee*). His intense awareness of the independent leftists' dilemma and his contribution as a political activist, propagandist, critical intellectual and "responsible craftsman" are emphasized. PAUL THOMPSON, *"The British General Election: A Predictable Disaster."* Analyzes the political context of the Tory victory in the general election, focusing on the campaign against the Labor Party and the relation of the far left in the struggle, both then and now. PFM

RADICAL AMERICA, 13:5 (September-October 1979)

SHEILA ROWBOTHAM, *"The Women's Movement and Organizing for Socialism."* The challenge the women's movement is making to the prevailing assumptions of socialist organizations is raised *vis-à-vis* such questions as: "how theory is conceived, how the political organization sees its relationship to other movements, how consciousness is assumed to change, how the scope of politics is defined, how individual socialists see themselves and their relationship to other people, now and in the past." Argues for the creation of a socialist movement that begins with the theory and practice of the women's liberation movement, and not with that of existing Leninist parties. ALLEN HUNTER, LINDA GORDON, *"Feminism, Leninism and the U.S.: A Comment."* A response from the minority of the editorial group critical of some of Rowbotham's views. Though in unanimous agreement that a strong commitment to feminism is essential to challenge all the oppressive aspects of our society, and critical of Leninism's resistance to the most radical criticism raised by feminism, some editors are unwilling to condemn Leninist practice in toto. This minority still clings to the absurd hope of better forms of Leninism, or viable alternative models, and the compatibility of Leninist theory and strategy with a feminist vision. What seems extremely relevant to this argument is anarcho-feminism, which has been continually ignored by most of the left, be it Leninist, Trotskyist or Social Democrat. MATTHEW RINALDI, *"The Disturbing Case of Feodor Federenko."* Though a large part of the article chronicles the anti-Semitic record of Ukranian nationalism and the friendly relation between the Ukrainian nationalists and German fascism, the emphasis is on how a former member of the SS and a guard at Treblinka, the most infamous death camp in Poland during World War II, was allowed to retain his U.S. citizenship even though he admitted to these crimes. These points are made to remind us that fascism was an international movement and that many non-German Nazi war criminals have been reintegrated into U.S. society as "good citizens." The particular biases of the Immigration and Naturalization Service are also discussed as well as the implications all this has for our own politics in an era of gathering momentum to the Right. PHILIP MATTERA, *"Hot Child in the City: Urban Crisis, Urban Renaissance, and Urban Struggle."* Analyses the legal and illegal ways workers and the poor in New York have attempted to cope with their worsened situation and diminishing social wage. Criticizes the increasing turn to self-management proposals on the ground that while self-management may give people a sense of more control over their lives, it may also be simply another way for people to participate in their own exploitation. SUSAN REVERBY, *"With Babies and Banners: Story of the Women's Emergency Brigade."* A review of an award-winning political documentary made by The Women's Labor History Film Project, which briefly summarizes the process of its creation and discusses some of its political implications and appeal. PFM

RADICAL AMERICA, 13:6 (November-December 1979)

DAVID MONTGOMERY, *"The Past and Future of Workers' Control."* Argues that workers' control has not simply been a utopian notion of intellectuals and that the struggle to retain knowledge and decision-making power on the job has prevented management from gaining full control of the labor process. HARLEY SHAIKEN, *"Numerical Control of Work: Workers and Automation in the Computer Age."* Though mainly about the factory and machines, this guide to understanding the impact of computer-based systems on workers and the labor process has important implications for anyone who works. This analysis of numerical control (i.e., the automation of skilled machining) is intended to help better understand the issues that technology raises for all workers on the shop floor. The primary thesis is that "unions must battle for some control over new technology or find that management will use it to take complete control of the mental aspects of work." COMBAHEE RIVER COLLECTIVE, *"Why Did They Die? A Document of Black Feminism."* A reprint of a pamphlet written and distributed by a Boston Black Feminist group analyzing the sexual politics of a series of brutal slayings of black women in the Boston area. In the struggle against the black male paternalism dominating the community's response, the authors stress the need for black and white women to identify with each other's common oppression. ANNE BOBROFF, *"Alexandra Kollontai: Feminism, Workers' Democracy, and Internationalism."* Surveys the political struggle and ultimate failure of the leading spokeswoman for women's liberation in the early Soviet period and in the Workers' Opposition, a group that

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fought for democratic workers' control of industry in the early 1920s. Her failure is seen as inevitable owing to the need for industrialization and the lack of conditions for a mass women's movement at the time, and raises such questions as alternatives to the course of industrialization that the Bolsheviks took (i.e., Taylorism, centralism, etc.). In light of this, it is surprising that Kollontai's position on Kronstadt, a prime example of the anarchist alternative, is completely ignored. PFM

SCIENCE FICTION STUDIES, No. 20 (March 1980)

Arts Building, McGill University, 853 Sherbrooke Street West, Montreal, Quebec H3A 2T6. $6.50 for 3 issues. Special section on Science Fiction on Women — Science Fiction by Women. JOANNA RUSS, *"Amor Vincit Foeminam: The Battle of the Sexes in Science Fiction."* Surveys a variety of texts, contrasting the mystified phallocentric apologies for the sexist status quo embodied in the war of the sexes type of narrative with the conceptually advanced, socially and sexually generous type of the feminist utopia. SUSAN GUBAR, *"C.L. Moore and the Conventions of Women's Science Fiction."* In Mary Shelley's line, Moore illustrates the identification of the female author with the alien creature — monster, mutant, or extraterrestrial. LINDA LEITH, *"Marion Zimmer Bradley and Darkover."* The hope, in Bradley's work, is always that opposites (male, rational, technological vs. female, intuitive, irrational) will be reconciled, but she loads the dice against the romantic side. ROBERT GALBREATH, *"Holism, Openness and the Other: Le Guin's Use of the Occult."* Le Guin's metaphoric references to occult traditions (prophecy, empathy, Atlantis, etc.) indicate her valuation of a totality that is open to the other and that reconciles opposites. NADIA KHOURI, *"The Dialectics of Power: Utopia in the Science Fiction of Le Guin, Jeury and Piercy."* Studies the connections between utopia and the dramatization of power. Concludes that ideological blockages in Le Guin and Jeury foreclose the realization of an authentic utopian dimension in their narratives; Piercy, by contrast, basing her vision on a richer urban-plebeian experience, presents utopian becoming evolving from tragedy through a critical dialectic. JEAN PFAELZER, *"Parody and Satire in American Dystopian Fiction of the Nineteenth Century."* At the end of the 19th century, dystopian fiction was reactionary, mocking utopian projects and assumptions (e.g., equality of sexes or races, collective property, individual perfectability) and denying that history is progressive. BEATRICE FINK, *"Narrative Techniques and Utopian Structures in Sade's* Aline et Valcour*."* On the development of literary form through the interplay of utopian and novelistic genre elements in Sade. DAVID N. SAMUELSON, *"Critical Mass: The Science Fiction of Frederik Pohl."* An assessment of Pohl's career in the context of aesthetic and market pressures bearing on the production of science fiction. GEORGE LOCKE, *"The New Bleiler and the New Clarke."* PATRICK PARRINDER, *"William Morris: Romantic or Revolutionary?"* Plus book reviews. JAF

SCIENCE FICTION STUDIES, No. 21 (July 1980)

GERARD KLEIN, *"A Petition by Agents of the Dominant Culture for the Dismissal of Science Fiction."* Discusses the social group that writes and reads SF and forms a living subculture, and looks in detail at the tactics of the repression of SF that are used in the prevailing culture. CARLO PAGETTI, *"The First Men in the Moon: H.G. Wells and the Fictional Strategy of his 'Scientific Romances.'"* Examines in detail Wells' complex treatment of ambivalence in the myth of scientific progress. Highlights the role of the narrator and the interplay of elements in a mixed genre. SAMUEL R. DELANY, *"Reflections on Historical Models in Modern English Language Science Fiction."* Insists on sociological, semantic, and institutional distinctions between SF and canonic literature, and, criticizing Peter Fitting's analysis (SFS, No. 17), offers an alternative model for SF historiography. In the end, stresses the play of systematic formal criticism in the writer-reader-editor network of relationships. ALLESSANDRO PORTELLI, *"The Three Laws of Robotics: Laws of the Text, Laws of Production, Laws of Society."* Sees Asimov's three laws as a response to misgivings about science and its products, about automation and the power of commodities, and argues that they function, rhetorically and normatively, as a structure of defense against the tensions and anxieties permeating post-war American consumer society. JOE SANDERS, *"Science Fiction and Detective Fiction: The Case of John D. MacDonald."* A study of motifs in MacDonald's work in the two genres. JORG HIENGER, *"Entertainment and Challenge in Science Fiction."* Argues that escapist literature provides emotional stimulation which provokes intellectual stimulation by way of its hermeneutic demands and opens the way to a radical reorientation. PATRICIA WARRICK, *"The Encounter of Taoism and Fascism in Philip K. Dick's* The Man in the High Castle*."* Proposes that Dick's main characters, especially Mr. Tagomi, represent aspects of Taoism, in confrontation with totalitarianism, at the critical moment of choosing to act in a world of political and economic violence and fraud. For Dick, the ethical conduct of the "minor man" is the ultimate bulwark against chaos and destruction. ELISABETH VONARBURG, NORBERT SPEHNER, *"Science Fiction in Quebec: A Survey."* Compares Quebec SF with French

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and English SF and notes the absence of specialization among writers and editors. I. and A. Gopnik, *"A Brief and Biased Guide to the Philosophy of Science for Students of Science Fiction."* Annotated bibliography of anglophone critical rationalism. DARKO SUVIN, *"Seventy-four More Victorian Books that should be Excluded from Science Fiction Bibliographies."* Annotated book list supplementing the list provided in *SFS*, No. 14. ROBERT K. MARTIN, *"The Quest for Poe."* Review essay of Peter Haining, ed., *The Edgar Allen Poe Scrapbook* ("dangerous for reasons which go beyond its vulgarity and tastelessness") and David Ketterer, *The Rationale of Deception in Poe* ("scholarly"; "clears away the rubbish of accumulated Scrapbooks"; "little critical evaluation"). ROBERT M. PHILMUS, *"Reference, Anyone?"* Review essay of Peter Nicholls, ed., *The Science Fiction Encyclopedia,* and Frank M. Magill, ed., *Survey of Science Fiction Literature* (5 vols.); the former "a remarkable achievement," comprehensive, balanced, and consistent; the latter excessively uneven. Plus book reviews, notes, and correspondence. JAF

SCREEN, 21:1 (Spring 1980)

29 Old Compton Street, London W1V 5PL, England. $20 for 4 issues. *Screen* plus *Screen Education*, $26 for 4 issues. MICK EATON, *"Taste of the Past — Cinema History on Television."* A review of Thames Television's series *Hollywood, the Pioneers.* The series assumes that the discourse of film evolves naturally with the introduction of the appropriate technology and omits any analysis of the development of narrative sequences. TYMOTHY J. CLARK, *"Preliminaries to a Possible Treatment of 'Olympia' in 1865."* The negative reactions to Manet's 'Olympia' are analyzed in terms of the relation of text and spectator. Neither nude nor prostitute, 'Olympia' cannot be fixed in the discourse on woman and therefore the contemporary critics were forced to attempt to resolve the ambiguity by assigning fixed meanings. VICTOR BURGIN, *"Photography, Fantasy, Fiction."* In still photography, the primary suturing occurs in the identification of the subject with the camera position. Because the camera "freezes" a fragment, the fantasy-fascination with the photograph parallels the fetish. JOHN ELLIS, *"Photography-Pornography-Art-Pornography."* Pornography is no more than "a designation given to a class of representations which is defined by particular ideological currents active in our society." The positions of the Festival of Light, the feminists and the Williams Report are all inadequate because they fail to take into account the central ambiguity of pornography, that is, that it begins to ask "what is desire?" and "what is sexuality?" PM

SCREEN EDUCATION, No. 34 (Spring 1980)

29 Old Compton Street, London W1V 5PL, England. $14 for 4 issues. RICHARD JOHNSON, *"Cultural Studies and Educational Practice."* The pedagogic example will prove to be crucial in mediating between the culturalist and structuralist traditions in England. Johnson includes valuable summaries of the current debate. TONY BENNETT, *"Popular Culture: A 'Teaching Object.'"* Provides an overview of definitions of popular culture from the perspective of their usefulness as points of entry into university-level teaching. FRANCIS MULHERN, *"Notes on Culture and Cultural Struggle."* Argues against an abstract definition of culture that would produce an "idealism that dissolves politics, viewing social transformation as a process in which the cultural struggle for subjectivity is paramount." ANGELA McROBBIE* *"Settling Accounts with Subcultures: A Feminist Critique."* Subculture studies have consistently ignored issues concerning the acculturation of girls: the role of their leisure, fantasy escapes and imaginary solutions, their symbols. SIMON FIRTH, *"Music for Pleasure."* Analysis in media studies has focused on the realist-formalist debate. What has been absent and is crucial for any adequate study of music is a developed concept of leisure. HAZEL CARBY, *"Multi-Culture."* Even multi-culturalist studies, which attempt to redress positively racial questions in education, have a racist bias in that they define blacks as *problems*. DIANA ADLAM, ANGIE SALFELD, *"The Diversion of Language."* A critique of socio-linguistic studies, particularly Rosen's. Plus Stuart Hall and Raymond Williams' *Politics and Letters.* PM

SOCIAL ANARCHISM, 1:1 (Winter 1980)

Atlantic Center for Research and Education, 2743 Maryland Avenue, Baltimore, MD 21218. $3.50 for 2 issues. PEGGY KORNEGGER, *"Invisible Dicators— Social Science Research and Liberal Politics."* A personal account by a politically conscious, anarcho-feminist typist and copy editor at Abt Associates, a multinational consulting firm contracting with government and private institutions to provide "analysis of social problems" and "design, operation and evaluation of social programs and institutions." Specializing in six major areas from "Economics and Environmental Analysis" to "Health Care Systems," the firm's work includes projects on "Social Experimentation and Research," "Education," "Child and Family," and "Law and Justice." The extent of their widespread penetration and influence in American and world politics as a subtle and insidious

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means of social control is heavily documented. DAVID MARSHALL, *"Signs of Power."* This essay, based on a poster that appeared on all public buses in Paris in 1978, is part of a work in progress on the signs and images presented to us by public authorities in Europe and the United States. KINGSLEY WIDMER, *"Anarchism vs. Schoolism: The Influential Case of Paul Goodman."* Rather than directly take up the arguments and problems that deschooling engenders, the primary consideration here is with its libertarian intellectual roots. The emphasis is on the central arguments of Goodman's "new libertarian abolitionism," rather than on his many eccentricities and contradictions. Its newness is described in opposition to the reformist position that in effect seeks to extend formal education and to hope for positive social effects from it. ROBERT MEREDITH, *"Excerpts from Transformations: A Dictionary of Contemporary Changes."* This diary, confession, autobiography and cultural-political analysis by "a man attempting to understand the disease of contemporary Americans. . . offers the record of his personal struggles as representative of the predicament of other white male intellectuals during the 1960s and 1970s." The selections from his dictionary include definitions for such diverse words as "habit," "irony," "law," "pleasure," "property," "should," and "survival." DAN GEORGAKAS, *"Andrew Devon Logbook."* A short story. ELAINE LEEDER, *"Feminism as Anarchist Process."* The intrinsic relation between feminism and anarchism is examined *vis-à-vis* the distinction between the "mosaic process" of feminist groups as compared to the traditional "linear" thinking that has pervaded human interaction in capitalist society. The former is characterized as an organic process; a non-hierarchical, non-competitive, supportive structure, and its obvious relation with anarchism is demonstrated. Personal experiences with "Tiamat," an anarcho-feminist affinity group in Ithaca, New York, and Anarcho-Feminist Conferences are cited as two examples of this process. PFM

THEORY AND SOCIETY, 9:1 (January 1980)

Elsevier Scientific Publishing Co. Inc., 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017. $24.50 per year (6 issues). Special issue on Work and the Working Class. DAVID MATZA, DAVID WELLMAN, *"The Ordeal of Consciousness."* The problem of developing a working class consciousness is related to a country's national history. The workers need to have a collective understanding of their work situation, and this requires self-definition and solidarity. Today's problem, as in the past, is capitalism's ability to change and absorb its opponents. There has been a historical blurring of class boundaries, and the outcome of this has been the rise of an urban class to oppose a suburban class. A synthesis between national-liberation and class struggle is represented in the urban people. CARMEN J. SIRIANNI, *"Workers' Control in the Era of World War I."* A boring historical analysis of the movements for workers' control over production after World War I, discussed on an international level in some detail using a resource mobilization model. Sirianni is careful not to oversimplify or to offer ready solutions to problems such as bureaucracy and integration. DAVID STARK, *"Class Struggle and the Transformation of the Labor Process."* The reorganization of work in the early part of the 20th century is depicted as the result of capital accumulation. The particular form was influenced by state government, emerging occupational groups, and formal and informal organizations. MAGALI SARFATTI-LARSON, *"Proletarianization and Educated Labor."* Alienation is presented as a state relative to one's education. ERIK OLIN WRIGHT *"Class and Occupation."* Argues that class structure cannot be considered a simple typology of occupational categories. Class and occupations are separate dimensions of social structure and should not be collapsed. A formal model is presented to try to show the relation of these two dimensions and the social relations of production as they are connected to the technical division of labor. MICHAEL SCHUDSON, *"A Discussion of Magali Sarfatti-Larson's The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis."* Professions are used to legitimate social inequalities, but Schudson argues that this did not happen until the 1950s, with the increasing importance that was placed then on college education. RER

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